清洁能源展望2022 分析与评论

2022

ISSN1831-9424

CLEANENERGYOUTLOOKS:

ANALYSISANDCRITICALREVIEW

EUR31261EN

ThispublicationisaTechnicalreportbytheJointResearchCentre(JRC),theEuropeanCommission’sscienceandknowledgeservice.Itaimstoprovideevidence-basedscientificsupporttotheEuropeanpolicymakingprocess.ThescientificoutputexpresseddoesnotimplyapolicypositionoftheEuropeanCommission.NeithertheEuropeanCommissionnoranypersonactingonbehalfoftheCommissionisresponsiblefortheusethatmightbemadeofthispublication.ForinformationonthemethodologyandqualityunderlyingthedatausedinthispublicationforwhichthesourceisneitherEurostatnorotherCommissionservices,usersshouldcontactthereferencedsource.ThedesignationsemployedandthepresentationofmaterialonthemapsdonotimplytheexpressionofanyopinionwhatsoeveronthepartoftheEuropeanUnionconcerningthelegalstatusofanycountry,territory,cityorareaorofitsauthorities,orconcerningthedelimitationofitsfrontiersorboundaries.

Contactinformation

Name:TarvydasD.

Email:Dalius.TARVYDAS@ec.europa.eu

Tel.:+3122456-513

EUScienceHub

https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu

JRC130719

EUR31261EN

PDFISBN978-92-76-57878-9ISSN1831-9424doi:

10.2760/309952

KJ-NA-31-261-EN-N

Luxembourg:PublicationsOfficeoftheEuropeanUnion,2022

©EuropeanUnion,2022

ThereusepolicyoftheEuropeanCommissiondocumentsisimplementedbytheCommissionDecision2011/833/EUof12December2011onthereuseofCommissiondocuments(OJL330,14.12.2011,p.39).Unlessotherwisenoted,thereuseofthisdocumentisauthorisedundertheCreativeCommonsAttribution4.0International(CCBY4.0)licence

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TheEuropeanUnion/EuropeanAtomicEnergyCommunitydoesnotownthecopyrightinrelationtothefollowingelements:Coverpageillustration-©

Howtocitethisreport:TarvydasD.,CleanEnergyTechnologyObservatory:CleanEnergyOutlooks:AnalysisandCriticalReview–2022StatusReportonTechnologyDevelopment,Trends,ValueChainsandMarkets,PublicationsOfficeoftheEuropeanUnion,Luxembourg,2022,doi:10.2760/309952,JRC130719.

i

Contents

Abstract 1

Foreword 2

Acknowledgements 3

ExecutiveSummary 4

1Introduction 6

2Energyscenarios 8

2.1Background 8

2.2Selectioncriteria 8

2.3Methodologicalapproach 12

3Energysystemdevelopmentsinlowcarbonfutures 13

3.1Primaryenergy 13

3.2Energyuseinsectors 14

3.3Greenhousegasemissions 17

3.4Macro-economics 19

3.5Investmentinrenewablegenerationcapacities 21

4Lowcarbonenergytechnologyoutlooks 23

4.1Bioenergy 23

4.2Solarenergy 28

4.3Geothermal 32

4.4Heatpumps 35

4.5Hydrogen 36

4.6Hydro 40

4.7Ocean 43

4.8Wind 46

5Conclusions 50

References 53

Listofabbreviationsanddefinitions 56

Listoffigures 57

.

1

Abstract

Thereportassessesenergyscenariostudiespublishedbymajorintergovernmentalorganisations,industry,academiaandNGOsbetweenthebeginningof2019andtheendof2021.Itprovidesanaggregatedviewofpossiblefuturedevelopmenttrendsonselectedlowcarbonenergytechnologygroups:bioenergy,solarenergy,geothermalenergy,ambientheat,hydrogen,hydropower,oceanenergyandwindenergy.IthighlightsthepossibleroleofthesetechnologiesintheenergymixgloballyandintheEU,aswellastheEUshareindeploymentofthesetechnologies.

Acomparisonofenergyscenarioscreatedbydifferentactorscanfacilitateabetterunderstandingoftherolethatthesetechnologiescouldplayinfutureenergysystems,howtheymightinteractwitheachother,whatisneededtointegratethemintoexistingsystemsandhowtheycouldbeaffectedbysocialandbehaviouralchanges.Thereportdistilsviewsonthemaintechnologiesdrivingthedecarbonisationeffort,asseenbyenergyscenariostudiesinamediumterm(2030)andlongterm(2050)timeframe,averagingtheeffortneededanddiscussingthepossibleassumptionsbehindtheoutliers.

