chapter平狄克微观经济学实用

会计学1chapter平狄克微观经济学实用Slide2TopicstobeDiscussedCapturingConsumerSurplusPriceDiscriminationIntertemporalPriceDiscriminationandPeak-LoadPricing第1页/共113页Slide3TopicstobeDiscussedTheTwo-PartTariffBundlingAdvertising第2页/共113页Slide4IntroductionPricingwithoutmarketpower(perfectcompetition)isdeterminedbymarketsupplyanddemand.Theindividualproducermustbeabletoforecastthemarketandthenconcentrateonmanagingproduction(cost)tomaximizeprofits.第3页/共113页Slide5IntroductionPricingwithmarketpower(imperfectcompetition)requirestheindividualproducertoknowmuchmoreaboutthecharacteristicsofdemandaswellasmanageproduction.第4页/共113页Slide6CapturingConsumerSurplusQuantity$/QDMRPmaxMCIfpriceisraisedaboveP*,thefirmwilllosesalesandreduceprofit.PCPCisthepricethatwouldexistinaperfectlycompetitivemarket.AP*Q*P1Between0andQ*,consumerswillpaymorethanP*--consumersurplus(A).BP2BeyondQ*,pricewillhavetofalltocreateaconsumersurplus(B).第5页/共113页Slide7CapturingConsumerSurplusP*Q*:singleP&Q@MC=MRA:consumersurpluswithP*B:

P>MC&consumerwouldbuyatalowerpriceP1:lesssalesandprofitsP2:increasesales&andreducerevenueandprofitsPC:competitivepriceQuantity$/QDMRPmaxMCPCAP*Q*P1BP2第6页/共113页Slide8CapturingConsumerSurplusQuantity$/QDMRPmaxMCPCAP*Q*P1BP2QuestionHowcanthefirmcapturetheconsumersurplusinAandsellprofitablyinB?AnswerPricediscriminationTwo-parttariffsBundling第7页/共113页Slide9CapturingConsumerSurplusPricediscriminationisthechargingofdifferentpricestodifferentconsumersforsimilargoods.第8页/共113页Slide10PriceDiscriminationFirstDegreePriceDiscriminationChargeaseparatepricetoeachcustomer:themaximumorreservationpricetheyarewillingtopay.第9页/共113页Slide11P*Q*Withoutpricediscrimination,outputisQ*andpriceisP*.VariableprofitistheareabetweentheMC&MR(yellow).AdditionalProfitFromPerfectFirst-DegreePriceDiscriminationQuantity$/QPmaxWithperfectdiscrimination,eachconsumerpaysthemaximumpricetheyarewillingtopay.ConsumersurplusistheareaaboveP*andbetween0andQ*output.D=ARMRMCOutputexpandstoQ**andpricefallstoPCwhereMC=MR=AR=D.ProfitsincreasebytheareaaboveMCbetweenoldMRandDtooutputQ**(purple)Q**PC第10页/共113页Slide12P*Q*ConsumersurpluswhenasinglepriceP*ischarged.VariableprofitwhenasinglepriceP*ischarged.AdditionalprofitfromperfectpricediscriminationQuantity$/QPmaxD=ARMRMCQ**PCWithperfectdiscriminationEachcustomerpaystheirreservationpriceProfitsincreaseAdditionalProfitFromPerfectFirst-DegreePriceDiscrimination第11页/共113页Slide13QuestionWhywouldaproducerhavedifficultyinachievingfirst-degreepricediscrimination?Answer1) Toomanycustomers(impractical)2) Couldnotestimatethereservation priceforeachcustomerAdditionalProfitFromPerfectFirst-DegreePriceDiscrimination第12页/共113页Slide14PriceDiscriminationFirstDegreePriceDiscriminationThemodeldoesdemonstratethepotentialprofit(incentive)ofpracticingpricediscriminationtosomedegree.第13页/共113页Slide15PriceDiscriminationFirstDegreePriceDiscriminationExamplesofimperfectpricediscriminationwherethesellerhastheabilitytosegregatethemarkettosomeextentandchargedifferentpricesforthesameproduct:Lawyers,doctors,accountantsCarsalesperson(15%profitmargin)Collegesanduniversities第14页/共113页Slide16First-DegreePrice

