高盛-退税与能源成本上涨:对美国消费者的影响-Tax Refunds vs.Higher Energy Costs:The Impact on the US Consumer-20260420_第1页
高盛-退税与能源成本上涨:对美国消费者的影响-Tax Refunds vs.Higher Energy Costs:The Impact on the US Consumer-20260420_第2页
高盛-退税与能源成本上涨:对美国消费者的影响-Tax Refunds vs.Higher Energy Costs:The Impact on the US Consumer-20260420_第3页
高盛-退税与能源成本上涨:对美国消费者的影响-Tax Refunds vs.Higher Energy Costs:The Impact on the US Consumer-20260420_第4页
高盛-退税与能源成本上涨:对美国消费者的影响-Tax Refunds vs.Higher Energy Costs:The Impact on the US Consumer-20260420_第5页
已阅读5页,还剩18页未读 继续免费阅读

下载本文档

版权说明:本文档由用户提供并上传,收益归属内容提供方,若内容存在侵权,请进行举报或认领

文档简介

Eco

h

ntsi:c/s/wse.vaaruhelist

20April2026|10:39PMEDT

USECONOMICSANALYST

TaxRefundsvs.HigherEnergyCosts:TheImpactontheUSConsumer

nWhatoriginallyappearedtobeasolidyearforconsumerspendinghasquicklybecomemorechallenging.Wereassessthekeydriversofconsumerspendingforthisyear,withafocusonthenearlycompletetaxseasonandtherecentsurgeingasolineprices.

nLastyear’sfiscalpackage—theOneBigBeautifulBillAct(OBBBA)—likelyo仟settheimpactofhighercapitalgainstaxpaymentsthistaxseason.Taxrefundsarecurrently17%higherthanlastyear,implyinga$50bnincreaseoverlastyearbytheendofMay.Taxpaymentsareontracktoendup$40-55bngreaterthanlastyearbut$25-40bnbelowthe$80bnincreasethatwewouldhaveexpected

absenttheOBBBA.Combined,thesefiowsimplyatotalbenefitofaround

$75-90bnfromtheOBBBAbutroughlyunchangedtaxbillsyear-over-year—resultinginalimitedtailwindforconsumerspending.

nGasolinepriceshaveincreasedbynearly40%sincethewarbegan,representingaroughly$140bnannualizedheadwindtohouseholdincomesatcurrentlevels.Underourcommoditystrategists’baselineforecastwhereBrentreturnsto

$80/bblbyyear-end,weexpectthisheadwindtoshrinkto$60bnannualizedbyyear-endbuttotal$70bnfor2026asawhole.Highergasolineprices

disproportionatelyweighonthespendingofhouseholdsinthelowestincomequintile—whospendroughlyfourtimesasmuchongasolineasashareof

after-taxincomecomparedwiththoseinthetopquintile—andspendingondiscretionarycategories,suchasrestaurants.

nWeexpectweakrealconsumptiongrowthoverthecomingmonths.Forthe

upcomingMarchrelease,weforecastasharp1.0%month-over-monthincreaseinnominalheadlineretailsales,butamodest0.1%increaseinthecontrolgroup.Onarealbasis,weforecasta1.0%declineinheadlineretailsalesanda0.1%

declineinthecontrolgroup.

nUnderourbaselineoilforecast,weprojectrealdisposableincomegrowthof

1.6%onaQ4/Q4basis(or1.2%full-year).Weforecastrealconsumptiongrowthof1.2%in2026onaQ4/Q4basis(or1.5%full-year).Weexpectparticularly

weakconsumptiongrowthin2026forthelowestincomequintile,forwhichweprojectjust0.7%realincomegrowthduetohighergasolineandfoodcostsandcutstogovernmentbenefits.

nInanadversescenariowhereBrentaverages$100/bblin2026Q4,wewould

RonnieWalker

+1(917)343-4543|

ronnie.walker@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

AlecPhillips

+1(202)637-3746|

alec.phillips@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

JosephBriggs

+1(212)902-2163|

joseph.briggs@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegACcertificationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto

/research/hedge.html

.

