天津大学模板PPT课件

.,1,.,2,目录,1.Introduction2.LiteratureReview3.Model3.1RepairProcessandInventoryPolicy3.2CostStructure3.3InformationStructure3.4ContractTypesandPayoffs3.5SignalingGame4.Benchmark:First-BestUnderCompleteInformation5.SignalingwithVerifiableInventory5.1Resource-BasedContract5.2Performance-BasedContract6.SignalingwithUnverifiableInventory6.1Resource-BasedContract6.2Performance-BasedContract7.Extensions:EfficiencyEnhancementStrategies7.1EndogenizingInventoryVerifiability7.2PoolingInventoryAcrossMultipleBuyers8.Conclusions,.,3,1.Introduction,供货商,买方,产品,PBC,RBC,可靠性私有信息,使用,备用库存,维护,背景介绍,.,4,文献回顾,2.LiteratureReview,PBCforoutsourcedservicesasymmetricinformationinoperationsmanagementtheuseofwarrantiesasasignalingmechanism,.,5,建模,3.Model,3.1RepairProcessandInventoryPolicyN:identicalcopies;B:inventorybackorder;s:inventory;TheexpectedbackordersinsteadystateisAvailabilityisequalto,.,6,建模,3.2CostStructureEachtimeaproductfailureoccurs,thebuyerincursafixedcostr0.ThebuyersexpectedcostisequaltoThevendorsexpectedcostisequalto,.,7,建模,3.3InformationStructureWeassumethattheproductofferedbythevendorisoneoftwopossibletypes,LorH,whereLdenoteslowreliabilityandHdenoteshighreliability.Hazardrateordering（危险率序）:Excesswealthordering（剩余财富序）:,.,8,建模,3.4ContractTypesandPayoffsWecanwritethebuyersexpectedpayoffasThevendorsexpectedpayoffisgivenbyRBC:PBC:,.,9,建模,3.5SignalingGameWeassumethatthevendor,whopossessesprivateinformationaboutthereliabilityofanewlydevelopedproduct,choosescontracttermsandproposesthemtothebuyer.Thebuyerthenacceptsthecontracttermsifhisexpectedpayoffexceedsanoutsideoptionvaluedat.WeseekaperfectBayesianequilibrium(PBE)thatisalsorenegotiation-proof.,.,10,建模,4.Benchmark:First-BestUnderCompleteInformation,Giventhevendortype,thefirst-bestoutcomeisobtainedbysolvingtheoptimizationproblem.,.,11,建模,5.SignalingwithVerifiableInventory,Wenowconsiderthesettinginwhichthevendorpossessesprivateinformationaboutproductreliability.,5.1Resource-BasedContractThevalueofsetbythevendorinhercontractmayrelayinformationaboutwhetherornottheproductisreliable.,.,12,建模,5.1Resource-BasedContract,Insummary,successfulsignalingbythereliablevendorispossibleunderRBCwhenherinventorychoiceisverifiable,butitcomesatacostsincethevendorhastoleavepositivesurplustothebuyer.,.,13,建模,5.2Performance-BasedContract,Therefore,successfulsignalingbythereliablevendorcanbedoneunderbothRBCandPBCwhentheinventoryisverifiable.However,PBCpresentsanadvantagebecauseitsrisksharingmechanismismoreamenabletosignalingthanthatofRBC.,.,14,建模,6.SignalingwithUnverifiableInventory,6.1Resource-BasedContractWithinventorynolongerverifiable,thepayofffunctionsforthevendorandthebuyerunderRBCremainthesameasthoseoftheverifiableinventorycase.Anunderinvestmentininventorycauseseconomicinefficiency.,.,15,建模,6.2Performance-BasedContractThereliablevendoroverinvestsininventoryinequilibrium.Overall,wefindthattheinteractionbetweenthevendorsdiscretionaryinventorychoiceandhersignalingincentivecreatessubtledynamicsthatimpacttherelativeefficiencyofafter-salesservicecontractsinnontrivialways.,.,16,建模,Whichcontracttypewillthereliablevendorprefer?Thus,thereliablevendorfindsthattheabilitytosignalhertypewithPBCmorethancompensatesforthecostassociatedwithoverinvestmentininventoryandanybenefitpresentedbyRBC,whichdoesnotimproveuponapoolingoutcome.,.,17,扩展,7.Extensions:EfficiencyEnhancementStrategies,EndogenizingInventoryVerifiabilityPoolingInventoryAcrossMultipleBuyers,.,18,结论,8.Conclusions,Suggestions:Thekeyt