世界经济论坛-AI智能体行动手册+AI+Agents+in+Action

Incollaboration

withCapgemini

AIAgentsinAction:

APlaybookforTrustedAdoption,

AuthorizationandScaling

INSIGHTREPORT

MAY2026

AIAgentsinAction2

Images:GettyImages

Contents

Foreword3

Executivesummary4

Introduction5

1

Agentguidelines7

1.1Establishingasharedlanguageforautonomy,8

authorityandconsequence

1.2Allocatingdecisionrightsandaccountabilityacrossthelifecycle9

1.3Definingwhenagenticsystemsaretheappropriatesolution9

1.4Sequencingadoptionandprioritizingearlyusecases10

1.5Deploymentcontextsandbaselinegovernance11

1.6Definingthehuman–agentoperatingmodel12

1.7Fromenterpriseguidelinestodeploymentauthorization12

2

ACAP:TheAgentCapabilityandAuthorizationProfile14

2.1ACAPstructureandhowtouseit16

2.2Systemdesignandassessment17

2.3Prepareanddeploy23

2.4Monitorandimprove27

Conclusion30

Appendix:ACAPsummaryplaybook31

Contributors34

Endnotes37

Disclaimer

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Thefindings,interpretationsand

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©2026WorldEconomicForum.Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproducedortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans,includingphotocopyingandrecording,orbyanyinformation

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AIAgentsinAction3

May2026

AIAgentsinAction:

APlaybookforTrustedAdoption,AuthorizationandScaling

Foreword

VolkerDarius

ChiefExecutiveOfficer,

CapgeminiInvent

CathyLi

Head,CentreforAIExcellence;

MemberoftheExecutive

Committee,WorldEconomicForum

StephanMergenthaler

ManagingDirector,

ChiefTechnologyOfficer,

WorldEconomicForum

Artificialintelligence(AI)agentshaveleftresearch

laboratoriestobecomeapermanentfixturein

organizationalworkflows.Thisshifthasoutpaced

ourexistinggovernanceframeworks.Wherethe

firstpublicationinthisserieslaidtheconceptual

foundations,andthesecondintroduced

assessmentandclassificationtools,thisthirdreporttacklesadecidedlypracticalquestion:howcananorganization,inconcreteterms,delegateauthoritytoanautomatedsystemwhileremainingfully

accountableforitsactions?

Theanswertothisquestionisnotprimarily

technical.Itisorganizational.Whatwehave

observedinourworkwithmembersoftheAIGlobalAlliance’sSafeSystemsandTechnologiesworkinggroupisthatorganizationsgraspwhatanagent

cando,buttheystruggletodefinewhatitshouldbeauthorizedtodoincontext.Thisgapbetweencapabilityandauthorizationisboththecentral

challengetolarge-scaleadoptionandtherationaleofthisplaybook.

ThegovernanceofAIagentscannotbeanafterthought.Itmustbebuiltinatthedesignstage,formalizedbeforedeploymentand

activelymaintainedinproduction.Onlythencan

organizationsmovefromisolatedpilotstoportfoliosofagentsdeployedwithconfidence,enablingtheexpectedbenefitsofautomationtoberealized

withoutcompromisinginternalcontrols,regulatorycomplianceorstakeholdertrust.

Thisreportistheresultofintensivecollaboration

betweenpractitioners,technicalteams,risk

managementfunctionsandlegalexpertsfrom

avarietyofindustries.Itdoesnotofferuniversal

answers,butratherastructured,adaptableand

auditableauthorizationmodel:theAgentCapabilityandAuthorizationProfile(ACAP).Thismodel

translatescorporatepolicyintoanoperationalmandateforeachdeployment.

Wehopethisplaybookwillprovideapractical

resourceforteamsseekingtointegrateAI

agentsintotheirorganizationsresponsiblyand

contributemorebroadlytothedevelopmentof

sharedstandardsforthegovernanceofdelegatedagency.AsAndrejKarpathyhasframedit:the

decadeofAIagentshasbegun.1Thewaywelaythefoundationstodaywilldeterminethetrustwecanplaceinthemtomorrow.

AIAgentsinAction4

Executivesummary

TheAgentCapabilityandAuthorizationProfileisapracticalframeworkdesignedtohelporganizationsadopt,authorize

andscaleAIagents.

Artificialintelligence(AI)agentsintroducenew

adoptionchallengesfororganizations,particularlyindefiningtheconditionsunderwhichtheyare

authorizedtoactandinensuringthatthisauthorityisenforcedassystemsevolveinoperation.

