英语安全工程专业翻译

1、Unit1Safety Management Systems 1. Accident Causation ModelsThe most important aim of safety management is to maintain and promote workers' health and safety at work. Understanding why and how accidents and other unwanted events develop is important when preventive activities are planned. Acciden

2、t theories aim to clarify the accident phenomena，and to explain the mechanisms that lead to accidents. All modem theories are based on accident causation models which try to explain the sequence of events that finally produce the loss. In ancient times, accidents were seen as an act of God and very

3、little could be done to prevent them. In the beginning of the 20th century ， it was believed that the poor physical conditions are the root causes of accidents. Safety practitioners concentrated on improving machine guarding, housekeeping and inspections. In most cases an accident is the result of t

4、wo things ： The human act, and the condition of the physical or social environmentPetersen extended the causation theory from the individual acts and local conditions to the managementsystem. He concluded that unsafe acts, unsafe conditions ， and accidents are all symptoms of something wrong in the

5、organizational management system. Furthermore, he stated that it is the top management who is responsible for building up such a system that caneffectivelycontrol the hazards associated to the organization soroperation. The errors done by a single person can be intentional unintentional. Rasmussen a

6、nd Jensen have presented a three-level skill-rule-knowledge model for describing the origins of the differenttypes of humanerrors.Nowadays， this model is one of the standard methodsin the examination of human errors at work.Accident-proneness models suggest that some people are more likely tosuffer

7、anaccident than others. The first model was created in 1919 ， based on statistical examinations in a mumilions factory. This model dominatedthe safety thinking and research for almost 50 years, and it is still used in some organizations. As a result of this thinking, accident was blamedsolely on emp

8、loyees rather than the work process or poor management practices. Since investigations to discover the underlying causal factors were felt unnecessary and/or too costly, a little attention was paid tohow accidents actually happened. Employees* attitudes towards risks andrisk taking have been studied

9、, e. g. by Sulzer-Azaroff. According to her, employees often behave unsafely, even whenthey are fully aware of the risks involved. Many research results also show that the traditional promotion methods like campaigns, posters and safety slogans have seldom increasedthe use of safe work practices. Wh

10、en backed up by other activities suchas training, these measures have been somewhat more effective. Experiences on some successful methods to change employee behavior and attitudes have been reported. One well-known method is a small-group process used forimproving housekeeping in industrial workpla

11、ces. A comprehensive model ofaccident causation has been presented by Reason who introduced the concept of organizational error. He stated that corporate culture is the starting-point of the accident sequence. Local conditions and human behavior are only contributing factors in the build-up of the u

12、ndesired event. The latent organizational failures lead to accidents and incidents when penetrating system s defenses and barriers. Gmoeneweghas developed Reason s model by classifying the typical latent error types. His TRIPOD mode! calls the different errors as General Failure Types ( CFTs). The c

13、oncept of organizational error is in conjunction with the fact that some organizations behave more safely than others. It is often said that these organizations have good safety culture. After the Chernobyl accident，this term became well-known also to the public.Loss prevention is a concept that is

14、often used in the context of hazard control in process industry. Lees has pointed out that loss prevention differs from traditional safety approach in several ways. For example, there is more emphasis on foreseeing hazards and taking actions before accidents occur. Also, there is more emphasis on a

15、systematic rather than a trial and error approach. This is also natural, since accidents in process industry can have catastrophic consequences. Besides the injuries to people, I he damageto plant and loss of profit are major concerns in loss prevention.The future research on the ultimate causes of

16、accidents seems to focus on the functioning and management of the organization. The strategic management, leadership, motivation, and the personnel's visible and hidden values are some issues that are now under intensive study.2. Safety Management as an Organizational ActivitySafety management i

17、s one of the management activities of a company. Different companies have different managementpractices ， and also different ways to control health and safety hazards. Organizational culture is a major component affecting organizational performance and behavior. One comprehensive definition for an o

18、rganizational culture has been presented by Schein who has said that organizational culture is “ a pattern of basic assumptions invented ， discovered, or developed by a given group as it leans to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be

19、 considered valid and, therefore,to be taught to new membersas the correct way to perceive, think,and feel in relation to those problems". The concept of safety culture istoday under intensive study in industrialized countries. Booth & Lee have stated that an organization's safety cultu

20、re is a subset of the overall organizational culture. This argument, in fact, suggests that a company s organizational culture also determines the maximum level of safety the company can reach. The safety culture of an organization is the productof individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions

21、, competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization s health and saf ety management.Furthermore, organizations with a positive safety culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of

22、 the importance of safety, and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures. There have been many attempts to develop methodsfor measuring safety culture. Williamson el al. have summarized some of the factors that the various studies have shown to influence organization's safety culture.