DiscriminationinPracticeQuantityDMRMC$/QP2P3P*4P5P6P1Sixpricesexistresultinginhigherprofits.WithasinglepriceP*4,therearefewconsumersandthosewhopayP5orP6mayhaveasurplus.Q第15页/共113页Second-DegreePriceDiscriminationQuantity$/QDMRMCACP0Q0Withoutdiscrimination:P=P0

andQ=Q0.Withsecond-degreediscriminationtherearethreepricesP1,P2,andP3.(e.g.electricutilities)P1Q11stBlockP2Q2P3Q32ndBlock3rdBlockSecond-degreepricediscriminationispricingaccordingtoquantityconsumed--orinblocks.第16页/共113页Second-DegreePriceDiscriminationQuantity$/QDMRMCACP0Q0P1Q11stBlockP2Q2P3Q32ndBlock3rdBlockEconomiesofscalepermit:IncreaseconsumerwelfareHigherprofits第17页/共113页Slide19PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscrimination 1) Dividesthemarketintotwo-groups. 2) Eachgrouphasitsowndemand function.第18页/共113页Slide20PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscrimination 3) Mostcommontypeofprice discrimination.Examples:airlines,liquor,vegetables,discountstostudentsandseniorcitizens.第19页/共113页Slide21PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscrimination 4) Third-degreepricediscriminationis feasiblewhenthesellercan separatehis/hermarketintogroups whohavedifferentpriceelasticities ofdemand(e.g.businessair travelersversusvacationair travelers)第20页/共113页Slide22PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationObjectivesMR1=MR2MC1=MR1andMC2=MR2MR1=MR2=MC第21页/共113页Slide23PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationP1:pricefirstgroupP2:pricesecondgroupC(Qr)=totalcostofQT=Q1+Q2Profit()=P1Q1+P2Q2-C(Qr)第22页/共113页Slide24PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationSetincrementalforsalestogroup1=0

第23页/共113页Slide25PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationSecondgroupofcustomers:MR2=MCMR1=MR2=MC

第24页/共113页Slide26PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationDeterminingrelativeprices

第25页/共113页Slide27PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationDeterminingrelativeprices

Pricing:Chargehigherpricetogroupwithalowdemandelasticity第26页/共113页Slide28PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationExample:E1=-2&E2=-4

P1

shouldbe1.5timesashighasP2第27页/共113页Slide29Third-DegreePriceDiscriminationQuantityD2=AR2MR2$/QD1=AR1MR1Consumersaredividedintotwogroups,withseparatedemandcurvesforeachgroup.MRTMRT=MR1+MR2第28页/共113页Slide30Third-DegreePriceDiscriminationQuantityD2=AR2MR2$/QD1=AR1MR1MRTMCQ2P2QTQT:MC=MRTGroup1:P1Q1;moreelasticGroup2:P2Q2;moreinelasticMR1=MR2=MCQTcontrolMCQ1P1MC=MR1atQ1andP1第29页/共113页Slide31NoSalestoSmallerMarketEvenifthird-degreepricediscriminationisfeasible,itdoesn’talwayspaytoselltobothgroupsofconsumersifmarginalcostisrising.第30页/共113页Slide32NoSalestoSmallerMarketQuantityD2MR2$/QMCD1MR1Q*P*Groupone,withdemandD1,arenotwillingtopayenoughforthegoodtomakepricediscriminationprofitable.第31页/共113页Slide33TheEconomicsofCouponsandRebatesThoseconsumerswhoaremorepriceelasticwilltendtousethecoupon/rebatemoreoftenwhentheypurchasetheproductthanthoseconsumerswithalesselasticdemand.Couponsandrebateprogramsallowfirmstopricediscriminate.PriceDiscrimination第32页/共113页Slide34PriceElasticitiesofDemandforUsersVersusNonusersofCouponsToilet

