公司理财（英文版·第5版）课件 第29章 公司治理

CorporateFinanceFifthEditionChapter29CorporateGovernanceCopyright©2020,2017,2014PearsonEducation,Inc.

AllRightsReservedChapterOutline(1of2)29.1

CorporateGovernanceandAgencyCosts29.2MonitoringbytheBoardofDirectorsandOthers29.3CompensationPolicies29.4ManagingAgencyConflict29.5RegulationChapterOutline(2of2)29.6

CorporateGovernanceAroundtheWorld29.7

TheTradeoffofCorporateGovernanceLearningObjectives(1of4)Definecorporategovernance,anddescribeitsroleinthesuccessfulreductionofagencyproblems.Describetherolesofthefollowingincorporategovernance:a.Theboardofdirectorsb.Themarketforcorporatecontrolc.RegulationLearningObjectives(2of4)Definetheterm“capturedboard”anddescribesituationsinwhichaboardismostlikelytobecaptured.Discussthecostsandbenefitsofhavingmanagersasshareholders,intermsofpropercorporategovernance.Discussthecostsandbenefitsofhavingmanagerialcompensationtiedtofirmperformance,intermsofpropercorporategovernance.LearningObjectives(3of4)Identifyalternativesavailabletoshareholdersiftheboardfailstoactintheirinterests.Identifythemethodsthatboardscanusetoentrenchthemselves.DescribetheprovisionsoftheExchangeActsof1933and1934,theSarbanes-OxleyActof2002,andtheDodd-FrankActof2010,whichattempttoimproveshareholderprotections.LearningObjectives(4of4)Comparecorporategovernancepracticesacrosscountries.Specificallyaddressthefollowing:a.Common-lawversuscivil-lawcountriesb.Pyramidalownershipstructuresc.Dualclasssharesd.Theroleofemployeesingovernancee.Cross-holdings29.1CorporateGovernanceandAgencyCostsCorporateGovernanceThesystemofcontrols,regulations,andincentivesdesignedtominimizeagencycostsbetweenmanagersandinvestorsandpreventcorporatefraudTheroleofthecorporategovernancesystemistomitigatetheconflictofinterestthatresultsfromtheseparationofownershipandcontrolwithoutundulyburdeningmanagerswiththeriskofthefirm.29.2MonitoringbytheBoardofDirectorsandOthersIntheUnitedStates,theboardofdirectorshasaclearfiduciarydutytoprotecttheinterestsoftheshareholders.Mostothercountriesgivesomeweighttotheinterestsofotherstakeholdersinthefirm,suchastheemployees.TypesofDirectors(1of2)InsideDirectorsMembersofaboardofdirectorswhoareemployees,formeremployees,orfamilymembersofemployeesGrayDirectorsMembersofaboardofdirectorswhoarenotasdirectlyconnectedtothefirmasinsidersare,butwhohaveexistingorpotentialbusinessrelationshipswiththefirmTypesofDirectors(2of2)Outside(Independent)DirectorsAnymemberofaboardofdirectorsotherthananinsideorgraydirectorBoardIndependence(1of2)Onaboardcomposedofinsider,gray,andindependentdirectors,theroleoftheindependentdirectorisreallythatofawatchdog.However,becauseindependentdirectors’personalwealthislikelytobelesssensitivetoperformancethanthatofinsiderandgraydirectors,theyhavelessincentivetocloselymonitorthefirm.BoardIndependence(2of2)CapturedDescribesaboardofdirectorswhosemonitoringdutieshavebeencompromisedbyconnectionsorperceivedloyaltiestomanagementBoardSizeandPerformanceResearchershavefoundthatsmallerboardsproducesurprisinglyrobustresultthatareassociatedwithgreaterfirmvalueandperformance.Thelikelyexplanationforthisphenomenoncomesfromthepsychologyandsociologyresearch,whichfindsthatsmallergroupsmakebetterdecisionsthanlargergroups.OtherMonitorsIncludessecurityanalysts,lenders,theS

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C,andemployeesSecuritiesanalystsproduceindependentvaluationsofthefirmstheycoversothattheycanmakebuyandsellrecommendationstoclients.Lenderscarefullymonitorfirmstowhichtheyareexposedascreditors.Employeesofthefirmaremostlikelytodetectoutrightfraudbecauseoftheirinsideknowledge.TheS