23、 These include ： organizational responsibility for safety, managementattitudes towards safety, managementactivity in responding tohealth and safety problems, safety training and promotion， level of riskat the workplace ， workers' involvement in safety ， and status of the safety officer and the s

24、afety committee.Organizations behave differently in the different parts of the world. This causes visible differences also in safety activities, both in employeelevel and in the management level. Reasons for these differences are discussed in the following. The studies of Wobbe reveal that shop-floo

25、rworkers in the USA are, in general, less trained and less adaptable thanthose in Germany or Japan. Wobbe claims that one reason for this is that,in the USA, companies providing further training for their staff can expectto lose these people to the competitors. This is not so common in Europeor in J

26、apan. Furthermore ， for unionized companies in the USA ， seniorityis valued very highly ， while training or individual s skills and qualifications do not effect job security ， employment, and wagelevels very much. Oxenburgh has studied the total costs of absence from work, and found that local cultu

27、re and legislation has a strong effect on absenteeism rates. For example, the national systems for paying and receiving compensationexplain the differences to some extent. Oxenburgh mentions Swedenas a high absenteeism country, and Australia as a low absenteeism country. In Sweden injuries and illne

28、sses are paid by the state social security system, while in Australia, the employer pays all these costs, including illnesses notrelated to work. Comparison of accident statistics reveals that there are great national differences in accident frequencies and in the accidentrelated absenteeism from wo

29、rk. Some of the differences can be explainedby the different accident reporting systems. For example, in somecountriesonly absenteeism lasting more than three working days is included in thestatistics. The frequency of minor accidents varies a lot according to the possibility to arrange substitutive

30、 work to the injured worker. Placingthe injured worker to another job or to training is a common practice forexample in the USAand in the UK, while in the Scandinavian countries this is a rarely used procedureSome organizations are more aware of the importance of health and safetyat work than others

31、. Clear development stages can be found in the processof improving the management of safety. Waring has divided organizations to three classes according to their maturity and ability to create aneffective safety managementsystem. Waring calls the three organizational models as the mechanical model,

32、the socio-technical model, and the human activity system approach. In the mechanical model, the structures and processes of an organization are well-defined and logical, but people as individuals, groups, and the whole organizations are not considered. The socio-technical model is an approach to wor

33、k design which recognizes the interaction of technology' and people ， and which produces work systems that are technically effective and have characters that lead to high job satisfaction. A positive dimension in this model is that human factors are seen important, for example, in communication,

34、 training and emergency responses. The last model, the human activity system approach focuses on people, and points out the complexity of organizations. The strength ofthis approach is that both formal (or technical) paradigms and humanaspects like motivation, learning, culture, and power relations

35、are considered.Waring points out that although the human activity approach does not automaticallyguarantee success, it has proven to be beneficial toorganizations in the long run.3. Safety Policy and PlanningA status review is the basis for a safety policy and the planning of safety activities. Acco

36、rding to BS 8800 a status review should compare the company s existing arrangements with the applicable legal requirements,organization'scurrent safety guidelines, best practicesin theindustry s branch ， and the existing resources directed to safety activities.A thorough review ensures that the

37、safety policy and theactivitiesare developed specificallyaccording to the needs of thecompany.A safety policy is the management s expression of the direction to be followed in the organization. According to Petersen, a safety policy should commit the management at all levels and it should indicate w

38、hich tasks, responsibilities and decisions are left to lower-level management. Booth and Lee have stated that a safety policy should also include safety goals as well as quantified objectives and priorities. The standard BS 8800 suggests that in the safety policy ， management should show commitment

39、to the following subjects ： Health and safety are recognized as an integral part of business performance ； A high level of health and safety performance is a goal which is achieved by using the legal requirements as the minimum, and where the continual cost- effective improvement of performance is t

40、he way to do things ；Adequate and appropriate resources are provided to implement the safety policy ；The health and safety objectives are set and published at least by internal notification ； The managementof health and safety is a prime responsibility of the management ， from the most senior execut

41、ive to the supervisory level The policy is understood, implemented, and maintained at all levels in the organization ； Employees are involved and consulted in order to gain commitment to the policy and its implementation;The policy and the management system are reviewed periodically, and the complia

