4不对称信息-激励和组织

LectureFour:第四讲Asymmetricinformation不对称信息Incentives&Organization激励和组织managerialeconomics1白重恩AsymmetricInformation不对称信息Adverseselection逆向选择Appraisal鉴定Screening筛选Signaling发信号managerialeconomics2白重恩Imperfect/symmetricInformation

不完全/不对称信息Imperfectinformation–absenceofcertainknowledge(uncertainty)不完全信息Asymmetricinformation–onepartyhasbetterinformationthantheother不对称信息–一方比另一方拥有更多更优越的信息

partywithworseinformationalsosuffersfromimperfectinformation拥有较少较劣信息的一方遭遇不完全信息managerialeconomics3白重恩Rish风险Uncertaintyaboutbenefitorcost关于收益和成本的不确定性Arisesfromimperfectinformation由不完全信息而引起Risk-aversepersonpreferscertainpaymenttouncertainpaymentswithsameexpectedvalue如果一确定收入与一不确定收入期望值相等，厌恶风险的人会选择前者。Risk-aversepersonwillbuyinsurance

厌恶风险者会购买保险managerialeconomics4白重恩AdverseSelection逆向选择Conventionalmarket:whensupplyexceedsdemand,lowerpricerestoresequilibrium

信息对称的市场：当供应超过需求，降价会取得均衡Whinemarketwithadrerseselection:lowerpricedrivesoutbettervintages’leadingtoevenworseadverseselection葡萄酒市场的逆向选择：低价驱逐优质葡萄酒的供应，导致更严重的逆向选择。managerialeconomics5白重恩HongKong’sScrapePaper香港的废纸UsedtobeaUS$65millionbusiness曾经是6500万美元的生意“We’veseenpapershipmentsthatcontainedmorewatercontentthanpaper.”“Nowyoucan’tgetmanyofthesebuyerstolookatanythingbeingshippedoutofHongKong.”(AWSJ,May22/23,1998.)“我们发现港货所含的水比纸多”“现在你找不到多少人购买香港废纸。”（AWSJ，1998年5月22/23）managerialeconomics6白重恩LifeInsruance,I人寿保险，ICoverage=$200,000for43year-oldmale43岁男性20万美元的人寿保险NTUCIncomeSingapore新加坡NTUC人寿保险PacificCenturyHongKong香港盈科人寿保险Grouppolicy集体$240$212Individual(non-smoker)个体（不吸烟者）$1849$466Individual(smoker)个体（吸烟者）$1849$1120managerialeconomics7白重恩LifeInsurance,IIGrouppolicyavoidsadverseselection集体购买避免逆向选择Individualpolicyattractsadverseselection个体购买吸引逆向选择managerialeconomics8白重恩Appraisal鉴定Characteristicisobjectivelyverifiable特点能够被客观地辨认Potentialgaincoversappraisalcost潜在收益足以补偿鉴定成本Whoprocuresappraisal?谁安排鉴定？Numberofbuyers购买者的人数Natureofcharacteristic—common/specificvalue购买者是否具有共同或特定的考虑managerialeconomics9白重恩Moody’sRatingsforabout$14trillionofsecuritiesfrom90countries为遍布90个国家的大约14兆美元的证券评级Chargesissuersforrating向发行者收费Rating评级Defaultrate违约率Aaa,Aa,A0Baa0.12%Ba0.61%B4.08%managerialeconomics10白重恩Appraisal:MoreExamples更多鉴定的例子Expertevaluation专家评估Transcripts学习成绩单Creditchectks信用调查Medicalchecks医疗检查Employmentreports雇用报告managerialeconomics11白重恩Screening筛选Lessinformedpartyindirectlyelicitsotherparty’scharacteristicthroughstructuredchoice由较少信息方发起的，可以使信息较多方间接透露其特性的作法Betterinformedpartymustbedifferentiallysensitivetothechoice信息较多的一方中，具有不同特性的人会自动作出不同的选择managerialeconomics12白重恩Who’stherealmother?Solomon:“Dividethelivingchildintotwo,andgivehalftotheone,andhalftotheother.”所罗门：“把这个小孩切成两半，这一半给她，另一半给她。”womanwhosesonwasalive:“giveherthelivingchild,andbynomeansslayit.”Otherwoman:“Itshallbeneitherminenoryours;divideit.”孩子妈妈说：“把孩子给她吧，千万不能杀他。”另一位说：“它既不是我的也不是你的，分了他。”managerialeconomics13白重恩HRMPractices人力资源管理实践Age/wageprofilesandemployeeturnover年龄/工资曲线与雇员流动率Performancepayandproductivity奖金和生产效率Earlyretirementschemes提前退休计划Benefits公司员工福利managerialeconomics14白重恩IndirectSegmentDoscrimination间接板块价格歧视Restrictedv.unrestrictedairfares有限制对无限的飞机票Wholesalepricecutsv.cents-offcoupons