GoldmanSachsU

Sho:/wA.

inalyst

expect2026consumptiongrowth¼ppbelowourbaseline,withaparticularlylargehit(-弘pp)tospendinggrowthforthelowestincomequintile.Inaseverelyadversescenario($115/bbl),wewouldexpectoverallconsumptiongrowth½ppbelowourbaseline.

20April20262

GoldmanSachsU

Sho:/wA.

inalyst

20April20263

TaxRefundsvs.HigherEnergyCosts:TheImpactontheUSConsumer

Whatoriginallyappearedtobeasolidyearforconsumerspendinghasquicklybecomemorechallenging.Wereassessthekeydriversofconsumerspendingforthisyear,withafocusonthenearlycompletetaxseasonandtherecentsurgeingasolineprices.

TaxRelief:LaterButOnlyaLittleSmallerThanExpected

Lastyear’sfiscalpackageincludedroughly$100bninestimatedtaxrelieffrom

provisionsthatwereretroactiveforthe2025taxyear.AstheTreasurydidnotchangetaxwithholdingduringtheyear,allofthesurplustoconsumersshouldshowupduringthecurrenttaxfilingseason.

Mostoftheattentionhasbeenontaxrefunds,whichsofarare$41bn(17%)higherthanlastyear(leftpanelofExhibit1).Bymid-April,theTreasuryhastypicallypaidmorethanthreequartersoftherefundsitwillpayduringfilingseason,implyingatotalaround

$50bngreaterthanlastyearbytheendofMay.

BillionsofdollarsBillionsofdollars

800FederalIndividualNonwithheldIncomeTaxDeposits,800FilingSeason-to-Date

7002026,model-implied(not700accountingforOBBBAimpact)

6002026,Actual20252024600

500500

400400

300300

200200

100100

001-252-42-142-243-63-163-264-54-154-255-55-15

Exhibit1:TaxRefundsAreonCoursetoIncrease$50bnYear-over-year;WeEstimateTaxPaymentsWillIncrease$40-55bnYear-over-year,$25-40bnBelowWhatTheyWouldHaveBeenAbsenttheOBBBA

FederalIndividualTaxRefunds,FilingSeason-to-Date

202620252024

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

1-252-42-142-243-63-163-264-54-154-255-55-15

BillionsofdollarsBillionsofdollars

Source:Treasury,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

However,thedistributionofbenefitsfromthenewtaxlawsuggeststhatasubstantialshareofthecashfiowtailwindshouldalsocomevialowertaxpayments.TheleftpanelofExhibit2showsgrosstaxpaymentstoandfromindividualtaxpayers,byincome.

Refundsareconcentratedamongthelowerincomegroups,primarilyduetorefundabletaxcredits.Higherincomegroupsaccountfornearlyallofthepaymentsduringfiling

season,whichareconcentratedinthedaysjustbeforeandthecoupleofweeksaftertheApril15duedate.

20April20264

Exhibit2:MostoftheIncrementalBenefitsoftheTaxCutsinLastYear’sFiscalPackageWereConcentratedinIncomeGroupsThatTypicallyOweMoreinTaxesDuringtheFilingSeasonThanTheyReceiveinRefunds

50

40

30

20

10

0

>1mn

Billionsof$Billionsof$

60OBBBATaxReductionbyIncomeLevel,2026(GSEstimates)60

SALT

Std.Deduct.