2

Foreword

ThisreportisanoutputoftheCleanEnergyTechnologyObservatory(CETO).CETO’sobjectiveistoprovideanevidence-basedanalysisfeedingthepolicymakingprocessandhenceincreasingtheeffectivenessofR&Ipoliciesforcleanenergytechnologiesandsolutions.ItmonitorsEUresearchandinnovationactivitiesoncleanenergytechnologiesneededforthedeliveryoftheEuropeanGreenDeal;andassessesthecompetitivenessoftheEUcleanenergysectoranditspositioningintheglobalenergymarket.

CETOisbeingimplementedbytheJointResearchCentreforDGResearchandInnovationEnergy,incoordinationwithDGEnergy.

3

Acknowledgements

Theauthorisparticularlygratefulforthecommentsandcontributionsreceivedfromthefollowingcolleagues:JoseMOYA(JRC),CatrionaBLACK(JRC)fortheirvaluableinputthathelpedtoshapethereport.

GRANATAStefanoNicola(DGCLIMA),POPONIDaniele(DGRTD),KITOUSAlban(DGCLIMA),DOSREISPieroCarlo(DGCLIMA)andPEKARFerenc(JRC)fortheirreviewandcomments.

JRCcolleaguesNigelTAYLOR(CETOprojectleader),AndreasSCHMITZandAnaVAZQUEZDIAZ(CETOdeputyprojectleaders)fortheirsupport,reviewandcomments.

Authors

Tarvydas,Dalius

4

ExecutiveSummary

DespitetheParisagreement,globalgreenhousegasemissionscontinuetorise.TheCOVID-19pandemicwasabletocauseaslightreductionin2020,butthisdidnotlast.In2021,CO2emissionsroseagain,and2022isexpectedtochalkupanewworldrecord.WiththeEuropeanGreenDealandtherecentREPowerEUplan,theEuropeanUnionisacceleratingeffortstodecarboniseitseconomyandreducegreenhousegasemissionsbyatleast55%by2030,achievingcarbonneutralityby2050.

Russia'sinvasionofUkrainetriggeredvastglobalenergymarketdisruption.Manyscenariostudies,relayingonnaturalgasastransitionfuel,losttheyrelevance.ThisreportisbasedonthescenariostudiespublishedbeforeRussianinvasion(exceptREPowerEU)anddonottakeintoaccountgeopoliticalupheavalandinstabilityofenergyprices.Nevertheless,insidesprovidedarestillusefulinunderstandingchallengesenergyofenergysectortransitiontocarbonneutrality.

Therearemanyenergyscenariostudieswhichfocusonnet-zeroorParis-compatiblefutures.Thisreportlooksintothirteenstudiesandfocusesoneightgroupsoftechnologiesthatcouldfacilitatethetransitiontoacarbon-neutraleconomy.Fromeachstudy,onescenariowasselected,lookingintodeepdecarbonisationpathways.

Acrossthesestudies,thereisonecommonunderstanding:thefuturebelongstoelectricity.Despitedifferencesinlevelsofambition,methodologicalapproachesandtransformationspeeds,allstudiesseeelectronsdrivingboththeglobalandtheEuropeaneconomies.Theremaybedisagreementsonhowelectricitywillbegeneratedandused,butconsensusisclear:toreduceemissions,aconsiderableincreaseinelectrificationinallend-usesectorsisneeded.Itcanbedoneeitherdirectlyorviaenablingintermediatetechnologies,likegreenhydrogenandsyntheticfuels.By2030,electricityandelectricity-basedfuelscouldsatisfyabove40%oftotalfinaldemandintheEU.Accordingtosomeenergyscenariostudies,by2050,electricityandelectricity-basedfuelscouldsatisfyupto90%oftotalfinaldemandintheEU.Globally,electrificationreacheslowerlevels,ataround30%oftotalfinaldemandin2030andapproaching70%onaverageby2050.

Whilethejuryisoutonthefutureenergymix,twomaintechnologiesaresettodominatethepowersector:wind(bothonshoreandoffshore)andsolar(mostlyPV).Inthemajorityofscenarios,thesetwotechnologiesprovidearound70-80%ofallelectricitygeneratedin2050.Insomeextremecases,theshareofwindandsolarcanreachashighas90%.Scenariostudiesdonotagreeonwhethersolarorwindwillbemoreimportant.

