汽车专业毕业设计-翻译-中英文(全)competition-and-regulation-in-the-korean-automobile-insurance-indu

PAGEPAGE4005/31/07CompetitionandRegulationintheKoreanAutomobileInsuranceIndustryWondonLee*SogaEwedemi***AssociateProfessorofInsurance,DaeguUniversitywlee@daegu.ac.kr**ProfessorofFinance,ClarionUniversityofewedemi@1.IntroductionTheKoreanpropertyandliabilityinsuranceindustryhadassetsofUS$49billionanddirectpremiumswrittenofUS$25billionin2005,whichwasthesecondlargestmarketinAsiaand10thintheworld(SwissRe,2006).Automobileinsuranceaccountedfor35.2%ofthetotalpremiumswritten,whichistheimportantbusinesslineintheKoreanpropertyandliabilityinsuranceindustry.In2005Koreanproperty-liabilityinsurancestatisticsshowsthattheshareofdirectpremiumoflong-terminsuranceis47.9%.However,long-terminsuranceissimplyaproductinwhichanassumedinterestrateisusedforrate-makingandofwhichinsuranceperiodisusuallygreaterthanorequalto3years.Long-terminsuranceproductshavebeenusuallydevelopedforaccidentalandsicknessinsurance,generalpropertyinsurance,andevenindividualannuity.Duetolargepremiumincomeinnaturelong-terminsurancehasgrownuprapidlysinceitsadventin1969.Thatisthereasonwhyaportionofdirectpremiumfromautomobileinsuranceisquitelessthanaround50%unlikeothercountrieswiththefullydevelopedproperty-liabilityinsuranceindustry.Sincethemonopolizedmarketwasopenedtoallthepropertyandliabilityinsurancecompaniesin1983,AlthoughsomepropertyandliabilityinsurancecompanieswerelicensedtosellautomobileinsuranceaftertheKoreanWar(1950-1953),therewasnoactualbusinessduetoalackofexperienceanduncertaintyaboutitsprofitability.In1957thegrowingsocialconcernaboutprotectingpersonsinjuredbyautomobileaccidentsledtoestablishKoreaAutomobileInsuranceCompanyoperatedbytheNationalAutomobileTransportationAssociation.After4yearoperationthecompanywentbankruptcyduetomismanagement.Rightafterthat,in1962,anewKoreaAutomobileInsuranceCompanywasestablishedintheformofaninsurancepoolby10propertyandliabilityinsurancecompanies.Thecompanywasconvertedtoastockcompanyin1968.Since1962,theKoreanautomobileinsuranceindustryhasbeenmonopolizedbyonecompanyunderastrictgovernmentcontroluntiltheindustrywasopenedto13propertyandliabilityinsurancecompaniesincluding2foreigncompaniesin1983.theaveragegrowthrateofdirectpremiumisoverIn2005Koreanproperty-liabilityinsurancestatisticsshowsthattheshareofdirectpremiumoflong-terminsuranceis47.9%.However,long-terminsuranceissimplyaproductinwhichanassumedinterestrateisusedforrate-makingandofwhichinsuranceperiodisusuallygreaterthanorequalto3years.Long-terminsuranceproductshavebeenusuallydevelopedforaccidentalandsicknessinsurance,generalpropertyinsurance,andevenindividualannuity.Duetolargepremiumincomeinnaturelong-terminsurancehasgrownuprapidlysinceitsadventin1969.Thatisthereasonwhyaportionofdirectpremiumfromautomobileinsuranceisquitelessthanaround50%unlikeothercountrieswiththefullydevelopedproperty-liabilityinsuranceindustry.AlthoughsomepropertyandliabilityinsurancecompanieswerelicensedtosellautomobileinsuranceaftertheKoreanWar(1950-1953),therewasnoactualbusinessduetoalackofexperienceanduncertaintyaboutitsprofitability.In1957thegrowingsocialconcernaboutprotectingpersonsinjuredbyautomobileaccidentsledtoestablishKoreaAutomobileInsuranceCompanyoperatedbytheNationalAutomobileTransportationAssociation.After4yearoperationthecompanywentbankruptcyduetomismanagement.Rightafterthat,in1962,anewKoreaAutomobileInsuranceCompanywasestablishedintheformofaninsurancepoolby10propertyandliabilityinsurancecompanies.Thecompanywasconvertedtoastockcompanyin1968.Since1962,theKoreanautomobileinsuranceindustryhasbeenmonopolizedbyonecompanyunderastrictgovernmentcontroluntiltheindustrywasopenedto13propertyandliabilityinsurancecompaniesincluding2foreigncompaniesin1983.Compulsoryautomobileliabilityinsuranceforbodilyinjurybeganin1963andalsoliabilityforpropertydamagewasmandatedin2004.However,automobileinsurancehasnotbeenaprofitablebusinesssincetheadventofcompetitioninthemarketin1983.During23fiscalyearsincludingyear2005theautomobileinsuranceindustryexperiencedunderwritingprofitsonlytwotimesin1997and1998.Althoughunderwritinglosseshavebeentotallyorpartiallyoffsetbyinvestmentprofits,theindustryhasbeenbelievedtoexperiencechronicoperatinglosses.TheKoreanproperty-liabilityinsurancecompaniesdonotdiscloseinvestmentprofitsattributabletothefundfromtheautomobileinsurancesectorsincetheydonothaveseparateinvestmentaccountsaccordingtothebusinesslines.Thehugeaggregatelosseshavebeenbasedoncomplaintsaboutastrictgovernmentregulationanddemandsforchangesandimprovementsintheregulation,includingincreasesinpremium(thepriceofinsurance).InfactthehistoryoftheKoreanautomobileinsuranceindustryisthehistoryofderegulationontheindustry.TheKoreanproperty-liabilityinsurancecompaniesdonotdiscloseinvestmentprofitsattributabletothefundfromtheautomobileinsurancesectorsincetheydonothaveseparateinvestmentaccountsaccordingtothebusinesslines.Thecontinualunsatisfactoryperformancecouldbeascribedtothemorefundamentalproblemsinthisindustry.UnfortunatelyitishardtofindmorethoroughstudyandanalysistofindthefundamentalproblemsabouttheautomobileinsuranceindustryinKorea.Inthispaper,weextensivelyexaminetheKoreanautomobileinsuranceindustryinthecontextofthestructure-conduct-performance(S-C-P)frameworkofindustrialorganization.Thecontentofthisapproachisthatexogenousbasicconditionsdeterminemarketstructureandthatthereisunidirectionalflowofcausalityfrommarketstructure,throughconduct,toperformance.(Reid,1987)Thecontentofthisapproachisthatexogenousbasicconditionsdeterminemarketstructureandthatthereisunidirectionalflowofcausalityfrommarketstructure,throughconduct,toperformance.