Child

Auto

Tips

Overtime

Senior

50

40

30

20

10

0

<30k30-40

200-

500

100-

200

500-

1mn

40-

50

75-

100

50-

75

800

600

400

200

0

-200

>1mn

Billionsof$Billionsof$

1000GrossFederalTaxPaymentsbyIncomeLevel,20231000

PaymentwithreturnEstimated

Withheld

Refund

Credittonextyear

800

600

400

200

0

-200

<30k30-40

200-

500

100-

200

500-

1mn

40-

50

75-

100

50-

75

Source:Treasury,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

TheincrementalbenefitsofthetaxcutsCongresspassedlastyear(shownintheright

panelofExhibit2)wereconcentratedinincomegroupswhosepaymentwiththetax

returnnormallyexceedstheirtaxrefunds(seethedi仟erencebetweenthegreyand

greenbarsintheleftpanelofExhibit2).IfweassumethatthosetaxbenefitsshowupasincreasedrefundsandreducedtaxpaymentsinproportiontotheamountsshownintheleftpanelofExhibit2,thiswouldimplyaround$45bninlowertaxpaymentsand

$35-55bninhigherrefunds,dependingonwhethertaxpayersinhigherincomebracketschoosetocreditoverpaymentsforwardtonextyear’staxesowedortakerefundsnow.

Taxreceiptsoverthelastfewdayssuggestthattaxpaymentsareindeedcomingin

belowwhatwouldhavebeenexpected.Amodelpredictingnon-withheldtaxreceiptsusingstockmarketreturns,homesales,andfiowoffundsdatasuggeststhesepaymentsshouldbe14%higherthanlastyear,orabout$80billionthroughmid-May.Payments

throughApril16areuplessthan10%,withthelargestpaymentdayssofar—April15and16—runningonlyslightlyaheadoflastyear.Overall,themostrecentdatasuggestthattotaltaxseasonpaymentswillendup$25-40bnlowerthanwouldhavebeen

expectedabsentthenewtaxlaw.

Thisimpliesatotaltaxfilingseasonbenefitofaround$75-90bn,onlyslightlysmallerthanthe$90bnwehadassumedafterthelawpassedlastyear.

Withnettaxpayments(paymentslessrefunds)ontracktoberoughlyunchanged

comparedtolastyear—thetaxbenefitfromlastyear’sfiscalpackageisroughlyequalinmagnitudetotheincreaseincapitalgainstaxpayments—weexpectlimitedimpactfromthistaxseasononconsumerspending.

20April20265

Exhibit3:TheTaxSeasonBenefitFromLastYear’sFiscalPackageShouldOffsetAnyPotentialDragonConsumptionFromIncreasedTaxPaymentsFromHigherCapitalGains

PercentofPCE0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

-0.2

PercentofPCE0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

-0.2

OBBBAImpact-ReducedPaymentsOBBBAImpact-IncreasedRefundsIncreasedCapitalGains

Total

ImpactofTaxSeason

onRealPCELevelvs.2025,byChannel(GSEstimates)

JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec

-0.4-0.6

-0.8

-0.4-0.6

-0.8

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

TheHeadwindFromHigherGasolinePrices

Gasolinepriceshaveincreasedbynearly40%sincethewarbegan,representinga

roughly$140bnannualizedheadwindtohouseholdincomesatcurrentlevels.Underourcommodityteam’sbaselineforecastwhereBrentreturnsto$80/bblbyyear-end,we

expectthisheadwindtoshrinkto$60bnannualizedbyyear-endbuttotal$70bnfor2026asawhole.

Inpastoilshockepisodes,consumershavetypicallyinitiallyrespondedtotheshockbydissaving(i.e.,consumerslowertheirsavingratetocoverthehighercostofgasoline).Consistentwiththehistoricalpattern,theleftpanelofExhibit4showsthathigher

frequencymeasuresofnominalspendinggrowthacceleratedinMarchandtherightpanelshowsthattheaccelerationlikelyrefiectedanincreasedcontributionfrom

spendingongasoline.

20April20266

Exhibit4:AlternativeMeasuresofNominalConsumerSpendingAcceleratedinMarch,MostlyRefiectingIncreasedSpendingonGasoline

SecondMeasure:ContributiontoYear-over-Year

RetailSpendingGrowth(28dmovingavg.)

