联合国贸易发展委员会-二十国集团投资措施第二十九次报告（英）

1

4July2023

Twenty-ninthReportonG20InvestmentMeasures

1

WhentheGlobalFinancialCrisisbrokeoutin2008,G20memberscommittedtorefrainfromintroducingnewbarrierstoinvestmentandtrade.

2

TheycomplementedthiscommitmentbyarequestthatWTO,OECDandUNCTADmonitorandreportpubliclyontheirnewtradeandinvestmentpolicymeasures.Sofar,28reportshavebeenissuedunderthismandate.

3

Twomoreglobalcrises–theCOVID-19pandemicandthewarinUkraine–havesinceprolongedthestrainontheglobaleconomyandhaveshapedinvestmentpolicymakinginG20membersandbeyond.WhilethedirecteconomicimpactoftheCOVIDpandemiconinvestmentpolicyinG20membershassubsided,theoveralleconomicenvironmentremainschallenging,andconcernsaboutthesecurityimplicationsofFDIcontinueshapingpolicymakinginG20members.

SeveralG20membersmaintainandkeepexpandingselectiverestrictionsoninternationalinvestmentandcapitalflowsinthecontextofthewarinUkraine.Theserestrictionsdonotconstituteadeviationfromtheoverallstancevis-à-visinternationalinvestment.Toenhancetransparencyaboutthesemeasures,thiseditionagainlistsmeasuresthathavebeentakeninresponsetothewarinUkrainesinceOctober2022.TheyareincludedinseparateAnnexes3and4tounderscoretheirdifferingandpotentiallytemporarynature.

1ThisreportoninvestmentmeasuresisissuedundertheresponsibilityoftheSecretary-GeneraloftheOECDandtheSecretary-GeneralofUNCTAD.IthasnolegaleffectontherightsandobligationsofmemberStatesoftheOECDorUNCTAD.Nothinginthisreportimpliesanyjudgment,eitherdirectorindirect,astotheconsistencyofanymeasurereferredtointhereportwiththeprovisionsofanyOECDorUNCTADagreementoranyprovisionsthereof.Asinpreviousreports,thisdocumentdistinguishesbetweenmeasuresrelatedtoforeigndirectinvestment(preparedjointlybytheOECDandUNCTAD)andmeasuresrelatedtootherinternationalcapitalflows(preparedsolelybytheOECD).Asthepreceding27thand28threport,thisreportcontainsannexesthatlistmeasuresaffectingFDIadoptedbyG20membersinthecontextofthewarinUkraine.

2G20Leaders

“DeclarationoftheSummitonFinancialMarketsandtheWorldEconomy

”,Washington,

15November2008.

3EarlierreportsoninvestmentmeasuresbyOECDandUNCTADtoG20Leadersareavailableonthewebsitesofthe

OECD

and

UNCTAD

.

2

ThereportasawholedocumentsmeasuresthatG20governmentshavetakenbetween16October2022to

15May2023.Asallpreviousreportsinthisseries,itwasjointlypreparedbytheOECDandUNCTADSecretariats.

I.DevelopmentofForeignDirectInvestment(FDI)flows

GlobalFDIfellbackin2022,afterplummetingin2020andreboundingin2021.FluctuationsinmajorconduiteconomiesaswellasasinglelargetransactioninLuxembourgalsocontributedtoshapingFDItotals.

4

LowerequityinflowscontributedtothedeclineofFDIinG20economies,althoughtheywerepartlyoffsetbyanincreaseinreinvestedearning(Figure1),particularlyinOECDcountries.Germany,theRussianFederationandtheUnitedStatessawlargedeclinesintotalFDIinflows.However,flowstomostotherG20countriesremainedstableorincreased.Australia,inparticular,experiencedarecord-highincreaseinFDI,reflectingintensifiedM&Aactivityinthefirstquarterof2022.Brazilalsoreachedaten-yearrecordhighinFDIinflows,duetoincreasedreinvestedearnings.Intra-companyloansturnedtopositivelevelsinG20economies,buttheirimpactontotalFDIflowsremainedlimited.

Figure1:G20FDIinflowsbyinstrument,2005-2022(USDbillions)

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0

-200

EquityReinvestmentofearningsDebtTotalFDIinflows

Note:pdatafor2022arepreliminary.G20aggregateexcludesdataforP.R.ChinaandSaudiArabiawhodonotreportonFDIcomponents.ReinvestmentofearningsforIndonesia,theRussianFederation(for2021-2022only)andSouthAfricaareincludedinthecategory"equity".