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Cprotectstheinvestingpublicagainstfraudandstockpricemanipulation.29.3CompensationPoliciesStockandOptionsManagers’paycanbelinkedtotheperformanceofafirminmanyways.Manycompanieshaveadoptedcompensationpoliciesthatincludegrantsofstockorstockoptionstoexecutives.Thesegrantsgivemanagersadirectincentivetoincreasethestockprice,whichtiesmanagerialwealthtothewealthofshareholders.PayandPerformanceSensitivity(1of4)Theuseofstockandoptiongrantsinthe1990shasleadtoasubstantialincreaseinmanagementcompensation.However,thishashadsomenegativeconsequences.PayandPerformanceSensitivity(2of4)Forexample,oftenoptionsaregranted“atthemoney,”meaningthattheexercisepriceisequaltothecurrentstockprice.Managersthereforehaveanincentivetomanipulatethereleaseoffinancialforecastssothatbadnewscomesoutbeforeoptionsaregranted(todrivetheexercisepricedown)andgoodnewscomesoutafteroptionsaregranted.Figure29.1C

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OCompensationSource:ExecucompPayandPerformanceSensitivity(3of4)Recentresearchhasfoundevidencesuggestingthatmanyexecutiveshaveengagedinbackdatingtheiroptiongrants.PayandPerformanceSensitivity(4of4)BackdatingThepracticeofchoosingthegrantdateofastockoptionretroactively,sothatthedateofthegrantwouldcoincidewithadatewhenthestockpricewaslowerthanitspriceatthetimethegrantwasactuallyawarded.Bybackdatingtheoptioninthisway,theexecutivereceivesastockoptionthatisalreadyin-the-money.29.4ManagingAgencyConflictAcademicstudieshavesupportedthenotionthatgreatermanagerialownershipisassociatedwithfewervalue-reducingactionsbymanagers.Butwhileincreasingmanagerialownershipmayreduceperquisiteconsumption,italsomakesmanagershardertofire.DirectActionbyShareholders(1of3)ShareholderVoiceAnyshareholdercansubmitaresolutionthatisputtoavoteattheannualmeeting.Recently,unhappyshareholdershavestartedtorefusetovotetoapprovetheslateofnomineesfortheboard.DirectActionbyShareholders(2of3)ShareholderApprovalShareholdersmustapprovemanymajoractionstakenbytheboard.Forexample,targetshareholdersmustapprovemergeragreements.DirectActionbyShareholders(3of3)ProxyContestsDisgruntledshareholderscanholdaproxycontestandintroducearivalslateofdirectorsforelectiontotheboard.Thisgivesshareholdersanactualchoicebetweenthenomineesputforthbymanagementandthecurrentboardandacompletelydifferentslateofnomineesputforthbydissidentshareholders.Figure29.2

ProxyContestOutcomesSource:FactSetSharkWatchManagementEntrenchmentLargeinvestorshavebecomeincreasinglyinterestedinmeasuringthebalanceofpowerbetweenshareholdersandmanagersinafirm.TheInvestorResponsibilityResearchCenter(I

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C)hascollectedinformationon24differentcharacteristicsthatcanentrenchmanagers.TheThreatofTakeoverManyoftheprovisionslistedintheI

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Cindexconcernprotectionfromtakeovers.Onemotivationforatakeovercanbetoreplacepoorlyperformingmanagement.Anactivetakeovermarketispartofthesystemthroughwhichthethreatofdismissalismaintained.29.5RegulationTheSarbanes-OxleyAct(S

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X)TheoverallintentofS

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Xwastoimprovetheaccuracyofinformationgiventobothboardsandtoshareholders.S

