2026年全球经济和市场展望报告：AI非理性繁荣：经济上行股市下行（英文版）-锋集团

Forinstitutionalandsophisticatedinvestorsonly.Notforpublicdistribution.

VanguardresearchDecember2025

Vanguardeconomicandmarketoutlookfor2026

AIexuberance:Economicupside,stockmarketdownside

RapidevolutionhasincreasedAI’spotentialtobecomeatransformativeeconomicforce,withpromisingimplicationsforproductivityacrossindustries.Adoptionis

accelerating,andwhiletoday’sAIleadersdominateheadlines,tomorrow’swinnersmaylookverydifferent.Theoutlookformarketsisnuanced.

Highergrowthisonthehorizon

OnthebackofAIcapital

investmentandapotentialproductivitysurge,theU.S.

economycouldeventually

growby3%.Solidgrowth

andstill-stickyinflationwill

leavetheFederalReserve

withlimitedroomtocutratesbelowour3.5%estimateof

theneutralrate,whichwouldneitherpromotenorrestricteconomicactivity.Page3.

Equitymarketsmayremain

exuberantbutfacerisingrisks

Inthenearterm,growth-

andtech-heavyU.S.equitiescouldcontinuetoplayan

outsizedroleinshaping

sentimentacrossglobal

capitalmarkets.However,U.S.-basedAIscalers’trackrecordofgrowingearningsyearafteryearwillcome

underrenewedscrutinyastheyembarkon

unprecedentedAIcapitalinvestment.Page10.

Wefavorfixedincomeandvaluestocks

Wemaintainourview

thathigh-qualitybonds

offercompellingreal

returns.Fromarisk-returnperspective,bothU.S.

value-orientedandnon-U.S.developedmarketsequitiesprovidemoreattractive

prospectsthanU.S.growthequities,especiallyifAI

transformstheeconomy.

Theseassetclassesshould

benefitmostovertime

asAI’sboosttoproductivitybroadenstoconsumers

ofthetechnology.Page15.

Contents

5

Ouroutlook

forAI

15

Marketand

portfoliooutlook

20

Regionaleconomic

outlooks

3

Globaloutlook

summary

Vanguard’s2026economicforecasts

Country/region

Growth

Coreinflation

Unemploymentrate

Policyrate

(year-end)

Keyrisktoourview

U.S.

2.25%

2.6%

4.2%

3.5%

AIoptimismcollapsesandinvestmentbuildoutstalls

Euroarea

1.2%

1.8%

6.3%

2.0%

Inflationmateriallyundershootsthe2%target

China

4.5%

1.0%

5.1%

1.2%

Technologyinnovationandinvestmentaccelerate

Notes:ForecastsareasofDecember10,2025.FortheU.S.,growthisdefinedastheyear-over-yearchangeinfourth-quarterGDP.FortheeuroareaandChina,growthisdefinedastheannualchangeinGDPintheforecastyearcomparedwiththepreviousyear.Coreinflationexcludesvolatilefoodandenergyprices.FortheU.S.andtheeuroarea,coreinflationisdefinedastheyear-over-yearchangeinthefourthquartercomparedwiththepreviousyear.ForChina,coreinflationisdefinedastheaverageannualchangecomparedwiththepreviousyear.FortheU.S.,coreinflationisbasedonthecorePersonalConsumptionExpenditures

Index.FortheeuroareaandChina,coreinflationisbasedonthecoreConsumerPriceIndex.ForU.S.monetarypolicy,Vanguard’sforecastreferstothetopendoftheFederalOpenMarketCommittee’stargetrange.Theeuroarea’spolicyrateisthedepositfacility.China’spolicyrateistheseven-dayreversereporate.

Unemploymentratereferstothefourth-quarteraveragein2026.

Source:Vanguard.