Source:OECD//UNCTAD.Cross-borderM&Aactivitysloweddownwithfewerdealsbeingconcludedin2022,possiblyinresponsetoatighterfinancialenvironment,continuedgeopoliticalchallengesandconcernsaboutaloomingrecession.Theoutlookforgreenfieldinvestmentactivityremainedpositivein2022:totalcapitalexpenditureimpliedinannouncedprojectsincreasedby57%inG20economiescomparedto2021,whilethenumberofprojectsgrewby14%,althoughitremainedbelowpre-pandemiclevels(Figure2).Onasectorallevel,plannedcapitalexpenditureincreasedinallsectors:manufacturing(62%),services(39%)andinfrastructure(57%).Nevertheless,prospectsfor2023remainuncertain:inthefirstquarterof2023,

4Themostrecentfiguresareavailablein

OECDFDIinFigures,April2023

andUNCTAD,forthcoming,WorldInvestmentReport2023,Investinginsustainableenergyforall,July2023.

3

thevalueofnewannouncedinvestmentprojectsdroppedby40%andthenumberofprojectsdeclinedby15%comparedtothepreviousquarter.

5

Figure2.Cross-borderinvestmentactivityinG20economies

Capitalexpenditurefromannouncedgreenfieldprojects,USDbillion(left)and

numberofprojects(right)bysector

Source:FTFDIMarketsdatabase,OECD/UNCTADcalculations.

II.G20members’investmentpolicymeasures

1.InvestmentpolicymeasuresspecifictoFDIandmeasuresrelatedtonationalsecurity

Duringthereportingperiod,G20membersmadefewadjustmentstotheirinvestmentpolicies,confirmingalonger-timetrendtolessfrequentadjustmentsinthisareathatwasonlyinterruptedinresponsetotheCOVID-19pandemic,whichsawmorefrequentchanges.

6

Wheremeasuresweretaken,theirnatureandscopedoesnotsuggestthattheyarelikelytohaveamajorimpactonFDIflowsorallocation(seeAnnex1foradescriptionoftheindividualmeasures).

MeasurestomanagethepotentialsecurityimplicationsofFDIconstituteagainasignificantshareofthepolicychangestakeninthereportingperiod.SevenG20membersadoptedmeasuresofthiskindinthereportingperiod(Canada,France,Italy,Japan,RussianFederation,UnitedKingdom,andUnitedStates).OnlyfiveG20memberstookFDI-specificmeasuresthatwerenotrelatedtothemanagementofsecurityimplicationsofFDI.

5InQ12023animportantincreasewasrecordedcomparedtothepreviousquarterinthe“communications”sector,wherethevalueofgreenfieldinvestmentprojectsalmostdoubledandforthesector“softwareandITservices”,withanincreaseof61%.ThevalueofnewannouncedinvestmentinthehealthcaresectoralsogrewinG20economies,withanincreaseof32%inthefirstquarterof2023relativetothepreviousperiod.

6Seeforexamplethefindingsofthe

22ndOECD/UNCTADinvestmentpolicymonitoringreport

,whichwasreleasedinNovember2019andnotedthatonlythreeG20membershadtakenFDI-specificmeasuresinthereportingperiod.ThereportsthatcoveredtheonsetoftheCOVID-19pandemicandthesubsequentsemesters,foundthatG20Membershadtakenanunusuallyhighnumberofinvestmentpolicymeasuresinthesereportingperiods(seethe

23rdOECD/UNCTADReportonG20InvestmentMeasures

,coveringtheperiodfrom16October

2019to15May2020,

24thOECD/UNCTADReportonG20InvestmentMeasures

(16Mayto15October2020),andthe

25thOECD/UNCTADReportonG20InvestmentMeasures

(16October2020and15May2021).

4

NumberofpolicychangesinG20

membersinyear

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

TheattentiontothesecurityimplicationsofFDIinG20economies–andbeyond–hasbeenincreasingsince2017andshowsnosignofabating.

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SpecificconcernsaboutsuchimplicationsinthecontextoftheCOVID-19pandemicanditsassociatedeconomicdisruptionandinthecontextofthewarinUkrainehavemotivatedsomeofthepolicyadjustments,butwerenotthecauseofthesurgeinpolicyattentiontotheissue(Figure3).

Figure3.PolicychangestomanagesecurityimplicationsofFDIinG20members(2009-2023)

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

existingmechanismreformed

inrelationtowarinUkraine

existingmechanismreformed

inrelationtoCOVID

existingmechanismreformed

(notassociatedwithCOVIDor

warinUkraine)

newmechanimsestablished

(notassociatedwithCOVIDor

warinUkraine)

anymeasure,polynomial

trendline

Source:OECD/UNCTADcalculationsbasedonmonitoringreportspreparedfortheG20.Datafor2023until

15May2023.AssociationwithCOVIDpandemicorwarinUkrainebasedonofficialjustificationofthemeasures.