Solarenergyandwindarecurrentlythefastestevolvingelectricityproductiontechnologiesand,accordingtoscenariostudies,theywilldominatethemarketby2050.Inthenext10years,globalinstalledsolarcapacitywillgrowsevenfoldonaverage,reachingaround5000GWoftotalinstalledsolarpower.Inthesameperiod,globalwindinstalledcapacitywillgrowto3000GWonaverage(withsomeoutliersseeingalmost6000GW),withgenerationincreasingalmostsixfoldcomparedto2019.After2030,growthcontinues:by2050installedsolarcapacitywillreach10000-15000GWglobally,providing22-40%oftotalelectricitygeneration.By2050,globalwindinstallationscouldreach7000-8000GWand,onaverage,generateover30%oftheworld’selectricity.Inmostofthestudiesreviewed,around80%ofglobalpowerisproducedusingwindandsolarinstallationsbythemiddleofthecentury.IntheEU,solarpowergrowthisslower–with‘only’athreefoldincreaseovertenyears,averagingaround370GWofinstalledpowercapacityin2030.Afterwards,thetrendcontinues,reachingaround1000GWonaverageandproviding13-22%oftheEU’selectricityin2050.IntheEUinstallcapacityofwindwillbesimilartosolarin2030(averagingaround365GW),butlowerin2050(averagingaround670TGW)

Inthefuture,mosthydrogenwillbeproducedbyintermittentrenewableelectricity.By2030,hydrogendemandforenergyisnegligible,bothgloballyandintheEU.Studiesdonotagreeonwhichsectorswilldriveitstransformation,butbetween2030and2050,hydrogenconsumptionincreases,ledbytransportandindustry.

Themajorityofbioenergy,bothgloballyandintheEU,isusedinfinaldemandsectors.Inthemediumterm(2030),itshowsaslightincreaseoncurrentlevels.Despitesmallchangesinbioenergyconsumptionlevels,thereareshiftsinsectoraldemand.Studiesseeadecreasingdemandforsolidbiomassinthebuildingssector,whilemorebioenergywillbeusedintheindustryandtransportsectors.In2050,globaltrendsdiverge:somescenariosseegrowthafter2030,whileothersseeadecrease.IntheEU,bioenergyutilisationwillbelowerin2050comparedto2030,withthebuildingssectorleadingthereduction.

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Geothermalpowerinstallationsarestilllowinnumberandstatisticallycomparabletoemergingtechnologies.In2020,therewasonly14GWofgeothermalpowercapacityinstalledglobally,whichcouldreacharound200GWin2050.IntheEU,studiesanticipatenosignificantadditionstogeothermalcapacity,resultinginanegligibleshareevenin2050.

Hydropoweriscurrentlythemainrenewableenergysourceusedforpowerproduction,accountingfor50%renewablepowercapacitiesand63%generation.By2030,noneoftheglobalorEUenergyscenariosseeanymajordevelopmentinhydropower.By2050,hydropowercouldreacharound2000GWoftotalinstalledcapacitygloballyprovidinglessthan10%oftotalelectricitysupplyinmoststudies.

Oceanenergyisanemergingtechnologywithonly0.5GWcurrentlyinstalledglobally,halfofwhichisintheEU.Itcanbeconcludedthatevenwithhighgrowthpotential,oceanenergywillnotplayasignificantroleby

2050.

Heatpumps(ambientheat)arenotusuallydirectlyincludedinenergyscenariostudiesresults.Nevertheless,energyscenariostudiesstresstheimportanceofambientheatinthefutureenduseenergymix.Heatpumpscouldcoverheatingdemandinthebuildingssectorandlowandmediumtemperatureheatinindustry.In2030,thenumberofheatpumpscouldvarybetween200millionand600millionglobally,reachingupto1800millionby2050.IntheEU,heatpumpscouldprovide530TWhoffinalenergyin2050.

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1Introduction

DuringthesixyearsafterthesignatureofTheParisAgreement,194countriessubmittedNationallyDeterminedContributions(UNFCCC,2022b).However,theworldisevenfurtherawayfromtheclimatetargetsnowthanin2015.TheCOVID-19crisisresultedinaslightreductionofglobalCO2emissionsin2020,butnotforlong–in2021therewasareturntopre-pandemiclevels,tocontinuetonewheightsonitsCO2emissionsjourney.InAugust2021,theofficialTheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)announcementofthefirstinstalmentofitsSixthAssessmentReport(AR6)wasentitled,“Climatechangewidespread,rapid,andintensifying”(IPCC,2021).TheIPCCessentiallyconcludedthatclimateiswarmingupatafasterpacethanpreviouslyanticipatedandtherefore,immediateactionshouldbetaken.Ontheotherhand,therearepositivesignsofchange–theEUcanbeseenasashowcaseforeffortstoreduceCO2emissions:despiteitsgrowingeconomicoutput,greenhousegasemissionsintheEuropeanUnionhavesteadilydecreasedsince2015.Nevertheless,inordertominimiseclimatechange,decarbonisationeffortsshouldbestrengthenedglobally.