tissue -0.60 -0.66Stuffing/dressing -0.71 -0.96Shampoo -0.84 -1.04Cooking/saladoil -1.22 -1.32Drymixdinner -0.88 -1.09Cakemix -0.21 -0.43PriceElasticityProduct Nonusers Users第33页/共113页Slide35Catfood -0.49 -1.13Frozenentrée -0.60 -0.95Gelatin -0.97 -1.25Spaghettisauce -1.65 -1.81Crèmerinse/conditioner -0.82 -1.12Soup -1.05 -1.22Hotdogs -0.59 -0.77PriceElasticityProduct Nonusers UsersPriceElasticitiesofDemandforUsersVersusNonusersofCoupons第34页/共113页Slide36TheEconomicsofCouponsandRebatesCakeMixNonusersofcoupons:PE=-0.21Users:PE=-0.43第35页/共113页Slide37TheEconomicsofCouponsandRebatesCakeMixBrand(Pillsbury)PE:8to10timescakemixPEExamplePEUsers:-4PENonusers:-2第36页/共113页Slide38TheEconomicsofCouponsandRebatesUsing:Priceofnonusersshouldbe1.5timesusersOr,ifcakemixsellsfor$1.50,couponsshouldbe50cents

第37页/共113页Slide39AirlineFaresDifferencesinelasticitiesimplythatsomecustomerswillpayahigherfarethanothers.Businesstravelershavefewchoicesandtheirdemandislesselastic.Casualtravelershavechoicesandaremorepricesensitive.第38页/共113页Slide40Elasticitiesof

DemandforAirTravel

Price -0.3 -0.4 -0.9Income 1.2 1.2 1.8FareCategoryElasticity First-Class UnrestrictedCoach Discount第39页/共113页Slide41AirlineFaresTheairlinesseparatethemarketbysettingvariousrestrictionsonthetickets.Lessexpensive:notice,stayovertheweekend,norefundMostexpensive:norestrictions第40页/共113页Slide42IntertemporalPrice

DiscriminationandPeak-LoadPricingSeparatingtheMarketWithTimeInitialreleaseofaproduct,thedemandisinelasticBookMovieComputer第41页/共113页Slide43SeparatingtheMarketWithTimeOncethismarkethasyieldedamaximumprofit,firmslowerthepricetoappealtoageneralmarketwithamoreelasticdemandPaperbackbooksDollarMoviesDiscountcomputersIntertemporalPrice

DiscriminationandPeak-LoadPricing第42页/共113页Slide44IntertemporalPriceDiscriminationQuantityAC=MC$/QOvertime,demandbecomesmoreelasticandpriceisreducedtoappealtothemassmarket.Q2MR2D2=AR2P2D1=AR1MR1P1Q1Consumersaredividedintogroupsovertime.Initially,demandislesselasticresultinginapriceofP1.第43页/共113页Slide45Demandforsomeproductsmaypeakatparticulartimes.RushhourtrafficElectricity-latesummerafternoonsSkiresortsonweekendsIntertemporalPrice

DiscriminationandPeak-LoadPricingPeak-LoadPricing第44页/共113页Slide46CapacityrestraintswillalsoincreaseMC.IncreasedMRandMCwouldindicateahigherprice.Peak-LoadPricingIntertemporalPrice

DiscriminationandPeak-LoadPricing第45页/共113页Slide47MRisnotequalforeachmarketbecauseonemarketdoesnotimpacttheothermarket.Peak-LoadPricingIntertemporalPrice