VanguardIslatesteconomicandmarketviews

ForupdatestoVanguard’seconomic,market,andvisitoureconomicandmarkethub:

portfolioviewsthroughouttheyear,

Economicand

markethub

Asset-classreturn

forecasts

U.S.valuations

UnitedKingdom

China

Time-varying

portfolio

Japan

Australia

Regionaleconomicoutlooks

UnitedStates

Canada

Mexico

Euroarea

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2

Globaloutlooksummary

Financialmarketsareexuberant—andtherearesomegoodreasonsforthat.Despitemegatrendheadwindsin2025likedemographicslowdownsandrisingtariffs,economiesheldfirm.U.S.

corporateearningsgrowthandfundamentalsstayedstrong,poweredbyAIinvestmentandotherpositivetechnologyshocks.

Ourdata-drivenmegatrendsframeworkshowsthesesupply-sideforceswillshiftagainin2026.HowwellAIinvestmentwillcounteractnegativeshocksshapesoureconomicoutlook.Overthe

nextfiveyears,weseean80%chancethat

economicgrowthdivergesfromconsensus

expectations.Theseprojectionsshapeour

investmentoutlookandoffersomewhat

unconventional—yetincreasinglycompelling—

investmentopportunitiesforincreasinglyfrothyfinancialmarkets.

Highergrowthisonthehorizon,particularlyfortheU.S.

WeanticipatethatAIwillstandoutamong

othermegatrends,givenitscapacitytotransformthelabormarketanddriveproductivity.AI

investment’soutsizedcontributiontoeconomicgrowthrepresentsthekeyriskfactorin2026.

TheongoingwaveofAI-drivenphysical

investmentisexpectedtobeapowerfulforce,

reminiscentofpastperiodsofmajorcapital

expansionsuchasthedevelopmentofrailroadsinthemid-19thcenturyandthelate-1990s

informationandtelecommunicationssurge.Ouranalysissuggeststhatthisinvestmentcycleis

stillunderway,supportingourprojectionofuptoa60%chancethattheU.S.economywillachieve3%realGDPgrowthinthecomingyears—aratemateriallyabovemostprofessionalandcentral

bankforecasts.

Butthisfutureisnotquitenow.In2026,the

U.S.ispositionedforamoremodestaccelerationingrowthtoabout2.25%,supportedbyAI

investmentandfiscalthrustfromtheOneBigBeautifulBillAct.Thefirsthalfoftheyear

maybesoftergiventhelingeringeffectsofthestagflationarymegatrendshocksoftariffsanddemographics,aswellasyet-to-materialize

broad-basedgainsinworkerproductivity.Thelabormarkets,whichcooledmarkedlyin2025,shouldstabilizebytheendof2026,helpingtheunemploymentratetostaybelow4.5%.

EconomicgrowthisexpectedtokeepU.S.

inflationsomewhatpersistent,remainingabove2%bythecloseof2026.Thiscombinationofsolidgrowthandstill-stickyinflationsuggeststhat

theFederalReservewillhavelimitedscopetocutratesbelowourestimatedneutralrateof3.5%.

OurFedforecastisabitmorehawkishthanthebondmarket’sexpectations.

GivensimilarAI-relateddynamics,ourforecast

forChina’seconomicgrowthisalsoabove

consensusexpectationsin2026.Despiteongoingexternalandstructuralchallenges,realGDP

growthismorelikelytoregister5%than4%.

Conversely,ourriskassessmentfortheeuroareaismoreconsensus-likegiventhelackofstrongAIdynamics.Weanticipategrowthtohovernear

1%in2026,asthedragfromhigherU.S.tariffsisoffsetbyincreaseddefenseandinfrastructure

spending.Inflationshouldstayclosetothe2%target,allowingtheEuropeanCentralBanktomaintainitscurrentpolicystancethroughouttheyear.

Adifferentiatedinvestmentplaybook

Ourcapitalmarketsoutlookdiffersacross

markets,assetclasses,andinvestmenttime

horizons.Overall,ourmedium-runoutlookfor

multiassetportfoliosremainsconstructive,withpositiveafter-inflationreturnslikelytocontinue.In2026,U.S.technologystockscouldwell

maintaintheirmomentumgiventherateofinvestmentandanticipatedearningsgrowth.

