二战中太平洋战场上美国海军-从珍珠港到原子弹

SeaPowerandMaritimeAffairsLesson12:TheUSNavyinthePacific,1941-1945LearningObjectivesComprehendthepoliticalandeconomicforcesthatledJapantostrikeatPearlHarborandtheFarEast.ComprehendtheJapanesestrategyforanearlyvictoryandtheirconceptofthepostwarPacificpowerbalance.ComprehendtheimpactofPearlHarborandthesubsequentBattlesofCoralSeaandMidwayonthetransformationoftheaircraftcarrier'sroleinnavalwarfare.KnowthesignificanthighlightsoftheevolutionofUSoperationalstrategyinthePacific,includingmajorbattlesorcampaignsandinstanceswherestrategywasflawedorambiguous.KnowthestrategicsignificanceoftheemploymentandrefinementofamphibiouslandingtacticsbytheUSNavyandUSMarineCorps.ComprehendthereasonsthegeopoliticalworldorderwaschangedasaresultofJapan’sactionsinstrikingattheWesternpowersin1941.BackgroundInformationJapanese-AmericanRelationstense:JapanchallengedAmerica’s“OpenDoor”policybyattackingManchuriain1931.In1937,JapaneseexpansioninChinaresultedinattackonAmericangunboat,thePanay,byJapaneseaircraft.RooseveltadoptedeconomicsanctionsleadingtoanoilembargobyAmericans,BritishandDutch(July1941)BackgroundInformationTheJapanesestruckfortheoil-richDutchEastIndies(Indonesia),Singapore,andthesurroundingBritish-ownedMalaya,Thailand,thePhilippines,andHongKong.TheJapanesecamouflagedtheirplanswithdiplomaticnegotiationsinWashington.TheUnitedStatesexpectedanassaultsomewhereinthePacificbecausecryptanalysts,inatechniquecalled“Magic,”hadbrokentheJapaneseDiplomaticCode.BackgroundInformationTheattackonPearlHarborsurprisedtheAmericans,whohadnotanticipatedastrikesofareastoronemountedsolelybycarrier-bornaircraft.PearlHarborPearlHarbor:Japan’sPlanSoutherndriveintoIndochinaandDutchEastIndiesforoil.StrikeatPhilippinesandSingaporetoknockoutlocalAmericanandBritishForces.PearlHarbor—JapanesePlansAttackonPearlHarborconceivedbyAdmiralYamamoto:Greatrisk—U.S.wouldsurelyenterthewar.Greaterpotentialgain—U.S.PacificFleetwouldbeknockedoutofthewar.JapanwouldthenconsolidategainsthroughoutChinaandthePacific.PossibilityofU.S.agreeingtoJapaneseterritorialgainstomakepeace.GoodpossibilityofU.S.involvementinEuropeaswell.WilldrainnavalresourcesfromPacificOcean.U.S.AtlanticFleetalreadyinvolvedinconvoyescortagainstU-boats.AdmiralIsorokuYamamotoCommanderinChiefJapaneseCombinedFleetWoundedatTsushimaStraitLivedintheUnitedStatesBoston-StudiedEnglishWashingtonD.C.-NavalAttachéAgainstwarwiththeU.S.DemandedPearlHarborAttackDestructionofU.S.PacificFleetSeptember1940:“IfIamtoldtofightregardlessoftheconsequences,Ishallrunwildforthefirstsixmonthsorayear,butIhaveutterlynoconfidenceforthesecondorthirdyear.”TheAttackSixnewestandlargestJapanesecarriersatcoreofstrikingforceSortiefromKuriles,rendezvous7Dec,200milesNofPearlHarborLaunched183aircraftat0600,strike075590%ofdamageinflictedby0825TheAttackU.S.PacificFleet-PearlHarborNoclearwarningfromWashington.InterceptsdidnotidentifyPearlHarborasatarget.SlowcommunicationsbetweenWashingtonandCommanderinChief,U.S.PacificFleet.BattleshipsinberthsatPearlforweekendliberty.“BattleshipRow”CarriersLexingtonandEnterprisedeliveringaircrafttoMidwayandWakeIslands.Yamamoto-“ClimbMountNiitaka”messagetoViceAdmiralNagumotocommenceattack.PearlHarbor7December1941“ToraToraTora”AftermathofPearlHarborBattleshipfleeteffectivelydestroyedCarrierssurviveandbecomenewcapitalshipsSubmarines,repairfacilities,andoiltanksalsoleftunharmedbyattackResultgenerallynotanticipatedbyAmericannavalplannersbeforePearlHarborNavaltacticschangetosupportcarrierstrikesCircularformationsdevelopedtoprotectcarriersAftermathofPearlHarborU.S.declareswaronJapan“DayofInfamy”-FranklinDelanoRooseveltHitlerdeclareswarontheU.S.AmericanpublicopinionchangesinfavorofwarTowarwego...ContinuedJapaneseAttacksMalayPeninsulaattacked-December1941BritishbattleshipsHMSRepulseandPrinceofWalessunk10December1941Guamtaken10December1941WakeIslandFirstInvasionrepulsed8December1941Taken23December1941ContinuedJapaneseAttacksHongKong-25December1941Thailand,Philippines,BorneoinvadedinDecember1942Singapore-15February1942Furtherattacks?SouthwestPacific:NewGuineaandAustraliaCentralPacificandnorthernPacific:MidwayandAleutianIslandsContinuedJapaneseAdvanceBurmaDutchEastIndies(Indonesia)-“SouthernResourcesArea”Richinoil“ABDA”navalforces(Australia-Britain-Dutch-American)DefeatedattheBattleoftheJavaSea-27February1942NowtheJapanesehadalloftheoiltheyneededProvidedtheycouldkeeptheirSLOCopenThePhillipinesInitialstrikeon8December1941