ThisplaybookintroducestheAgentCapability

andAuthorizationProfile(ACAP)asadeployment-levelauthorizationinstrumentforagenticsystems.TheACAPconnectsenterprisedelegationpolicy,systemdesignandoperationaloversightina

single,repeatableworkflowthatmakesdelegatedactionauditable,enforceableandreviewable.

ThroughtheACAP,theplaybookestablishesastructuredoperatingmodelforAIagent

deployment:validatingreadinessthroughevaluation,enforcingboundariesthrough

technicalcontrolsandmaintainingauthorizationthroughproductionmonitoring.

Manyagentsinaportfoliomaysharethesamefoundationmodel,therefore,asinglemodel-

levelvulnerabilitycanpropagateacrossan

organization’sentireagentestatesimultaneously,reinforcingtheneedfordeployment-level

authorizationandmonitoringforeachinstance.

Itprovidesthreecoreelements:clearagent

guidelines,enforceableauthorizationprofiles,

andaphasedadoptionlifecyclefrompilotto

scale.Thisestablishesaclear,assignablemodelfordelegation,astructuredpathfrompilotto

productionandaconsistentframeworkfor

scalingfromindividualdeploymentstoportfoliosofagents.

AIAgentsinAction5

AIagentsare

entrustedtoactonbehalfofapersonoranorganizationinpursuitof

definedobjectives,underconstraintssetbypolicies,

toolsandaccesscontrols.

Introduction

AIagentsareadvancingfasterthan

governance–authorization,notcapability,isnowthecriticalbottleneck.

Artificialintelligence(AI)agentshaverapidlymovedfromexperimentationtoearlyimplementation,

andsomeobserversspeakofa“decadeofAI

agents”2ahead.Thatlongtimehorizonsignalsbothsignificantopportunityandtherealitythat“itisstillearlydays”3foragentadoptionanddeployment.

Thisreportaddressesapracticalgapthatemergedinearlydeployments.Organizationsareincreasinglyabletodescribewhatanagentiscapableof,but

oftenlackaconsistentwaytodeterminewhatitisauthorizedtodowithinaspecificworkflow.This

playbookintroducestheAgentCapabilityand

AuthorizationProfile(ACAP)asadeployment-

levelauthorizationrecordforagentsystemsand

explainshowitiscreated,approvedandmaintainedacrosstheadoptionlifecycle.Themodelwillevolveandmaturealongsidethefieldandshouldbe

understoodasanearlycontributiontowardsthestandardizationofdeployment-levelauthorizationforagenticsystems.Asharedstructurefor

authorizationcandeliverimmediateoperationalvaluewhileprovidingafoundationforstrongerassuranceovertime.

Onboardinganagentcan,insomeways,be

comparedtoonboardinganewemployee.The

processinvolvesassessingcapabilities,assigningresponsibilities,grantingaccess,defining

supervisionandadjustingthescopeofactionasperformanceandtrustevolve.Thisisastructuralcomparisononly,asagentslackclearlegalstatus,moralresponsibilityandreputationalincentive

–governanceisbuilttooffsetthesegaps.The

comparisonisusefulbecausetheterm“agent”haslongreferredtoapersonwhoactsonbehalfofanorganizationwithindefinedbounds.Realestate

agents,callcentreagentsandpublicsectoragentsoperatewithdelegatedauthority,clearproceduresandescalationwhenexceptionsarise.

AIagentsaredescribedasagentsforthesamereason.Theyareentrustedtoactonbehalfofapersonoranorganizationinpursuitofdefined

objectives,underconstraintssetbypolicies,toolsandaccesscontrols.Unliketraditionalsoftware,theycaninterpretcontextanddeterminewhattodonextinsituationsthatarenotfullyspecifiedinadvance.Thiscombinationofnon-determinism

anddelegatedactionmakesadoptionlesslike

installingsoftwareandmorelikeintroducinga

neworganizationalactorthatrequiresstructuredonboarding,explicitdecisionrightsandcontinuousoperationaloversight.

Inthisplaybook,authorizationisdefinedatthe

leveloftheagentsolution.Wheremultipleagents

collaborate,orwhereanorchestratingagent

coordinatessub-agents,thedeploymentistreatedasaunifiedsystemforauthorizationpurposes,

evenasitsinternalcompositionevolves.TheACAPthereforereflectsthecombinedarchitecture,sharedtoolaccess,coordinationlogicandend-to-end

authorityboundariesofagivensolution,includingcomponent-levelspecificationsforagentroles,toolaccessandmemory.

