商学院2011级acca金融工具相关会计功能扩展研究5月19日改

1、专业：会计学学生指导老师摘要济2008度改专业：会计学学生指导老师摘要济2008度改StudyonthefunctionlinstrumentsaccountingMajor: Student:Lihis yse some historic economic ch as Credit Crisis,Asian l Crisis as well StudyonthefunctionlinstrumentsaccountingMajor: Student:Lihis yse some historic economic ch as Credit Crisis,Asian l Crisis as w

2、ell as Enron Scandal,including outbreaks,and synchronous reform oflregulation and accounting t the initial accounting standard of simple information reflection has improved towards risk reflection and control.And the accounting group has also developed from a self-discipline coordinatethemulti-aniza

3、tion to a group of l t Secondly,based on present domestic ernational economic situations the development of capital market,we t the global economy has o new stage of slow recovery from the subprime crisis in 2008. The structure of capital market also needs to be further reformed.With reference to th

4、e experience of economic recovery,we regard this opportunity as the key to conduct reform l regulation andaccounting The key of this thesis is yse the difference n accountingstandardsand conceptsof l regulation.Therefore wefind out the difference and synergism in them.Then we discuss the feasibility

5、 and urgency of the divergence and he sight of its basic stakeholders.Meanwhile we cite relevant part of New Basel Accord which has contributions lay and coordination betn finanofyse it.We mend to conduct a l regulation and accounting standard from Finally,wet resent economicenvironment and capital

6、situation,it is feasible to conduct divergence and coordination work n lregulation and accounting standard .And we need to accelerate the speed to tackle l Accounting目录导研究目的及意国内外相关研究情国外相关研究情国内相关研究情思路及结2.2.1中的发律建设阶.亚洲会计开始发目录导研究目的及意国内外相关研究情国外相关研究情国内相关研究情思路及结2.2.1中的发律建设阶.亚洲会计开始发2.1.3事件会计自律时代结世界金融环境现我国金

7、融环境的政策改变及趋3差异及协同分3.1要求差异分3.1.1目标差3.2.1概念理解差3.2差异可协调设定有共同理论基的基础之趋势要求信息处理趋利益相关者对信息的需4金与会计准则功能协同及延展研最低资本要求问4.1.2 监督部门及市场纪律问4.2与会计准则功能协同及延展进一步研究VaR的延5.结参考文致1.1 研究目的及意体现出的社会价值随着资本市场的变化而不断发展改变中。在 2008 年爆发1.2 国内1.1 研究目的及意体现出的社会价值随着资本市场的变化而不断发展改变中。在 2008 年爆发1.2 国内外相关研究情1.2.1 国外的学者重点对金融工具相关的会计准则做出研究。和风险大小进行分

8、析；JohnGoodwin（2008）itz(2011下1.2.2 为；思路及结20081.2.2 为；思路及结2008改2008 现今国内外经济发展会计准则与金融会计准则与金融的差异协同的必要性的金融与会计准则功能协同及延展现有2 2.1 会计准则在历史金中的发2020及的的2008 现今国内外经济发展会计准则与金融会计准则与金融的差异协同的必要性的金融与会计准则功能协同及延展现有2 2.1 会计准则在历史金中的发2020及的的19291024，。这就是在这个危难时期，19333就、及15结论：会计准则和金融 差异协同工作可行且需要加快进一步的协历史经济 中金融 与会计准则化的阶段：1934

9、207090的另一个重，有条件涉化的阶段：1934207090的另一个重，有条件涉3100600和19912.1.3 2090，也就是这一场大范围经实质性促进了亚1997、演的角色进行分析，199812，ZubaidurRahman、90或要谈及金融对于会计的匹配差异和，一定要提及的就是在2001Adelphia、 、Qwest宗700颁或要谈及金融对于会计的匹配差异和，一定要提及的就是在2001Adelphia、 、Qwest宗700颁2.2 现今金融工具相关经济环2.2.1 世界金融环境2008，2008爆又2.2.2 我国金融环境的政策改变及场，2008爆又2.2.2 我国金融环境的政策