destroysU.S.aircraftGeneralDouglasMacArthurevacuatesManilaRetreatstoBataanPeninsulaandCorregidorIsland12March-MacArthurevacuateswithfamilytoAustraliaunderordersfromFDRinaNavypatrolboat-“Ishallreturn”GeneralJonathanM.Wainwright-SurrenderofU.S.andFilipinoforceson6May1942leadstotheBataanDeathMarchFilipinoresistanceagainstJapaneseoccupationcontinuesU.S.DefensiveOrganization/PlansAdmiralChesterW.NimitzrelievesKimmelasCommanderinChief,U.S.PacificFleetNimitz-CommanderinChiefPacificOceanAreasIncludesNorth,Central,andSouthPacificAreasMacArthur-CommanderinChiefSouthwestPacificAreaAustralia,NewGuineau,EastIndies,andPhilippinesFleetelementsinthiszoneremainedunderNimitz'scontrolU.S.DefensiveOrganization/PlansControversialcommandstructureNocommonsuperior--twoseparatewarsinthePacificOverwhelmingU.S.industrialandlogisticalsuperiorityAllowsdividedcommanduntilforcesconvergeonPhilippinesin1944FleetAdmiral

ErnestJ.KingCommanderinChief, U.S.Fleet(COMINCH)ChiefofNavalOperations(March1942)Proponentofchangingpreviouslyagreedupon“GermanyFirst”strategyandmovingresourcestothePacifictheatreofwar.ISHALLRETURN!GeneralDouglasMcArthurFleetAdmiral

ChesterW.NimitzCommanderinChiefU.S.PacificFleetandPacificOceanAreasWorldWarIIFleetAdmiralWilliamF.“Bull”HalseyCarrierstrikesonGilbertsandMarshalls.1February1942USSSaratogatorpedoedbyJapanesesubmarine.U.S.AirRaidonTokyoApril1942HalseycommandsTaskForce16HornetandEnterpriseLieutenantColonelJimmyDoolittle-B-25“Mitchells”ArmyAirCorpsbombersallowgreaterrangeUnabletoreturntolandoncarriersChinausedaslandingareaEarlylaunchcausedbysightingbyJapanesepicketsIncreaseinAmericanmoraleFDR:Attackwaslaunchedfrom“Shangri-La”ErasesJapaneseresistancetoYamamoto’sMidwayplanBattleoftheCoralSea