Thereisacommonunderstandingthatclimatechangeshouldbestopped,andthatthetimeframefordoingsoisclosing.Thereisabroadsetofwaysinwhichtheeconomycanbedecarbonised.Everybodyagreesthatpartofthesolutionshould(atleastpartially)betechnologybased:inordertoreducetheCO2footprintoftheeconomy,weshouldreplacefossilfuelswithrenewableenergyresources.Thisstillleavesthequestionofwhichrenewabletechnologiesshouldbeusedandtowhatextent.Anotheropenquestionishowmuchenergywewillactuallyneedinthefuture.Consumptionwhichdoesnotstopgrowingmayhithardplanetarylimits(ClubOfRome,2022).Increasingenergyefficiencyispartofthesolution,butbehaviouralandsocialchangesmayalsobenecessary.

Technologyinnovationanddeployment,aswellastheavailabilityofresources,economicgrowth,changesinsocietyandevendietarypreferences,nottomentionunpredictableeventslikethepandemics,extremeweathereventsorgeopoliticalupheavals,willaffecthowhumansproduce,transformandconsumeenergyandthedegreetowhichtheenergysystemisenvironmentallysustainable.TheglobalenergymarketdisruptioncausedbyRussia'sinvasionofUkrainetriggeredparadigmchangeinenergyscenariostudies(e.g.REPowerEUplan(EuropeanCommission,2022d)amendedFitfor55(EuropeanCommission,2019b)).Thereisobviouslyuncertaintyonthedegreetowhichthesefactorswillaffecttheenergysystemstransformation.Thelongerthetimehorizon,thewidertheuncertaintyrangeis.Thatiswhythereisamultitudeofenergyscenarioslookingintothemediumterm(2030)andlongterm(2050andbeyond),whichincorporatebroadersocietalandmacroeconomictrendsimpactingtheenergysystem.Usingdifferentassumptions,scopesandtools,scenariostudiesprovideawiderangeofviewsofhowtheenergysystemcouldevolveinthefuture.

Anin-depthreviewofarangeofenergyscenarioscreatedbyavarietyofactorsisneededtobetterunderstandtherolethatselectedtechnologiescouldplayinfutureenergysystems,howtheyinteractwitheachother,whatisneededtointegratethemintoexistingsystemsandhowtheywillbeaffectedbysocialchanges.Scenarioscreatedbydifferentactors–suchasnationalandinternationalorganisations,privatecorporations,non-governmentalorganisations(NGOs),researchinstitutesandacademia–allowustoseethebroaderpicture,representingawiderangeofstakeholderviewsoutsideanysingleprofessionalbubble.

Thecomparativeassessmentofenergyscenariosisuseful,becauseontheonehanditmayidentifythebasicsetoftechnologiesdominatingthemajorityofenergyscenarioprojections.Ontheotherhand,themost‘extreme’scenarioswouldallowunderstandingtheboundaryconditionsunderwhichtheenergysystemcouldevolve.Whileinherentlyuncertain,suchinformationcouldformthebasisfordeveloping“noregret”solutions,basedoncommonalitiesobservedinscenarioresults.Differencesamongscenarioresultsmayindicatehigheruncertainty(risk)areaswheremoreresearchmaybeneededanddecisionsshouldbemademorecarefully.

Thisreportisbasedonthirteenenergyscenariostudiespublishedbydifferentstakeholders,focusingonNet-ZeroorParis-comparablepathways.Welookintoeightgroupsoftechnologythatcoulddrivethetransitiontoacarbon-neutraleconomy(bioenergy,solarenergy,geothermalenergy,ambientheat,hydropower,ocean,windandhydrogen).Thelattergroup,hydrogen,includetechnologiesfortheproduction,storageandtransportofhydrogenwhichcouldhavemultipleapplications.Hydrogencouldbeusedforpowergenerationorinenduses(transport,buildings,industry),whileactingasdemand-sidemanagementorstoragetechnologythatwouldenabletheintegrationofintermittentrenewableenergysourceslikesolarandwind.Itcanalsobeusedasanintermediatestepindecarbonisinghard-to-abatesectorsintheformofsyntheticfuels.Fromeachstudy,onescenariowasselected,lookingintodeepdecarbonisationpathwaysfortheglobaland/orEuropeanenergysystems.