3

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Butletusbeclear:Risksaregrowingamidthisexuberance,evenifitappears“rational”by

somemetrics.Morecompellinginvestment

opportunitiesareemergingelsewhereevenforthoseinvestorsmostbullishonAI’sprospects.

Ourconvictioninthisviewisgrowing,anditisinformedbyinvestmentreturnsinprevious

technologycycles.

Ourcapitalmarketsprojectionsshowthatthestrongestrisk-returnprofilesacrosspublic

investmentsoverthecomingfiveto10yearsare,inorder:

1.High-qualityU.S.fixedincome.

2.U.S.value-orientedequities.

3.Non-U.S.developedmarketsequities.

Wemaintainoursecularviewthathigh-quality

bonds(bothtaxableandmunicipal)offer

compellingrealreturnsgivenhigherneutralrates.Returnsshouldaveragenearcurrentportfolio

incomelevels,representingacomfortablemarginovertherateofexpectedfutureinflation.That’stheprimaryreasonwhybondsareback,regardlessofwhatcentralbanksdoin2026.Importantly,

U.S.fixedincomeshouldalsoprovidediversificationifAIdisappointsandfailstousherinhigher

economicgrowth—ascenariowithoddsthatwecalculatetobe25%–30%.

Thehistoryofinvestingduringtechnologycyclesrevealssomecounterintuitive

investmentopportunities.

Weremainmostguardedinourassessment

oftech-heavyU.S.growthstocks,whichhave

outperformedmostotherinvestmentsbyan

astoundingmarginoverthelastfewyears.Yetaswewillshowinthisoutlook,ourmutedexpectedreturnsforthetechnologysectorareentirely

consistentwithourmorebullishprospectsforanAI-ledU.S.economicboom.

TheheadyexpectationsforU.S.technology

stocksareunlikelytobemetforatleasttwo

reasons.Thefirstisthealready-highearnings

expectations,andthesecondisthetypical

underestimationofcreativedestructionfrom

newentrantsintothesector,whicherodes

aggregateprofitability.Volatilityinthissector—andhencetheU.S.stockmarketoverall—isvery

likelytoincrease.Indeed,ourmutedU.S.stock

forecastof4%–5%averagereturnsoverthenextfiveto10yearsisnearlysinglehandedlydrivenbyourrisk-returnassessmentoflarge-cap

technologycompanies.

Thehistoryofinvestingduringtechnologycyclesrevealssomecounterintuitive—yetincreasingly

compelling—investmentopportunitiesregardlessofwhetherAIprovestransformativeornot.BothU.S.value-orientedandnon-U.S.developed

marketsequitiesshouldbenefitmostover

timeasAI’seventualboosttogrowthbroadenstoconsumersofAI.Economictransformationsareoftenaccompaniedbysuchequitymarket

shiftsoverthefulltechnologycycle.

Overall,thesethreeinvestmentopportunitiesarebothoffensiveanddefensive.Thisriskassessmentholdsnomatterwhethertoday’sAIexuberance

ultimatelyprovesrationalornot.

IMPORTANT:Theprojectionsandother

informationgeneratedbytheVanguardCapitalMarketsModel®(VCMM)regardingthelikelihoodofvariousinvestmentoutcomesarehypotheticalinnature,donotreflectactualinvestment

results,andarenotguaranteesoffutureresults.DistributionofreturnoutcomesfromtheVCMMarederivedfrom10,000simulationsforeach

modeledassetclass.Simulationsareasof

October31,2025.Resultsfromthemodelmayvarywitheachuseandovertime.Formore

information,pleaseseepage26.

4

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OUROUTLOOKFORAI

AI-enablinginvestment:Earlystageswithampleroomtogrow

AIhasrapidlyevolvedfromatechnological

breakthroughtoatransformativeeconomic

force,reshapingexpectationsforproductivity,growth,andcompetitivenessacrossindustries.