批发价格折扣对顾客优惠卷managerialeconomics15白重恩Auction拍卖Usecompetitivepressuretoforcebidderstorevealtheirinformation用竞争压力迫使投标方透露他们的信息Open/sealedbidding公开喊价与暗标Discriminatory/non-discriminatorypricing歧视性/非歧视性订价Reserveprice设定底价Winner’sCurseismoresevere赢家的诅咒更加严峻Morebidders更多的竞标者Truvalue/costmoreuncertain真正的价值/成本更多的不确定Sealed-bidauction暗标managerialeconomics16白重恩Signaling发信号Betterinformedpartycommunicatescharacteristicthroughsignal信息较多的一方通过发出信号的方式交流其特点Costofsignaldiffersaccordingtocharacteristic

self-selection

signaliscredible

具有不同特性的人，发信号的成本不同自我选择信号是可信的managerialeconomics17白重恩Signaling:Examples发信号：例子ThePeacock’stail雄性孔雀的尾巴Automanufacturers-extendedwarranty汽车制造商-延长保修期U.S.publicly-listedcompanies–dividends美国上市公司-派发股息Initialpublicofferings–lockupagreements上市发行新股-锁定协议managerialeconomics18白重恩Advertisingasasignal广告作为信号Advertisingexpendituremustbesunk广告成本必须沉没Buyersmustbeabletodetectpoorquality购买者必须有探查劣质的能力Informationaboutpoorqualitymustquicklyspreadandcutintoseller’sfuturebusiness关于劣质的信息必须迅速传播并削减销售者未来的生意managerialeconomics19白重恩Reputation声誉Buyersareofferedapacketofstones,called“sight”,thatroughlycorrespondstotheirindicatedinterests.Thestonesarwgradedandsortedonthebasisoftheirgrosscharacteristicsonly,withoutanyattemptbyDeBeerstoestimatetheirvalueclosely.DeBeers只根据总体特点对石头进行评级和分类，没有对价值进行精确的评估managerialeconomics20白重恩FromForevertoLVConnection

DeBeers如何走出卡特尔的困境？managerialeconomics21白重恩ContingentContract或有合同Paymentiscontingentonrealizedcharacteristic:付款是根据事后发现的实际特性而定：Internationaltrade–buyback国际贸易—回购Compensationforlegalservices律师费managerialeconomics22白重恩IsLiftingtheFogtheOnlyStrategy?

消除云雾是唯一的策略吗？PreservingtheFog保留云雾NegotiatingintheFog云雾中谈判StirringuptheFog制造云雾managerialeconomics23白重恩PreservingtheFog保留云雾ET–thewrongcall“外星人”Followingtheherd羊群效应Creatingreasonstofail替失败找借口managerialeconomics24白重恩NegotiatinginaFog云雾中谈判PlayTexasShootout我分你选Establishasettlementescrow不透露信息的中间人Usedifferencesofopiniontostructurewin-windeal善用或有合同创造双赢机会managerialeconomics25白重恩StirringuptheFog制造云雾Hidehighprices

隐瞒高位订价Disguiseopportunisticpricing

隐瞒机会主义订价Hidelowprices,too,preservinganimageofquality.