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Xattemptedtoachievethisgoalinthreeways:Byoverhaulingincentivesandindependenceintheauditingprocess.Bystiffeningpenaltiesforprovidingfalseinformation.Byforcingcompaniestovalidatetheirinternalfinancialcontrolprocesses.TheCadburyCommissionFollowingthecollapseofsomelargepubliccompanies,theU.K.governmentcommissionedSirAdrianCadburytoformacommitteetodevelopacodeofbestpracticesincorporategovernance.Dodd-FrankActDodd-Frankaddedanumberofnewregulationsdesignedtostrengthencorporategovernance,includingIndependentCompensationCommitteesNominatingDirectorsVoteonExecutivePayandGoldenParachutesClawbackProvisionsPayDisclosureInsiderTradingInsiderTradingOccurswhenapersonmakesatradebasedonprivilegedinformationSomeexamplesofinsiderinformationincludeknowledgeofanupcomingmergerannouncement,earningsrelease,orchangeinpayoutpolicy.Thepenaltiesforviolatinginsidertradinglawsincludejailtime,fines,andcivilpenalties.29.6CorporateGovernanceAroundtheWorldProtectionofShareholderRightsThedegreetowhichinvestorsareprotectedagainstexpropriationofcompanyfundsbymanagersandeventhedegreetowhichtheirrightsareenforcedvarywidelyacrosscountriesandlegalregimes.ControllingOwnersandPyramids(1of8)MuchofthefocusintheUnitedStatesisontheagencyconflictbetweenshareholdersandmanagers.Inmanyothercountries,thecentralconflictisbetweenwhatarecalled“controllingshareholders”and“minorityshareholders”.ControllingOwnersandPyramids(2of8)Inthesefirms,thereisusuallylittleconflictbetweenthecontrollingfamilyandthemanagement(itisoftenmadeupoffamilymembers).Instead,theconflictarisesbetweentheminorityshareholders(thosewithoutthecontrollingblock)andthecontrollingshareholders.ControllingOwnersandPyramids(3of8)DualClassSharesandtheValueofControlDualClassSharesWhenoneclassofafirm’sshareshassuperiorvotingrightsovertheotherclassOnewayforfamiliestogaincontroloverfirmsevenwhentheydonotownmorethanhalfthesharesistoissuedualclassshares.Forexample,aclassBsharemighthave10votesforeveryonevoteofaclassAshare.Controllingshareholderswillholdallormostoftheshareswithsuperiorvotingrightsandissuetheinferiorvotingclasstothepublic.ControllingOwnersandPyramids(4of8)PyramidStructuresPyramidStructureAwayforaninvestortocontrolacorporationwithoutowning50%oftheequitywherebytheinvestorfirstcreatesacompanyinwhichhehasacontrollinginterest.Thiscompanythenownsacontrollinginterestinanothercompany.Theinvestorcontrolsbothcompaniesbutmayownaslittleas25%ofthesecondcompany.ControllingOwnersandPyramids(5of8)PyramidStructuresThefollowingslidedetailsanactualpyramidcontrolledbythePesentifamilyinItalyasof1995.ThePesentifamilyeffectivelycontrolsfivecompanieseventhoughitdoesnothavemorethan50%ownershipofanyoneofthem.Figure29.3PesentiFamilyPyramid,1995ControllingOwnersandPyramids(6of8)PyramidStructuresTunnelingAconflictofinterestthatariseswhenashareholderwhohasacontrollinginterestinmultiplefirmsmovesprofits(andhencedividends)awayfromcompaniesinwhichhehasrelativelylesscashflowtowardfirmsinwhichhehasrelativelymorecashflowrights(“upthepyramid”).ControllingOwnersandPyramids(7of8)TheStakeholderModelStakeholderModelTheexplicitconsiderationmostcountries(otherthantheUnitedStates)givetootherstakeholdersbesidesequityholders,inparticular,rank-and-fileemployees.Table29.1EmployeeParticipationinCorporateGovernanceinOECDCountriesMandatedWorksCouncilsEmployeeAppointedBoardMembersConstitutionalEmployeeProtectionsNoExplicitRequirementsAustriaAustriaFranceAustraliaBelgiumCzechRepublicIcelandCanadaDenmarkDenmarkItalyChileFinlandEstoniaNorwayIrelandFranceFranceblankIsraelGermanyGermanyblankJapanGreeceHungaryBlankMexicoHungaryLuxembourgblankNewZealandKoreaNetherlandsblankPolandNetherlandsNorwayblankSwitzerlandPortugalSlovakRepublicblankTurkeySloveniaSloveniablankUnitedKingdomSpainSwedenblankUnitedStatesSource:BasedonOrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment,SurveyofCorporateGovernanceDevelopmentsinO

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DCorporateGovernanceFactbook2017.ControllingOwnersandPyramids(8of8)Cross-HoldingsWhileintheUnitedStatesitisrareforonecompany’slargestshareholdertobeanothercompany,itisthenorminmanycountries.InJapan,groupsoffirmsconnectedthroughcross-holdingsandacommonrelationtoabankareknownaskeiretsu.InKorea,hugeconglo