Muchlikeelectricity,railroads,andtheinternet

beforeit,AIisdrivingastructuralshiftthat

demandssignificantcapitalinvestmenttoretooltheeconomyforanewera.Thisisnotapassingtrend—butratherthefoundationforthenext

waveofeconomicprogress.

Today,theAIcapitalinvestmentcycleremains

initsearlystages,mirroringthetrajectoryof

historicbuildouts.UnlikepopularnarrativesthatframeAIinvestmenttothispointasatech-sectorphenomenon,ithasbeenbroadbased,touching

nearlyeverycorneroftheeconomy.Yettheroadaheadlooksdifferent.Thenextphasewillhingeon“AIscalers”thatareaimingtoachievea

quantumleapingenerativeAIcapabilities.1

Thesedeep-pocketedAIscalersappearcapableoffollowingthroughontheirhistoric$2.1trillioncapitalinvestmentcommitmentsinto2027.

However,investmentofthismagnitudewill

increasinglyinvolveawidevarietyoffinancingchannels,includingleases,publicandprivate

credit,andvarioustypesofequityofferings.

Thisphaseoftheinvestmentcycle—whichis

likelytoplayoutoverthenextthreetofive

years—willbeadouble-edgedsword.Ononehand,itwillspurtheeconomytoswapout

oldtoolsfornewones—whicheconomistscall“capitaldeepening.”Butitwillalsopresentan

increasinglynarrowinvestmentlandscape,whereinvestorswillfinditdifficulttoavoidrisktiedto

thesuccessofthisvintageofAIinvestment.

Deep-pocketedAIscalersappearcapableoffollowingthroughontheirhistoric

$2.1trillioninvestmentcommitments.

Ageneral-purposetechnologyneedscapitaldeepening

SincetheemergenceofChatGPTinlate2022,AIinvestmenthascontributedroughly$250

billiontoU.S.GDP.2Whilethisnominalsum

mightsoundlarge,historicalcomparisonsofferperspective.AsashareofGDP,thecurrentAIcapitalinvestmentcycleappearstobetrackingpastcapitalbuildoutsclosely.

Fromtherailroadinthe19thcenturytopost-

WorldWarIIindustrialexpansiontotheinternetandpersonalcomputerinthe1990s,theadventofageneral-purposetechnology(GPT)hasbeenfollowedbytheeconomyengagingincapital

deepeningthatrequiressignificantupfrontinvestmentinthenewtools.

WeexpectAItobenoexception.Ouranalysisofbenchmarkperiodssuggeststhatthesehistoricbuildoutshavecrescendoedoveramultiyear

period—typicallypeakinginafour-tosix-yearwindow.Bythismeasure,thecurrentAIcyclewouldappeartobeinthestill-earlystages,at30%–40%ofpastpeaks.

1Inthisoutlook,wedefineAIscalersasS&P500companiesintheSoftware&Services,TechnologyHardware&Equipment,Semiconductors&SemiconductorEquipment,andElectricUtilitiesindustrygroups.Economically,thisdefinitioncapturesthebroadercorporateecosysteminvolvedinAI-enablingcapital

investmentandincludeskeycompaniesthatinvestorscommonlyassociatewithAIscaling,suchasAmazon,Alphabet(Google),Tesla,Apple,Oracle,Microsoft,Nvidia,andMeta.

2WedefineAIinvestmentasinvestmentinsoftware,informationprocessingequipment,communicationstructures,datacenterstructures,electricpowerstructuresandequipment,andsemiconductorsasdefinedbytheBureauofEconomicAnalysis.

