波士顿大学全球发展政策研究中心-《中非经济公报》2026年版 China-Africa Economic Bulletin 2026 EDITION

GlobalDevelopmentPolicyCenter

China-Africa

EconomicBulletin

2026EDITION

BYMENGDIYUE,TERRENCEKAIRIZA,YIYUANQIANDABBIKEDIR

MAY2026

MengdiYueisaResearchFellowfortheenergyandclimate

workstreamattheBostonUniversityGlobalDevelopmentPolicy

Center.Sheearnedhermaster’sdegreeininternationalrelationsandinternationaleconomicsfromtheJohnsHopkinsUniversitySchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudies(SAIS).ShepreviouslyworkedasanacademicresearcheratInternationalInstituteofGreenFinance(IIGF)andFudanUniversity,contributingtoacademicandpolicydiscussionsongreenfinance,debtsustainability,BRIinfrastructureandglobal

developmentdynamics.

TerrenceKairizaisaLecturerintheDepartmentofEconomicsat

BinduraUniversityofScienceEducationandaResearchFellowat

theAfricanEconomicResearchConsortium.Hisresearchfocuseson

developmenteconomics,withparticularinterestsingender,climate

changeadaptation,foodsecurity,agriculture,health,andindustrial

development.HeholdsaPhDinDevelopmentEconomicsfromthe

NationalGraduateInstituteforPolicyStudies,Japan.

YiyuanQiisaformerResearchFellowatBostonUniversityGlobal

DevelopmentPolicyCenter,whereshewastheinterimleadfortheData

AnalysisforTransparencyandAccountability(D.A.T.A.)workstream.

ShesupportedtheGDPCenter’spublic-facingdatatoolsthattrack

Chineseloansandinvestmentsacrossenergyandinfrastructuresectors,

makingcomplexfinancialflowsaccessibleandactionableforresearchers,

journalists,andpolicymakers.YiyuanholdsaM.A.inInternational

PoliticalEconomyandInternationalEconomicsfromtheJohnsHopkins

UniversitySchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudies.

AbbiM.KediristheInterimExecutiveDirectorandtheDirectorofResearchattheAfricanEconomicResearchConsortium(AERC).In

additiontolongyearsofservicesinUKacademia,hehasexperience

workingbothingovernmentandinternationalorganizations,such

astheUnitedNationsaswellasconsultingexperiencewiththe

WorldBankandAfricanDevelopmentBank.Hepublishedmore

than45journalarticles.HeiseditorialboardmemberofJournal

ofDevelopmentStudies;JournalofEntrepreneurialBehaviourand

Research;Economies;andFrontiersinEnvironmentalScience.AbbiiscurrentlyamemberoftheTaskForceonClimate,DevelopmentandtheInternationalMonetaryFund.

Cover:CapeTown,SouthAfrica.PhotobyBenjaminleRouxviaUnsplash.

China-AfricaEconomicBulletin|2026Edition3

SUGGESTEDCITATION

Yue,M.,Kairiza,T.,Qi,Y.,andKedir,A.2026.“China-AfricaEconomicBulletin,2026Edition.”BostonUniversityGlobalDevelopmentPolicyCenterandAfricanEconomicResearchConsortium.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ThisresearchbenefitedgreatlyfromhelpfulcommentsbySolomonOwusu,dataanalysissupportbyRebeccaRay,DiegoMorroandNicolòCapirone,anddatareviewbyWilliamOlichney.

4China-AfricaEconomicBulletin|2026Edition

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

5

INTRODUCTION

7

TRENDSINCHINA-AFRICATRADE

8

TRENDSINCHINA’SFOREIGNDIRECTINVESTMENTTOAFRICA

20

TRENDSINCHINA’SLENDINGANDDEVELOPMENTFINANCETOAFRICA

30

OUTLOOKFORCHINA-AFRICACOOPERATION

40

REFERENCES

42

China-AfricaEconomicBulletin|2026Edition5

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

In2024,China’seconomicrelationshipwithAfricancountriesfeaturedrecord-hightradevalues,revivalofforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)fromtheCOVID-19pandemicandadramaticdeclineofChineselendingamidabroaderreversalinnetcapitalflowstotheGlobalSouth.