10、改变及场导在201542012218522了；、20132012201120102009金融机信金融机金融机金融机20132012201120102009金融机信金融机金融机金融机金融机金融机金融机金融机金融机金融机20132012201120102009金融机信金融机金融机金融机金融机20132012201120102009金融机信金融机金融机金融机金融机长金融机金融机金融机金融机金融机金融机金融机金融机200920132012201120102009国企业债200920132012201120102009国企业债2010。会计准则与要求差异分和行业除和2010。会计准则与要求差异分和行业除

11、和3.1.1 著名的金或。业，监费者”很少存在自我权益的情况著名的金或。业，监费者”很少存在自我权益的情况业2006会计学总需求益的保护：2090有效引导投资决策的信息FASB 和 IASB 签订的一份谅解备忘录中益的保护：2090有效引导投资决策的信息FASB 和 IASB 签订的一份谅解备忘录中曾重申了双输前文有提到，金融系统相较于会计系统而言地强调社会职能的体现的部分都属于单个主体不对2.实际反映。2006或者市，稳定对对2.实际反映。2006或者市，稳定对价格存在因信息披露程度不。3.2 会计准则与差异可协调3.2.1 自。3.2 会计准则与差异可协调3.2.1 自。3.2.2 上相性

12、性3.2.3 业业的200320052014的业务开始多样发展3.2.4 性3.2.3 业业的200320052014的业务开始多样发展3.2.4 正效4 融4.1 议与会计准则功能协同及延展现有成果新协新下1988新管融4.1 议与会计准则功能协同及延展现有成果新协新下1988新管4.1.1 协8%，的4%协议首次提出了资本充足率这一概念，即资本充足率（CAR）T1T2/a资本充足率则=T1/a4%充分运用自己分4.1.2 充分运用自己分4.1.2 场在业4.2 金与会计准则功能协同及延展进一步研究VaR 理论会计中的延VaRVaR1993在业4.2 金与会计准则功能协同及延展进一步研究Va

13、R 理论会计中的延VaRVaR1993G30的VaRVaRVaRVaR融。55l致 致 1监事会（SB）。19932005Karbhari制度，监事会是无效的。1监事会（SB）。19932005Karbhari制度，监事会是无效的。色他们的权力缺乏不能表现不佳的高管和监事而且对于监事会来说Li，Wu（2009）更意义的。比如，Tuek, FilipoviPokrovac(2009)Chen, ,和 Rui (2006) Hoitash (20们也同意 Dahyaetal意义的。比如，Tuek, FilipoviPokrovac(2009)Chen, ,和 Rui (2006) Hoitash

14、(20们也同意 Dahyaetal(2002)200520062006采用盈余反应系数（ERC）和应计盈余（DA）两种方法计2005DingWu, Li, 和Jia。2.1 中国监事会研究背1980采用盈余反应系数（ERC）和应计盈余（DA）两种方法计2005DingWu, Li, 和Jia。2.1 中国监事会研究背19801990层31）2）确保公司高级管律3）4）6）199912100%1999了200510，的权力。200520062.2 相关理论回本2.2.1Tueketal(2009Velte (2010)Wagner (2011)273意义的统计数据优势。Boneberg (201

15、1a, 2011b)2.2.2早期监事会系统的研究结果；Dahya et 会是无效的，作者说到（1）本2.2.1Tueketal(2009Velte (2010)Wagner (2011)273意义的统计数据优势。Boneberg (2011a, 2011b)2.2.2早期监事会系统的研究结果；Dahya et 会是无效的，作者说到（1）Dahya, Karbhari,Xiao,1998(2003)ConguinXiao,Dahya, andLin (2004)24的权力是董事会和监事会共的而公司的所有者关系是决定监事会有效。有趣的是，中油 9.5%的者相信监事会成员可以成为对董。第二个研究支

