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1、Chapter 8An Economic Analysis of Financial StructureTake-home MessagesFinancial Structure, 不同融资渠道的统计特征关于不同融资渠道的特征:Eight Basic Facts / PatternWhat affect the structure,不同渠道存在的缘由Theory 1, Transaction Costs 重点讨论Theory 2, Adverse Selection in debt market:Lemons problem重点讨论Theory 3, Moral Hazard in equit

2、y market:Principal-Agent Problem:重点讨论and too big to failin debt market:2本章的主要内容 以一个汽车贷款案例串联以上问题提出各种方案,问题,找出对策思索题:汽车贷款案例他的祖母过世了,留给他10000美圆遗产。当他收到支票的时候,他最好的朋友陪他去银行,并方案把这笔钱存人银行。在银行里,他的朋友提示他这家银行的存款利率为3%,而其购车贷款的利率为9%。他的朋友建议:“他为何不站在购车贷款办事处的门口,本人直接向来一个来恳求购车贷款的客户放贷?这样他可以获得比存款3%的利率更高的利息收入,并且排除中间人。1请解释他假设发放这笔

3、贷款很难获得收益的缘由。2请解释由银行发放这笔贷款可以获得收益的缘由。视角一:间接金融vs间接金融假设选择间接金融即银行问题:利率低,报答低处理方法:用直接金融,example:招财宝假设选择直接金融,个人贷款给个人问题:买卖本钱之一,合同制定和执行本钱很高。处理方法:银行经过规模效应,与专业分工,降低本钱视角二:假设选择债券合同-逆向选择问题问题:逆向选择信誉差的才来借款处理方法:Private production and sale of information信誉调查,央行信誉,芝麻信誉,Government regulation to increase information温州私人借

4、款,在政府部门登记Collateral and net worth拿他们家牛和犁抵押,找有信誉的人大户担保Financial intermediation经过银行借贷视角三:假设选择债券合同-品德风险问题问题:品德风险合同签署后,借款人投资高风险处理方法Net worth and collateral拿他们家牛和犁抵押,找有信誉的大户做中保 Monitoring and Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants合同条款包含Incentive compatible : Discourage undesirable behavior, Encourage desir

5、able behaviorKeep collateral valuable, Margin requirementProvide informationFinancial intermediation经过银行借贷视角三:假设选择股权合同还是债券合同假设选择债券合同内容如上问题:如上述处理方法:如上述,新的方法:股权鼓励假设选择直接金融,股权鼓励问题:股权合同的品德风险处理方法:见下文视角四:假设选择股权合同-品德风险问题:委托代理问题 我出钱他打工处理方法:Monitoring (Costly State Verification)手机定位签到。Free-rider problem among

6、 stock holdersGovernment regulation to increase informationLaws: standard accounting principles; impose stiff criminal penaltiesFinancial Intermediationventure capital firm: hold several positions in the managing body of the firmDebt Contracts1. 假设向律师支付佣金制定一份贷款合同仅仅运用一次的话,那么这一买卖本钱就过于高昂。假设他将一切资金都借给一个人

7、,那么就像把一切鸡蛋都放在一个篮子里那样承当了较高的风险,实现风险分担。最后,他几乎无法获得防止信息不对称所产生问题的方法。在高风险程度的借款者筹借资金的时候,会产生逆向选择。而那些将贷款资金用于赌博而非原方案的的车的行为,将会导致品德风险。2由于商业银行具有多笔同类贷款,所以它们向律师支付一次佣金,制定出一份可以反复使同的合同规模效应。商业银行发放收益率并非总是同向变动的多样化贷款,经过这种方式从总体上降低这些贷款的风险程度。商业银行掌握了监视和控制借款者的方法,以此降低逆向选择和品德风险的危害专业分工。 Warning本章的Pattern与theory脱节Pattern部分讨论:企业不同渠