The2026editionoftheChina-AfricaEconomicBulletintracesChina-Africaengagementacrossthreedomains—trade,investmentandlendinganddevelopmentfinance—focusingonupdatessincethelasteditionwithevidencethrough2022(Mosesetal.2024).Thebulletinaimstoprovideadata-drivensnapshotoftrendsandemergingpatternsthatmeritfurtherresearchandpolicyattention.

Keyfindings:

•In2024,Africa’stradewithChinareachedarecordvalueof$275billion,including$182billioninimports(6.3%ofGDP)and$93billioninexports(3.2%ofGDP).Thatsameyear,Chinaaccountedfor16percentofAfrica’stotalexportsand28percentoftotalimportsandwastheleadingexportdestinationfor19outof54Africancountries.

•Thetoptransitionmineralcategories(includingores,concentratesandprocessedproducts)importedbyChinafromAfricaarecopper,bauxiteandaluminum,chromium,manganeseandcobalt.AfricaisamajorsupplierofchromiumandmanganesetoChinadespitetheirsmalltradevalues.

•China’sexportsoflow-carbontechnologies(LCTs)1toAfricatotaled$9.8billionin2024,mostlyinpowergeneration,energystorageandpollutioncontrol.LCTtradeisconcentratedinafewadvancedmarketslikeSouthAfrica,EgyptandNigeria.

•ChineseFDIinAfricareboundedstronglyin2023and2024followingpandemic-eralows.Thisrecentuptickislargelydrivenbyasmallnumberoflargeprojectsratherthanabroad-basedsurge.

•WhileAfrica’saverageratioofpublicandpubliclyguaranteed(PPG)debttogrossnationalincomeremainsmoderate,netcapitalflowsfromChinahaveturnednegative,meaningannualrepaymentsnowexceedannualnewdisbursements.Increasingdebtservicecostsin2026-2030riskcrowdingoutcriticalspendingondevelopmentandtheenergytransition.

•ChineseloancommitmentstoAfricahavedeclinedsharplysince2020,fallingbelow$5billionannually.Duringthe2010s,theyexceededWorldBanklendinginseveralyearsand,after2020,arebroadlycomparabletoAfricanDevelopmentBanklendinglevels.

•In2023,eightAfricancountriesandtwomultilateralAfricanborrowersreceived13loanstotalingapproximately$4.61billion,followedbysixloansworth$2.1billionin2024.Thelargestlendingvolumewenttothefinancialsector,followedbytransportationandenergy.

•Nonewlendingtocoal,oilorgasprojectsinAfricahasbeenrecordedsince2019.However,lendingtonon-hydrorenewables(solar,wind,nuclearandgeothermal)remainedsmallinscaleatapproximately$1.7billioncombinedover2000-2024.

1Definedastechnologiesthatemitfewergreenhousegasesduringconsumption.SeeFigure

11notesfordetails.

Freetown,SierraLeone.PhotobyBuntingKargboviaUnsplash.

China-AfricaEconomicBulletin|2026Edition7

INTRODUCTION

Africa’sdevelopmentagendaisanchoredintheUnitedNationsSustainableDevelopmentGoalsandtheAfricanUnionAgenda2063.Since2000,thecontinenthasexperiencedsteadyeconomicgrowth,butaseriesofconcurrentshockshaveposedsignificantchallenges,includingtheCOVID-19pandemic,theconflictbetweenRussiaandUkraine,and,morerecently,aglobalpullbackbytheUSwhoseeffectsfalldisproportionatelyonAfrica.Despitetheseheadwinds,Africa’srealGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)growthratesareprojectedtobe3.9percentin2025andfourpercentin2026,surpassingotherregionsexceptemerginganddevelopingAsia(AfricanDevelopmentBankGroup2025).

Beneaththisgrowthmomentumliestructuralvulnerabilitiesthatcomplicatethelonger-termoutlook.Africa’sexportsremainconcentratedinrawandunprocessedcommodities,leavingthecontinentexposedtopricevolatility.Risingdebtservicecoststhreatentocrowdouttheinvestmentneededforanenergytransitionandforbroaderstructuraltransformation.

ItisagainstthisbackdropthatChina’sroleinAfrica’seconomictrajectorydemandscarefulexamination.Theeraoflarge-scaleinfrastructureloansandresource-basedarrangementsisgivingwaytoamorevariedand,insomerespects,morecautiousengagement.Africa’sownprioritiesarealsoshifting,movingawayfromtheoldaid-and-infrastructuremodeltowarddebtsustainability,industrializationandvalueaddition.