(Reid,1987)Thestudybeginswithananalysisofthestructureoftheautomobileinsuranceindustrywithabriefhistory.Thischapterdealswithmarketconcentration,entrybarriers,andeconomiesofscaleaswellasproduction.Thethirdchapterexaminesthepricingbehavioroftheindustryunderthetariffsystemimposedbythegovernmentandthepriceliberalizationstartingin1994.Theeffectsofantitrustlawagainstacartel-likepricingbehaviorarepresented.Chapter4examinestheperformanceoftheautomobileinsuranceindustryinthecontextofprofitabilityofbusinessandaffordabilityandavailabilityofinsurancecoverage.Inthefinalchapter,somepolicyimplicationsareproposedbasedontheanalysesandconcludingremarksfollow.2.ThestructureoftheautomobileinsuranceindustryBriefhistoryInKoreaatrueautomobileinsurancebusinesshasbegunwiththeestablishmentofKoreaAutomobileInsuranceCompany(KAIC)in1962,whichwasfundedby10incumbentpropertyandliabilityinsurancecompanies.Before1962Koreanpropertyandliabilityinsurancecompanies’operationhadbeenconfinedmainlytofireandmarineinsurance,eventhoughtheyhadlicensestosellautomobileinsurance.Theythoughtautomobileinsurancewasveryriskyandunprofitablebusinesssincethemarketwasverysmallwithabout30,000carsinthecountryandtherewasnoaccumulateddataforrate-making.However,growingpublicconcernsaboutautomobileaccidentvictimsforcedpropertyandliabilityinsurancecompaniestomakeaninsurancepooltoprovideautomobileinsurancecoverageonavoluntarybasis.Theoutcomewasaninsurancepool,socalledKAIC,whichwasconvertedtoastockcompanyin1968.In1963followingyearoftheestablishment,bodilyinjuryliabilitywithapolicylimitbecamecompulsorybythelaw.Since1963,withrisingautomobileusage,theautomobileinsurancehasbecomeincreasinglyimportantinKoreanpropertyandliabilityinsuranceindustry.Till1997,whenthelong-terminsuranceovertook,theautomobileinsurancehadbeenthelargestpartoftheKoreanpropertyandliabilityinsuranceindustry.<Figure1>showsthepremiumdistributionbylinesofpropertyandliabilityinsurancefrom1963to2005.Since1962,theautomobileinsuranceindustryhadbeenmonopolizedbyonecompanyunderastronggovernmentcontroluntiltheindustrywasopenedto13propertyandliabilityinsurancecompaniesincluding2foreigncompaniesin1983.Evenafterbeingseeminglytheopenmarket,theautomobileinsuranceindustryhadbeenheavilyregulated.Allcompanieswererequiredtousegovernment-authorizedpremiumrates,providingthesameproductsatthesameprice.Theratingbureau,KoreaInsuranceDevelopmentInstitute,hadmadegrosspremiumratesbaseduponwholeindustrydatauntil2001,whentheliberalizationofpremiumloadingswasgettingstartedbyindividualcompanies.TherehadbeennopricecompetitionintheKoreanautomobileinsuranceindustry.Newentriestothemarketwerevirtuallyprohibitedbythevagueprovision,socalled‘EconomicNeedTest’,‘EconomicNeedTest’meansthattheTheratingbureau,KoreaInsuranceDevelopmentInstitute,hadmadegrosspremiumratesbaseduponwholeindustrydatauntil2001,whentheliberalizationofpremiumloadingswasgettingstartedbyindividualcompanies.