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WhenShouldaServiceProviderUtilizea‘NameYourOwnPrice’Channel?TuoWangEstherGal-OrRabikarChatterjee0WhenShouldaServiceProviderOver$6billionintotalrevenuesfromApril’98topresent.“Opaque”productsSingle-bidOperatesoncommissionplusdifferencebetweenbidandpricesetbyserviceprovider1Over$6billionintotalrevenResearchQuestionsFromthe
serviceprovider’s
perspective:WhendoesserviceproviderbenefitfromsellingthroughtheNYOPchannel?Whataretheoptimalpricesforthe“posted-price”andtheNYOPchannels,andhowmuchopacityshouldbeintroducedintheNYOPchannel?HowmuchinformationaboutconsumerdemanddoestheserviceproviderneedtohavebeforehecontractswiththeNYOPretailer?2ResearchQuestionsFromtheserRealWorldSet-upOther“postedprice”retailers(travelagents,Expedia,Travelocity…)CONSUMERSDirect“postedprice”channelsNYOPBids3RealWorldSet-upOther“postedOurModelSet-upCONSUMERS(vi~[0,1])Direct“postedprice”channelNYOPPostedPriceMinimumAcceptablePriceBids4OurModelSet-upCONTimelineoftheGameServiceProvidersetsPH
andd.ConsumersdecidetobuyornotatPHPayPH
(serviceisguaranteed)ConsumersbidwithoptimalvalueBiServiceProvidersetsMinimumAcceptablePricePLNotBuyBuyTheNYOPRetailer(P)BidAcceptedNoTransaction
(Consumerswhosebidsare
rejectedcannotobtainservice)Bi
≥
PLBi<PLSignalofDemandyLateConsumersPayPH
(serviceisguaranteed)5TimelineoftheGameServicePrModelAssumptionsLargepopulationofpotentialrationalconsumerswithreservationprice
vi
~[0,1]Degreeof“opacity”inNYOPchannel
(1-d),
0d
1DiscountedvaluationinNYOPchannel=dvi
AsingleproviderhavingcapacityK≤1.Two-stagegameProviderchoosesthepostedpricePHandtheopacityparameterdinthefirststage.ProviderchoosesthresholdforminimumacceptablebidPLinthesecondstage.Posted-pricechannelavailabletoconsumersinbothstagesNYOPchannelonlyavailableinsecondstage6ModelAssumptionsLargepopulatModelAssumptions(Cont’d)Onlyafractionofconsumersatanyvaluationisactuallyactiveinthemarket.yv-denotesdensityofactiveconsumershavingvaluationv.yv~U[0,2] Eyv=1.yisasignalofdemanddensityy~U[0,2].7ModelAssumptions(Cont’d)OnlyFormulation1DensitiesinthepostedpriceandNYOPsegmentsperfectlycorrelated,andyisaperfectsignalofyv
forallvaluationlevels.UncertaintycompletelyresolvedwhenobservingyTwoPossibleFormulations:
If[v1,v2]valuationsofpostedpricesegment[v3,v4]valuationsofNYOPsegmentVolumesofthesegments:
y(v2-v1),y(v4-v3).8Formulation1UncertaintycomplUncertaintyonlypartiallyresolvedwhenobservingyDensitiesinthepostedpriceandNYOPsegmentindependentlydistributed.Thesignalycontainsusefulinformationonlyaboutthepostedpricesegment.yisaperfectsignalofpostedpricedensityExpectedVolumes:.yisanimperfectsignalofpostedpricedensityWithprobabilityhperfectlypreciseandwithprobability(1-h)completelyuninformativeExpectedVolumes:Formulation29UncertaintyDensitiesinthepModelAssumptions(Cont’d)RationalExpectations-consumersknowthedistributionfunctionofy.Providerguaranteesthattheservicewillbeavailabletoanyconsumerwhoisactiveinthepostedpricemarket.Ifthedemandinthepostedpriceexceedscapacitysuchaguaranteeimpliesthattheprovidercanuseasub-contractortosatisfythedemand(codesharing.)NosuchguaranteeisofferedtoconsumersactiveintheNYOPchannel.AfterobservingthesignalytheprovidersubmitsthethresholdpricePL(y)totheretailer.Onlybidsinexcessofthisminimumpriceshouldbeacceptedbytheretailer.10ModelAssumptions(Cont’d)RatiConsumerBehaviorConsumerchoosesoptimalbidinNYOPchanneltomaximizenetexpectedpayoff:LetB(v)bethemaximizerofabove,thenOptimalBidRationalconsumerscaninferpossiblerangeofminimumacceptableprices11ConsumerBehaviorConsumerchooMarketSegmentationConsumerSelfSelection:DonotbuyBuyfromNYOPretailerBuyfromposted-pricechannel0vv1Consumeroftypev