42、nce of the policy is audited on a regular basis;It is ensured that employees receive appropriate training ， and are competent to carry out their duties and responsibilities.Somecompanies have developed so-called “ safety principles which cover the key areas of the company s safety policy. These prin

43、ciples are utilized as safety guidelines hat are easy to remember, and which are often placed on wall-boards and other public areas in the company. As an example, the DuPont company's safety principles are the following： All injuries andoccupational illnesses can be prevented. Management is resp

44、onsible forsafely. Safety is an individual s responsibility and a condition of employment. Training is an essential element for safe workplaces. Audits must be conducted. All deficiencies must be corrected promptly.It is essential to investigate all injuries and incidents with injury potential. Off-

45、the-job safety is an important part of the safety effort. It is good business to prevent injuries and illnesses.People are the most important element of the safety and occupational health program.The safety policy should be put into practice through careful planning ofthe safety activities. Planning

46、 means determination of the safety objectives and priorities, and preparation of the working program to achieve the goals. A company can have different objectives and priorities according to the nature of the typical hazards, and the current status of hazard control. However, somecommonelements to a

47、 safety activity planning can be found. According to BS 8800， the plan should include ： appropriate and adequately resourced arrangements, competent personnel who have defined responsibilities, and effective channels of communication；procedures to set objectives, device and implement plans to meet t

48、he objectives ,and to monitor both the implementation and effectiveness of the plans;description of the hazard identification and assessment activities;methods and techniques for measuring safety performance, and in such way that absence of hazardous events is not seen as evidence that all is well.

49、In the Member States of the European Union, the “ framework” Directive 89/391 / EECobligates the employer to prepare a safety program that defines how the effects of technology, work methods, working conditions, social relationships and work environment are controlled. According lo Walters, this dir

50、ective was originally passed to harmonize the overall safety strategies within the Member States, and to establish a common approach to the managementand organization of safety at work. Planning of the safety activities is often done within the framework of quality and environmentalmanagement system

51、s.一单元安全管理体系1、事故致因模型安全管理的最重要的目的是维护和促进工人的健康和安全工作。了解为什么和怎样事故和其他有害事件的发展是非常重要的计划预防活动时。事故理论旨在澄清事故现象，并解释说，导致事故发生的机制。所有现代的理论都是基于事故致因模型而试图解释，最后产生损失的事件序列。在古代，意外被视为上帝的行为，很少可以做，以防止他们。在20 世纪初，它被认为体质较差的条件是事故的根源。安全从业人员集中于提高机器防护，家务和检查。在大多数情况下，发生事故的是两件事情的结果是：人的行为，而物理或社会环境的条件。彼得森延长了因果关系理论从个体行为，因地制宜的管理体制。他的结论是不安全行为，不安

52、全状态，事故是一些错误的组织管理系统的所有症状。此外，他指出，这是高层管理谁负责建立这样一个能够有效控制关联到组织的运作风险系统。由一个人完成的错误可能是有意的还是无意的。拉斯穆森和Jensen 已经提出了三个层次的技能规则知识模型描述了不同类型的人为错误的起源。如今，这种模式是在人为的失误，在工作中检验的标准方法之一。事故倾向性模型表明，有些人更容易患anaccident 比其他人。第一种模式是在 1919 年的基础上，在mumilions 工厂的统计检验。这种模式占主导地位的安全思考和研究了近50 年，它仍然在一些组织使用。由于这种思维的结果，事故是完全归咎于员工，而不是工作过程或管理不善

53、。由于调查，以发现潜在的偶然因素被认为不必要和/或成本太高，有点注意了事故如何实际发生。* 员工态度对风险和承担风险进行了研究，电子。克由苏尔寿- Azaroff 。据她介绍，员工往往不安全的行为，即使他们完全了解所涉及的风险。许多研究结果还表明，传统的促销方法，如宣传活动，海报和安全标语很少增加了使用的安全工作实践。当其他活动，如培训备份，这些措施已较为有效。已经报道了一些成功的方法来改变员工的行为和态度的体验。一个众所周知的方法是用于改善管家在工业场所一个小团体的过程。事故原因的综合模型已经提出了理性谁介绍组织错误的概念。他说，企业文化是企业的出发点事故序列。当地的条件和人类行为的唯一起作