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5

Priorbuildoutshavealsoreimaginedcorporationstructures,leadingtonewstandardsandregula-tionsandredrawingcompetitivelandscapesformany(and,attimes,most)industries.Thetele-communicationsandinternetbuildoutsawthe

passagesoftheTelecommunicationsActof1996andtheDigitalMillenniumCopyrightActasjusttwoexamplesthatservedtoderegulatetelecommarkets,promotecompetition,andprovidenewlegalprotectionsforthedigitalage.3

Althoughbroader-architecturedevelopmentsaredifficulttomeasureinrealtime,wewouldassessthemtobestillformingforAI—evidencedbythecurrentcriticaldebatesrelatedtoregulatory

andgovernancestandardsandstill-evolvingcompetitiveandindustrydynamics.4

Theinvestmentcycleistrackinghistoriccapitalbuildouts

Automanufacturingpeak,

5years

Telecommunicationspeak,

5yearsand6months

Railroadpeak,

4yearsand9monthsgaspeak,

9months

ChangeinshareofGDP(percentagepoints)1.5

Oiland

3yearsand

1.0

0.5

0

–0.5

012345678Yearsfromstartofinvestmentcycle

Post-WWIIautomanufacturingRailroad

(1840s–1850s)

Telecommunications(1990s)

Oilandgas

(1970s–1980s)

AI

(current)

AIforecast

Notes:ThischartshowsthechangeinthetotalsizeofdifferentinvestmentcyclesasashareofrealGDP.Theperiodstartingpointsare:Q11850forrailroad,Q11946forpost-WWIIautomanufacturing,Q11980foroilandgas,Q21995fortelecommunications,andQ32022forAI(current).

Sources:Vanguardcalculations,basedondatafromtheBureauofEconomicAnalysis,asofOctober31,2025.RailroaddataaresourcedfromPereiraetal.(2014).

3Formoreinformation,seeFederalCommunicationsCommission(2013)andU.S.CopyrightOffice(2025).

4Formoreinformation,seeCongressionalResearchService(2025).

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6

Thecurrentinvestmentcyclehashadbroad-basedsupportfrom

theeconomy

DespitethespotlightonAI,investment

overallhasbeenbroadbasedthusfar,finding

participationacrossmanysectorsinthe

economy.Thiscontrastswiththepeaksofprior

historiccapitalbuildouts,wheninvestmentwasdominatedbyaclusterofplayersand/orsectors.

Thisbalancedsectoralfootprintpointsto

morephasestocome.Whilethetechsectoris

leadingtheway,itsshareremainswellbelow

pastlevels.Inpreviousbuildouts,dominant

sectorsoftenaccountedfordouble-digitsharesoftotalinvestmentastheircontributionstothe

buildoutintensified.Today,theinformationanddataprocessingsectoraccountsforjust7%ofnonresidentialinvestmentintheU.S.economy.

Sinceroughly2017,capitalexpenditurehas

beenlargelydrivenbyintangibleinvestmentsinsoftware,computers,andrelatedequipment.

Today,roughly25centsofeverydollarinvested

goestotheseintangiblecategories.AsthecapitaldeepeningneededtosupportAIacceleratesandmatures—namely,greatertangibleinvestment

indatacenters,energyproduction,and

semiconductormanufacturing—weexpect

investmentstobroadenoutbeyondintangiblesconcentratedonsoftwareapplications.

TheAIcapitalbuildouthasbeenwide-ranging

Concentrationindex

4

2

0

-2

Concentrationby:Investmenttype

Industry

1947196019731986199920122025

Notes:Thisconcentrationindexmeasuresdegreeofconcentrationbyinvestmenttypeandindustry.Theindexiscalculatedasthesumofsquaredsharesofnonresidentialinvestment,normalizedbystandarddeviation.

Sources:Vanguardcalculations,basedondatafromtheBureauofEconomicAnalysis,asofOctober31,2025.

Forinstitutionalandsophisticatedinvestorsonly.Notforpublicdistribution.

7

Techdominatesthecurrentcyclebuthasasmallershareoftotalinvestmentcomparedwiththeleadingindustriesinearliereras

Top5industriesbyshareoftotalinvestmentatpeakofinvestmentconcentration

1949

1982

2000

Current

Farming

Oilandgas

Telecommunications

Informationanddataprocessing

12%11%

11%

7%

Electricpower

7%

Telecommunications

Realestate

7%

Electricpower

6%

8%

Railroads

Realestate

Computersandelectronics

Chemicalproducts

6%

6%

6%

5%

Telecommunications

Electricpower

Banking

Realestate

6%

5%

6%

5%

Oilandgas

Banking

Electricpower

Miscellaneous

5%

4%

4%

5%

Sources:Vanguardcalculations,basedondatafromtheBureauofEconomicAnalysis,asofOctober31,2025.