isindifferentConsumeroftypev(y)submitsabidjustequaltotheminimumthresholdprice.12MarketSegmentationConsumerSeConsumerBehavior(Contd.)When
ExcessDemandPossibleWhenDefiniteExcessCapacity13ConsumerBehavior(Contd.)WhenConsumerBehavior(Contd.)Consumerwithv=(marginalpostedpricebuyer)isindifferentbetweenbuyingatpostedpriceandbidding.PayoffatPostedPriceChannel
serviceisguaranteedExpectedPayoffatNYOPChannel14ConsumerBehavior(Contd.)ConsConsumerBehavior(Contd.)OptimalBidwhenDensitiesareIndependentlyDistributed.15ConsumerBehavior(Contd.)OptiEquilibriumMinimumAcceptablePriceinNYOPChannelTheminimumacceptablepriceissetsothattheentirecapacityisexhausted.Thisistheonlycrediblepricingbehaviorinthesecondstage.Theproviderisunabletopre-commitnottotrytoclearhiscapacityinthesecondstage.Abigproblemwhencapacityislarge.ReminiscentoftheDurableGoodMonopolistwhoisunabletopre-commitnottocutpricesinthefuture.16EquilibriumMinimumAcceptableEquilibriumMinimumAcceptablePriceinNYOPChannel(i)
DensitiesPerfectlyCorrelated(ii.a)
DensitiesIndependentlyDistributed,yperfectsignalof
postedpricedensity(ii.b)DensitiesIndependentlyDistributed,yimperfectsignalof
postedpricedensity17EquilibriumMinimumAcceptableEquilibriumMinimumAcceptablePriceinNYOPChannelForfixedvaluesof
andd(i)WhenDensitiesarePerfectlyCorrelated
DesignateshighestpossiblerealizationofdemandthatyieldsexcesscapacitytobesoldintheNYOPchannel.18EquilibriumMinimumAcceptable(ii.a)WhenDensitiesareIndependentlyDistributedNotethatPL(y)isincreasingwithyinbothcases.19(ii.a)WhenDensitiesareIndBenchmark-OnlyPostedPriceMarketisAvailabledonotbuybuyinpostedpricemarketSalesofProviderTransactwiththeNYOPretaileronlyif:20Benchmark-OnlyPostedPriceExpectedPayoff-DualChannelChoosedandPHtomaximizeabove.toderive•EasiertoformulateasachoiceofdandandusetheconditionProposition1
Itisneveroptimalfortheprovidertochoosedandsothat•SinceNYOPoffersaninferiorproduct,usethischannelcautiouslytosegmentthemarket.DonotleaveexcesscapacitytobesoldintheNYOPunderthebeststateofthedemandy=2.21ExpectedPayoff-DualChannelBayesianEquilibriumPropositions2&3Irrespectiveofwhetherornotdensitiesarecorrelated,theproviderallocateshalfofhiscapacitytobesoldinthePostedPriceChannel.(i)(ii)Withcorrelationpostedpricesarelower.(iii)Sincethepayofffunctionoftheproviderisalinearfunctionofd,choosethehighestpossibledconsistentwithdualdistribution.Withcorrelation,extentofopacityislower.Introducesomeopacitytosustainsegmentation.22BayesianEquilibriumPropositio(iv)BeingfullyinformedatthetimeofagreementwithNYOPretaileryieldslowerprofits.(v)Dualchannelprofitableonlyforrelativelysmalllevelofcapacity.PerfectcorrelationIndependentlydistributed23(iv)BeingfullyinformedatthAdvantagesandDisadvantagesofDualChannelsAdvantagesPricescanbeadjustedtoexhaustcapacity.PricerigidityinPostedPriceMarket.Marketsegmentationfacilitatespricediscriminationviatheintroductionofa"damagedgood".DisadvantagesTosustaintheNYOP,opacityhastobeintroduced,whichdiminishesconsumers'willingnesstopay.Flexibilityinpricingthatfacilitatessellingdistressedcapacityerodesthepre-commitmentcapabilitiesoftheprovidertokeephighpostedprices.(DurableGoodMonopolistProblem)ServiceproviderisunabletoextracttheentirerevenuesgeneratedfromNYOPconsumers,sinceNYOPretailercanprivatelyobservebids.24AdvantagesandDisadvantagesoTheRoleofCorrelationinDetermining