Inparallel,thenumberofG20membersconcernedaboutthesecurityimplicationsofFDIisincreasing.PolicymeasurestomanagesecurityimplicationsofFDIarenotlimitedtoafewjurisdictionsamongtheG20members.Since2009,17G20membershavetakenmeasuresinthiscategory(greycolumnsinFigure4).

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7Seeforabroadersetof62economies,OECD(2023),

“Investmentpolicydevelopmentsin61economiesbetween

Investmentpolicydevelopmentsin61economiesbetween16October2021and

15March2023”,andUNCTAD

(2020),

“InvestmentPolicyMonitor:SpecialIssue–InvestmentPolicyResponsestotheCOVID-19

Pandemic”.Forananalysisofthedriversofthistrend,seeUNCTAD(2019),

“InvestmentPolicyMonitor:NationalSecurity-

RelatedScreeningMechanismsForForeignInvestment.AnAnalysisofRecentPolicyDevelopments

”aswellasOECD(2020),“

Acquisition-andownership-relatedpoliciestosafeguardessentialsecurityinterests–current

andemergingtrends,observeddesigns,andpolicypracticein62economies

”.ForanalysisofthekeyfeaturesofFDIscreeningregimesadoptedinrecentyears,see:UNCTAD(2023),

“TheEvolutionofFDIscreening

mechanisms–keytrendsandfeatures

”.

8ThethreeG20membersthathavenotbroughtmeasuresintoforcethatwereexplicitlygearedtowardsprotectingessentialsecurityinterestssince2009areBrazil,Indonesia,andSouthAfrica.SouthAfricahasadoptedlegislationinthisarea(the

CompetitionAmendmentAct2018

,section14),butthislegislationhadnotcomeintoforceattheendofthereportingperiodon15May2023.

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numberofG20members

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

Figure4.PolicychangestomanagesecurityimplicationsofFDIinG20members(2009-2023)

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

totalnumberofG20

membersthathave

takenmeasuressince

2009

numberofG20

membersthathave

takenactioningiven

year

Source:OECD/UNCTADcalculationsbasedonmonitoringreportspreparedfortheG20.Datafor2023until15May2023.

2.MeasuresadoptedinrelationtotheRussianFederationandtoBelarusinthecontextofthewarinUkraineandmeasurestakenbytheRussianFederationinthiscontext

Duringthereportingperiod,nineG20membersadoptednewmeasuresinlightofthecontinuedwarinUkraine.Immediatelyafter24February2022,severalG20membersandmanyothercountrieshadalreadyadoptedaseriesofsuchmeasures.

9

ThesemeasuressoughttostifleaccesstothebenefitsofinternationalinvestmentbytheRussianFederationanddesignatedindividualsandentitiesclosetotheRussianGovernment.

10

NewmeasuresadoptedduringthereportingperiodcontinuetotargetprimarilytheRussianFederation.Thesemeasurescanbecategorisedinthreebroadcategories:

11

First,measuresthatspecificallytargetdesignatedindividualsand/orentities,subjectingthemtofinancialandeconomicsanctionssuchasassetfreezes.Second,investment-specificmeasureswhichbanorrestrictinvestmentsrelatedtotheRussianFederation.Andthird,financialmeasuresnotspecifictoFDI(e.g.,measuresrelatedtocapitalcontrols,accesstocapitalmarkets,sellingofsecurities,amongothers).Thesemeasurescontinuetohaveconsiderableimplicationsforcross-bordercapitalflowsandtransactionstoandfromtheRussianFederation.Inresponsetothesesanctions,theRussianFederationhascontinuedtoadoptnewmeasures,includinginvestment-specificmeasuresandmeasuresrelatedtocross-bordercapitalflows.

DetailedinformationonthemeasuresisavailableinAnnex3formeasuresspecifictoFDI,andAnnex4formeasuresnotspecifictoFDI.

9Seethefindingsofthe

27ndOECD/UNCTADreportonG20investmentmeasures

,releasedinJuly2022,andofthe

28thOECD/UNCTADreportonG20investmentmeasures

,releasedinNovember2022.

10Inadditiontogovernmentmeasures,aconsiderablenumberofcompaniesfromawidearrayofindustriessuspendedtheiroperationsintheRussianFederationorwithdrewanddivestedtheiroperationsfromthecountryforvariousreasons,includingreputationalandliabilityrisks,humanrightsconsiderations,volatilemarketconditions,andpracticalchallengestodoingbusinessasaresultofthesanctions.ThesemeasuresarenotcoveredbythisreportastheyarenotattributabletoG20governments.FordetailsonthesemeasuresseeOECD(2022),

InternationalinvestmentimplicationsofRussia’swaragainstUkraine

.