隐瞒低位订价，保持公司形象managerialeconomics26白重恩Incentives&OrganizationOrganizationalarchitecture组织结构Moralhazard道德风险Holdup套牢Makeorbuy自造还是外包managerialeconomics27白重恩Airbus:Production,I空中客车：生产，IAnnual“pokergame”:comsortiumfixedtransferpriceswithpartners年度“扑克游戏”：空中客车与合作伙伴修订转移价格Partnersreceivedproportionateshareofconsortiumprofit

合作伙伴按股份比例分割空中客车的利润Wherewaspartner’sincentivegreater—forselforAirbus?

合作伙伴会更关注哪一方的利润？自己公司还是空中客车？managerialeconomics28白重恩Airbus:Production,II空中客车：生产，II“Itwasquiteadishonestsystem…Eachpartner’sprimemitivationwastoloodafteritsowninterest.”MikeTurner,AirbusBoardMember“这简直是一个不诚实的系统…每个人合伙人的根本动机都是追逐自己公司的利益。”MikeTurner，空中客车董事managerialeconomics29白重恩Airbus:Production,III空中客车：生产，III“AirbusIndustries”productionsystemisoneofthemostefficient–andflexible–intheworld.Approximately96percentoftheaircraftworkisperformedinplantsoperatedbythepartnercompanies.”Airbus:CorporateOverview,Dec.1999“空中客车的生产系统是世界上最有效率和弹性的系统之一。飞机制造的将近96%的工作是由合作伙伴公司的工厂完成的。”空中客车：公司回顾，1999年十二月managerialeconomics30白重恩Inthefuture,growthinshareholdervalueandefficiencycanresultonlyfromanoverallchangeinourorganization.Thereisaneedforgreatercentralizationandcentralauthority.”NoelForgeard,ManagingDirector“将来，股东价值的增长和效率的提高只能从我们组织的整体变化中得到，这需要更多的集中化和权力集中。”NoelForgeard,执行董事AirbusIntegrated(2001):80%ownedbyEADSand20%byBAESystems空中客车的整合（2001）80%由EADS拥有，20%由BAE拥有managerialeconomics31白重恩OrganizationalArchitecture组织结构Distributionofownership

所有权分布Incentiveschemes

激励计划Monitoringsystems

监督系统managerialeconomics32白重恩MoralHazard

道德风险Asymmetricinformationoboutaction对行动的信息不对称Conflictofinterest

利益冲突managerialeconomics33白重恩HappyCoincidence?

碰巧吗Between1970-82,1970至1982年期间U.S.fertilityratefellby13.5%from1.84to1.59perhundredpopulation美国生育率下降了13.5%由每百人1.84到1.59。Proportionofdeliveriesbycesareansectionrose剖腹产的比例上升了240%managerialeconomics34白重恩BankingExample,I自己掏钱投资稳妥冒险初始投资100100高回报（1/2概率）110125低回报（1/2概率）10065期望回报（毛）10595期望回报（净）5-5managerialeconomics35白重恩BankingExample,II:SafeInvestment

借钱投资：稳妥项目*Assumezerointerestrate假设零利率存款者银行所有者中央银行总计初始投资9730100高回报（毛）97130110低回报（毛）9730100期望回报（毛）9780105期望回报（净）0505managerialeconomics36白重恩BankingExample,III:RiskyInvestment

借钱投资：冒险投资存款者银行所有者中央银行总计初始投资9730100高回报（毛）97280125低回报（毛）970-3265期望回报（毛）9714-1695期望回报（净）011-16-5managerialeconomics37白重恩银行业的道德风险Premiumfordepositinsuranceisnotexperience-rated存款保险的保费不是按以往经营情况而定Riskiertheinvestment,thegreatertheexpectedbenefitforthebankownersandthehighertheexpectedlossfortheCentralBank

conflictofinterest投资越具风险，银行所有者的期望收益越大，中央银行的期望损失越大利益冲突CentralBankcannoteasilymonitoractionsofthebank中央银行不容易监督银行的行为managerialeconomics38白重恩ResolvingMoralHazard

解决道德风险问题Incentivescheme激励计划Conditionalpayment有条件的付款Quota指标Monitoringsystem监督系统managerialeconomics39白重恩IncentivevsRisk