4-8May1942JapaneseattempttocutcommunicationtoAustraliaPortMoresbyinNewGuineaIslandofTulagiAdmiralFrankJackFletcherCommandsTaskForce17Purecarrierengagement—firstinhistoryLexingtonsunkandYorktowndamagedBattleoftheCoralSeaJapanesecarrierShohosunkZuikakuandShokakudamaged-unavailableatMidwayJapanesetacticalvictoryTookmorekillsU.S.strategicvictoryJapaneseadvancetemporarilyhaltedJapaneseCarrierShokakuUSSLexington(CV2)BattleofMidway

3-6June1942BattleofMidway

3-6June1942Yamamoto’sobjective:LureoutanddestroyU.S.carrierforcesCarrierraidandinvasionbackedbyentireJapaneseCombinedFleetYamamotodivideshisforcesOverlyconfidentTwocarriersandinvasionforceattacktheAleutiansTheySTILLhaveanoverwhelmingforceU.S.DisadvantagesandAdvantagesHeavilyoutnumberedInferioraircraftsusceptibletoattacksbyJapanese“Zeros”AirfieldonMidwayIsland-unsinkablecarrierInterceptionanddecodingofJapanesecommunicationsVirtuallycompleteinformationregardingYamamoto'sfleet,tacticaldisposition,androutesofapproach.RadarCommandersNimitz-OverallcommandfromPearlHarborHalseyill,replacedbyRearAdmiralRaymondA.SpruanceFletcher-TacticalcommandfromrepairedYorktownYamamoto-OverallcommandaboardbattleshipYamatoNagumo-CarrierStrikingForceJapanese“Zero”aircrafttechnologicallysuperior.EarlyJapaneseadvantage-U.S.attacksarerepulsed.Admiral

ChuichiNagumoCommanderJapaneseCarrierStrikingForceBattleofMidwayRearAdmiral

FrankJackFletcherCommanderTaskForce17USSYorktown(CV5)RearAdmiral

RaymondA.SpruanceCommanderTaskForce16USSHornet(CV5)USSEnterprise(CV6)Battleof

MidwayMitsubishiA6M“Zero”TBD-1DevastatorTorpedoBombersUSSYorktown(CV5)SBD-3DauntlessDiveBombersF4FWildcatsUSSEnterprise(CV6)USSHornet(CV8)CaptainMarcMitscher,CommandingOfficerUSSYorktown(CV5)Damagedbyairstrikeson4June.Sunkbysubmarinetorpedoattackon7June.JapaneseCarriers

Kaga,Akagi,andSoryuUSSYorktown(CV5)USSYorktown(CV5)SubmarinesinthePacificUnrestrictedSubmarineWarfareCommencesagainstJapanimmediatelyfollowingPearlHarborattackbyorderofCNOAdmiralKing.“Weshallneverforgetthatitwasoursubmarinesthatheldthelinesagainsttheenemywhileourfleetsreplacedlossesandrepairedwounds.”

-FleetAdmiralChesterNimitz,1947BreakTime…………….WhenWeResume:TheUSNavyandtheOffensivePhaseU.S.AircraftProductionJapanandGermanyhadearlyadvantageinairwar:MesserschmitME-109MitsubishiA6MZeroU.S.aircraftindustryproduceshigherperformanceaircraftAmericanindustrialbaseallowsrapidandmassproductionNewflighttrainingprogramsdevelopedU.S.gainsadvantageinairwarfareAirsupremacyeventuallyestablishedinbothEuropeanandPacifictheatersA6M“Zero”or“Zeke”FighterF2A“Buffalo”FighterF4F“Wildcat”FighterWildcatsontheProwlF6F“Hellcat”FighterF4UCorsairFighterSBD“Dauntless”DiveBomberSB2C“Helldiver”DiveBomberTBF“Avenger”TorpedoBomberPBY“Catalina”ScoutU.S.SubmarineForceU.S.SubmarineWarfareSimultaneouslywithDualadvance,USconductswaroncommerceUnrestrictedSubmarineWarfareorderedimmediatelyafterPearlHarbor--newroleforU.S.submarinesEarlyoperationalproblems-1942-43:Undependabletorpedoes-poorlydesignedmagneticfusing.Manycommanderswereexcessivelycautious.SubsinBattleBataanandCorregidor,PhilippinesSuppliedbysubmarinesfromtheAsiaticFleetEvacuationofpersonnelBattleofMidwayGuardedapproachestotheislandGuadalcanalCampaignBegintobemoreeffectiveatfleetoperationsU.S.SubmarineWarfareLate1943:TorpedofusingproblemscorrectedRadarinstalledandsonarimprovedCentralPacificAdvanceInitiallyuncontestedbyJapaneseNavyBattlesofthePhilippineSeaandLeyteGulfU.S.submarinessupportfleetandamphibiousoperationsJapanesebattleshipandcarrierssunkU.S.SubmarineWarfareSearchandrescueofdownednavalaviatorsCommerceraidingofJapaneseshippingfromEastIndiesBy1945-3/4oftheJapanesemerchantfleetsunkHighcasualtyratesamongsubmarinecrews:Rotationpolicy:20%ofcrewtransferredaftereachpatrol.JapaneseSubmarineWarfareLongLancetorpedo-smallervariantforsubmarinesFocusedattacksonU.S.warshipsandavoidedsupplyshipsUsedtoscreenandscoutforbattlefleets“Warriorethos”ofJapanesenavalleadersUsedforsupplyofbypassedgarrisonsJapaneseSubmarineWarfareBattleofMidwayFailedtointerceptU.S.carrierforcesTorpedoedUSSYorktownundertowGuadalcanalCampaignUSSSaratogatorpedoedJanuary1942USSWaspsunkUSSIndianapolissunk