DiscriminationandPeak-LoadPricing第46页/共113页Slide48MR1D1=AR1MCP1Q1Peak-loadprice=P1.Peak-LoadPricingQuantity$/QMR2D2=AR2Off-loadprice=P2.Q2P2第47页/共113页Slide49HowtoPriceaBestSellingNovelWhatDoYouThink? 1) Howwouldyouarriveatthepricefor theinitialreleaseofthehardbound editionofabook?第48页/共113页Slide50HowtoPriceaBestSellingNovelWhatDoYouThink? 2) Howlongdoyouwaittoreleasethe paperbackedition?Couldthe popularityofthebookimpactyour decision?第49页/共113页Slide51WhatDoYouThink? 3) Howdoyoudeterminethepricefor thepaperbackedition? HowtoPriceaBestSellingNovel第50页/共113页Slide52TheTwo-PartTariffThepurchaseofsomeproductsandservicescanbeseparatedintotwodecisions,andtherefore,twoprices.第51页/共113页Slide53TheTwo-PartTariffExamples 1) AmusementParkPaytoenterPayforridesandfoodwithinthepark 2) TennisClubPaytojoinPaytoplay第52页/共113页Slide54TheTwo-PartTariffExamples 3) RentalofMainframeComputersFlatFeeProcessingTime 4) SafetyRazorPayforrazorPayforblades第53页/共113页Slide55TheTwo-PartTariffExamples 5) PolaroidFilmPayforthecameraPayforthefilm第54页/共113页Slide56TheTwo-PartTariffPricingdecisionissettingtheentryfee(T)andtheusagefee(P).Choosingthetrade-offbetweenfree-entryandhighusepricesorhigh-entryandzerouseprices.第55页/共113页Slide57UsagepriceP*issetwhereMC=D.EntrypriceT*

isequaltotheentireconsumersurplus.T*Two-PartTariffwithaSingleConsumerQuantity$/QMCP*D第56页/共113页Slide58D2=consumer2D1=consumer1Q1Q2Theprice,P*,willbegreaterthanMC.SetT*atthesurplusvalueofD2.T*Two-PartTariffwithTwoConsumersQuantity$/QMCABC第57页/共113页Slide59TheTwo-PartTariffTheTwo-PartTariffWithManyDifferentConsumersNoexactwaytodetermineP*andT*.Mustconsiderthetrade-offbetweentheentryfeeT*andtheusefeeP*.Lowentryfee:Highsalesandfallingprofitwithlowerpriceandmoreentrants.第58页/共113页Slide60TheTwo-PartTariffTheTwo-PartTariffWithManyDifferentConsumersTofindoptimumcombination,chooseseveralcombinationsofP,T.Choosethecombinationthatmaximizesprofit.第59页/共113页Slide61Two-PartTariffwith