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TRENDSINCHINA-AFRICATRADE

Africa’sTradewithChinaandtheRestoftheWorld

In2024,Africa’sbilateraltradewithChinareachedarecordvolumeof$275billion,with$182billioninimports(6.3%ofregionalGDP)and$93billioninexports(3.2%ofregionalGDP).Drivenbyalargerincreaseinexports,especiallyinextractives,Africa’stradedeficitwithChinadroppedslightlyfrom$91.9billion2023to$89.6billionin2024(3.1%ofregionalGDP)(Figure1).Chinaaccountedfor16percentofAfrica’stotalexportsand28percentoftotalimports.

Figure1:Africa’sTradeValuesasShareofRegionalGDPwithChinaandtheRestoftheWorld,2000-2024

Source:Authors’calculationsfromUnitedNations(2025).

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Between2000and2024,China’sshareofAfricanexportsrosefrom0.7percentto3.2percentofGDPdespiteintermittentfluctuations.Overthesameperiod,China’sshareofAfricanimportsincreasedmoresteadilyfromonepercentto6.3percentofGDP.Incontrast,Africa’stradewiththerestoftheworldlargelytrackedGDPgrowth,indicatingthattradewithChinagrewfasterthanAfrica’sbroaderexternaltrade.

BothAfrica’sexportstoChinaandtherestoftheworldshowstrongsensitivitytoglobaleconomicshocks.Tradevaluesroseduringperiodsofstrongglobaldemandandhighcommodityprices,andcontractedsharplyduringadverseshockssuchasthe2008globalfinancialcrisis,theeuroareasovereigndebtcrisisfrom2012to2016(UNECA2012)andtheCOVID-19pandemicin2019-2021.Importsweremoreresilientthanexportsacrosstheseshocks.Inparticular,AfricanimportsfromChinadeclinedlesssharplyandrecoveredfasterthanimportsfromothercountries.

Chinawastheleadingexportdestinationfor19outof54Africancountriesin2024,upfrom17in2014(Figure2).Forasubsetofresource-intensiveeconomieslikeGuinea,theDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo(DRC),Eritrea,SierraLeone,Zimbabwe,SouthSudanandZambia,Chinaabsorbedover50percentofexportvaluein2024,withitssharesubstantiallyexceedingthatofthesecond-largestpartner.Insomecountries,Chinaisamongseveralmajorexportdestinations,reflectingabroaderpatternoftradediversification.Forinstance,Gambiadirected38percentofitsexportstoChinaand29percenttoIndiain2024.

Figure2:LargestExportingPartnersofAfricanCountriesin2014and2024

Source:Authors’calculationsfromUnitedNations(2025).

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TradewithIndividualAfricanPartners

In2024,39AfricancountriesrecordedtradedeficitswithChina,halfofwhichwerebelow$1billion.ThelargestdeficitswereinNigeria($17.5billion),Egypt($16.6billion)andLiberia($13billion),whilesurpluseswereconcentratedinresource-exportingeconomies,notablytheDRC($17.2billion)andAngola($13billion),whichtogetheraccountedfor70percentofAfrica’stotalsurpluswithChina(Figure3).

Figure3:TopFiveAfricanSurplusandDeficitPartnerswithChinain2024

Source:Authors’calculationsfromUnitedNations(2025).

Figure4tracesthetrajectoriesofAfrica’slargestsupplierstoChinasince2000.AngolaandSouthAfricastandoutasthemostconsistentexporters,thoughtheirpathshavediverged.Angola’sexportspeakedatover$30billionin2011beforedecliningtoaround$16billionby2024,reflectingbothdomesticproductionconstraintsandChina’sgradualdiversificationofoilsuppliers.SouthAfricahasmaintainedamorestablepath,fluctuatingbetween$10and$15billionoverthepastdecade,underpinnedbyadiversifiedmineralbase.TheDRC’sexportstoChinaclimbedsteeplyafter2015tosurpass$20billionby2024,drivenmostlybyChineseinvestmentsincobaltandcopper.Together,theDRC,AngolaandSouthAfricaaccountforoverhalfofthecontinent’sexportstoChinain2024.Guinea’sexportstoChinahaveacceleratedfrom2021to2024,drivensignificantlybybauxiteandaluminum.However,Guinea’sstrategicimportancetoChinaisextendingbeyondthemasChinesestakesinitsresourceextractionsectordeepenthroughtheSimandouironoreproject.AsamajorexporterofcrudeoiltoChina,theRepublicoftheCongohasseenfluctuationsinexportvalueduetoglobaloilpricefluctuations.