8、道的融资哪个多,哪个少的问题。但是实际部分却讨论,为什么选这种渠道,不选择那种渠道Financial Structure金交融同的常见方式:股权与债券金融买卖链条的长短:直接与间接 股权,债券,直接,间接都有存在价值都出现问题都有处理方案此消彼长的缘由本书没有讨论量变的缘由,而是关注存在价值。在于本钱和收益的平衡 股权vs债务股权 为什么需求股权合同,视频:How the Stock Market Works (9:12)股权的问题处理方法债务为什么需求债务合同债务合同的问题处理方法直接金融vs间接金融直接债务Why需求直接金融,视频的截图直接金融的问题处理方法间接债务债务的金融中介:银行为什

9、么需求间接债务。也即为什么需求银行。间接债务的问题:余额宝的兴起与银行衰弱处理方法Basic Facts about Financial Structure Throughout the WorldThis chapter provides an economic analysis of how our financial structure is designed to promote economic efficiency The bar chart in Figure 1 shows how American businesses financed their activities us

10、ing external funds (those obtained from outside the business itself) in the period 19702000 and compares U.S. data to those of Germany, Japan, and Canada Figure 1 Sources of External Funds for Nonfinancial Businesses: A Comparison of the United States with Germany, Japan, and CanadaSource: Andreas H

11、ackethal and Reinhard H. Schmidt, “Financing Patterns: Measurement Concepts and Empirical Results, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitat Working Paper No. 125, January 2004. The data are from 19702000 and are gross flows as percentage of the total, not including trade and other credit data, which are n

12、ot available. Sources of External Funds for Nonfinancial Businesses: A Comparison杨玉琳 林明英 奚雅芝 付佩雯 直接融资间接融资stockbondloan Sources of External Funds for Nonfinancial Businesses: A ComparisonFact 2: marketable debt and equity securities is not the primary wayFact 1: Stocks are not the most important sour

13、ces Sources of External Funds for Nonfinancial Businesses: A ComparisonFact 3: Indirect finance is many times more important than direct finance Fact 4: Financial intermediaries, particularly banks, are the most important source直接融资的开展趋势Eight Basic FactsStocks are not the most important sources of e

14、xternal financing for businesses Really? Why?Issuing marketable debt and equity securities is not the primary way in which businesses finance their operations Why?Indirect finance is many times more important than direct finance Why? What is advantage of indirect finance? What is advantage of direct

15、 finance? Financial intermediaries, particularly banks, are the most important source of external funds used to finance businesses. Are these true in china?Eight Basic Facts (5-8)The financial system is among the most heavily regulated sectors of the economyOnly large, well-established corporations

16、have easy access to securities markets to finance their activities The rules is changing as time goes by. How about crowd-funding? Kickstarter is the worlds largestfundingplatform for creative projects. 雷锋网。Collateral is a prevalent feature of debt contracts for both households and businesses. Why?

17、Any examples? Think about the story of rural loans in republic of china. Is this true in china.Debt contracts are extremely complicated legal documents that place substantial restrictive covenants on borrowersTheory 1, Transaction costWhy Financial intermediaries?Transaction cost: Economies of scale

18、 and Expertise Transaction CostsWhy transaction costs is cause problems? (1) Threshold of investment: large commission on small trade. (2) restricted channel of investment, you have to put all your eggs in one basket.Financial intermediaries have evolved to reduce transaction costsEconomies of scale

19、 Examples? Bundle small investors funds together. Mutual funds. (1) Overcome threshold problem; (2) diversification. Expertise the expertise in computer/internet technology reduce the cost supply sideCase: Alibabas YuE Bao 余额宝 Hits 2.5M Users, $1 Billion Already Deposited; Yongjinbao国金证券 “佣金宝 Theory

20、 2, Adverse selection原理:lemon problem in second hand car market股权:PE债务:lemon problem in Loan marketFor instance, if you offer an average interest rate for your loans, the people who are better risks will go elsewhere for their money, while the risky people will gladly take your money.Asymmetric Info

21、rmation: Adverse Selection and Moral HazardAdverse selection occurs before the transactionMoral hazard arises after the transactionAgency theory analyses how asymmetric information problems affect economic behaviorThe Lemons Problem: How Adverse Selection Influences Financial StructureIf quality can