Thisreportisthethirdinathree-partseriesonAIagents;deepercontextualunderstandingcanbegainedbyreviewingtheearlierpublications.

NavigatingtheAIFrontier:APrimerontheEvolutionandImpactofAIAgents4establishedshared

definitionsanddescribedtheevolutionofdifferenttypesofagents.Thesecondpaper,AIAgentsin

Action:FoundationsforEvaluationandGovernance,5introducedagentclassification,evaluation,risk

assessmentandproportionategovernance.Thisthirdandfinalpaperintheseriesbuildsonthosefoundationsbyprovidingastructuredandaction-orientedframeworkforadoptionandintegration.

Theplaybookdrawsonworkinggroupmeetings,workshopsanddeep-diveinterviewsconducted

throughtheSafeSystemsandTechnologies

workinggroupoftheAIGlobalAlliance6to

identifyemergingpractices,commonpitfallsandoperationalpatternsacrossagentdeployment.Itiswrittenforpractitionerswhoarepiloting,evaluatinganddeployingAIagents.

Theframeworksintroducedherewillrequirerevisionasthetechnologymatures.UpdatestotheACAPmodelmaybetriggeredbynewcapabilitiesit

cannotyetaccommodate,failuresthatexposegovernancegapsorregulatorychangesthatredefinecompliance.

InthedecadeofAIagents,startingwithaclear

modelforauthorizationandoversightisaprerequisiteformaintainingtrusteddeploymentatscale.

AIAgentsinAction6

Howtousethisplaybook

Thisplaybookisdesignedtobeusedasapracticaloperatingguideformovingfromagentpilotstoauthorized,monitoreddeployment.Ittieseverystepof

adoptiontothelifecycleofagentimplementationandusestheACAPasalivingauthorizationrecordthatiscreated,completedandupdatedacrossthelifecycle.

Atahighlevel,theplaybookhasthreebuildingblocks:

,.i

Definestheenterprisepolicy

fordelegatedagency,including

sharedterminology,decisionrights,deploymentcriteriaandbaseline

governanceexpectations.

3

1

2

Agentguidelines(Chapter1)

TheACAP(Chapter2)

Servesasthewrittenauthorization

foraspecificagenticsolutionwithinadefinedworkflow,recordingitsscope,operatingcontext,authority,controls,requiredevidence,accountableownersandre-authorizationcadence.

Theadoptionlifecycle

(subsections2.2,2.3and2.4)

Operationalizesauthorizationthrough

threephases:1)systemdesignand

assessment,2)prepareanddeploy,

and3)monitorandimprove.Each

phasespecifieswhatmustbedesigned,evidenced,signedoffandcontinuouslymaintained.Progressionbetweenphasesisgovernedbyphasegates,which

requirepredefinedminimumrequirementstobemetbeforemovingforward.

Howtoapplyitinpractice:

Startwithagentguidelinesifyourorganizationneedsasharedlanguageandcleardecisionrightsfordelegation.

EstablishanACAPforasingledeploymentifyouarerunningpilotsandneedtomakescope,authority,controlsandevidenceexplicitbeforeproductionrelease.

Usethelifecyclephasesasyourexecutionplantomovefromdesigntocontrolledrelease,tomonitoredoperationandchange.

AoneoverviewofthecompleteACAPstepsisprovidedintheAppendixofthisreport.Theoverviewisintendedasaquickreferenceguide,butthestepsshouldbecarriedoutandmaintainedthroughoutthelifecyclephasesdescribedinChapter2.

AIAgentsinAction7

1

Agentguidelines

Introducingagenticsystemsrequirestherightorganizationalconditionsforeffective,responsibledeployment.

SuccessfuladoptionofAIagentsstartswith

asharedunderstandingofwhatisbeingbuilt

anddeployed,aswellaswhoisresponsible

foreachpartoftheprocess.Earlypilotshave

shownthatmanychallengesarelinkedtounclearterminology,misalignedexpectationsandgapsbetweentechnicalandoperationalteams.7

Establishingcommonlanguageandclearlydefinedrolesearlyisanessentialstepintheadoptionjourney.

Agentguidelinesareintendedtoserveasanew

enterprise-levelinstrument,endorsedbyleadershipandappliedacrossalldeployments.Theyestablishsharedlanguageandbaselineconditionsunder

whichagentsmaybeintroduced.