Advantagesvs.DisadvantagesPerfectCorrelationimpliesproviderisfullyinformedatthetimeofagreement.Withindependentlydistributeddensities,provideronlypartiallyinformed.Betterinformationhastheadvantageofimprovedfinetuningofpricestoclearcapacity.Betterinformationhasthedisadvantageoferodingpre-commitmentpowertoagreaterextent.Uponobservationofaloweryrealizationtheprovidercutstoagreaterextentwithimprovedinformation.Aggravatesthecannibalizationthreattothepostedpricemarket.withcorrelationThedisadvantagedominates,implyingthat25TheRoleofCorrelationinDet0.511.50.7k=0.15ySteepnessoftheWholesalePriceSchedule260.511.50.7kScheduleofthresholdwholesalepricesteeperwhendensitiesarecorrelated.Itiseverywherelowerthanwhendensitiesareindependentlydistributed.Erosionofpre-commitmentpowermoresevere.Withcorrelation.27ScheduleofthresholdwholesalComparativeStatisticsLargercapacitylevel,cannibalizationthreatmoresevere.Increaseopacitytoprotectpostedpricemarket.Inspiteofthisdefense28ComparativeStatisticsLargercDemandSignalyImperfectPredictorofDemandinPostedPriceExpecteddensityinpostedpricesegmentIsthereanintermediatevalueofthatmaximizestheexpectedpayoffoftheprovider?29DemandSignalyImperfectPredVerticalIntegrationWhentheserviceproviderverticallyintegratestheNYOPchannel,theprovidercollectsfromeachconsumerthefullbidB(v)insteadofthewholesalepriceProposition6Verticalintegrationkeepsthesizeofeachsegmentthesame.Itleadstohigherpostedpricesandhigherprofits.30VerticalIntegrationWhenthesVerticalIntegration(Cont’d)Whenbothproviderandretailerusepostedpricingastheirbusinessmodel,verticalintegrationeliminatestheproblemofdoublemarginalizationandleadstolowerretailprices.WhentheretailerusestheNYOPmodelinstead,verticalintegrationreducesthecannibalizationeffect.TheproviderislessconcernedaboutlosingsalestotheNYOPsegmentgiventhathecanextracttheentirebidofeachconsumer.Withreducedthreattohisdirectmarketingchanneltheprovidercanraisehisretailpricepostintegration.31VerticalIntegration(Cont’d)WImplicationsTheexistenceofopacityiscriticalinordertosustainthedualchannelsstrategy.Thedualchannelexistsonlyforrelativelysmalllevelsofcapacity.ItisimportanttooptimallyselectthetimeatwhichtheprovidercontractswiththeNYOPretailer.Anoverlyprecisedemandsignalthatbecomesavailablebydelayingtheagreement,maynotbedesirable.TheavailabilityofaveryprecisesignalprovidesanindicationtoconsumersthatdeeppricecutsaremorelikelyintheNYOPmarket,thuserodingthecommitmentpoweroftheprovidertokeeppriceshighVerticalIntegrationwiththeNYOPretailerleadstohigherprices.32ImplicationsTheexistenceofoCostandBenefitsofUsingNYOPChannelBenefits:PriceFlexibilityFacilitatingMarketingSegmentationCost:Segmentationisaccomplishedwithopacitywhichreduceswillingnesstopay.Priceadjustmentsarenotalwaysbeneficial(thelossofcommitmentpower).Revenuesharingwithretailer.33CostandBenefitsofUsingNYOFutureResearchCompetitionbetweenserviceprovidersCompetitionbetweenopaquechannels: Pvs.H34FutureResearchCompetitionbetWhenShouldaServiceProviderUtilizea‘NameYourOwnPrice’Channel?TuoWangEstherGal-OrRabikarChatterjee35WhenShouldaServiceProviderOver$6billionintotalrevenuesfromApril’98topresent.“Opaque”productsSingle-bidOperatesoncommissionplusdifferencebetweenbidandpricesetbyserviceprovider36Over$6billionintotalrevenResearchQuestionsFromthe
serviceprovider’s
perspective:WhendoesserviceproviderbenefitfromsellingthroughtheNYOPchannel?Whataretheoptimalpricesforthe“posted-price”andtheNYOPchannels,andhowmuchopacityshouldbeintroducedintheNYOPchannel?HowmuchinformationaboutconsumerdemanddoestheserviceproviderneedtohavebeforehecontractswiththeNYOPretailer?37ResearchQuestionsFromtheserRealWorldSet-upOther“postedprice”retailers(travelagents,Expedia,Travelocity…)CONSUMERSDirect“postedprice”channelsNYOPBids38RealWorldSet-upOther“postedOurModelSet-upCONSUMERS(vi~[0,1])Direct“postedprice”channelNYOPPostedPriceMinimumAcceptablePriceBids39OurModelSet-upCONTimelineoftheGameServiceProvidersetsPH