‘EconomicNeedTest’meansthatthegovernmentarbitrarilyjudgeswhetherthecountryneedsanotherinsurancecompanywhenacompanyappliesforainsurancelicense.However,theregulatoryenvironmentwasdrasticallychangingwiththe1996affiliationwithOECD(OrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment)andthe1997financialcrisis.In1997toovercomeapossiblemoratorium,theKoreangovernmentborrowedemergencyfundsfromIMF,IBRD,andADB.ByOECD,asaquasi-regulator,andIMF,asacreditor,theKoreangovernmentwasstronglyadvisedor/andrequiredtoremovegovernmentcontrolsoverthefinancialactivities.Deregulationbyexternalforceswasdirectedtoanopencompetition.Oneoftwomajorchangesinregulationwastoremovean‘EconomicNeedTest’fromalicenserule.Nowanybodycandoaninsurancebusinessifclearlyspecifiedentryconditionsaremet.Secondly,pricecompetitionhasstartedsinceAugust,2000whenanexpenseloadingofgrosspremiumwasliberalized.OneyearlaterIn1997toovercomeapossiblemoratorium,theKoreangovernmentborrowedemergencyfundsfromIMF,IBRD,andADB.<Table1:RecentStatusoftheKoreanAutomobileInsuranceMarket>200020012002200320042005#ofregisteredcars(1,000)(growthrate)12,210(8.1%)13,181(8.0%)14,211(7.8%)14,677(3.3%)14,990(2.1%)15,537(3.6%)PremiumsWritten(bil.KRW)(growthrate)6,487(17.3%)7,321(12.9%)7,895(7.8%)7,942(0.6%)8,506(7.1%)8,781(3.2%)NumberofFirms,EntryandMarketconcentrationIn1983whentheautomobileinsurancemarketwasshiftedtoacompetitivemarketfromthemonopoly,13propertyandliabilityinsurancecompaniesincluding2foreigncompaniestookpartinthemarket.Alldomesticcompanieswerestockcompanies.ThereisnomutualcompanyintheKoreaninsurancemarket.Until1999whenoneforeigncompanywithdrewanautomobileinsuranceline,therehadbeennochangeinthenumberoffirmsintheautomobileinsuranceindustry.Inyear2000onedomesticcompanywentintobankruptcy.Thiscompanywasactuallyaforeigncompanysincethecompanywaspurchasedbyaforeigncapitalayearago.Thiscompanywasactuallyaforeigncompanysincethecompanywaspurchasedbyaforeigncapitalayearago.In2001thefirstautomobilemono-lineinsurancecompanyenteredthemarketaftertheentryregulationwaschanged.Twomoremono-linecompaniesjoinedtheautomobileinsuranceindustryin2003.Mono-linecompaniesattackedthemarketwithlowerpricesbyusingtele-marketingandinternetmarketingchannels.Withtheadventofmono-linecompanies,realpricecompetitionstartedintheKoreanautomobileinsurancemarket.AsofMarch,2006,14outof28propertyandliabilityinsurancecompaniessellautomobileinsuranceinKorea.<Table2:MarketConcentrationinAutomobileInsuranceIndustry>FiscalYearNo.ofFirmsCR1CR4HHI1962-19821100%-10,00019831389.7%94.7%805919841359.6%75.4%372519851345.1%67.2%235819861335.2%63.3%170419871327.5%60.6%134919881322.4%58.8%119619891319.9%59.2%117119901319.3%59.4%118019911318.2%58.3%116019921316.8%57.7%113519931316.1%57.0%112019941315.9%57.5%112519951319.3%60.3%118919961323.4%64.1%130719971325.9%66.5%139819981327.9%66.8%146019991328.2%68.7%149620001229.3%70.1%156020011231.3%72.3%169220021230.8%70.5%163020031430.0%68.8%156220041429.6%68.5%153220051428.0%68.3%1467*KoreaFairTradeCommissionconsidersamarketconcentratedifCR10.5andCR30.75.