WhilethenextphaseappearsdependentonAIscalers,ithasfurtherlegs

ThenextphaseofthebuildoutlooksincreasinglydependentonAIscalersinafewdistinctways

toprovidethecomputingpower,datastorage,

andfrontiermodelsneededforlarge-scale

applications.Thefirstdependencyismagnitude.Trackingpastcapitaldeepeningcycleswould

requirethatAIscalersfollowthroughonthe$2.1trillioncapitalinvestmentcommitmentsexpectedtodate.5AIscalers’datacenterinvestment

representsadecisiveswingfactorinthenextphaseoftheAIcapitalinvestmentcycle.

Theseconddimensionisthetypeofinvestment.WithAIdatacenterbuildoutslikelytoconstitutethebulkofAI-relatedcapitalinvestment,we

expectamorenarrowsetofsectorsinthe

economytoparticipateinthecomingphase—

supplyingtheAIchips,skilledandspecialized

laborrequiredforbuildingandoutfitting,utilities(togeneratepower),andrealestatecloserto

existingelectricgrids.

Overall,theimplicationsfortheeconomyand

marketsareclear:WeareclosertothebeginningthantotheendofthisAIinvestmentcycle.

Thelastnotable,andarguablymostimportant,

dependencyofthisAIcapitalinvestmentcycle

istheevolvingcorporatefundamentalsofthe

AIscalers.Asthesecompanieslooktooutdothehistoricbuildouts,anaturalquestionarises:Are

theyoverextendingthemselvestofundsuchlargeinvestments?

5The$2.1trillionfigureisbasedonconsensusestimatesfromBloombergforAIscalers.Capitalcommitmentsfromwell-knownmega-captechfirms—

Amazon,Oracle,Meta,Alphabet(Google),Tesla,Microsoft,Nvidia,andApple—aloneaccountfortwo-thirdsofthetotal($1.4trillionoutof$2.1trillion).

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8

OurbaselineviewisthattheAIscalersdo

havethewherewithaltofundtheseinvestments,thankstothecombinationoflargecashstockpiles,strongbalancesheets,andbusinessmodelsthathaveprovidedunusuallydeepcompetitivemoatsandconsistentearningsgrowth.Indeed,the

market’sconsensusviewisthatAIscalerswill

remainprofitableenoughtomorethancovertheplannedinvestmentof$2.1trillionbetween2025and2027.6

Whilethesefirmsmayhavetheabilitytofundthenextphaseofthisbuildout,thehistoricsizeofsuchinvestmentwillincreasinglyfavortheirspreadingtheriskacrossvariousfinancing

channels.Inthesecondhalfof2025alone,we

havewitnessedgrowingpopularityinleasing

(oftenwithacreditbackstop/guarantee),tappingprivateandpubliccreditmarkets(bothin

investmentgradeandhighyield),andcreative

vendorfinancingthatpartlyleveragesthe

favorablevaluationofcertainfirmscentralto

AIcapitalinvestment.Consciousofthemarket’sexpectationtocontinuedeliveringonearnings

growth—amultiyeartrend—theAIscalerswillbecomeastuteoperatorsoftheirfunding

capacities,likelyutilizingmost(ifnotall)

availablechannelstomaintaintheirearningsgrowthtrajectories.7

$2.1trillionforAIcapitalinvestment:TheAIscalersaregoodforit

U.S.dollars(billions)$300

200

100

Expectedsumofrealizedandactualquarterlyretainedcashflow,netofbuybacks:$2.4trillion

Expectedsumofrealizedandactualquarterlycapital

expenditure:$2.1trillion

0

2021202220232024202520262027

Retainedcashflow,netofbuybacks

Forecast

CapitalexpenditureForecast

Q12025throughQ42027

Notes:ThischartshowshistoricalandconsensusestimatesforcapitalexpenditureandretainedcashflowminusbuybacksforAIscalers(seefootnote1for

definition).The$2.1trillionincapitalexpenditurerepresentsthesumofrealizedandactualquarterlycapitalexpenditureinthechartfromthebeginningof2025totheendof2027.