China-AfricaEconomicBulletin|2026Edition11

Figure4:TrajectoriesofAfrica’sTopExporterstoChina,2000-2024

Source:Authors’calculationsfromUnitedNations(2025).

Africa’simportsfromChinafollowadifferentlogic,dominatedbyitslargestconsumermarkets(Figure5).SouthAfricahasheldthetoppositionthroughout,withabroadmixofmanufacturedgoodsdrivingimportssteadilyupwardintheearly2000stoexceed$22billionby2024,reflectingbothitsstatusasAfrica’smostindustrializedeconomyanditsroleasaregionaldistributionhub(Mutambara2017).Nigeria’simportsaremorevolatile,withimportcapacitycloselytiedtooilrevenuesandforeignexchangeavailability.Egypthasemergedasamajorimportersincethe2010s,withimportsapproaching$17billionby2024.Inaddition,despiteitssmallpopulationandeconomicsize,Liberiarankedasthefourth-largestimporterin2024becauseitisaflag-of-conveniencejurisdiction,whereChinesecompaniesexportandregistershipsundertheLiberianflagtobenefitfromlowercostsandlighterregulatoryrequirements.SouthAfricaandNigeriaareonbothlists,reflectingtheirdualrolesasresourceexportersandconsumermarkets.

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Figure5:TrajectoriesofAfrica’sTopImportersfromChina,2000-2024

Source:AuthorcalculationfromUnitedNations2025.

Africa’sExportstoChina

Africa’sexportstoChinahaveshownconsistentdominancebyextractiveindustriesoverthepasttwodecades.Withlittlediversification,agricultureandmanufacturingtogetheraccountforabout13percentofexportvaluesfrom2000to2024(Figure6).

Figure6:Africa’sExportstoChinabyUNCTADCategory,2000-2024

Source:Authors’calculationsfromUnitedNations(2025).

Note:Tradevaluesrepresentcumulativetotalsovertheperiodshown.

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Structuralandpolicyfactorsonbothsidesoftherelationshiphelpexplainthepersistenceofthispattern.Onthesupplyside,Africa’sabundantnaturalresourceendowments,combinedwithlimitedtechnologicalcapabilities,humancapitalandprocessingcapacity,haveledtoacomparativeadvantageinprimarycommodityexportswhileconstrainingthecompetitivenessofnon-extractivesectors(Baliamoune-Lutz2011;RakotoarisoaandFang2015).Onthedemandside,China’sgrowingappetiteforrawmaterialstofuelitsdomesticindustrializationhasreinforcedtheexportpattern,whiletheimportsofitsaffordablemanufacturedgoodsandmachinerythatcomeswithinfrastructurefinancinghavemadeitimpossibleforAfricatocompeteagainst(Eisenman2012).

ThedominanceofextractiveexportsisnotuniquetoChina.AccordingtoUnitedNations(2025),in2024,80.4percentofIndia’simportsfromAfricawereextractivesand74.2percentforItaly.Primaryproductsaccountedfor71.3percentoftheEuropeanUnion’s(EU)importsfromAfricabyStandardInternationalTradeClassificationproductgroups,withmineralproductsalonecomprising48.9percentbyHarmonizedSystem(HS)classification(EuropeanCommission2025).TheUSandFrancehaveslightlybalancedcompositions,withextractivesaccountingfor51.2percentand44.1percentoftheirrespectiveimportsfromAfricaandmanufacturescomprising34.7percentand38.5percent.

ExportsofTransitionMinerals

Intheextractivessector,thetoptransitionmineralcategories(includingores,concentratesandprocessedproducts)importedbyChinafromAfricaarecopper,bauxiteandaluminum,chromium,manganeseandcobalt(Figure7).Copperdominatesbyvalue,risingfromlessthan$5billionin2010to$26billionin2024,withparticularlysharpaccelerationafter2019duetobothincreasedimportvolumesofcopperoresandconcentratesandhighercopperprices.Bauxiteandaluminum,aswellaschromiumimports,havegrownsteadilyoverthesameperiod,whilemanganeseandcobaltcontractedmodestlyin2024followingearlierpeaks.