**TheHorizontalMergerGuidelinesissuedbytheUSDepartmentofJusticeandtheFederalTradeCommissionclassifymarketsasunder:0<HHI<1000,notconcentrated,1000<HHI<1800,moderatelyconcentrated,and1800<HHI,concentrated.ScaleeconomiesThereisabigrangeinthesize(intermsofpremiumswrittenaswellasassets)ofinsurancecompaniessellingautomobileinsuranceinKorea.Thereare4companieswithtotalannualpremiumsofover1trillionKRWand10companieswithlessthan1trillionKRW.Theso-called“Big4”companiesaccountforabout70%ofthemarket.Usuallyitisofinteresttoaskwhetherornotthelargercompanieshaveacostadvantageoverthesmallercompanies.Substantialcostadvantagescouldindicatebarrierstoentryandthepossibilitythatlargecompaniescouldsetpricessubstantiallyabovemarginalcostwithoutprovokingcompetitiveentry.However,itishardtoexpectthatkindofpricingbehaviorsincetherewasnopricecompetitioninthemarketbeforeyear2000whenthetariffsystemwaspartiallylifted.Ifthereareeconomiesofscalepresent,wewouldexpecttheexpenseratiotodeclinewithfirmsize.Theeconomiesofscaleanalysisperformedhererelatesexpenseratiostodirectpremiumswrittenofonly10outof14companies.Sinceoneinbankruptcyandthreenewlyenteredcompanieshaveshownabnormalexpenseratios,thesecompaniesareexcludedintheanalysis.Sinceoneinbankruptcyandthreenewlyenteredcompanieshaveshownabnormalexpenseratios,thesecompaniesareexcludedintheanalysis.(Year1999)ER=38.72－0.0000035DPW(29.45)(－1.811)R2=0.29(Year2000)ER=40.99－0.0000059DPW(13.69)(－1.601)R2=0.24(Year2001)ER=33.66－0.0000012DPW(23.99)(－0.827)R2=0.08(Year2002)ER=34.14－0.0000017DPW(19.88)(－0.976)R2=0.11(Year2003)ER=34.82－0.0000026DPW(36.18)(－2.656)R2=0.47(Year2004)ER=33.48－0.0000011DPW(20.91)(－0.749)R2=0.07(Year2005)ER=38.34－0.0000043DPW(12.77)(－1.498)R2=0.22,whereER=ExpenseRatioandDPW=DirectPremiumWritten.Theresultsofsimpleregressionanalysisprovideonlyweakevidenceofscaleeconomies.Althoughthecoefficientofthepremiumvolumevariableisnegativeinallcases,itissignificantatthe5percentlevelonlyinyear2003.Addingonemorevariable,aratioofnetpremiumtodirectpremiumtoreflectreinsuranceactivitydoesnotyieldanybetterresults.DistributionChannels<Table3:PremiumDistributionbyChannelsinAutomobileInsurance>(KRWinbillions)YearDirectWritingSolicitorsAgentsBrokersTotal2001243(3.3%)2,608(35.6%)4,486(61.1%)-7,3372002367(4.6%)2,534(32.0%)5,013(63.4%)-7,9142003604(7.6%)2,427(30.5%)4,923(61.8%)6(0.1%)7,9602004724(8.5%)2,519(29.6%)5,267(61.8%)11(0.1%)8,5212005950(10.8%)2,635(30.0%)5,189(59.0%)16(0.2%)8,790<Table4:ExpenseRatiosofOn-lineCompanyvs.TraditionalCompanyFirm2003200420051on-linecompany24.2%26.7%26.7%Averageoftraditionalcompanies31.4%31.9%32.3%<Table5:PremiumShareofOn-lineProducts>Year20012002200320042005On-lineFirms0.4%2.0%3.3%5.3%6.6%IncumbentFirms-0.3%1.2%1.9%3.6%Total0.4%2.3%4.5%7.2%10.2%3.TheconductintheindustryHowpriceissetThewayinwhichthevolume,quality,andrangeofproductsaredetermined4.ThePerformanceoftheIndustryProfitabilitySince1983whentheautomobileinsurancebusinesswasopenedtotheincumbentpropertyandliabilityinsurers,theinsurershavecomplainedthattheyareconsistentlylosinglargesumsofmoneyinoperatingtheautomobileinsuranceline.Iftheysuccessfullyconvincedregulators,theywereallowedtoincreasepremiumratesandimprovedlossratiosandunderwritingprofits.However,discussionsofpremiumrateshaveoftenbeenbasedonmisinformationaboutprofitabilityintheindustry.Atraditionalprofitmeasureusedinthepropertyandliabilityinsuranceindustryisthecombinedratio.Thisratioisveryhandyandprovidessomeusefulinformationabouttheinsuranceindustry.However,ithasoftenledtoincorrectconclusionsaboutprofitability.Thecombinedratio,whichisthesumofthelossratioandtheunderwritingexpenseratio,isusedasanindicatorofprofitability.Thelossratioisanestimateofexpectedpaymentsforreportedandunreportedclaims,expressedasaratiotoearnedpremiums.Itisconventionalthatexpectedclaimspaymentsincludelossadjustmentexpenseswhichareincurredtoinvestigateandsettleclaims.InKorea,however,theseexpenses,about2%ofearnedpremiums,areconsideredapartofunderwritingexpenses.Thispracticeallowstheinsurerstounderestimatelossreserves.Theunderwritingexpenseratioconsiderstheexpensesassociatedwithwritinginsurancepoliciesexpressedasaratiotoearnedpremiums.Acombinedratioover100%indicatesanunderwritingloss.However,aninsurancecompanycanhaveacombinedratioover100%Itisconventionalthatexpectedclaimspaymentsincludelossadjustmentexpenseswhichareincurredtoinvestigateandsettleclaims.InKorea,however,theseexpenses,about2%ofearnedpremiums,areconsideredapartofunderwritingexpenses.Thispracticeallowstheinsurerstounderestimatelossreserves.<Figure2>showsthecombinedratiosoftheautomobileinsuranceindustryfromyear1983toyear2005.Asawaytocorrectthecombinedratioforinvestmentincometheoveralloperatingratiowasintroduced.Theoperatingratioisthecombinedratiominustheratioofinvestmentincometopremiumsearned.Investmentincomeisusuallyallocatedbylineonthebasisofreserves(CumminsandWeiss,1991)becausedataarenotdirectlyavailableontheinvestmentincomeattributabletoaparticularline.Toallocateaggregateinvestmentincometotheautomobileinsuranceline,weassumethattheshareoftotalinvestmentincomeisproportionaltotheshareoftotalinvestedassetsonthebasisofthesumofunearnedpremiumreserve,lossreserveandcontingencyreservefortheautomobileinsuranceline.<Figure3>showstheoperatingratiosfromyear1983toyear2005.Theoperatingratioisobviouslyabettermeasureofprofitabilityaslongastheinsurersearninvestmentincomefromtheirinvestedassetsfundedbyreservestooffsetunderwritinglosses.<Table5>showstheestimatedprofitabilityofautomobileinsurancefromyear1998toyear2005.Thereasonwechooseyear1998isthatmarketvaluationinassetsandloanqualityclassificationshavebeenusedintheKoreaninsuranceindustrysince1998.However,thefairvaluationmethodisnotusedinreservevaluations.Ifthereservesarenotdiscounted,theclaimpaymentsthatmaynotbemadeforseveralyearsarerecognizedascostsinthecurrentyear,therebyunderstatingannualincome.