Thisreportfocusesoninsightsderivedfromaquantitativecomparisonofselectedenergyscenarioresults,distillingpossibledeploymentrangesoftheseeighttechnologygroupsinthemid-andlong-termfuture.Their

7

rolesareassessedinpowergenerationandfinaldemandbothgloballyandintheEU.Lookingintofutureglobalmarkets,thepossibleroleoftheEUisdiscussed.

8

2Energyscenarios

2.1Background

Scenariostudiesexaminearangeofpossiblefutures,drivenbyunderlyingassumptions.Energyscenariosareoutlooksthatdescribehowenergysupplyanddemandmaydevelopinthefuture,basedonacoherentsetofassumptions.Wideutilisationofenergyscenarioswastriggeredbytheenergycrisisofthe1970s(Shell,2008),andtodaytheyareusedbyawiderangeactors,includingoilcompanies(Shell,2021)(BP,2020),governmentsandintergovernmentalorganisations(EuropeanCommission,2020),andareanindispensabletoolfordecision-makersinparticularandpublicdiscourseingeneral(CAN,2022).Energyscenariosarealsoanindispensabletoolforthebetterunderstandingpathwaystomitigateclimatechange.Theycanhelpustounderstandcomplexrelationsbetweenfactorssuchaschangesinenergydemand,lifestylesanddietarypreference.Scenariosareinstrumentalinthestruggletofightclimatechange(UNFCCC,2022a).

Inthepast,energyscenariosweretechnology-drivenandbasedonsimulationoroptimisationmodels,butwitheverincreasingdataavailabilityandcomputationalpower,themodelsbehindenergyscenarioshaveevolved.Insomecases,energyscenariosaretheresultsofintegratedmodellingframeworkslinkingtogetherdifferentspecialisedmodelscoveringnotonlyenergyproductionandconsumptiontechnologies,butalsolanduse,behaviouralchanges,socioeconomicaspects,etc.Thisapproachallowsforabetterunderstandingoflinksandthefeedbackloopsofdifferentcomponents.AprominentexampleofthelinkingofdifferentmodelsistheintegratedassessmentmodelsusedbytheIPCC.

TheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)ParisAgreement(UNFCCC,2015)triggeredthedevelopmentofamultitudeofenergyscenariosdrivenbyclimategoals.Theserangefromglobalstudiesconsideringthepossibilityofreachingcarbonneutralitybyasetdate(inthelateststudiesusually2050orearlier)orstayingwithinacarbonbudget(TheGlobalCarbonProject,2022)(withorwithoutoffset),tonationalorregionalstudiesintowaystobecomezero-carbon(EuropeanCommission,2019b).

Thisreportispredominantlybasedonnormative

1

energyscenariostudiesbasedonoptimisationorsimulationmodelsormodellingsuites

2

.Themajorityofenergyscenariostudiesusedinthisreporthaveanormativegoalofreachingnet-zeroemissionsby2050.Despitetheircommongoalofdecarbonisation,thesescenariostudiesseeverydifferentpathwaystoachievingit:drivenbydifferentassumptionsontechnologydevelopment,theeconomyandbehaviouralchanges,resultingindifferentlevelsofdemandandwaystoachieveit.Comparingdifferentstudieshelpsustounderstandthecomplexinteractionsbetweenfuturetechnologiesanddrivers,prioritisingonesetofsolutionsoveranother.

2.2Selectioncriteria

Inthepreparationofthisreport,47scenariostudiesweretakenintoconsideration,publishedfromJanuary2019toFebruary2022.Ourselectionwasbasedoncoverage(intermsofgeographicaldisaggregationandthesetoftechnologiesreported),relevance(includingpublishinginstitution,assumptionsandlevelofambition)andtheavailabilityofdatasets.Basedontheseconsiderations,13studieswereselected.Themajorityofthesehavescenariosinlinewithfastglobaldecarbonisation,reachingclosetozeroemissionsby2050.Foreachstudy,onlyonescenariowasused.Inthecaseofseveralscenariosperstudy,selectionwasbasedonthelevelofambition,andhowcloseassumptionsand/orresultsweretotheEUGreenDeal(EuropeanCommission,2019b).

In

Figure1

and

Figure2,

asummaryofscenariocoverageispresented.Inthesetables,“Yes”indicatesthatinformationisavailableeitherinthestudyitselforintheaccompanyingmaterials,and“No”,thatinformationisnotreadilyavailable.“Detailed”indicatesthatthescenarioprovidesadisaggregationofselectedvariables,forexampleinthecaseofwind,informationisavailableforbothonshoreandoffshore.Insomecases,studiesprovideevenhigherlevelsofdisaggregation,forexampleoffshorewind,fixedorfloating.Inthecase

1Normativescenarios(explorativeortarget-seekingscenariosinothersources)strivetoachieveanormativelydefinedfuture,withaclearvisiononthestateofasetofelementsorvariablesatagivenpointoftimeinthefuture.Normativescenariosareusuallytargetdriven(forexampleachievingnet-zeroGHGemissionsorabandoningallfossilfuelbyacertainpointintime).Normativescenariosmayalsohaveotherconstraints(forexamplealimitedsetofpossiblefuturetechnologies:nonewnuclearpowerplants).

2Whilehistorically,energysectorstudieswereusuallybasedonasinglemodellookingonlyattheenergysector,modelscenariostudiesareoftenbasedonseveral(oftensoftly)interlinkedmodels,dealingwithdifferentareas.Forexample,JRCGECO(Keramidas,etal.,2021)usesthePOLES-JRC(JRC,2018)modeloftheworldenergysystemfortheenergysectorandgreenhousegas(GHG)emissionforecasting,andJRC-GEM-E3(JRC,2022)isusedtoevaluatetheeconomicimpactsofeachscenariodeveloped.UTS/ISF(Teske,2019)usedanevenmorecomplexmodellingsuiteofsixmodelsdealingwiththeenergysystem,transport,renewabletechnologyassessment,thepowersystemandseveralmodelstoassessemissionpathways(UTS/ISF,2017).

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ofhydrogen,“Split”meansthatinformationonfinaldemandisavailableforpurehydrogenandsyntheticfuels.“Partial”indicatesthatinformationisavailable,butnotsufficienttofullycovertheselectedtechnology.Forexample,hydrogenandsyntheticfuelsarecombined.InthecaseoftheEU,itindicatesdataavailabilityinthegeographicalcoverageclosesttotheEU27.IfthereportcoversboththeEU27andEurope,EU27valueswereused.Inothercases(EU28,OECDEurope,andEurope),originaldata,whenpossible,werescaleddowntoEU27levelinordertomakethemcomparable.

Itisworthnotingthat“NotAvail.”doesnotindicatethattheselectedtechnologyorparameterwasnotused/availableintheanalysiscoveredbytheselectedscenariostudy.Inmostcasesitonlyindicatesthattheselectedvariablewasnotprovidedinthedatatablesorgraphsforthisscenarioorwasreportedinanaggregatedway,notsuitableforthetechnologydisaggregationlevelusedinthisreport.

Figure1.Coverageofselectedscenarios

EU

JRCGECO

IRENA

IEAWEO

ECFit55

DNV

Shell

McKinsey

EUCalc

CAN

BP

JRCTIMES

IFS

BNEF

EU27

NotAvail.

EU27/Partial

Yes

Europe

No

EU27

EU28

EU28

EU28/PartialEU27

OECDEurope

NotAvail.

Yes

Yes

Yes

NotAvailable

NotAvailable

Yes

NotAvailable

NotAvailable

NotAvailable

Partial

NotAvailable

Yes

Yes

Generation

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

FuelInputYes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

FinalEmissions

YesYes

YesYes

YesYes

YesYes

YesYes

PartialyYes

Yes

Yes

Partial

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Tes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Primary

Yes

NotAvail.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

NotAvail.

Yes

Yes

Partial

Yes

Yes

Yes

Capacity

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

NotAvail.

Yes

NotAvail.

Yes

Yes

Tes

GDP

Yes

NotAvail.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

NotAvail.

NotAvail.

NotAvail.

Yes

NotAvail.

Yes

NotAvail.

YesNotAvail.

NotAvail.Yes

PopulationInvestments

Partial

Partial

Yes

Yes

NotAvail.

NotAvail.

yes

NotAvail.

Yes

Partial

NotAvail.

NotAvail.

NotAvail.

NotAvail.

NotAvail.

NotAvail.

Yes

NotAvail.

Partial

NotAvail.

Yes

NotAvail.

Scenario

World

Partial

Source:JRCanalysis

Figure2.Technologiesrepresentedinselectedscenarios

ScenarioYearBioenergySol