22、not be assessed, the buyer is willing to pay at most a price that reflects the average qualitySellers of good quality items will not want to sell at the price for average qualityThe buyer will decide not to buy at all because all that is left in the market is poor quality itemsThis problem explains

23、fact 2 and partially explains fact 1Cases: the used-car market. Akelof(1970). Stock and bond markets.Discuss: Why there are still peach in the used-bysicle market? Adverse Selection :lemons problemWhat is lemons problem?How to deal with it?Video: The Lemon Problem (2:46)httpsyoutube/watch?v=N78gTX7V

24、OwMVideo: Asymmetric Information and Used Cars 2:39httpsyoutube/watch?v=sXPXpJ5vMnU lemons problem in finance GoodBadGovernment regulation to increase informationPrivate production and sale of informationFinancial intermediationCollateral and net worthTools to Help Solve Adverse Selection ProblemsPr

25、ivate production and sale of informationthat distinguishes good from bad firms and then sell it (征信公司)Free-rider problem (与盗版有何区别)How about public goods. Government regulation to increase informationNot always works to solve the adverse selection problem, explains Fact 5.Case: Cheat with no punishme

26、nt in chinas stock market. Special treatment stock, ST* for short. Is it lemon market?Financial intermediationExplains facts 3, 4, & 6. Peach or lemon? In the used-car market, used-car dealers? In the financial market, bank?Collateral and net worthExplains fact 7. Collateral v.s. information ? Equit

27、y capital as collaterral. republic of china rural loan.Eight Basic Facts (contd) Theory 3, Moral hazard原理:Principal Agent problem股权:Moral Hazard in Equity Contracts: 1People who invested in AIG, thought that their money was relatively safe(2) However, AIG was also sellingCDS and MBSs that started to

28、 default in large numbers in 2021 3 AIG is too big to fail债务:Moral Hazard in Debt ContractsMoral hazardMoral hazard的特点本钱。Video: Moral Hazard 1:21Video:To big to fail : CEO Richard Fuld got $483,800,000 to Bankrupt Leheman. Is this fair? 6:41Video: Introduction to Moral Hazard ( 4:09)Video: Solutions

29、 to Moral Hazard (5:55)Video: Solutions to Moral Hazard: Signaling (6:45)How Moral Hazard Affects the Choice Between Debt and Equity ContractsCalled the Principal-Agent ProblemPrincipal: less information (stockholder)Agent: more information (manager)Theory or math,. Separation of ownership and contr

30、ol of the firmManagers pursue personal benefits and power rather than the profitability of the firmHow to solve the principal-Agent ProblemVideo:Busy Secretary - The Principal-Agent Problem ( 4:17)Tools to Help Solve the Principal-Agent ProblemMonitoring (Costly State Verification)Free-rider problem

31、 among stock holdersFact 1 Government regulation to increase informationFact 5 (Laws: standard accounting principles; impose stiff criminal penalties)Financial IntermediationFact 3 (venture capital firm: hold several positions in the managing body of the firmDebt ContractsFact 1 : fixed payment inst

32、ead of flexible return;Mechanism design: incentive-compatible, truth-telling condition, participation conditionEight Basic FactsHow Moral Hazard Influences Financial Structure in Debt MarketsBorrowers have incentives to take on projects that are riskier than the lenders would like.This prevents the

33、borrower from paying back the loan. Tools to Help Solve Moral Hazard in Debt ContractsNet worth and collateralLower the collateral, greater the moral hazard problemIncentive compatibleMonitoring and Enforcement of Restrictive CovenantsDiscourage undesirable behaviorEncourage desirable behaviorKeep c

34、ollateral valuableProvide informationCovenant Monitoring and Enforcement are often costlyFinancial IntermediationFacts 3 & 4 : Bank: private loans avoiding free-ride problem . insurance company: ?Summary Table 1 Asymmetric Information Problems and Tools to Solve ThemAsymmetric Information in Transition and Developing Countries“Fina

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