<Table6:EstimatedProfitabilityofAutomobileInsurancefrom1998to2005>(KRWinbillions)YearPremiumsEarnedIncurredLosses<L/R>NetExpenses<E/R>UnderwritingGains<C/R>InvestmentIncome<I/R>OperatingGains<O/R>19985,0843,134<61.6>1,650<32.4>300<94.0>295<5.8>595<88.2>19994,7783,477<72.8>1,719<36.0>(418)<108.8>400<8.4>(19)<100.4>20005,3603,904<72.8>1,880<35.1>(425)<107.9>186<3.5>(239)<104.4>20016,2184,177<67.2>2,007<32.3>34<99.5>360<5.8>393<93.7>20026,8654,692<68.3>2,200<32.0>(27)<100.3>253<3.7>227<96.6>20037,0815,434<76.7>2,227<31.5>(580)<108.2>298<4.2>(282)<104.0>20047,2345,268<72.8>2,321<32.1>(354)<104.9>344<4.8>(10)<100.1>20057,5605,792<76.6>2,439<32.3>(671)<108.9>332<4.4>(339)<104.5>Note:Underwritinggains/lossesandoperatinggains/lossesmaynotaddorsubtractduetorounding.<Table7:EstimatedProfitabilityofPropertyandLiabilityInsurance(exceptAutomobileandLong-termInsurance)from1998to2005>(KRWinbillions)YearPremiumsEarnedUnderwritingGainsCombinedRatioInvestmentIncomeOperatingGainsOperatingRatio19987,269-899112.469-830111.419997,094-979113.893-885112.520007,918-838110.645-793110.020018,241-600107.387-512106.220029,193-382104.264-319103.520039,727-257102.679-178101.8200410,814-422103.995-327103.0200512,536-408103.3100-308102.5<Table8:EstimatedProfitabilityofPropertyandLiabilityInsurancefrom1998to2005>(KRWinbillions)YearPremiumsEarnedUnderwritingLossesCombinedRatioInvestmentIncomeOperatingGainsOperatingRatioNetProfit(ROE)199812,353-599104.896536697.0219(7.84)199911,872-1,397111.81,51111499.072(2.11)200013,278-1,263109.5709*-554104.2-551(-18.08)200114,459-566103.91,53196593.3820(20.48)200216,058-409102.51,11370495.6425(9.28)200316,808-837105.01,42759096.5301(6.11)200418,048-776104.31,71694094.8541(9.76)200520,096-1,079105.41,78770896.5450(7.37)*Arateofreturnoninvestedassetswasonly3.67%comparedto8.12%ofyear1999duetostockmarketdepression.**Rateofreturnsoninvestedassets:6.05%(1998),6.62%(2001),4.33%(2002),5.03%(2003),5.48%(2004),5.11%(2005)AffordabilityandAvailability5.PolicyImplicationsandConcludingRemarks<References>Cummins,J.D.andM.A.Weiss,1991,“TheStructure,Conduct,andRegulationoftheProperty-LiabilityInsuranceIndustry,”TheFinancialConditionandRegulationofInsuranceCompanies,editedby:Kopcke,R.W.andR.E.Randall,Boston,FederalReserveBankofBoston,pp:117-154.Joskow,PaulL.,1973,“Cartels,CompetitionandRegulationintheProperty-LiabilityInsuranceIndustry,”TheBellJournalofEconomicsandManagementScience,Vol.4,No.2,pp.375-427.Reid,GavinC,,1987,TheoriesofIndustrialOrganization,Oxford,UK,BasilBlackwellLtd.Scherer,F.M.andD.Ross,1990,IndustrialMarketStructureandEconomicPerformance,3rdedition,Boston,MA,Smallwood,DennisE.,1975,“Competition,Regulation,andProductQualityintheAutomobileInsuranceIndustry,”inPromotingCompetitioninRegulatedMarkets,editedbyA.Phillips,Washington,SwissRe,2006,“WorldInsurancein2005,”Sigma,No.5.,p.35.Viscusi,W.K.,JohnM.Vernon,andJosephE.Harrington,Jr.,1992,EconomicsofRegulationandAntitrust,Lexington,MA,D.C.HeathandCompany.05/31/07竞争与监管在韩国汽车保险业Wondon李*苏我Ewedemi***副教授保险，大邱大学，韩国教授