--July1945-sharkattacksPreludetoGuadalcanalJapaneseleadershipshockedbydefeatatMidwayCancelplanstotakeFiji,Samoa,andNewCaledoniaMustproceedwithplantotakePortMoresbyWithinbomberrangeofmajornavaloperatingbaseatRabaulJapanesebeginbuildingairfieldatGuadalcanalPreludetoGuadalcanalNimitzmovestoreinforceSouthPacificAreaProtectvitalsealinesofcommunicationwithAustralia.ViceAdmiralRobertL.GhormleyCommanderSouthPacificOceanArea(SubordinatetoNimitz).TwobasesestablishedinNewHebrides.Army-NavyDisputeMacArthurproposesretakingRabaulWantsNavytolethimborrowFirstMarineDivisionAdmiralKingObjectstoMacarthur'splanProposesstep-by-stepadvancethroughSolomonstore-takeRabaul.NimitzandGhormleyincommandwithMarinesmakingamphibiousassaultsandNavyprovidingsupport.ArmyforcesusedasgarrisonsforislandsOperationWatchtowerCompromiseThree-StagePlanofOperationsInitialadvanceinEasternSolomonsunderNimitzBoundarybetweenAreasmovedwestMacArthurtakescommandafterTulagisecured

GudalcanalCampaignAug1942-Feb1943

WhoevercontrolledanairfieldwouldcontrolairovertheSolomonsVitalSLOCForbothsidesitsymbolizedoffensiveratherthandefensivewarfareGuadalcanalForceCommandersAdmiralRobertL.GhormleyoverallcommandofWatchtowerRearAdmiralRichmondKellyTurner-AmphibiousForcesViceAdmiralFrankJackFletchercarriergroupProvidedsupportagainstJapanesefleetduringdayGeneral

