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资本结构的影响对加纳上市公司盈利的实证分析外文翻译外文翻译原文THEEFFECTOFCAPITALSTRUCTUREONPROFITABILITYANEMPIRICALANALYSISOFLISTEDFIRMSINGHANASELECTIONMATERIALSOURCETHEJOURNALOFRISKFINANCEVOL6NO5,2005AUTHORJOSHUAABORABSTRACTPURPOSETHISPAPERSEEKSTOINVESTIGATETHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDPROFITABILITYOFLISTEDFIRMSONTHEGHANASTOCKEXCHANGEGSEDURINGAFIVEYEARPERIODDESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACHREGRESSIONANALYSISISUSEDINTHEESTIMATIONOFFUNCTIONSRELATINGTHERETURNONEQUITYROEWITHMEASURESOFCAPITALSTRUCTUREFINDINGSTHERESULTSREVEALASIGNIFICANTLYPOSITIVERELATIONBETWEENTHERATIOOFSHORTTERMDEBTTOTOTALASSETSANDROEHOWEVER,ANEGATIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHERATIOOFLONGTERMDEBTTOTOTALASSETSANDROEWASFOUNDWITHREGARDTOTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTOTALDEBTANDRETURNRATES,THERESULTSSHOWASIGNIFICANTLYPOSITIVEASSOCIATIONBETWEENTHERATIOOFTOTALDEBTTOTOTALASSETSANDRETURNONEQUITYORIGINALITY/VALUETHERESEARCHSUGGESTSTHATPROFITABLEFIRMSDEPENDMOREONDEBTASTHEIRMAINFINANCINGOPTIONINTHEGHANAIANCASE,AHIGHPROPORTION85PERCENTOFTHEDEBTISREPRESENTEDINSHORTTERMDEBTKEYWORDSCAPITALSTRUCTURE,PROFIT,GEARING,GHANAINTRODUCTIONTHECAPITALSTRUCTUREDECISIONISCRUCIALFORANYBUSINESSORGANIZATIONTHEDECISIONISIMPORTANTBECAUSEOFTHENEEDTOIMIZERETURNSTOVARIOUSORGANIZATIONALCONSTITUENCIES,ANDALSOBECAUSEOFTHEIMPACTSUCHADECISIONHASONAFIRMSABILITYTODEALWITHITSCOMPETITIVEENVIRONMENTTHECAPITALSTRUCTUREOFAFIRMISACTUALLYAMIXOFDIFFERENTSECURITIESINGENERAL,AFIRMCANCHOOSEAMONGMANYALTERNATIVECAPITALSTRUCTURESITCANISSUEALARGEAMOUNTOFDEBTORVERYLITTLEDEBTITCANARRANGELEASEFINANCING,USEWARRANTS,ISSUECONVERTIBLEBONDS,SIGNFORWARDCONTRACTSORTRADEBONDSWAPSITCANISSUEDOZENSOFDISTINCTSECURITIESINCOUNTLESSCOMBINATIONSHOWEVER,ITATTEMPTSTOFINDTHEPARTICULARCOMBINATIONTHATIMIZESITSOVERALLMARKETVALUEANUMBEROFTHEORIESHAVEBEENADVANCEDINEXPLAININGTHECAPITALSTRUCTUREOFFIRMSDESPITETHETHEORETICALAPPEALOFCAPITALSTRUCTURE,RESEARCHERSINFINANCIALMANAGEMENTHAVENOTFOUNDTHEOPTIMALCAPITALSTRUCTURETHEBESTTHATACADEMICSANDPRACTITIONERSHAVEBEENABLETOACHIEVEAREPRESCRIPTIONSTHATSATISFYSHORTTERMGOALSFOREXAMPLE,THELACKOFACONSENSUSABOUTWHATWOULDQUALIFYASOPTIMALCAPITALSTRUCTUREHASNECESSITATEDTHENEEDFORTHISRESEARCHABETTERUNDERSTANDINGOFTHEISSUESATHANDREQUIRESALOOKATTHECONCEPTOFCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDITSEFFECTONFIRMPROFITABILITYTHISPAPEREXAMINESTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDPROFITABILITYOFCOMPANIESLISTEDONTHEGHANASTOCKEXCHANGEDURINGTHEPERIOD19982002THEEFFECTOFCAPITALSTRUCTUREONTHEPROFITABILITYOFLISTEDFIRMSINGHANAISASCIENTIFICAREATHATHASNOTYETBEENEXPLOREDINGHANAIANFINANCELITERATURETHEPAPERISORGANIZEDASFOLLOWSTHEFOLLOWINGSECTIONGIVESAREVIEWOFTHEEXTANTLITERATUREONTHESUBJECTTHENEXTSECTIONDESCRIBESTHEDATAANDJUSTIFIESTHECHOICEOFTHEVARIABLESUSEDINTHEANALYSISTHEMODELUSEDINTHEANALYSISISTHENESTIMATEDTHESUBSEQUENTSECTIONPRESENTSANDDISCUSSESTHERESULTSOFTHEEMPIRICALANALYSISFINALLY,THELASTSECTIONSUMMARIZESTHEFINDINGSOFTHERESEARCHANDALSOCONCLUDESTHEDISCUSSIONLITERATUREONCAPITALSTRUCTURETHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDFIRMVALUEHASBEENTHESUBJECTOFCONSIDERABLEDEBATETHROUGHOUTTHELITERATURE,DEBATEHASCENTEREDONWHETHERTHEREISANOPTIMALCAPITALSTRUCTUREFORANINDIVIDUALFIRMORWHETHERTHEPROPORTIONOFDEBTUSAGEISIRRELEVANTTOTHEINDIVIDUALFIRMSVALUETHECAPITALSTRUCTUREOFAFIRMCONCERNSTHEMIXOFDEBTANDEQUITYTHEFIRMUSESINITSOPERATIONBREALEYANDMYERS2003CONTENDTHATTHECHOICEOFCAPITALSTRUCTUREISFUNDAMENTALLYAMARKETINGPROBLEMTHEYSTATETHATTHEFIRMCANISSUEDOZENSOFDISTINCTSECURITIESINCOUNTLESSCOMBINATIONS,BUTITATTEMPTSTOFINDTHEPARTICULARCOMBINATIONTHATIMIZESMARKETVALUEACCORDINGTOWESTONANDBRIGHAM1992,THEOPTIMALCAPITALSTRUCTUREISTHEONETHATIMIZESTHEMARKETVALUEOFTHEFIRMSOUTSTANDINGSHARESTHESEMINALWORKBYMODIGLIANIANDMILLER1958INCAPITALSTRUCTUREPROVIDEDASUBSTANTIALBOOSTINTHEDEVELOPMENTOFTHETHEORETICALFRAMEWORKWITHINWHICHVARIOUSTHEORIESWEREABOUTTOEMERGEINTHEFUTUREMODIGLIANIANDMILLER1958CONCLUDEDTOTHEBROADLYKNOWNTHEORYOF“CAPITALSTRUCTUREIRRELEVANCE”WHEREFINANCIALLEVERAGEDOESNOTAFFECTTHEFIRMSMARKETVALUEHOWEVERTHEIRTHEORYWASBASEDONVERYRESTRICTIVEASSUMPTIONSTHATDONOTHOLDINTHEREALWORLDTHESEASSUMPTIONSINCLUDEPERFECTCAPITALMARKETS,HOMOGENOUSEXPECTATIONS,NOTAXES,ANDNOTRANSACTIONCOSTSTHEPRESENCEOFBANKRUPTCYCOSTSANDFAVORABLETAXTREATMENTOFINTERESTPAYMENTSLEADTOTHENOTIONOFAN“OPTIMAL”CAPITALSTRUCTUREWHICHIMIZESTHEVALUEOFTHEFIRM,ORRESPECTIVELYMINIMIZESITSTOTALCOSTOFCAPITALMODIGLIANIANDMILLER1963REVIEWEDTHEIREARLIERPOSITIONBYINCORPORATINGTAXBENEFITSASDETERMINANTSOFTHECAPITALSTRUCTUREOFFIRMSTHEKEYFEATUREOFTAXATIONISTHATINTERESTISATAXDEDUCTIBLEEXPENSEAFIRMTHATPAYSTAXESRECEIVESAPARTIALLYOFFSETTINGINTEREST“TAXSHIELD”INTHEFORMOFLOWERTAXESPAIDTHEREFORE,ASMODIGLIANIANDMILLER1963PROPOSE,FIRMSSHOULDUSEASMUCHDEBTCAPITALASPOSSIBLEINORDERTOIMIZETHEIRVALUEALONGWITHCORPORATETAXATION,RESEARCHERSWEREALSOINTERESTEDINANALYZINGTHECASEOFPERSONALTAXESIMPOSEDONINDIVIDUALSMILLER1977,BASEDONTHETAXLEGISLATIONOFTHEUSA,DISCERNSTHREETAXRATESTHATDETERMINETHETOTALVALUEOFTHEFIRMTHESEARE1THECORPORATETAXRATE2THETAXRATEIMPOSEDONTHEINCOMEOFTHEDIVIDENDS3THETAXRATEIMPOSEDONTHEINCOMEOFINTERESTINFLOWSACCORDINGTOMILLER1977,THEVALUEOFTHEFIRMDEPENDSONTHERELATIVELEVELOFEACHTAXRATE,COMPAREDWITHTHEOTHERTWOOTHERTHEORIESTHATHAVEBEENADVANCEDTOEXPLAINTHECAPITALSTRUCTUREOFFIRMSINCLUDEBANKRUPTCYCOST,AGENCYTHEORY,ANDTHEPECKINGORDERTHEORYTHESETHEORIESAREDISCUSSEDINTURNBANKRUPTCYCOSTSARETHECOSTDIRECTLYINCURREDWHENTHEPERCEIVEDPROBABILITYTHATTHEFIRMWILLDEFAULTONFINANCINGISGREATERTHANZEROTHEBANKRUPTCYPROBABILITYINCREASESWITHDEBTLEVELSINCEITINCREASESTHEFEARTHATTHECOMPANYMIGHTNOTBEABLETOGENERATEPROFITSTOPAYBACKTHEINTERESTANDTHELOANSTHEPOTENTIALCOSTSOFBANKRUPTCYMAYBEBOTHDIRECTANDINDIRECTEXAMPLESOFDIRECTBANKRUPTCYCOSTSARETHELEGALANDADMINISTRATIVECOSTSINTHEBANKRUPTCYPROCESSEXAMPLESOFINDIRECTBANKRUPTCYCOSTSARETHELOSSINPROFITSINCURREDBYTHEFIRMASARESULTOFTHEUNWILLINGNESSOFSTAKEHOLDERSTODOBUSINESSWITHTHEMTITMAN,1984THEUSEOFDEBTINCAPITALSTRUCTUREOFTHEFIRMALSOLEADSTOAGENCYCOSTSAGENCYCOSTSARISEASARESULTOFTHERELATIONSHIPSBETWEENSHAREHOLDERSANDMANAGERSANDTHOSEBETWEENDEBTHOLDERSANDSHAREHOLDERSJENSENANDMECKLING,1976THENEEDTOBALANCEGAINSANDCOSTSOFDEBTFINANCINGEMERGEDASATHEORYKNOWNASTHESTATICTRADEOFFTHEORYBYMYERS1984ITVALUESTHECOMPANYASTHEVALUEOFTHEFIRMIFUNLEVEREDPLUSTHEPRESENTVALUEOFTHETAXSHIELDMINUSTHEPRESENTVALUEOFBANKRUPTCYANDAGENCYCOSTSTHECONCEPTOFOPTIMALCAPITALSTRUCTUREISALSOEXPRESSEDBYMYERS1984ANDMYERSANDMAJLUF1984,BASEDONTHENOTIONOFASYMMETRICINFORMATIONTHEEXISTENCEOFINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESBETWEENTHEFIRMANDLIKELYFINANCEPROVIDERSCAUSESTHERELATIVECOSTSOFFINANCETOVARYBETWEENTHEDIFFERENTSOURCESOFFINANCEFORINSTANCE,ANINTERNALSOURCEOFFINANCEWHERETHEFUNDSPROVIDERISTHEFIRMWILLHAVEMOREINFORMATIONABOUTTHEFIRMTHANNEWEQUITYHOLDERSTHUS,THESENEWEQUITYHOLDERSWILLEXPECTAHIGHERRATEOFRETURNONTHEIRINVESTMENTSTHISMEANSTHATITWILLCOSTTHEFIRMMORETOISSUEFRESHEQUITYSHARESTHANUSINGINTERNALFUNDSSIMILARLY,THISARGUMENTCOULDBEPROVIDEDBETWEENINTERNALFINANCEANDNEWDEBTHOLDERSTHECONCLUSIONDRAWNFROMTHEASYMMETRICINFORMATIONTHEORIESISTHATTHEREISAHIERARCHYOFFIRMPREFERENCESWITHRESPECTTOTHEFINANCINGOFTHEIRINVESTMENTSMYERSANDMAJLUF,1984THIS“PECKINGORDER”THEORYSUGGESTSTHATFIRMSWILLINITIALLYRELYONINTERNALLYGENERATEDFUNDS,IEUNDISTRIBUTEDEARNINGS,WHERETHEREISNOEXISTENCEOFINFORMATIONASYMMETRY,ANDTHENTHEYWILLTURNTODEBTIFADDITIONALFUNDSARENEEDEDANDFINALLYTHEYWILLISSUEEQUITYTOCOVERANYREMAININGCAPITALREQUIREMENTSTHEORDEROFPREFERENCESREFLECTSTHERELATIVECOSTSOFVARIOUSFINANCINGOPTIONSTHEPECKINGORDERHYPOTHESISSUGGESTSTHATFIRMSAREWILLINGTOSELLEQUITYWHENTHEMARKETOVERVALUESITMYERS,1984CHITTENDENETAL,1996THISISBASEDONTHEASSUMPTIONTHATMANAGERSACTINFAVOROFTHEINTERESTOFEXISTINGSHAREHOLDERSASACONSEQUENCE,THEYREFUSETOISSUEUNDERVALUEDSHARESUNLESSTHEVALUETRANSFERFROM“OLD”TONEWSHAREHOLDERSISMORETHANOFFSETBYTHENETPRESENTVALUEOFTHEGROWTHOPPORTUNITYTHISLEADSTOTHECONCLUSIONTHATNEWSHARESWILLONLYBEISSUEDATAHIGHERPRICETHANTHATIMPOSEDBYTHEREALMARKETVALUEOFTHEFIRMTHEREFORE,INVESTORSINTERPRETTHEISSUANCEOFEQUITYBYAFIRMASSIGNALOFOVERPRICINGIFEXTERNALFINANCINGISUNAVOIDABLE,THEFIRMWILLOPTFORSECUREDDEBTASOPPOSEDTORISKYDEBTANDFIRMSWILLONLYISSUECOMMONSTOCKSASALASTRESORTMYERSANDMAJLUF1984,MAINTAINTHATFIRMSWOULDPREFERINTERNALSOURCESTOCOSTLYEXTERNALFINANCETHUS,ACCORDINGTOTHEPECKINGORDERHYPOTHESIS,FIRMSTHATAREPROFITABLEANDTHEREFOREGENERATEHIGHEARNINGSAREEXPECTEDTOUSELESSDEBTCAPITALTHANTHOSETHATDONOTGENERATEHIGHEARNINGSSEVERALRESEARCHERSHAVETESTEDTHEEFFECTSOFPROFITABILITYONFIRMLEVERAGEFRIENDANDLANG1988ANDKESTER1986FINDASIGNIFICANTLYNEGATIVERELATIONBETWEENPROFITABILITYANDDEBT/ASSETRATIOSRAJANANDZINGALES1995ANDWALD1999ALSOCONFIRMASIGNIFICANTLYNEGATIVECORRELATIONBETWEENPROFITABILITYANDLEVERAGEFAMAANDFRENCH1998,ANALYZINGTHERELATIONSHIPAMONGTAXES,FINANCINGDECISIONS,ANDTHEFIRMSVALUE,CONCLUDEDTHATTHEDEBTDOESNOTCONCEDETAXBENEFITSBESIDES,THEHIGHLEVERAGEDEGREEGENERATESAGENCYPROBLEMSAMONGSHAREHOLDERSANDCREDITORSTHATPREDICTNEGATIVERELATIONSHIPSBETWEENLEVERAGEANDPROFITABILITYTHEREFORE,NEGATIVEINFORMATIONRELATINGDEBTANDPROFITABILITYOBSCURESTHETAXBENEFITOFTHEDEBTBOOTHETAL2001DEVELOPEDASTUDYATTEMPTINGTORELATETHECAPITALSTRUCTUREOFSEVERALCOMPANIESINCOUNTRIESWITHEXTREMELYDIFFERENTFINANCIALMARKETSTHEYCONCLUDEDTHATTHEVARIABLESTHATAFFECTTHECHOICEOFTHECAPITALSTRUCTUREOFTHECOMPANIESARESIMILAR,INSPITEOFTHEGREATDIFFERENCESPRESENTEDBYTHEFINANCIALMARKETSBESIDES,THEYCONCLUDEDTHATPROFITABILITYHASANINVERSERELATIONSHIPWITHDEBTLEVELANDSIZEOFTHEFIRMGRAHAM2000CONCLUDEDINHISWORKTHATBIGANDPROFITABLECOMPANIESPRESENTALOWDEBTRATEMESQUITAANDLARA2003FOUNDINTHEIRSTUDYTHATTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENRATESOFRETURNANDDEBTINDICATESANEGATIVERELATIONSHIPFORLONGTERMFINANCINGHOWEVER,THEYFOUNDAPOSITIVERELATIONSHIPFORSHORTTERMFINANCINGANDEQUITYHADLOCKANDJAMES2002CONCLUDEDTHATCOMPANIESPREFERLOANDEBTFINANCINGBECAUSETHEYANTICIPATEAHIGHERRETURNTAUB1975ALSOFOUNDSIGNIFICANTPOSITIVECOEFFICIENTSFORFOURMEASURESOFPROFITABILITYINAREGRESSIONOFTHESEMEASURESAGAINSTDEBTRATIOPETERSENANDRAJAN1994IDENTIFIEDTHESAMEASSOCIATION,BUTFORINDUSTRIESBAKER1973,WHOWORKEDWITHASIMULTANEOUSEQUATIONSMODELANDNERLOVE1968ALSOFOUNDTHESAMETYPEOFASSOCIATIONFORINDUSTRIESRODENANDLEWELLEN1995FOUNDASIGNIFICANTPOSITIVEASSOCIATIONBETWEENPROFITABILITYANDTOTALDEBTASAPERCE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