OtherGasolineTotal

Jul'25Sep'25Nov'25Jan'26Mar'26

PercentagePercentage

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

Percentchange,yearPercentchange,year

2525

20222023202420252026

CensusRetailSales

SecondMeasure

20

15

10

5

0

-5

20

15

10

5

0

-5

HardMeasuresofConsumerSpendingGrowth

SpendTrend

Source:DepartmentofCommerce,Bloomberg,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Weexpectasharp1.0%month-over-monthincreaseinnominalheadlineretailsalesintheupcomingreleaseforMarchbutaweakercontrolreading(+0.1%).Thispatternis

consistentwiththe

historicalresponse

toahittorealdisposableincomesfromhigher

gasprices:Exhibit5showsthatconsumersdisproportionatelycutbackonspendingoncarsandotherdiscretionarycategories.Onaninfiation-adjustedbasis,weforecasta1%declineinheadlineretailsalesanda0.1%declineinthecontrolgroup.

Exhibit5:IncreasedSpendingonGasolineIsLikelytoWeighMostonRealConsumerSpendingonAutosandOtherDiscretionaryCategories

Energy

Goods

Vehicles

Furnishings

&Durables

Rec.Goods

FoodServ.

Services

&Bev.

&Footwear

Healthcare

Transport.

Services

&Utilities

AverageEffectofBaselineOilShock

SpendingOvertheNext4Quarters,byProduct

PercentPercent

0.5

0.0

-0.5-1.0

-1.5-2.0-2.5-3.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5-1.0

-1.5-2.0-2.5-3.0

onReal

Motor

&Hotels

Rec.

Food

Clothing

Housing

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

AnotherReasontoExpectLow-EndUnderperformance

Highergasolinepriceswilldisproportionatelyburdenhouseholdsinthelowestincomequintile,whospendroughlyfourtimesasmuchongasolineasashareofafter-tax

incomecomparedwiththoseinthetopquintile.

20April20267

Exhibit6:HouseholdsintheLowestIncomeQuintileSpendRoughlyFourTimesasMuchastheTopQuintileonGasolineasaShareofAfter-TaxIncome

HeadlinePCEInflation,

byIncomeQuintile(GSEstimates)

BottomSecondThird

FourthTop

1.5

2024202520262027

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

PercentPercent

SpendingonGasolineandOtherEnergyGoodsasaShareofAfter-TaxIncome,byIncomeQuintile

(NationalAccountsBasis)

LowestSecondThirdFourthHighest

PercentPercent

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

IncomeQuintile

Source:DepartmentofCommerce,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Exhibit7showsourupdateddistributionalincomegrowthforecasts.Wecontinueto

expectunderperformanceforthebottomincomequintile,refiectingtepidjobgrowth,cutstoMedicaidandSNAPbenefits,andnowgreaterexposuretotheincreasein

gasolineprices.Weexpectnotablyfirmerincomegrowthamongmiddleandhigher

incomequintiles,whicharelessexposedtotheoilshockandaccruegreaterbenefitfromlastyear’sfiscalpackage.Inthisupdate,wehaveloweredourforecastsforthemiddle

incomequintilesandboostedourforecastforthetopincomequintile,refiectingthattaxbenefitsappearskewedmoretothetopoftheincomedistributionrelativetoourpriorforecasts(assuggestedbyouranalysisabove).

Exhibit7:RealIncomeGrowthIsLikelytoBeSoftestAmongLower-IncomeHouseholds,RefiectingGreaterExposuretoHigherGasolinePricesandGovernmentSpendingCuts

ByIncomeCohortOverall

*Includestheimpactofprovisionsbeyondrefunds(e.g.cutstogovernmentbenefits).