wlee@daegu.ac.kr**的金融学教授，克拉里昂宾夕法尼亚大学，美国

ewedemi@

1。导言韩国的财产和责任保险业在美国的资产四百九十〇点零零零亿美元和书面美国在2005年二百五十点零零零亿美元直接保费，这是亚洲第二大市场，在世界上10个（瑞士再保险公司，2006年）。汽车保险次的占35.2％的总承保保费，这是在韩国财产和责任保险业重要的业务线。由于垄断市场开放于1983年2直接保费平均增长率的所有财产和责任保险的公司超过118％。这种快速的增长速度主要归因于汽车的使用和强制汽车责任保险的急剧增加。3不过，汽车保险一直以来，没有在市场上的竞争在1983年出现一门有利可图的生意。在23日，包括2005年的汽车保险业的承保利润只有经历两次在1997财年和1998年虽然承保亏损已完全或。投资收益部分抵消，业界一直认为，经历长期经营亏损。4巨大的损失总额已在一个严格的政府规章，提出修改和改进监管，包括要求增加保费的投诉（此价格保险）。是事实上，在韩国汽车保险业历史上放宽对业界的历史。然而，在放松管制的情况并没有很大改善，一系列触目惊心。不断表现欠佳可能归因于该行业的更为基本的问题。遗憾的是，很难找到更多的深入研究和分析，了解在韩国汽车保险业的根本问题。在本文中，我们广泛审查在结构方面韩国汽车保险业的一行为一绩效（SCP）的工业组织的框架。5我们还分析了监管环境，行业经营和管制和放松管制可能带来的影响对工业表现，以及对工业结构和行为。这项研究开始于对汽车保险业的结构，一个简短的历史的分析。与市场集中，进入壁垒本章交易，以及规模经济以及生产。第三章探讨了在业界的定价行为关税制度所规定的政府和价格自由化在1994年开始。对一个卡特尔的影响反托拉斯法，如给出的定价行为。第四章探讨了汽车保险业的公司业务和盈利能力和可用性方面的表现保险覆盖面。在最后一章，有些政策影响的基础上，提出了分析和总结发言跟进。2。在汽车保险业的结构简史在韩国一个真正的汽车保险业已经开始与1962年成立的韩国汽车保险（KAIC），是由10个现任财产和责任保险公司提供资金。1962年之前，韩国的财产和责任保险的公司的运作已主要限于火灾海上保险，即使他们已经授权销售汽车保险。他们认为汽车保险是非常危险和不赢利的业务，因为市场非常小的约3万辆，并在该国的利率有没有积累的数据决策。但是，有关车祸的受害者越来越多的公众关注被迫财产和责任保险公司的保险，使池，提供自愿的基础上汽车保险服务。其结果是保险联营，所谓KAIC这是在1968年转为股份公司。下列在1963年编制，身体的伤害赔偿责任限制的政策成为法律的强制性。自1963年以来，不断上升的汽车使用，汽车保险已成为越来越多在韩国财产和责任保险业重要的。直到1997年，当长期保险超越，汽车保险一直是朝鲜财产和责任保险业。<Figure1>最大部分，显示了从1963年的财产和责任保险保费的分配线到2005年。自1962年以来，汽车保险业已经由一家公司垄断下，一个强大的政府控制，直到该行业开放13财产和责任保险的公司，包括2在1983年的外国公司。即使在目前似乎在公开市场上，汽车保险业被严格管制。都必须使用政府授权的保险费率所有公司，提供同样的价格相同的产品。6目前并未在韩国汽车保险业的价格竞争。新项目到市场几乎所禁止的含糊规定，所谓的'经济需求测试'，7，其中政府的唯一有权作出许可销售汽车保险。然而，监管环境的急剧变化与经合组织（经济合作和发展组织）和1997年金融危机的1996年归属。经合组织8，作为一个准监管机构，基金组织，作为债权人，韩国政府强烈建议或/并要求取消对金融活动的控制。外部势力的干预是针对一个开放的竞争。监管的两个重大变化之一是，删除一个'经济需求测试'，从许可的规则。现在，任何人都可以做一个保险业务项明确规定，如果条件得到满足。第二，价格竞争已经从2000年8月启动时的毛保费支出负荷为开放。一年后的预期索赔费用，纯保费，都可以由个别公司对自己的损失经验为基础。<Table1:韩国汽车保险Market>近况2000年2001年2002年2003年2004年2005年＃的（1000注册车辆）（增长率）12210（8.1％）13181（8.0％）14211（7.8％）14677（3.3％）14,990（2.1％）15537（3.6％）签单保费（bil.韩元）（增长率）6487（17.3％）7321（12.9％）7895（7.8％）7942（0.6％）8506（7.1％）8781（3.2％）企业数量，进入和市场集中1983年，当汽车保险市场转移到市场竞争的垄断，13财产和责任保险的公司，包括2外国公司参加了市场的一部分。所有国内企业为股票的公司。没有在韩国保险市场的相互公司。直到1999年一外国公司退出了汽车保险线，没有发生对公司在汽车保险业的数量变化。一个在2000年国内企业进入破产。9日，只有11家公司开始于2001年。2001年，第一辆汽车单线保险公司进入后进入市场调节的变化。另外两个单行公司于2003年加入汽车保险业。单系列的公司较低的价格袭击使用电话营销与市场网络营销渠道。随着单出现线的公司，真正的价格竞争开始在韩国汽车保险市场截至2006年3月，14。在28财产和责任保险的公司在韩国销售的汽车保险。<Table2:市场集中在汽车保险Industry>会计年度企业号红细胞CR1CR4的H股指数1962年至82年1100％-10,0001983年1389.7％94.7％80591984年1359.6％75.4％37251985年1345.1％67.2％23581986年1335.2％63.3％17041987年1327.5％60.6％13491988年1322.4％58.8％11961989年1319.9％59.2％11711990年1319.3％％59.411801991年1318.2％58.3％11601992年1316.8％57.7％11351993年1316.1％57.0％11201994年1315.9％57.5％11251995年1319.3％60.3％11891996年1323.4％64.1％13071997年1325.9％66.5％13981998年1327.9％66.8％14601999年1328.2％68.7％14962000年1229.3％70.1％15602001年1231.3％72.3％16922002年1230.8％70.5％16302003年1430.0％68.8％15622004年1429.6％68.5％15322005年1428.0％68.3％1467*韩国公平贸易委员会认为，市场集中，如果第一台0.5和Cr30.75。**在横向合并准则由美国司法部和联邦贸易委员会发出根据市场划分为：0“现代重工”100