andd.ConsumersdecidetobuyornotatPHPayPH
(serviceisguaranteed)ConsumersbidwithoptimalvalueBiServiceProvidersetsMinimumAcceptablePricePLNotBuyBuyTheNYOPRetailer(P)BidAcceptedNoTransaction
(Consumerswhosebidsare
rejectedcannotobtainservice)Bi
≥
PLBi<PLSignalofDemandyLateConsumersPayPH
(serviceisguaranteed)40TimelineoftheGameServicePrModelAssumptionsLargepopulationofpotentialrationalconsumerswithreservationprice
vi
~[0,1]Degreeof“opacity”inNYOPchannel
(1-d),
0d
1DiscountedvaluationinNYOPchannel=dvi
AsingleproviderhavingcapacityK≤1.Two-stagegameProviderchoosesthepostedpricePHandtheopacityparameterdinthefirststage.ProviderchoosesthresholdforminimumacceptablebidPLinthesecondstage.Posted-pricechannelavailabletoconsumersinbothstagesNYOPchannelonlyavailableinsecondstage41ModelAssumptionsLargepopulatModelAssumptions(Cont’d)Onlyafractionofconsumersatanyvaluationisactuallyactiveinthemarket.yv-denotesdensityofactiveconsumershavingvaluationv.yv~U[0,2] Eyv=1.yisasignalofdemanddensityy~U[0,2].42ModelAssumptions(Cont’d)OnlyFormulation1DensitiesinthepostedpriceandNYOPsegmentsperfectlycorrelated,andyisaperfectsignalofyv
forallvaluationlevels.UncertaintycompletelyresolvedwhenobservingyTwoPossibleFormulations:
If[v1,v2]valuationsofpostedpricesegment[v3,v4]valuationsofNYOPsegmentVolumesofthesegments:
y(v2-v1),y(v4-v3).43Formulation1UncertaintycomplUncertaintyonlypartiallyresolvedwhenobservingyDensitiesinthepostedpriceandNYOPsegmentindependentlydistributed.Thesignalycontainsusefulinformationonlyaboutthepostedpricesegment.yisaperfectsignalofpostedpricedensityExpectedVolumes:.yisanimperfectsignalofpostedpricedensityWithprobabilityhperfectlypreciseandwithprobability(1-h)completelyuninformativeExpectedVolumes:Formulation244UncertaintyDensitiesinthepModelAssumptions(Cont’d)RationalExpectations-consumersknowthedistributionfunctionofy.Providerguaranteesthattheservicewillbeavailabletoanyconsumerwhoisactiveinthepostedpricemarket.Ifthedemandinthepostedpriceexceedscapacitysuchaguaranteeimpliesthattheprovidercanuseasub-contractortosatisfythedemand(codesharing.)NosuchguaranteeisofferedtoconsumersactiveintheNYOPchannel.AfterobservingthesignalytheprovidersubmitsthethresholdpricePL(y)totheretailer.Onlybidsinexcessofthisminimumpriceshouldbeacceptedbytheretailer.45ModelAssumptions(Cont’d)RatiConsumerBehaviorConsumerchoosesoptimalbidinNYOPchanneltomaximizenetexpectedpayoff:LetB(v)bethemaximizerofabove,thenOptimalBidRationalconsumerscaninferpossiblerangeofminimumacceptableprices46ConsumerBehaviorConsumerchooMarketSegmentationConsumerSelfSelection:DonotbuyBuyfromNYOPretailerBuyfromposted-pricechannel0vv1Consumeroftypev
isindifferentConsumeroftypev(y)submitsabidjustequaltotheminimumthresholdprice.47MarketSegmentationConsumerSeConsumerBehavior(Contd.)When
ExcessDemandPossibleWhenDefiniteExcessCapacity48ConsumerBehavior(Contd.)WhenConsumerBehavior(Contd.)Consumerwithv=(marginalpostedpricebuyer)isindifferentbetweenbuyingatpostedpriceandbidding.PayoffatPostedPriceChannel
serviceisguaranteedExpectedPayoffatNYOPChannel49ConsumerBehavior(Contd.)ConsConsumerBehavior(Contd.)OptimalBidwhenDensitiesareIndependentlyDistributed.50ConsumerBehavior(Contd.)OptiEquilibriumMinimumAcceptablePriceinNYOPChannelTheminimumacceptablepriceissetsothattheentirecapacityisexhausted.Thisistheonlycrediblepricingbehaviorinthesecondstage.Theproviderisunabletopre-commitnottotrytoclearhiscapacityinthesecondstage.Abigproblemwhencapacityislarge.ReminiscentoftheDurableGoodMonopolistwhoisunabletopre-commitnottocutpricesinthefuture.51EquilibriumMinimumAcceptableEquilibriumMinimumAcceptablePriceinNYOPChannel(i)
