公司治理和高阶经营团队(ppt 27页).ppt

公司治理與高階經營團隊,ISU企四B策略管理Lecture102009.12.02,公司治理定義,TherelationshipamongstakeholdersthatisusedtodetermineandcontrolthestrategicdirectionandperformanceoforganizationsMechanismsbywhichstakeholdersofacorporationexercisecontrolovercorporateinsidersandmanagementsuchthattheirinterestsareprotected(John&Senbet,1998)使企業體透過法律的制衡管控與設計，在企業所有權與經營權分離的組織體系當中，有效監督其組織活動，以及如何健全其組織運作，防止脫法行為之經營舞弊，以實現企業社會責任之高度目標（OECD）,ImplicationsfromDefinitions(1),Protectwhosinterest?Stakeholder（利害關係人)orShareholder(股東）Whatarethepurposesforboard?IdentifyingwaystoensurethatstrategicdecisionsaremadeeffectivelyReflectingandenforcingthecompanyvaluesEnsuringthattheinterestoftop-levelmanagersarealignedwiththeinterestsoftheshareholders,ImplicationsfromDefinitions(2),SeparationofOwnershipandManagementAgencytheory（代理理論）Managersaretheagentoffirmsowners(principle)ManagerialopportunismThemechanismofaligningtheinterestofmanagersandfirmsownersAgencycost&GovernancemechanismThecontrolroleofdirectorsImperfectmeansofcontrollingmanagerialopportunism,ImplicationsfromDefinitions(3),代理理論代理理論討論的是當主理人（principle）必須委託代理人（agent）執行特定事務時，代理人因為投機主義或自己利益考量，可能與主理人利益發生不一致現象，進而可能造成主理人利益的損失大型現代公司因為所有權與經營權分離，造成經理人員（代理人）與股東（主理人）之間可能存在代理問題，是多數代理理論所討論的代理關係。,ImplicationsfromDefinitions(4),利害關係人利益會受到企業營運所影響的成員內部利害關係人：如股東、員工、管理者、董事會成員外部利害關係人：顧客、供應商、政府、社區、銀行、特定社會大眾確認誰是利害關係人，並且以其重要性，加以管理各國法令保護利害關係人的規定與程度均有所不同,CorporateGovernanceMechanisms:OwnershipConcentration,Large-blockshareholdersOwnatleast5%ofacorporatesharesFamily,Founder,Institution,ManagersOwnershipandMonitoring股權愈分散，監督力愈薄弱，經理人員會愈傾向採取投機行為進行高度非相關多角化盲目擴大企業的規模在職消費股權集中，監督力就比較好嗎？利益收斂觀點V.S.掠奪觀點,CorporateGovernanceMechanisms:OwnershipConcentration,InstitutionalOwners（機構股東，或法人股東）TheactiveroleforinstitutionalownersTheincentivesofinstitutionalownersTheattitudeofinstitutionsintakeoverManagerialOwners（經營權與所有權集中）LinkthemanagerialpaywiththeperformanceofafirmTheattitudeofmanagersinagencytheoryandstewardshiptheory（管家理論）當經營權與所有權集中時，經理人員就好像股東的管家一樣，切實守護公司資產,CorporateGovernanceMechanisms:BoardofDirectors（董事會）,AgroupofelectedindividualsActintheownersinterestsbyformallymonitoringandcontrollingthecorporationsTMTClassificationsofDirectorsInsiders,relatedoutsiders,outsidersThecompositionsofdirectorsTheEffectivenessoftheBoardThecollectivefunctionofboard,董事會特質,Composition（組成）Inside&outsidedirectors,Male&femaleCharacteristics（特徵）Agevariation,BackgrounddiversityProcess（董事會運作過程）Howtheboardisheld?Trust&conflictamongdirectorsStructure（董事會結構）Specialization,formality,centrality,董事會角色,ServiceServiceforStakeholderorshareholderStrategicContributionEstablishtheMajorStrategicDirectionsControlMonitorTMT,CEOsuccession,CEOCompensationBusinessEthicsMaintaintheethicsandCorporateValue,CorporateGovernanceMechanisms:高階經理人薪酬設計,AkindofGovernanceMechanismBasedontheargumentofagencytheorySeekstoaligntheinterestsofmanagersandownersthroughsalaries,bonuses,andlong-termincentivecompensationCompensationcommitteeLevelofpayvarybyregionsDeficitofcompensationbasedonstockorstockoptions,CorporateGovernanceMechanisms:市場治理機制,MarketforCorporateControlTakeover,mergerandacquisitionOftenTriggerbypoorperformanceDeficiencyofexternalcorporatecontrol管理者抵抗惡意收購的技巧Goldenparachute（金色降落傘）Poisonpill（毒藥丸）Greenmail（綠色郵件）,InternationalCorporateGovernance:Germany,NoAgencyProblemTheownerandthemanagerarethesameBankisatthecenter:Monitoring&ControllingTwo-tieredBoardStructureManagementboard:Executivethefunctionofdirection&managementSupervisorytier:Appointmenttothemanagementboard,executedbyunionmembers,employees,InternationalCorporateGovernance:Japan,TheImportanceofObligation,FamilyandConsensusKeiretsu（經連）asasystemofrelationshipinvestments（和台灣的集團企業類似）EmployeeisonememberofthecompanyfamilyConsensusamongTMTorBoardofdirectorsBankplaysimportantroleBank-basedfinancingandmonitoringThechangingofcorporategovernanceinJapan,InternationalCorporateGovernance:America,TheSeparationofOwnershipandManagementTheagencyproblemTheImportantRoleofCEOIndividualismcultureTheCommitteeinBoardofDirectorsTheRestrictedRoleofBankinCorporateGovernance,InternationalCorporateGovernance:Comparison,CorporateGovernanceinTaiwan,TheFamily-ownedstructureThenon-separationofOwnershipandmanagementThemonitoringandcontrollingroleofboardofdirectorsisrestrictedCEOsuccessionisrestrictedonthefamilymembershipTherelationshipamongshareholders,directorsandmanagersisdifferentfromAmericaStewardshiptheoryisusefulornot?,CorporateGovernanceinTaiwan,TheDominanceoftheFamilyinthebusinessistotallydeclinedoriscontingentontheindustrystructure家族不一定在所有的產業當中都吃得開TheindependentdirectorisusefulinTaiwansbusinessenvironmentornotHowtoprotecttheminorshareholdersright（小股東權益）如何透過制度設計，降低大股東（家族）與小股東之間的資訊不對稱程度（informationasymmetry）,理想董事會運作調查（1）,理想董事會運作調查（2）,相關法規看法選任過於浮濫委託書制度弊端太多董事會最需改善之處家族控制專業董事不足委任制度不當無法管制惡意利益輸送董事董事會流於形式,理想董事會運作,提高董事會運作功能方法降低家族對於企業所有權與經營權之干預提高專業董事比例嚴格把關選任董事辦法有效限制董事股權轉讓比例,財政部擬定公司治理方向導入獨立董事、獨立監察人制度制訂公司治理最佳實務準則強化資訊揭露健全公開收購制度制訂證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法,高階經營團隊,高層核心理論高階經營團隊的心理特質價值觀認知基礎高階經營團隊的經驗年資、教育背景、功能背景高階經營團隊特質的歧異程度變異程度愈高，衝突會愈多，但愈有利於創新或是產