54、用的因素在集结了不需要的事件。穿透系统的防御和障碍时，潜伏组织失灵导致事故和事故征候。Gmoeneweg已通过分类典型的潜在错误类型发展原因的模型。他的三脚架模式！调用不同的错误，一般故障类型 （ CFTS） 。 组织错误的概念是与事实有些组织表现比其他人更放心地结合。人们常常说，这些组织具有良好的安全文化。切尔诺贝利事故发生后，这个词成为知名的也给公众。防损是一个经常在过程工业危险源监控的情况下使用的一个概念。酒糟指出，防损不同于传统的安全方法在几个方面。例如，更强调预见的危害，并采取行动，事故发生之前。此外，还有更强调系统性，而?不是一个试错的方法。这也是自然的，因为在过程工业事故可能产生

55、灾难性的后果。除了受伤的人，我他破坏种植和利润损失是损失预防重大关切。对事故的根本原因，未来的研究似乎集中在组织的运作和管理。战略管理，领导，激励，以及人员的可见和隐藏的价值观有些问题是现在正在深入研究。2、安全管理作为组织活动安全管理是一个公司的管理活动之一。不同的企业有不同的管理方式，也不同的方式来控制健康和安全隐患。组织文化是影响组织绩效和行为的重要组成部分。对于组织文化的一个全面的定义已经提出了施恩谁曾表示，组织文化是“的格局基本假设，发明，发现，或由某一组开发，因为它偏向应对外部适应和内部整合的问题- 这一直运作良好，足以被认为是有效的，因此，要教给新成员的感知，思考和感觉有关这些问

56、题的正确方式。 “安全文化的概念如今正在工业化的深入研究国家展位和李都表示，一个组织的安全文化是整个组织文化的一个子集。这种说法，其实表明，一个公司的组织文化也决定了安全的最高水平，公司可以达到。的安全文化组织是个人和群体的价值观，态度，观念，能力和行为模式的确定承诺的产品和风格，以及一个组织的健康和安全管理水平。此外，以积极的安全文化机构的特点通过建立在相互信任，通过安全的重要性共享的观念沟通，并通过信心的预防措施的有效性。已经有许多尝试开发用于测量安全文化的方法。威廉姆森EL AL。总结了一些的因素各种研究表明，影响企业的安全文化，其中包括：用于对在应对健康和安全问题，安全培训和推广，风险

57、的工作场所层面，在工人参与安全，管理活动的安全，管理态度的组织责任安全，安全主任和安全委员会的地位。组织的行为不同，在世界的不同部分。这将导致明显的差异也是安全的活动，无论是在员工水平和管理水平。这些差异的原因将在下面讨论。沃伯的研究表明，车间工人在美国，一般来说，少训练，比德国或日本较难适应。沃伯声称，一个原因是，在美国，企业提供进?一步的培训，他们的工作人员可以指望这些人失去了竞争对手。这是不是很常见于欧洲或日本。此外，对于工会组织的企业，在美国，排名先后乃非常重视，而训练或个人的技能和资历不影响工作保障，就业和工资水平非常。Oxenburgh 已经研究没有从工作的总成本，并发现当地的文化

58、和法律对缺勤率有很大的影响。例如，国家系统支付和接收补偿解释这些差异在一定程度上。Oxenburgh 提到瑞典的高缺勤率的国家，澳大利亚作为一个低旷工国家。在瑞典，伤害和疾病都是由国家社会保障体系支付，而在澳洲，雇主支付所有这些费用，包括与工作无关的疾病。事故统计数据比较表明，有在事故频率和从工作中意外缺勤伟大的民族差异。有些分歧可以通过不同的事故报告系统来解释。例如，在有些国家只缺勤持续超过三个工作日被统计在内。小事故的频率根据安排替代性的工作，受伤工人的可能性是十分不同的。配售受伤工人到另一份工作或培训，例如在美国和英国的普遍做法，而在斯堪的纳维亚国家，这是一个很少使用的程序。有些组织更加意识到健康和安全的工作比其他人的重要性。清晰的发展阶段，可以在提高安全性的管理过程中被发现。华林划分了组织三类根据其成熟度，并建立一个有效的安全管理制度的能力。华林调用三种组织模式的力学模型，社会和技?术模式，以及人类活动的系统方法。在力学模型，一个组织的结构和流程都明确定义和逻辑，但人们作为个体，群体和整个组织都没有考虑。社会和技术模式，是设计工作，其中确认技术“和人互动，并产生了在技