16、系是的监事会有效性提出定量的研究支系。Ding,Wu, Li, and Jia (2010)20052005DingJia,Li,andWu Shan(2013)研DingJia,Li,andWu Shan(2013)研3.1 监事会规模和相关的研究，一个公司的董事会规模（体系中应当处于中等。LiptonandLorsch108、9Salmon (1993)815于9位则不能很好的发挥董事会职能对CEO进。Yermack(1996)发现7Vafeas (2000)行为与公司使命契合。 Levine (1990)Addison&Wagner (1997)3.2会成员的教育背Joachim(199

17、1)行为与公司使命契合。 Levine (1990)Addison&Wagner (1997)3.2会成员的教育背Joachim(1991)3.3会成员的职业背结构中，Xielt (2003) 和 Park&ShinShleiferVishny（1998）的起掠夺之手的作用。Bushman，Piotroski Smith（2004）。ChaneyFaccio,andParsley (2011)背景的监事不利于提高会计信息质量，3.4驱成本的（Jensen1976）。Conger,Finegold 和Lawler 起掠夺之手的作用。Bushman，Piotroski Smith（2004）。Ch

18、aneyFaccio,andParsley (2011)背景的监事不利于提高会计信息质量，3.4驱成本的（Jensen1976）。Conger,Finegold 和Lawler 3.5监事会变3.1和Adams Ferreira（2009）也决定了他们的知识和能力随着主管的成长他们的知识和经验的增加。Supervisoryboardcharacteristicsandinformationquality:EvidencefromGuangguiShuai a b str ac alcharacteristicsof supervisory Supervisoryboardcharacteris

19、ticsandinformationquality:EvidencefromGuangguiShuai a b str ac alcharacteristicsof supervisory nthesecharacteristicsandtheUsinghand-collecteddataonmembers, we study therelation information quality offirms inChina. Ourtsupervisorsnaccountingor academicbackground,supervisor compensation, andsupervisor

20、sareconsistent driversof improvementsin accounting informationin China. sarerobustto earningsresponsecoefficient discretionaryaccrualapproachestomeasureaccountinginformationquality.regulatorsand policy adviserscan leverageourfindingsto improvethe ofsupervisory he two-tierystem in There aretwo main s

21、ystemsofernance.is aunitarysystem, in whichof directors (BD) is charged to manageand monitor aUsually,directorsinsuchasystemconsistofseniorexecutivesaswellasagroupindependent directors.TheUnitedesand theUnited Kingdom aregood of thissystem.Thesecond isa two-tier boardsystem. Inadditionto aBD, a firm

22、hasasupervisory board(SB),group of Typically,executivescannotbehissystem, theBDischarged managingthefirmonaday-to-daybasiswhiletheSBservesthemonitoringfunction. Thetwo-tier boardsystemispopular inGermany,France, andJapan. Chinahashadtwo-tier system since1993. UnlikeinGermanyandother countries, theSB

23、in did ve ertodisciplinepoorlyperforming executives untillatet is,the SBinChina initially played onlyan advisory roleanditsrolehasimportanceinrecent The limitedliteratureon thetwo-tier ystemtSBsareineffective. Dahya, Karbhari,andXiao (2002),inaserieserviewsin China, summarizeseveralivereasons whySBs

24、Thereasonsinclude SBsplay onlyan advisoryhe s, they ertodisciplinepoorly performingexecutives, and have no landothererviewsin China, summarizeseveralivereasons whySBsThereasonsinclude SBsplay onlyan advisoryhe s, they ertodisciplinepoorly performingexecutives, and have no landotherincentivestoservea

25、smonitors. Recently,Jia,Ding, andWu(2009),in astudy ofenforcement actionsbytheChinaSecuritytmoreseveresanctions areed firmswithlargerSBs.Inaddition,more frequentSB tfacemoresevere enforcement actions tis,a largeSBoran SBwithmorefrequentmeetingsdoesnot help erestingly,theSBboardliteratureinothert SBs