Percent3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5-1.0

-1.5-2.0

Percent3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5-1.0

-1.5-2.0

GS2026RealIncomeGrowthForecasts,Full-YearBasis,byContributor

OBBBAImpact*Other

GasolineImpactTotal

BottomSecondThirdFourthFifth

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

20April20268

ABelow-ConsensusOutlookForConsumerSpending

Exhibit8showsourforecastsforrealconsumptiongrowthin2026.Weexpect

particularlyweakgrowthinthesecondquarter(0.9%quarterlyannualizedvs.consensusof1.7%),whichwilllikelyseethegreatestimpactofthehitfromhigheroilprices.We

expectfirmergrowthinthethird(1.5%)andfourth(1.8%)quarters,which—inadditiontothefadingdragfromhigheroilprices—willbenefitslightlyfromthespending

associatedwiththeWorldCupandspendingbynonprofitsonmidtermelectioncampaigns,respectively.Fortheyearasawhole,weforecastgrowthof1.2%ona

Q4/Q4basis,wellbelowthe1.8%consensusestimate.

Exhibit8:WeForecast1.2%ConsumptionGrowthonaQ4/Q4Basisin2026,BelowConsensus

PercentchangeRealPersonalConsumptionExpenditure(PCE)Percentchange

GSConsensus

2.52.52.1

2.01.71.71.81.81.91.82.01.51.5

1.51.51.2

1.00.91.00.50.40.5

0.00.0Q1Q2Q3Q4YoYQ4/Q4*

2026,QoQAR2026

*Calculatedfromquarterlyconsensusforecasts

3.0GrowthForecasts3.0

Source:Bloomberg,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Theveryuncertainoutlookforoilpricesimpliessignificantuncertaintyaroundconsumerspending,especiallyforlower-incomehouseholdsthatspendalargershareoftheir

budgetongasoline.Toassesstheriskfromoilpricemoves,Exhibit9estimateshow

consumerspendingwouldrespondinscenariosinwhichthereopeningoftheStraitof

Hormuzispostponedforanothermonth.TheorangebarsrepresentanadversescenariowhereBrentaverages$100/bblin2026Q4.Inthisscenario,wewouldexpect2026

consumptiongrowth¼ppbelowourbaseline,withaparticularlylargehit(-¾pp)tospendinggrowthforthelowestincomequintile.Theredbarsrepresentaseverely

adversescenariowherelaterreopeningisfollowedbypersistent2mb/dMideast

productionlossesandBrentaverages$115/bblin2026Q4.Inthatscenario,wewouldexpectoverallconsumptiongrowth½ppbelowourbaseline.

20April20269

Exhibit9:FurtherIncreasesinGasolinePricesWouldLikelyLeadtoaLargeDragonSpending,EspeciallyForLower-IncomeConsumers

EffectiveChangeinRealPCESpendingvs.GSBaseline

in2026UnderHigherGasolinePriceScenarios,

byIncomeQuintile

GSAdverseScenario

(Brentat$100/bblin2026Q4)GSSeverelyAdverseScenario

(Brentat$115/bblin2026Q4)

Percent0.5

0.0

-0.5-1.0

-1.5

-2.0

Percent0.5

0.0

-0.5-1.0

-1.5

-2.0

BottomSecondThirdFourthTopOverall

IncomeQuintile

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

RonnieWalker

AlecPhillipsJosephBriggs

20April202610

TheUSEconomicandFinancialOutlook

THEUSECONOMICANDFINANCIALOUTLOOK

(%changeonpreviousperiod,annualized,exceptwherenoted)

OUTPUTANDSPENDING

RealGDP

RealGDP(annual=Q4/Q4,quarterly=yoy)ConsumerExpenditures

ResidentialFixedInvestment

BusinessFixedInvestmentStructures

Equipment

IntellectualPropertyProductsFederalGovernment

State&LocalGovernmentNetExports($bn,'17)

InventoryInvestment($bn,'17)NominalGDP

IndustrialProduction,Mfg.