DensitiesPerfectlyCorrelated(ii.a)
DensitiesIndependentlyDistributed,yperfectsignalof
postedpricedensity(ii.b)DensitiesIndependentlyDistributed,yimperfectsignalof
postedpricedensity52EquilibriumMinimumAcceptableEquilibriumMinimumAcceptablePriceinNYOPChannelForfixedvaluesof
andd(i)WhenDensitiesarePerfectlyCorrelated
DesignateshighestpossiblerealizationofdemandthatyieldsexcesscapacitytobesoldintheNYOPchannel.53EquilibriumMinimumAcceptable(ii.a)WhenDensitiesareIndependentlyDistributedNotethatPL(y)isincreasingwithyinbothcases.54(ii.a)WhenDensitiesareIndBenchmark-OnlyPostedPriceMarketisAvailabledonotbuybuyinpostedpricemarketSalesofProviderTransactwiththeNYOPretaileronlyif:55Benchmark-OnlyPostedPriceExpectedPayoff-DualChannelChoosedandPHtomaximizeabove.toderive•EasiertoformulateasachoiceofdandandusetheconditionProposition1
Itisneveroptimalfortheprovidertochoosedandsothat•SinceNYOPoffersaninferiorproduct,usethischannelcautiouslytosegmentthemarket.DonotleaveexcesscapacitytobesoldintheNYOPunderthebeststateofthedemandy=2.56ExpectedPayoff-DualChannelBayesianEquilibriumPropositions2&3Irrespectiveofwhetherornotdensitiesarecorrelated,theproviderallocateshalfofhiscapacitytobesoldinthePostedPriceChannel.(i)(ii)Withcorrelationpostedpricesarelower.(iii)Sincethepayofffunctionoftheproviderisalinearfunctionofd,choosethehighestpossibledconsistentwithdualdistribution.Withcorrelation,extentofopacityislower.Introducesomeopacitytosustainsegmentation.57BayesianEquilibriumPropositio(iv)BeingfullyinformedatthetimeofagreementwithNYOPretaileryieldslowerprofits.(v)Dualchannelprofitableonlyforrelativelysmalllevelofcapacity.PerfectcorrelationIndependentlydistributed58(iv)BeingfullyinformedatthAdvantagesandDisadvantagesofDualChannelsAdvantagesPricescanbeadjustedtoexhaustcapacity.PricerigidityinPostedPriceMarket.Marketsegmentationfacilitatespricediscriminationviatheintroductionofa"damagedgood".DisadvantagesTosustaintheNYOP,opacityhastobeintroduced,whichdiminishesconsumers'willingnesstopay.Flexibilityinpricingthatfacilitatessellingdistressedcapacityerodesthepre-commitmentcapabilitiesoftheprovidertokeephighpostedprices.(DurableGoodMonopolistProblem)ServiceproviderisunabletoextracttheentirerevenuesgeneratedfromNYOPconsumers,sinceNYOPretailercanprivatelyobservebids.59AdvantagesandDisadvantagesoTheRoleofCorrelationinDetermining
Advantagesvs.DisadvantagesPerfectCorrelationimpliesproviderisfullyinformedatthetimeofagreement.Withindependentlydistributeddensities,provideronlypartiallyinformed.Betterinformationhastheadvantageofimprovedfinetuningofpricestoclearcapacity.Betterinformationhasthedisadvantageoferodingpre-commitmentpowertoagreaterextent.Uponobservationofaloweryrealizationtheprovidercutstoagreaterextentwithimprovedinformation.Aggravatesthecannibalizationthreattothepostedpricemarket.withcorrelationThedisadvantagedominates,implyingthat60TheRoleofCorrelationinDet0.511.50.7k=0.15ySteepnessoftheWholesalePriceSchedule610.511.50.7kScheduleofthresholdwholesalepricesteeperwhendensitiesarecorrelated.Itiseverywherelowerthanwhendensitiesareindependentlydistributed.Erosionofpre-commitmentpowermoresevere.Withcorrelation.62ScheduleofthresholdwholesalComparativeStatisticsLargercapacitylevel,cannibalizationthreatmoresevere.Increaseopacitytoprotectpos
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