26、have tSBscan For le,Tuek,Filipovi,andthe quality oflreports.TheSBliterature,however, seldomexaminesdetailedcharacteristicsofsupervisorsandhowtheserelatetoSBeffectiveness. context of the BD literature, the effectiveness of a boarddependspartly on thecharacteristicsof itsmembers. Forinstance, Chen, ,a

27、nd Rui tBD characteristics are importantfactorsin. Chan andLi (2008)tindependentdirectorslbackgroundenhancefirmvalue.Similarly,Hoitash(2011)tdirectorswith l tiestomanagement and serving on audit committeesareable improve afirmslreportingquality.1Thesestudies,however,focusindependentdirector characte

28、ristics inaunitaryboardsystem. Fewstudieshowsupervisor characteristicsinatwo-tier boardsystem relatetofirmHence, we have no apriorireasonsto tthe impact ofcharacteristics is similar to those in unitary board studies. It is a research question. Withoutadetailedexaminationofsupervisorcharacteristics,t

29、herelativeimportance of these characteristics in contributingtoSB performance is unclear. Inaddition,weconcur withDahyaetal.t,ifSBsareineffective,weshould examinehow improve their oredetail.Thus,an examination ofthe of supervisorsinatwo-tier board systemcan provide usefulinformation tofirms, andTheo

30、bjective ofthisstudy is,xaminetheeffectivenessof hecontextofaccountinginformationquality.Specifically,westudyrelation nindividualsupervisor characteristicsand accounting quality.Ourstudyconductsaysisof thesupervisor heSBliterature.Ourfindingsaddto thedebateon the effectivenessof SBsrelation nindivid

31、ualsupervisor characteristicsand accounting quality.Ourstudyconductsaysisof thesupervisor heSBliterature.Ourfindingsaddto thedebateon the effectivenessof SBsChina. Second, weidentifytheunderlyingdriversof accounting informationhecontextofSBs.Wetaccountinginformation quality istoward a goodystem.Only

32、good accountinginformation lowertheinformationasymmetry n afirmand itsoutsiderstit isfor stakeholdersto evaluatethefirms lperformance.Accordingly,and regulatorscan drawon thefindingsof thisstudy to reformthe SBsystem China.The focusofourstudy offerstwo additional , unlike literatureinothertwo-tier b

33、oard systems, themajority oftheliteraturerelated Chinatcan titsSBsareineffective.Thus, itisinformativetoidentifyBeffectiveness. Second,ChinasCompanyLaw madechangesin late 2005 and eredthe monitoringroleof SBsin2006. Hence, comparingtheimpactofSBcharacteristicson accounting information qualityand aft

34、er SB rovideotheeffectivenessof theregulationchangeOur t supervisors naccountingoracademicsupervisorcompensation, andfemalesupervisors areconsistentdriversimprovementsin accounting informationqualityinChina. s are toearningsresponsecoefficient(ERC) anddiscretionaryaccrual(DA)approachesmeasureaccount

35、inginformationquality. Inaddition,wetChinasCompanyLaw of 2005 had itiveimpactontheeffectivenessof SBs, atisconsistentwiththoseofDing,Wu,Li, andJia(2010). regulatorsandadviserscan leverage our findingsto improve theperformanceofhetwo-ystem in China.anizether asfollows. Sectionpresentsthebackgroundand

36、literaturereview.Thedataanddiscussedin Section ethod 2. Background andliterature2.1.Background ofThe economic reformin heearly1980scalled forthe need toraise for economicdevelopment.Thus, theernmentestablishedstockhe early1990s toecapitalformation.Subsequently,roducedCompany Law in December 1993 tor

37、egulate publicly traded firms.Oneofthe sheCompanyLaw mandatesatwo-tier ystem industrial tis, anSB he early1990s toecapitalformation.Subsequently,roducedCompany Law in December 1993 toregulate publicly traded firms.Oneofthe sheCompanyLaw mandatesatwo-tier ystem industrial tis, anSB t least threemembe