11Thesecategorieshavealreadybeenusedforthe27thand28thOECD/UNCTADreportonG20investmentmeasures.

6

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-80

3.CapitalflowsandinvestmentpolicymeasuresnotspecifictoFDI

12

Financialconditionseasedsignificantlyacrosstheglobeinthelastmonthsof2022andatthebeginningof2023onthebackoflowerinflation,bettergrowthprospects,somepauseininterestratehikes,loweruncertainty,andadepreciatingU.S.dollar.

Thesefactorstakentogetherhaltedthe2022bleedingofemergingmarkets(EM)portfolioflowsdescribedintheOECD/UNCTADreportcoveringthepreviousreportingperiod.TheMarchupdateoftheOECDMonthlyCapitalFlowDataset

13

highlightsasubstantialreboundofportfolioflowstoEMEs,withmorethanUSD110billioninflowsinthethreemonthsfromNovembertoJanuary2023(Figure5).

TheseinflowsweremainlytoEMsexcludingP.R.China(e.g.,MexicoandBrazil),whichisnotableasChineseflowstypicallymakeupthelargestshare.Onthebackofendingitszero-COVIDpolicy,P.R.

ChinasawareturntoinflowsoverNovembertoJanuary2023,albeitconcentratedinequities.ChinahasagainexperiencedsignificantoutflowsinFebruary2023continuinginMarchandAprilinbothequityandbondmarkets.

Figure5.Portfolioinflowstoemergingmarkets(USDbillion)

G20EMex-ChinaChinanon-G20EM

60

JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec

2022

JanFebMarApr

2023

Source:OECDMonthlyCapitalFlowDataset.Note:Sampleof23emergingmarketeconomies(16non-G20and7G20).Seedatasetfordetaileddataandcoveragedescription.ChinadataforApr23coversonlyportfoliodebtinflows.

Duringthereportingperiod,sevenG20memberstookpolicymeasuresconcerninginternationalcapitalflowsthatarenotspecifictoFDI.DetailedinformationonthemeasuresbycountryisavailableinAnnex2.

12Thissectionon“InvestmentpolicymeasuresnotspecifictoFDI”hasbeenpreparedbytheOECDSecretariatundertheresponsibilityoftheSecretary-GeneraloftheOECD.Annex2providesinformationonthecoverage,definitionsandsourcesoftheinformationcontainedinthissection.

13ThedatasetispubliclyavailableontheOECDwebsiteandupdatedquarterlyatthefollowinglink:

/daf/inv/investment-policy/oecd-monthly-capital-flow-dataset.xlsx

.

7

4.InternationalInvestmentAgreements

Between16October2022and15May2023,G20Membersconcludedonenew“otherIIA”:

14

theTürkiye-UnitedArabEmiratesComprehensiveEconomicPartnershipAgreements(CEPA).

15

Duringthisreportingperiod,twoBITsrecentlyconcludedbyG20Membersenteredintoforce,replacingtwotreatiesthatpreviouslyexistedbetweentheparties.

16

Four“otherIIAs”concludedbyG20Membersalsoenteredintoforce.

17

Asof15May2023,thetotalnumberofIIAsworldwidestoodat2,829BITsand435“otherIIAs”.

18

AggregatedataonG20members’IIAsisavailableinAnnex5.

III.Overallpolicyimplications

G20membershavemadeonlylimitedchangestotheirinvestmentpoliciesinthereportingperiod–withthenotableexceptionofadjustmentstomanagesecurityimplicationsofforeigninvestment.TheyhavealsotakenfurthermeasuresinrelationtothecontinuingwarinUkraine.

TheappreciationofthesignificanceofinternationalinvestmentiscriticaltoaddressthecurrentandfuturecrisesandtoachievetheSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs).

ThisisparticularlyimportantinthecontextofagrowingSDGinvestmentgapindevelopingcountries.Asweapproachthemidpointofthe2030AgendaforSustainableDevelopment,countriesneedtointensifytheireffortstopromoteandfacilitateinvestmentacrossallSDG-relevantsectors.Theyalsoneed

investmenttoensureaswiftandjusttransitiontocarbonneutrality,andtoovercomethecontinuedanddeepeningpovertyacrossandwithinsocieties.