ManyDifferentConsumersTProfit:entryfee:salesT*Totalprofitisthesumoftheprofitfromtheentryfeeandtheprofitfromsales.BothdependonT.第60页/共113页Slide62TheTwo-PartTariffRuleofThumbSimilardemand:ChoosePclosetoMCandhighTDissimilardemand:ChoosehighPandlowT.第61页/共113页Slide63TheTwo-PartTariffTwo-PartTariffWithATwistEntryprice(T)entitlesthebuyertoacertainnumberoffreeunitsGilletterazorswithseveralbladesAmusementparkswithsometokensOn-linewithfreetime第62页/共113页Slide64PolaroidCameras1971PolaroidintroducedtheSX-70cameraWhatDoYouThink?Howwouldyoupricethecameraandfilm?第63页/共113页Slide65PolaroidCamerasHint第64页/共113页Slide66PricingCellularPhoneServiceQuestionWhydocellularphoneprovidersofferseveraldifferentplansinsteadofasingletwo-parttariffwithanaccessfeeandper-unitcharge?第65页/共113页Slide67BundlingBundlingispackagingtwoormoreproductstogainapricingadvantage.ConditionsnecessaryforbundlingHeterogeneouscustomersPricediscriminationisnotpossibleDemandsmustbenegativelycorrelated第66页/共113页Slide68BundlingAnexample:Leasing“GonewiththeWind”&“GettingGertiesGarter.”Thereservationpricesforeachtheaterandmovieare:GonewiththeWind GettingGertie’sGarterTheaterA $12,000 $3,000TheaterB $10,000 $4,000第67页/共113页Slide69BundlingRentingthemoviesseparatelywouldresultineachtheaterpayingthelowestreservationpriceforeachmovie:MaximumpriceWind=$10,000MaximumpriceGertie=$3,000TotalRevenue=$26,000第68页/共113页Slide70BundlingIfthemoviesarebundled:TheaterAwillpay$15,000forbothTheaterBwillpay$14,000forbothIfeachwerechargedthelowerofthetwoprices,totalrevenuewillbe$28,000.第69页/共113页Slide71BundlingNegativeCorrelated:ProfitabletoBundleApaysmoreforWind($12,000)thanB($10,000).BpaysmoreforGertie($4,000)thanA($3,000).RelativeValuations第70页/共113页Slide72BundlingIfthedemandswerepositivelycorrelated(TheaterAwouldpaymoreforbothfilmsasshown)bundlingwouldnotresultinanincreaseinrevenue.GonewiththeWind GettingGertie’sGarterTheaterA $12,000 $4,000TheaterB $10,000 $3,000RelativeValuations第71页/共113页Slide73BundlingIfthemoviesarebundled:TheaterAwillpay$16,000forbothTheaterBwillpay$13,000forbothIfeachwerechargedthelowerofthetwoprices,totalrevenuewillbe$26,000,thesameasbysellingthefilmsseparately.第72页/共113页Slide74BundlingBundlingScenario:TwodifferentgoodsandmanyconsumersManyconsumerswithdifferentreservationpricecombinationsfortwogoods第73页/共113页Slide75ReservationPricesr2(reservationpriceGood2)r1

(reservationpriceGood1)$5$10$5$10$6$3.25$8.25$3.25ConsumerAConsumerCConsumerBConsumerAiswillingtopayupto$3.25forgood1andupto$6forgood2.第74页/共113页Slide76ConsumptionDecisionsWhen

ProductsareSoldSeparatelyr2r1P2IIConsumersbuyonlygood2P1Consumersfallintofourcategoriesbasedontheirreservationprice.IConsumersbuybothgoodsIIIConsumersbuyneithergoodIVConsumersbuyonlyGood1第75页/共113页Slide77ConsumptionDecisions

WhenProductsareBundledr2r1Consumersbuythebundlewhenr1+r2>PB

(PB=bundleprice).PB=r1+r2orr2=PB-r1Region1:r>PBRegion2:r<PBr2=PB-r1IIIConsumersbuybundle(r>PB)Consumersdonotbuybundle(r<PB)第76页/共113页Slide78Theeffectivenessofbundlingdependsuponthedegreeofnegativecorrelationbetweenthetwodemands.ConsumptionDecisions