38、rsin additionto aBD.membersof theSBcannot bethe directorsof theBD or senior executivesofthe The membership of an SB consists of shareholders and elected labor represenThe SB has five duties:1) to examine a firms l 2) to t the seniorexecutivesand the BDobey the laws and proceduresoftoundertakecorrect

39、iveactionwhenthebehaviorofseniorexecutivesanddirectors is detrimental to the firm,to arrange shareholder5) to takeon other dutiesashefirm TherevisedCompanyLaw ofDecember 1999 additionallyrequired settingupSBs100% e-ownedrises.Hence, theSBe egral partof ystemsinceToimprovetheeffectivenessof SBsinChin

40、a, theCSRCmadetwo heCompanyLaw in October, theCSRC leastone-thirdof theSBsmembershipconsistof electedlabor Second, the SBnow hastheauthority todismisssenior executivesand theright tolegal sior executives.The2005 amendmentsof theLaweredSBsinChina.WetthisSBsimprovetheeffectivenessof SBssince2.2.Litera

41、ture Ourr is connectedtotwo strandsof literature.isaboutthe ofanSBsysteminaglobalcontextandthesecondrelatestotheeffectivenessofSBs in China. We discuss these below.2.2.1.Theeffectivenessof anSBsystem inaglobal Tueketal.(2009)t thepresence of an audit committeeinan SBimprovesqualityofthefirmsaccounti

42、nginformation.Velte(2010)studiesSBsinGermanyAustraliawithrespecttoSBindependenceandfirm performance.Thet an SBssitiveimpacton SBindependence andperformance.Wagner(2011)focusesontheeffectoflaborparticipation inale 273 Germanfirmsandtfirms tleast one-third of theirSB labor ivesdo notexhibit aistically

43、significantdifferenceinorprofitfromfirmswithoutsuchanSB. Boneberg(2011a,stlabor participationin 273 Germanfirmsandtfirms tleast one-third of theirSB labor ivesdo notexhibit aisticallysignificantdifferenceinorprofitfromfirmswithoutsuchanSB. Boneberg(2011a,stlabor participationin itivelyrelatesto prod

44、uctivity but negativelyrelatesprofitability.Thegloballiteraturetsome underlyingcharacteristics, astheSBsindependence, theextent of laborparticipation, and auditduties,mayanimpact on theeffectivenessof SBsincountries2.2.2. SBsinn newstockmarketandaverydifferenteconomictthe literatureinChinamightbedif

45、ferenttofothercountries.Wecandividethisstrand of otwo clusters.rovidesan ysison SBsinChina. Dahya etal.(2002) conducted erviewsin China and areineffective.Theauthorst, unlikethoseinothercountries, hat(1) SBsplayonlyanadvisoryrolein er to discipline poorly performingland other incentivestoserve the e

46、rnances,(2) theyexecutives, and (3)supervisorshaveno monitors.Dahya,Karbhari,Xiao,(2003)present acasestudy of Department. inChina when thefirm skipped an SBannualreport inThefirmsstock pricereacted negatively afterthenews, ta missing report can manifest aernanceproblem.Thecaset an SBChinacan playaro

47、le, even if it issmall,inernance. Xiao,Dahya, Lin (2004) erviewswithdirectorsfromBDs, supervisorsfromSBs, thesecretariesof theBDstoexamine theirviewson the effectivenessof SBsinfirms.tsupervisor er sharing aBD and an SB,and thefirmsownership structure areimportantfactorsdeterminingtheeffectivenessof

48、 erestingly,only9.5%ofthet supervisorscan beeffectivemonitorsof theBD and executives.Theearly studieson SBsare ivein natureand offer empiricalevidenceontheeffectivenessof ThesecondclusterofliteratureonSBsinChinaprovides their effectiveness. Ding,Wu, Li, and Jia (2010)ive evidence t beforethe oftheCo

49、mpanyLaw inlate2005, the sizeandmeeting frequency of SBshad effectonexecutives Incontrast,sincetheCompanyLawchanged, thesizeand meetingfrequency ofhavea significant impact onthe ensitivitiesofexecutives.resultt regulatorychangesenhancing the supervisory dutiesofSBsmake them moreIncontrast,sincetheCo

50、mpanyLawchanged, thesizeand meetingfrequency ofhavea significant impact onthe ensitivitiesofexecutives.resultt regulatorychangesenhancing the supervisory dutiesofSBsmake them moreheirernanceduties.Ding,Jia,Li,and(2010) studytheresponses of BDsand SBsin curtailing futureenforcement after fraudulent a

51、ctivitiesand t SBsfail to playarole in curtailing. Shan (2013) t thesizeof an SBdoesnotrelate tomagnitudeof majorityshareholdertunnelingactivities.Thesecondcluster literature focuses on t supervisorcharacteristics.In sum,the global anderaleffectivenessofanSBwithoutexaminingliteratureprimarilystudy h

52、ow overall characteristics, suchassizeandthenumber of meetings, relatetoinformationquality,profit,productivity,andexecutiveFew studiesprovide a ysisof theeffectofcharacteristicsonaccountinginformationquality.Ourstudyfillsthisgap.Weaccounting informationquality asour erestbecauseit ispieceof informat

53、ionforerformance metricsforafirm.High-accountinginformationiscriticalin examiningother ernancemanagerial 3. SBcharacteristicsand variableFewstudiesprovideacomprehensivestudyof supervisorcharacteristicsaccountinginformationquality.Therefore,forexploratory es, weusecharacteristicsasin unitary boardstu

54、diesto study theimpact ofcharacteristicsonSBeffectiveness.Therefore,werelymostlyontheBDliteratureto discuss the potential SB characteristics for our study.3.1.SB sizeand According to thetheory, afirmsboard size(inaunitaryboard shouldbemoderate.Lipton and Lorsch (1992)tdom ior management and remain s

55、ilent.Theextent of thesilenceincreasesboardsize.Thettheoptimumboardsizeshouldberestrictedto n eight and nine members. Salmon (1993)neight and15 membersisprobablyaboutwithin10members, perhapst, forlargefirms,and a board should haveneight heaudit,compensation, othercommittees, sincethesecommitteesshou

56、ld havesufficientnumbersofindependentdirectors. Jensen (1993)t aboard cannot function well effectively monitorthe CEOifsnninemembers.Yermack(1996)tthevalue of afirmdeclinesmonotonically when itsboard hasn members.Vafeas(2000)independentdirectors. Jensen (1993)t aboard cannot function well effectivel

57、y monitorthe CEOifsnninemembers.Yermack(1996)tthevalue of afirmdeclinesmonotonically when itsboard hasn members.Vafeas(2000)t thesmaller , thehigherinformativenessof itsearnings.heliteratureon unitary boards, thesizeof SBshouldaffectefficiencyandeffectiveness,butwecannotanapriorioptimum numberwithou

58、tresearchingthesubject. Obviously,ifanSBtoo big, itis eredinconducting productiveactivities and ifan SB istoo thesupervisorscannot performtheirdutieswell.Therefore,the relationsizeof an SBandaccounting information qualityisn ChinasCompany LawrequiresSBsto be ed of shareholdersand elected ives.yzethe

59、 influenceof electedlabor onaccounting quality,weusetheproportionoflaboriveson the SB asa proxyfor ition.Accordingtotheparticipationtheory,stronglaborion enhanceworkershefirmand alignment with thefirms.Levine(1990)andAddisonandWagner(1997)t high laborestheeffectiveflow ofinformation andmotivateswork

60、ersto buildhumancapital. Moreover, highlaborparticipationcan make corporatemakingmore openand democratic andstrengthening the oftheseniorexecutives.xpectthelaborhe SB tocorrelatedwith thefirmsaccounting information 3.2.Supervisors education Oneof themain responsibilitiesofthe SBisto monitor theperfo