14“OtherIIAs”encompassavarietyofinternationalagreementswithinvestmentprotection,promotionand/or

cooperationprovisions–otherthanBITs.Theyincludefreetradeagreements(FTAs),regionaltradeandinvestmentagreements(RTIAs),comprehensiveeconomicpartnershipagreements(CEPAs),cooperationagreements,associationagreements,economiccomplementationagreements,closereconomicpartnershiparrangements,agreementsestablishingfreetradeareas,andtradeandinvestmentframeworkagreements(TIFAs).UnlikeBITs,“otherIIAs”mayalsoincludeplurilateralagreements.

15TheTürkiye-UnitedArabEmiratesCEPAwassignedon3March2023.

16TheBelarus-TürkiyeBIT(2018)enteredintoforceon13December2022,replacingtheBelarus-TürkiyeBITconcludedin1995;theRepublicofKorea-UzbekistanBIT(2019)enteredintoforceon5April2023,replacingtheRepublicofKorea-UzbekistanBITconcludedin1992.

17TheAustralia-EuropeanUnionFrameworkAgreement(2017)enteredinforceon21October2022;theCambodia-RepublicofKoreaFTA(2021)enteredinforceon1December2022;theAustralia-IndiaEconomicCooperationandTradeAgreement(ECTA)(2022)enteredinforceon29December2022;theIndonesia-RepublicofKoreaCEPA(2020)enteredinforceon1January2023.

18ThetotalnumberofIIAsisrevisedinanongoingmannerasaresultofretroactiveadjustmentstoUNCTAD’sIIANavigator(

/international-investment-agreements

).

8

Annex1:RecentinvestmentpolicymeasuresrelatedtoFDI(16October2022to15May2023)–

Reportsonindividualeconomies

DescriptionofMeasure

Date

Source

Argentina

Investmentpolicy

measures

Investment

measuresrelatingtonationalsecurity

Noneduringreportingperiod.

Noneduringreportingperiod.

Australia

Investmentpolicy

measures

Investment

measuresrelatingtonationalsecurity

On1January2023,themaximumfinancialpenaltiesfor1January2023

contraventionsofthe

ForeignAcquisitionsandTakeoversAct

1975’

sprovisionsthatrelatesolelytoresidentiallandwere

doubled.ThechangesarelaiddowninSchedule1tothe

Treasury

LawsAmendment(2022MeasuresNo.3)Act2022

andSchedule1

tothe

ForeignAcquisitionsandTakeoversFeesImposition

AmendmentAct2022

.

Noneduringreportingperiod.

TreasuryLawsAmendment

(2022MeasuresNo.3)Act

2022

,AustralianGovernment,FederalRegisterofLegislation,6December2022;

ForeignAcquisitionsand

TakeoversFeesImposition

AmendmentAct2022

,AustralianGovernment,FederalRegisterofLegislation,

6December2022.

Brazil

Investmentpolicy

measures

Investment

measuresrelatingtonationalsecurity

Noneduringreportingperiod.

Noneduringreportingperiod.

Canada

Investmentpolicy

measures

On1January2023the

ProhibitiononthePurchaseofResidential

PropertybyNon-CanadiansAct

enteredintoforce.Unlessanexceptionapplies,theActprohibitsthepurchaseofresidentialpropertyinCanadabynon-Canadiansfortwoyears.A

Regulation

wasissuedonthedefinitionsofthetermsemployedandtheexceptionforpersonsandproperties.

On27March2023,

RegulationsAmendingtheProhibitiononthe

PurchaseofResidentialPropertybyNon-CanadiansRegulations

enteredintoforce.Theseamendmentsexpandexceptionstoallownon-Canadianstopurchaseahomeincertaincircumstances.AnnouncedbytheCanadianMinisterofHousingandDiversityandInclusion,theseamendmentsallowmorework-permitholderstopurchaseresidentialproperty,excludetheprohibitionfromlandszonedforresidentialandmixeduse,andintroduceexceptionsfordevelopmentpurposes.

1January2023;

27March2023

ProhibitiononthePurchaseof

ResidentialPropertybyNon-

CanadiansAct

,S.C.2022,c.10,s.235,6March2023;

ProhibitiononthePurchaseof

ResidentialPropertybynon-

CanadiansRegulations

,

SOR/2022-250,CanadaGazette,

Part2,Vol.156,Number26,2December2022;

RegulationsAmendingthe

ProhibitiononthePurchaseof

ResidentialPropertybyNon-

CanadiansRegulations

,

SOR/2023-66,CanadaGazette,PartII,Volume157,Number8,27March2023.

“AmendmentstotheProhibition

onthePurchaseofResidential

PropertybyNon-Canadians

Act’saccompanying

Regulations

”,Can