WhenProductsareBundled第77页/共113页Slide79ReservationPricesr2r1P2P1Ifthedemandsareperfectlypositivelycorrelated,thefirmwillnotgainbybundling.Itwouldearnthesameprofitbysellingthegoodsseparately.第78页/共113页Slide80ReservationPricesr2r1Ifthedemandsareperfectlynegativelycorrelatedbundlingistheidealstrategy--alltheconsumersurpluscanbeextractedandahigherprofitresults.第79页/共113页Slide81MovieExampler2r1Bundlingpaysduetonegativecorrelation(Wind)(Gertie)5,00014,00010,0005,00010,00012,0004,0003,000BA第80页/共113页Slide82BundlingMixedBundlingSellingbothasabundleandseparatelyPureBundlingSellingonlyapackage第81页/共113页Slide83MixedVersusPureBundlingr2r1102030405060708090100102030405060708090100C2=MC2C2=30ConsumerA,forexample,hasareservationpriceforgood1thatisbelowmarginalcostc1.Withmixedbundling,consumerAisinducedtobuyonlygood2,whileconsumerDisinducedtobuyonlygood1,reducingthefirm’scost.ABDCC1=MC1C1=20Withpositivemarginalcosts,mixedbundlingmaybemoreprofitablethanpurebundling.第82页/共113页Slide84BundlingScenarioPerfectnegativecorrelationSignificantmarginalcostMixedvs.PureBundling第83页/共113页Slide85BundlingObservationsReservationpriceisbelowMCforsomeconsumersMixedbundlinginducestheconsumerstobuyonlygoodsforwhichtheirreservationpriceisgreaterthanMCMixedvs.PureBundling第84页/共113页Slide86BundlingExampleSellSeparatelyConsumersB,C,andDbuy1andAbuys2PureBundlingConsumersA,B,C,andDbuythebundleMixedBundlingConsumerDbuys1,Abuys2,andB&Cbuysthebundle第85页/共113页Slide87BundlingExampleSellseparately $50 $90 ---- $150Purebundling ---- ---- $100 $200Mixedbundling $89.95 $89.95 $100 $229.90C1=$20

C2=$30P1P2PBProfit第86页/共113页Slide88BundlingSellSeparately3($50-$20)+1($90-$30)=$150PureBundling4($100-$20-$30)=$200MixedBundling($89.95-$20)+($89.95-$30)-2($100-$20-$30)=$229.90C1=$20C2=$30第87页/共113页Slide89BundlingQuestionIfMC=0,wouldmixedbundlingstillbethemostprofitablestrategywithperfectnegativecorrelation?第88页/共113页Slide90MixedBundling

withZeroMarginalCostsr2r12040608010020406080100120120Inthisexample,consumersBandC

arewillingtopay$20moreforthebundlethanareconsumersAandD.Withmixedbundling,thepriceofthebundlecanbeincreasedto$120.A&Dcanbecharged$90forasinglegood.C10901090ABD第89页/共113页Slide91Sellseparately $80 $80 ---- $320Purebundling ---- ---- $100 $400Mixedbundling $90 $90 $120 $420P1P2PBProfitMixedBundling

withZeroMarginalCosts第90页/共113页Slide92BundlingQuestionWhyismixedbundlingmoreprofitablewithMC=0?第91页/共113页Slide93BundlingBundlinginPracticeAutomobileoptionpackagesVacationtravelCabletelevision第92页/共113页Slide94BundlingMixedBundlinginPracticeUseofmarketsurveystodeterminereservationpricesDesignapricingstrategyfromthesurveyresults第93页/共113页Slide95MixedBundlinginPracticer2r1ThefirmcanfirstchooseapriceforthebundleandthentryindividualpricesP1

andP2untiltotalprofitisroughlymaximized.P2PBPBP1Thedotsareestimatesofreservationpricesforarepresentativesampleofconsumers.第94页/共113页Slide96TheCompleteDinnerVersusalaCarte:

ARestaurant’sPricingProblemPricingtomatchconsumerpreferencesforvariousselectionsMixedbundlingallowsthecustomertogetmaximumutilityfromagivenexpenditurebyallowingagreaternumberofchoices.第95页/共113页Slide97BundlingTyingPracticeofrequiringacustomertopurchaseonegoodinordertopurchaseanother.ExamplesXeroxmachinesandthepaperIBMmainframeandcomputercards第96页/共113页Slide98BundlingTyingAllowsthesellertometerthecustomeranduseatwo-parttarifftodiscriminateagainsttheheavyuserMcDonald’sAllowsthemtoprotecttheirbrandname.第97页/共113页Slide99AdvertisingAssumptionsFirmsetsonlyonepriceFirmknowsQ(P,A)Howquantitydemandeddep