Figure7:Africa’sExportsofMajorTransitionMineralstoChina,2010-2024

Source:Authors’calculationsfromAsianDevelopmentBank,WorldTradeOrganization(2024)andUnitedNations(2025).

Note:China’simportdatawereusedinsteadofthepartnercountry’sexportdataduetodataavailability.

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Figure8providesamoredetailedpictureofAfrica’srelativeimportanceasasourceofChina’stransitionmineralimports.China’simportsofcopperfromAfrica,primarilyrefinedcoppercathodes,unrefinedcopperanodes,andoresandconcentrates,havegrownsteadilysince2016,mostlyfromtheDRCandZambia.Africaisnotamajorsupplierofcopper,butitssharegrewstrongly,reaching18percentofChina’sglobalimportsin2024.Additionally,China’sbauxiteandaluminumimportsarealmostentirelyfromGuinea,withover95percentofimportsintheformoforesandconcentrates.Africa’sshareinChina’sglobalimportshassurgedafter2015andagainafter2022,plateauingat30percentin2024.Last,despitesmallertradevaluesofchromiumandmanganese,Africaaccountsforover80percentofChina’simportsofbothmineralsin2024,primarilyfromSouthAfrica,andalmostentirelyasoresandconcentrates.

Figure8:Africa’sShareofChina’sGlobalTransitionMineralImports,2010-2024

Source:Authors’calculationsfromUnitedNations(2025).

Note:China’simportdatawereusedinsteadofthepartnercountry’sexportdataduetodataavailability.

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Africa’sImportsfromChina

Africa’simportprofilefromChinahasbeenmoreconsistentovertheyears,stronglydominatedbymanufacturedgoods,whosevaluescontinuedtogrowevenduringthepandemicyears,whileagricultureandextractiveshavemaintainedsharesbelowfivepercent(Figure9).

Figure9:Africa’sImportsfromChinabyUNCTADCategory,2000-2024

Source:Source:Authors’calculationsfromUnitedNations(2025).

Note:Tradevaluesrepresentcumulativetotalsovertheperiodshown.

Withinmanufacturing,Figure10showstheleadingcategoriesfrom2000to2024,alongwiththeirshareoftotalmanufacturingimportsinearlierperiodsforcomparison.Telecommunicationsequipmenthasledbyvalueineveryperiodafter2004,thoughitsshareoftotalmanufacturingimportsdeclinedafter2020relativeto2015-2019.Africa’smanufacturingimportsfromChinaarediversifiedacrossawiderangeofgoods,asthetopfiveonlyaccountforlessthan20percentofthetotal.

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Figure10:LeadingManufacturingImportsfromChinatoAfrica,asShareofTotalManufacturingImports,2000-2024

Source:Authors’calculationsfromUnitedNations(2025).

Note:Tradevaluesrepresentcumulativetotalsovertheperiodshown.

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ImportsofLow-CarbonTechnologies

In2024,China’sexportsoflow-carbontechnologies(LCTs)toAfricatotaled$9.8billion,accountingfor5.4percentofChina’stotalexportstoAfrica(Figure11).Theapparentdeclineinenergystorageandpowergenerationvaluesin2024isnotattributedtoacontractioninvolumebutrathertothesharppricedropsofsolarmodulesandbatteries(Myllyvirta2025).Buildingsandconsumerappliancesedgedslightlylower,whiletransportsawamodestincreasedrivenbyrisingelectricvehicle(EV)andhybridvehicleexportsacrossthecontinent.

Figure11:China’sLow-carbonTechnologiesExporttoAfricabySector,2013-2024

Source:Authors’calculationsfromUnitedNations(2025).