HOUSINGMARKET

HousingStarts(units,thous)

NewHomeSales(units,thous)

ExistingHomeSales(units,thous)Case-ShillerHomePrices(%yoy)*

20252026

20232024202520262027Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4

2.9

2.8

2.1

2.2

2.1

-0.6

3.8

4.4

0.5

2.8

1.6

1.8

1.9

3.4

2.4

2.0

2.0

2.2

2.0

2.1

2.3

2.0

2.9

2.3

1.7

2.0

2.6

2.9

2.6

1.5

1.8

0.6

2.5

3.5

1.9

0.4

0.9

1.5

1.8

-7.8

3.2

-2.2

-2.1

2.0

-1.0

-5.1

-7.1

-1.7

-4.8

2.0

1.5

1.5

7.3

2.9

4.1

5.4

4.8

9.5

7.3

3.2

2.4

8.9

5.4

5.1

4.4

16.7

1.1

-5.3

-0.8

3.8

-3.1

-7.5

-5.0

-6.6

0.4

4.0

4.0

4.0

2.9

3.5

8.3

8.3

5.2

21.3

8.5

5.2

4.3

16.7

6.5

6.0

5.0

6.2

3.5

5.6

5.9

4.8

6.5

15.0

5.6

5.4

6.0

5.0

4.8

4.0

3.3

3.8

-1.2

1.8

0.9

-5.6

-5.3

2.7

-16.7

22.5

0.0

1.0

1.0

3.6

3.8

2.5

1.0

0.9

1.9

3.1

2.0

1.5

0.3

0.3

0.5

1.0

-925

-1,033

-1,091

-1,011

-1,065

-1,381

-1,058

-956

-969

-993

-1,006

-1,017

-1,028

47

44

29

20

41

172

-18

-24

-16

6

25

25

25

6.7

5.3

5.0

6.0

4.2

2.9

6.0

8.3

4.2

7.0

7.2

3.6

3.8

-1.0

-1.0

0.9

1.8

3.2

4.0

2.5

2.5

-3.1

3.1

3.3

3.1

3.1

1,421

1,371

1,357

1,286

1,322

1,401

1,354

1,346

1,328

1,280

1,290

1,280

1,292

665

685

679

670

644

655

665

688

709

690

690

662

638

4,103

4,067

4,076

4,178

4,371

4,087

4,013

4,047

4,157

4,043

4,185

4,220

4,263

5.3

3.8

0.6

0.8

2.2

3.9

2.4

1.5

0.6

0.3

0.8

0.7

0.8

INFLATION(%ch,yr/yr)

ConsumerPriceIndex(CPI)**

3.3

2.9

2.7

3.3

2.1

2.7

2.5

2.9

2.7

2.7

3.8

3.4

3.3

CoreCPI**

3.9

3.2

2.6

2.1

2.0

3.1

2.8

3.1

2.7

2.5

2.6

2.3

2.2

CorePCE**†3.1

3.0

3.0

2.5

2.02.8

2.7

2.9

2.93.0

3.1

2.9

2.7

LABORMARKET

UnemploymentRate(%)^

3.8

4.1

4.4

4.6

4.4

4.2

4.1

4.4

4.4

4.3

4.5

4.6

4.6

U6UnderemploymentRate(%)^

7.2

7.6

8.4

8.7

8.3

7.9

7.7

8.1

8.4

8.0

8.4

8.6

8.7

Payrolls(thous,monthlyrate)

210

122

10

40

92

20

34

23

-39

68

20

27

47

Employment-PopulationRatio(%)^

60.1

59.9

59.7

58.9

58.9

59.9

59.7

59.7

59.7

59.2

59.1

59.0

58.9

LaborForceParticipationRate(%)^

62.5

62.5

62.4

61.8

61.6

62.5

62.3

62.5

62.4

61.9

61.9

61.8

61.8

AverageHourlyEarnings(%yoy)