Source:Bloomberg,asofNovember5,2025.

6Weuseconsensusforecastsofretainedcashflow,netofprojectedbuybacks,asaprimarysourceoffundingavailableforcapitalexpenditure.Theothersourceisexistingcashonbalancesheet.Combined,theexpectedsumis$2.4trillionfor2025to2027.

7Onamarket-cap-weightedbasis,theirinterestexpense/EBIT(earningsbeforeinterestandtaxes)anddebt-to-assetratioareone-thirdandfour-fifths,respectively,oftheS&P500Index’s.

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9

AIandtheeconomy:Productivityupside,butatanunevenpace

AstoAI’seconomicimpact,2026willseeits

productivityupsiderealized—albeitatanunevenpaceacrossindustriesandeconomies.After

decadesofdevelopment,AI’smainstreamarrivalinlate2022hasfeltsudden.2023and2024

representedaperiodofexperimentation,whenbusinessesandconsumersstartedexploringAI’scapabilitiesandgrewcomfortableusingit.

In2025,thenarrativeshiftedtowardbroader

adoption,withkeyAIscalersleadingthechargebydeepeningAIintegrationintheircloud

platforms.2026willbeayearofevenbroaderadoptioninwhichAIisembeddedinworkflows.

Itwillalsobeayearofkeyassessment,when

businessesandgovernmentsacrosstheglobe

closelymonitorAI’sproductivityimpactandtheevolvinglabormarket.

Aseconomy-wideassessmentofAIkicksinto

highergear,2026mayalsobringadditionalclaritytothedirectionoftravelforfoundationalAI

capability.Thecurrentparadigmofcompute-

heavyAIcapabilityimprovementcouldeitherfindadditionalsupport—possiblyratchetinguptheAIcapitalinvestment—ortransitiontoanalternativeparadigmifthehoped-forquantumleapinAI

capabilityremainselusive.

AIadoptiongainsmomentumacrossindustries

HouseholdAIadoptionhasfollowedtherapid

paceofrecentconsumertechnologieslikethe

internet,smartphones,andsocialmedia.Thereal

surpriseliesinthebreakneckpaceofAIadoptionbybusinesses,whichisrapidlyreshapingworkflows.Yetthejourneytowardfullintegrationandhigherlong-termproductivitygrowthisfarfrom

complete.Ourtask-basedframeworkrevealsthatAI’sproductivitypotentialissurprisinglyuniversal,eveninindustriestraditionallyseenasphysical

andlesssuitedforAI.Allindustriesspend

considerabletimeonrules-basedcognitivetasks,whichcurrentAItoolscandramaticallyaccelerateandstreamline.Thisintegrationcanraiseoverallproductivitybyreallocatingworkers’timeto

higher-valuetasksandbyreducingtheworkforceneededtoproducegoodsandservices,witheachdevelopmenthavingdistinctlabormarket

implications.

Ourtask-basedframeworkrevealsthatAI’sproductivitypotentialissurprisinglyuniversal,eveninindustriestraditionallyseenasphysicalandlesssuitedforAI.

Industry-leveladoptionratesvarywidely,

withinformationandprofessional/financial

servicesleadingtheway,whiletransportation/

warehousingandleisure/hospitalitylagfar

behind.UntilAIspreadsmoreevenlyacrossthe

economy,theoverallproductivityandinvestmentimplicationswilllikelybeconcentratedyet

significant.Recentquartershaveshownearly

signsofapositiveinflectioninlaborproductivity,thoughofficialstatisticsremaininconclusiveandwilllikelylaganyturningpoint.8

8Officialproductivitystatisticsareoftenrevisedseveraltimesaftertheirinitialrelease.The1990s