Note:TheHScodeclassificationofLCTproductsdrawsonArslanalpetal.(2023)andGallagheretal.(2025)

Africa’sLCTimportsfromChinain2024areheavilyconcentratedinahandfulofmarkets(Figure12).SouthAfricaisthetoprecipient,drivenbypowergeneration(mostlysolarandwind)andenergystorage(batteries).Egyptsimilarlyskewstowardpowergeneration($509million),whileNigeriashowsamorebalancedprofileacrossenergystorage,powergenerationandpollutioncontrol.Djiboutistandsoutastheonlycountrywheretransportdominates,withimportsconsistingalmostentirelyofEVs.PollutioncontrolaccountsforthemajorityofLCTimportsinseveralcountries,includingtheDRCandLiberia.Ingeneral,Africa’simportsofLCTsfromChinaaregrowinginadvancedmarketsbutremainlimitedelsewhere.Attheglobalscale,AfricacontinuestoplayamarginalroleinLCTtradeflowsoverall(Bandaraetal.2025).

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Figure12:China’sLow-carbonTechnologiesExporttoAfricain2024

Source:Authors’calculationsfromUnitedNations(2025).

Note:Individualcountrieswith$100millionoraboveareshown;othersareaggregatedintothe“AllOthers”category.

AddisAbaba,Ethiopia.PhotobyFanuelLeulviaUnsplash.

20China-AfricaEconomicBulletin|2026Edition

TRENDSINCHINA’SFOREIGNDIRECTINVESTMENTTOAFRICA

OverallTrend

Between2004and2024,Chinesecompaniesannounced$73.9billioningreenfieldforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)and$38.1billioninmergersandacquisitions(M&A)dealsinAfrica.

2

M&AannouncementsdominatedthelandscapebeforethelaunchoftheBeltandRoadInitiative(BRI)in2013,butgreenfieldFDIhasincreasedsubstantiallysincethen.ChinesegreenfieldFDIinAfricareboundedstronglyafterthepandemic,surgingtoarecord$13.7billionin2023beforemoderatingto$8.6billionin2024.Thisrecentuptickin2023-2024wasmostlydrivenbyasmallnumberoflargeprojectsratherthanabroad-basedsurge.Inaddition,theannualtotalnumberofFDIdealsannouncedin2022-2024waslowerthanin2017-2018(Figure13).

Figure13:ChineseGreenfieldandM&AFDIAnnouncementstoAfrica,2004-2024

Source:Authors’calculationsbasedonFinancialTimes(2025).

2ForeigndirectinvestmentdataarebasedonFinancialTimesfDiMarketsdataandsupplementedwithadditionalverificationandvalidationconductedbytheBostonUniversityGlobalDevelopmentPolicyCenter.Datausedintheanalysisonlyincludedealsfromcrediblesourceswithverifiedamounts.

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ChineseFDIcontinuestobeunevenlydistributedacrossAfrica,thoughwithadifferentregionalpattern(Figure14).NorthAfricaisakeydestination,motivatedbyindustrialparks,export-orientedmanufacturinghubsandfavorableinvestmentpoliciesthatattractbothChineseandglobalcapital.Beforethepandemic,NorthAfricaalreadyreceivedthelargestshareofChineseFDI.Morerecently,investmentsinMoroccoandEgyptaloneaccountedfor31percentoftotalChineseFDIinAfricafrom2022to2024.WestAfricausedtobeamajordestinationinearlierperiods,butFDIinflowsdeclinedduringthepandemicandhaveyettorecover.SouthernAfricahasreceivedrelativelysteadyFDIfromChinaexceptduringthepandemic.Withinthissubregion,SouthAfricahasreceiveddiversifiedinvestmentsspanningindustry,mineralsandfinancialservices,whileMozambique,ZambiaandZimbabwehavedrawninvestmentinenergy,metalsandminerals.EastAfricahasreceivedsteadyFDIinflowsevenduringthepandemic,withsubstantialinvestmentgoingtoindustry,tradeandservicessectorsinUganda,Kenya,EthiopiaandRwanda.

Figure14:ChineseFDIAnnouncementstoAfricabySubregion,2004-2024

Source:Authors’calculationsbasedonFinancialTimes(2025).

ChinesegreenfieldFDIandM&AinAfricaexhibitdifferentsectorandcountryfocus(Figure15).Greenfieldinvestmentisoverwhelminglydirectedtowardindustry,tradeandservices,followedbyenergy,metalsandminerals,spreadingacrosstheentirecontinent.Incomparison,M&Adealsconcentrateinenergy,metalsandminerals,withevensharpergeographicfocus:metalsandmineralsdealsclusterinSouthAfricaandtheDRC,whileenergydealsconcentrateinMozambique,Uganda,EgyptandNigeria.

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