ArcherVandegriftCommander-FirstMarineDivisionAmphibiouslandingvirtuallyunopposedMarinestakeHendersonField-“CactusAirForce”.GuadalcanalRiverCrossing“See-Saw”PatternJapandominatesnighttimeaction.“TokyoExpress”down“TheSlot”into“IronbottomSound”U.S.dominatesdaytimewithshoreandcarrieraircraftActionsBattleofSavoIsland,8-9August1942BattleoftheEasternSolomons,24August1942BattleoftheSantaCruzIslands,26-27October,1942“NavalBattleofGudalcanal”,12-13November,1942GuadalcanalCampaignBattleofSavoIsland-AlliesdefeatedinnightsurfaceactionBattleoftheEasternSolomons-carrierbattleUSSEnterprisedamagedbybombersUSSWaspsunkandSaratogadamagedbyJapanesesubmarinesBattleofSantaCruzIslandsHalseyrelievesGhormley-18October1942RearAdmiralThomasC.KinkaidHornetsunkandEnterprisedamagedNooperationalcarriersleftZuihoandShokakubadlydamagedTacticaldefeatbystrategicvictory?…maybeNavalBattleRearAdmiralWillisA.LeeusesRADARtohisadvantagetowinnighttimenavalbattleWashingtonandSouthDakotaoutfightJapanesebattleshipsWarshipsfleeTransportsbeachthemselvesGuadalcanalCampaign1stMarineDivisionrelievedbyArmy’s25thInfantryDivisionJapaneseforcesevacuateGuadalcanalU.S.forcesbeginadvanceupSolomonIslandsLand-basedairfieldsestablishedMarineCorps’“BlackSheep”Squadron(VMF-214)CommandedbyMajGreg“Pappy”BoyingtonMedalofHonorRecipientMacArthurdrivesJapanesefromeasternPapuaCapturesmainJapanesebaseatBunaAftermathBothsidessufferedheavylossesU.Slosesmoretonnageatsea,carriersJapanlosesmorelivesJapanallowedtodominateseaatnightwhileU.S.dominatesdayBattledragsonfromAug42-Feb43AftermathMacArthursuccessfulindrivingJapanesefromPapuanPeninsulaByFeb43JapplansforoffensivesinS.andWPacificstoppedcoldKingusesCasablancaConferencetoallocatemoreresourcestoPacificReconquestofAttuandKiskaAleutianIslands

(January-May1943)Norealthreattosecurity.NecessarytoendJapanesecontrolofAmericanterritoryforpoliticalreasons.BattleoftheKomondorskisLastclassicsurfaceshipbattle.AmericansattackheavilyguardedJapaneseconvoy.MinimalresistanceonAttu,noneonKiska.OperationCartwheelTheSolomonsCampaignHalseygoestoworkforMcArthurLeadsAmphibiousAssaultfromGuadalcanalalongSolomonsMcArthurwantsdirectassaultonRabaulKingandMarshalloverrulehimCaptureeveryislandBUTRabaultoisolateitRabaulbecomesisolatedandinsignificantOntothePhillipines(October1944)TheDefeatofJapanObjective:ThePhilippinesandthepenetrationoftheJapaneseinnerdefensezone!TheAdvancePacific“Thrust”AmphibsupportViceAdmiralRaymondSpruanceSignificantcampaigns:GilbertsMarshallsMarianasEssexClass

FastCarrierTheGilberts(Tarawa)NewfleetorganizationduetonewEssexClasscarrierfleetproductionObjectivetogainairfieldonBetioIslandtolaunchfurtherattacksinCentralPacificDrive3dayscostUS>3,000marinesMarinesatTarawaTarawaKwajaleinAtollTheMarshallsAftertheGilberts,concernfordeathtollinMarshallsNimitzordersRADMMITSCHERattackonAirpowerDestroysJapaneseForceKwajaleinsuccessfurtherstotherestoftheislandsTotalMarshalllosslessthanfirstdayofTarawaOntoMarianasTheMarianasDrawsoutJapaneseFleetBattleofPhilippineSea,19-20June1944“TheGreatMarianasTurkeyShoot”346Japplanesdowned3JapcarrierssunkClassicMahanianengagementLiberationofthePhilippinesU.S.advancecontinuesafterMarianasCampaignMacarthur'sforcescaptureNewGuineaAirstrikesinthePhillipineswipeouttwohundredaircraftBypasssmallerislandsandheadtoLeyteGulfearlyfrom20Decemberto20OctoberBattle

of

LeyteGulfBattleofLeyteGulf24-25October1944LargestbattleinallofnavalhistoryU.S.commandstructureremainsdividedandconfusedU.S.landingsinLeyteGulfMacArthur“returns”Battle

of

LeyteGulf“Incaseopportunityfordestructionofthemajorportionoftheenemyfleetisofferedorcanbecreated,suchdestructionbecomestheprimarytask.” --StandingOrderof FleetAdmiralNimitz“Whereis,repeatwhereis,TaskForce34?Theworldwonders.” --Nimitz’(messagetoHalseyduringthebattle.)Admiral

MarcMitscherCommanderFastCarrierTaskForceBattleofLeyteGulfBattleofLeyteGulfJapaneseCombinedFleetdividedintothreeforces:NorthernCentralSouthernJapanesed