处理的内部产权和SEO

2020/6/15,薛爽,1,ManagingInternalEquityandSEO,2020/6/15,2,ChapterObjective,TheequitymanagementperspectiveInternalcapitalmarkettheorySEOinfluenceandarrangementSEOmethodsandParadoxofrightsofferMkteffectofSEOannouncementNewissuespuzzle:long-termperformanceofSEOSomeinterestingresearchesonChineseSEOdiscussions,2020/6/15,3,Theequitymanagementperspective,Principal-agencyproblem:managementprivatebenefitssuchasperksorslackoffSolutions:-dividendsorstockrepurchases-monitoring:colludebetweenauditorandmanagersuchasEnronandArthurAnderson-incentivecompensation,Allsolutionsareimperfect,2020/6/15,4,InternalcapitalMKTtheory,Thetraditionalcapitalbudgetingparadigm-ifaprojectshouldinvest:positiveNPVrule-whattodowhenfacingbudgetinglimitation:selectthesetofferingthehighestTotalNPVLimitationsoftraditionalparadigm-whyiscapitalbudgetlimited?-whoandhowistheforecastofPVmade?-whataretherolesofheadquartersanddivisionmanagers,2020/6/15,5,InternalcapitalMKT(ICM)theory,TheadvantagesofICM-avoidtheinfor.asymmetry-increasedmonitoringincentives-betterassetredeployabilityPeckingordertheory,Internalcapital,Newissueofequity,debt,2020/6/15,6,InternalcapitalMKT(ICM)theory-peckingordertheory,Nowbothcompaniesneednewfundtoinvest.Smithsfinancialmanagerthink:sellstockfor$100pershare?Itsworthatleast$120.Astockissuenowwouldhandafreegifttonewinvestors.Jonessmanagerwithadifferentmood:exportmktsareOKfornow,buthowarewefoingtocompetewiththosenewSiberianranches?Fortunatelythestockpricehasheldupprettywell-wevehadsomegoodshort-runnewsforthepressandanalysts.Nowsthetimetoissuestock!,2020/6/15,7,InternalcapitalMKT(ICM)theory-peckingordertheory,Nowsupposetherearetwopressreleases:-SmithCO.willissue$120mil.of5-yearnotes.-JonesCO.willissue1.2mil.Newsharesandthecompanyexpectstoraise$120mil.,Whatsarationalinvestorlearnfromthis?-SmithsmanagerisoptimisticandJonessispessimistic.-Jonessmanagerisstupidtothinkthatinvestorwouldpay$100.Theattempttosellstockshowsthatitmustbeworthless.,Whatstheresult?-bothwillissuedebt!,SourcesandusesoffundinU.S.non-financialcorporations,2020/6/15,9,InternalcapitalMKT:-withinamultidivisionalfirm,Decentralizedinfor.,DivisionmakebudgetbasedonItsowninfo.,Seniormanagersdeterminethecapitalallocation.,Balancesomewhere,Infor.asymmetry,Meanstocontrolthisproblem:Expostaudit:efficientinamulti-periodmodelExanteaudit:costly,2020/6/15,10,InternalcapitalMKT:-withinamultidivisionalfirm,Divisionalrent-seeking:ScharfsteinandStein(2000)Thecross-subsidization:strongerdivisionssubsidizeweakones:ScharfsteinandStein(2000).ShinandStulz(1998):investmentinagivensegmentofadiversifiedfirmissensitivetoCFofthefirmsothersegmentsandislesssensitivetoitsownCFthanisasingle-segmentfirm.,2020/6/15,11,InternalcapitalMKT,IfexternalfinancingMKTisdeveloped,firmstendtobefocus;otherwise,tendtobediversified.,2020/6/15,12,SEO,Investmentopportunities,Profitabilityofexistingbusiness,IfinternalCFisInsufficient,SEOmayhaveapositivereact,IfSEO,MKTmayhaveanegativereact,2020/6/15,13,SEO,WhatstheinfluenceofSEO?-ownershipstructure-capitalstructure-interestshiftbetweenoldandnewshareholders,2020/6/15,14,SEO,Underwritemethods-Firmcommitment-BesteffortIssuingmethods-traditional-shelfregistration:matchingwithcapitalexpenditures;timingthebestmarketcondition;increasingthebargainingabilitywithunderwriter,Restrictiverequestsforcandidate;Alargenegativemktreaction,2020/6/15,15,SEO,MethodsofSEO-privateplacement;Wruck(1989)issuersaresmaller;arelativelybiggerdiscount;apositiveMKTreaction,Theownershipstructurehypothesis:anticipatechangeofmanagerialperformance,Theinfor.hypothesis:assessmentofinvestmentopportunities,HertzelandSmith(1993),2020/6/15,16,SEO,MethodsofSEO-stockandstockoptiongrant,employeestockownershipplans(ESOP)anddividendreinvestmentplans(DRIPs)-Rightsofferinghaveadeeplynegativemarketreaction-generalpublicoffering,Incentive;+reactionTaxadvantages;+reactionTakeoverdefense:-reaction,2020/6/15,17,MethodsofSEO,U.S.A.-1993-1955:morethan50%firmsselectedrightsoffering.-After1960s,generalpublicofferingdominating;1963-1981,onlylessthan5%firmsselectedrightsoffering-after1982,norightsofferingJapan-before1976,rightsoffering:50%-only6.3%financingthroughrightsofferingInEuropeandAsia:themainfinancingchannel,各国股权再融资方式比较,各国股权再融资方式比较,2020/6/15,19,SEO:thecostofissuing,Adverseselectioncosts:negativemktreactionWarrantstounderwriter:greenshoesoptionUnderwriterspread:apercentageofofferingproceedsfees(rightsoffering)investment,negativereaction;ifearning应配的50%为1,原红旗(2004),假设2:配股宣告期间市场反应,原红旗(2004),2020/6/15,58,假设3:高认购组公司和低认购组公司配股后业绩,原红旗(2004),2020/6/15,59,假设4:不同配股形式组的后续业绩比较,原红旗(2004),2020/6/15,60,假设5:大股东高认购公司和大股东低认购公司配股后长期回报率业绩比较a,原红旗(2004),2020/6/15,61,假设5:大股东不同认购方式下配股后长期回报率业绩比较a,原红旗(2004),2020/6/15,62,结论（1）大股东配股认购率高和低的公司存在一系列显著的差异；（2）大股东的配股决策考虑了企业未来的成长性；（3）市场对大股