激励对风险Efficientschemebalances有效率的激励计划会平衡：Benefitsofmoreeffort多劳多得Costsofriskbearing承担风险的成本Degreeofrish风险程度Riskaversion风险厌恶度managerialeconomics40白重恩AT&TIncentiveScheme

AT&T总裁激励计划1995:AT&TawardedCEORobertE.Allenoptionsfor108,000sharesfor108,000sharesat$43.94exerciseprice1995年：AT&T奖励总裁RobertE.Allen108000股（执行价为43.94美元）的期权05010015020025030095969798AT&TS&PTelIndexmanagerialeconomics41白重恩RelativePerformance

相对绩效Emplyment–promotethebestworker

雇用—提拔最佳雇员Sports–gold,silver,bronze体育—金银铜牌Examination–gradeonacure

考试—按曲线分级managerialeconomics42白重恩MultipleResponsibilities,I

多重责任，IExamples:high-schoolteachers,universityprofessors,franchising,HongKongminibusdrivers例如：中学老师，大学教授，特许经营，香港小巴驾驶员managerialeconomics43白重恩MultipleResponsibilities,II

多重责任，IIStrongincentiveinducesmoreeffortonthatdimensionbutlesseffortonotherdimensions若有强烈的激励机制引导某一个方面责任，则其他责任会被忽视Equalincentiveprinciple对等激励的原则Low-poweredcontracts采用较弱的绩效指标OWNERSHIP所有权变化managerialeconomics44白重恩Non-ProfitOrganizations

非赢利组织School’sobjective学校的目标Maximizeprofit利润最大化Maximizeeducationofstudents学生教育最大化Otherexamples–hospital,museum

其它例子—医院和博物馆Ono-profitorganizationtotonedownprofitincentive

采用非赢利组织来调低利润激励managerialeconomics45白重恩HongKong:TrafficWardens

香港：交通警察20-30%ofvehiclesatexpiredmetersdidnotgetcitations20-30%的逾时停车未被罚款Monitoredtrafficwardensissued69-215%morecitations被抽验的警察会多开69-215%的罚单Proposal:assigneachwardenadailyquotaofcitations建议给警察罚单指标managerialeconomics46白重恩Holdup

套牢WhenAirbusassignedA-318productiontoDASA,Aerospatialethereatenedtoquittheconsortium当空中客车将A-318的生产分配给DASA时，Aerospatiale威胁说要退出财团Conflictofinterest利益冲突Noasymmetryofinformation没有信息不对称managerialeconomics47白重恩ResolvingHoldup

如何避免被套牢Avoidspecificinvestments避免专用投资Writemoredetailedcontracts合同要具体详细Verticalintegration(redistributeownership)纵向整合（重新分配所有权）managerialeconomics48白重恩SaigonFloatingHotel

西贡海上宾馆1987:builtinSingapore建于新加坡1987-89:GreatBarrierReef,Australia澳大利亚GreatBarrierReef1989-96:SsigonRiver西贡河1996:VietnamGovernmentrefusedtorenewoperatinglicense越南政府拒绝续发经营许可证managerialeconomics49白重恩IMCO’sSaginawPlantIMCObuiltnew$22millionaluminiumplantinSaginaw,MI-threemilesfromGMcastingplantIMCO在美国密西根州Saginaw兴建新的2200万美元的铝厂，距离GM的铸造厂3英里GMcontractedtobuyover$1billionofaluminiumfromIMCOover13years合同规定GM在13年间向IMCO购买价值10亿美元的铝managerialeconomics50白重恩Makeorbuy?

自造还是外包？Holdup套牢Moralhazardinternalmonopolyscaleeconomies道德风险内部垄断，规模经济VerticalIntegration纵向整合ExternalContractor外部合同加工者managerialeconomics51白重恩台积电：纯制造或制造加设计固定成本高，大规模设计能力不足managerialeconomics52白重恩美国电报电话公司（AT&T）长途电话业务设备制造业务managerialeconomics53白重恩总结Summary：两种信息问题：信息不完全：信息缺乏。可能所有人都同样缺乏。信息不对称：一方比另一方拥有更多更优越的信息。对未来信息的不完全可能带来风险。信