4.2

5.4

4.6

4.0

3.9

5.0

4.6

4.5

4.4

4.2

4.1

3.9

3.8

GOVERNMENTFINANCE

FederalBudget(FY,$bn)

-1,694

-1,833

-1,775

-2,050

-2,200

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

FINANCIALINDICATORS

FFTargetRange(Bottom-Top,%)^

5.25-5.5

4.25-4.5

3.5-3.75

3-3.25

3-3.25

4.25-4.5

4.25-4.5

4-4.25

3.5-3.75

3.5-3.75

3.5-3.75

3.25-3.5

3-3.25

10-YearTreasuryNote^

3.88

4.58

4.18

4.20

4.25

4.23

4.24

4.16

4.18

4.30

4.20

4.20

4.20

Euro(€/$)^

1.11

1.04

1.17

1.19

1.20

1.08

1.18

1.17

1.17

1.15

1.14

1.18

1.19

Yen($/¥)^

141

157

157

155

141

150

144

148

157

160

160

158

155

*Weightedaverageofmetro-levelHPIsfor381metrocitieswheretheweightsaredollarvaluesofhousingstockreportedintheAmericanCommunitySurvey.AnnualnumbersareQ4/Q4.

**AnnualinflationnumbersareDecemberyear-on-yearvalues.QuarterlyvaluesareQ4/Q4.

†PCE=Personalconsumptionexpenditures.^Denotesendofperiod.

Note:Publishedfiguresinbold.

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

20April202611

TheUSEconomicsTeam

JanHatzius

+1(212)902-0394

jan.hatzius@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

RonnieWalker

+1(917)343-4543

ronnie.walker@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

PierfrancescoMei

+1(212)902-8809

pierfrancesco.mei@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

+1(212)902-8357

manuel.abecasis@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

+1(212)357-2619

david.mericle@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

+1(972)368-1516

jessica.rindels@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

AlecPhillips

+1(202)637-3746

alec.phillips@

ManuelAbecasis

ElsiePeng

+1(212)357-3137

elsie.peng@

JessicaRindels

DavidMericle

GoldmanSachsU

Sho:/wA.

inalyst

20April202612

DisclosureAppendix

RegAC

We,RonnieWalker,AlecPhillipsandJosephBriggs,herebycertifythatalloftheviewsexpressedinthisreportaccuratelyrefiectourpersonalviews,whichhavenotbeeninfiuencedbyconsiderationsofthefirm’sbusinessorclientrelationships.

Unlessotherwisestated,theindividualslistedonthecoverpageofthisreportareanalystsinGoldmanSachs’GlobalInvestmentResearchdivision.ContributingAuthors:RonnieWalkerGoldmanSachs&Co.LLC,AlecPhillipsGoldmanSachs&Co.LLC,JosephBriggsGoldmanSachs&Co.LLC.

Unlessotherwisestated,theindividualslistedintheContributingAuthorsdisclosureofth

温馨提示

  • 1. 本站所有资源如无特殊说明,都需要本地电脑安装OFFICE2007和PDF阅读器。图纸软件为CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.压缩文件请下载最新的WinRAR软件解压。
  • 2. 本站的文档不包含任何第三方提供的附件图纸等,如果需要附件,请联系上传者。文件的所有权益归上传用户所有。
  • 3. 本站RAR压缩包中若带图纸,网页内容里面会有图纸预览,若没有图纸预览就没有图纸。
  • 4. 未经权益所有人同意不得将文件中的内容挪作商业或盈利用途。
  • 5. 人人文库网仅提供信息存储空间,仅对用户上传内容的表现方式做保护处理,对用户上传分享的文档内容本身不做任何修改或编辑,并不能对任何下载内容负责。
  • 6. 下载文件中如有侵权或不适当内容,请与我们联系,我们立即纠正。
  • 7. 本站不保证下载资源的准确性、安全性和完整性, 同时也不承担用户因使用这些下载资源对自己和他人造成任何形式的伤害或损失。

评论

0/150

提交评论