Bydefiningtheseelementsonceattheorganizationallevel,theguidelinesensurethatdeploymentdecisionsarecomparable,thatresponsibilitydoesnotfragmentacrossteams,andthatagentauthorityisexpandedbasedonevidenceratherthanadhocpractice.

Establishingasharedlanguagefor

1.1

autonomy,authorityandconsequence

Sharedlanguageanddefinitionsattheorganizationallevelhelpensure

thattechnical,

operationaland

governance

functionsevaluatedeployments

againstthesameparameters.

Agentguidelinesbeginbydefiningtheoperationalconceptsthatgoverndelegation.Establishing

sharedterminologyanddocumentedgovernanceconceptsattheenterpriselevelalignswithAI

managementsystemexpectationsforpolicy,rolesandoperationalcontrols,suchasthosedefined

byISO42001.8Thesedefinitionshelpdeterminehowdeploymentsareassessed,whatcontrolsare

requiredandwhenhumaninterventionismandatory.Coreconceptsinclude:

Autonomy:Thedegreetowhichanagentdetermineshowanobjectiveispursued,setsitssub-goalsandexecutesactions

withoutreal-timehumandirection.

Authority:Thepermissions

grantedtoact,suchasread,write,execute,communicateortransact

acrosssystemsanddata.Includes

representationalauthoritytoactontheorganization’sbehalfand,whereexplicitlygranted,decisionalauthoritytomakebindingcommitments.

Consequentialevents:Outputsthat

havesignificantimpact–legal,financial,security(includingimpersonation),

safety,ethical,reputationalorcustomer-facinginteractions–whetherwithintheorganizationorexternally.Theseeffectscanextendbeyondthesystemitselfandthereforerequireexplicitcheckpointsandcontrolgatesthroughouttheprocess.

Operationalcontext:Theworkflow,

users,systems,dataclassesand

jurisdictionswithinwhichtheagentacts.

Boundaries:Theexplicitlimitsofintendeduse,includingprohibitedactionsand

escalationtriggers.

Sharedlanguageanddefinitionsattheorganizationallevelhelpensurethattechnical,operationaland

governancefunctionsevaluatedeployments

againstthesameparametersandthatauthorizationdecisionsremainconsistentacrosstheorganization.9Thisfoundationandsharedcontextarehelpfulas

organizationsstartadoptingmultipleagents.

AIAgentsinAction8

AIAgentsinAction9

Allocatingdecisionrightsand

accountabilityacrossthelifecycle

Developers

andengineeringteamscollaboratewithdataownerstomonitor

quality,definethesystem’stechnicalcharacteristics,

constraintsandenforceable

controls.

1.2

Agentguidelinesspecifythatdelegationof

authoritytoanagentrequiresclearallocationof

humanownershipassociatedwithintroducingandoverseeingagentsinpractice.Thismirrorswidely

usedriskgovernancepracticessuchasthose

definedbytheNationalInstituteofStandardsand

Technology(NIST)AIRiskManagementFramework,whichemphasizesdefinedroles,accountability,andoversightacrosstheAIlifecycle.10Theobjectiveistoensurethateveryagentdeploymenthasnamedownersforthefollowing:

–Definingtheagent’soperationalroleandscope

–Grantingandexpandingitsauthoritybasedonrisk

–Assessingandacceptingtheassociatedrisk

–Supervisingconsequentialevents

–Approvingmaterialchangesincapability,accessorcontext

Inpractice,thesedecisionrightsremainconstant

throughouttheagenticsystemlifecycle,but

responsibilityforexercisingthemsitsacrossmultiplefunctionsandoftenspansmultipleagenticsystems.Inatypicaldeployment:

–Adoptersordeploymentownersdefinetheoperationalmandateandremainaccountablefortheagent’soutcomesintheworkflow.

–Developersandengineeringteams

collaboratewithdataownerstomonitorquality,definethesystem’stechnicalcharacteristics,

constraintsandenforceablecontrols,leadingtorobustguardrails.

–Subjectmatterexperts(SMEs)determinewhatacceptableperformanceandoutputlooklikeincontextandinterpretbehaviouralsignalsduringoperation,formingthebasisforevaluation.

–Risk,complianceandlegalfunctions

approvethedelegationwithintheorganization’scontrolframeworkandsettherequiredlevel

ofgovernance.

–Humansupervisorsexercisereal-time

checkpointsforconsequentialeventsandintervenewhenboundariesarereached.

–Humanresourcesandchange-managementfunctionsalignroleevolution,training

andincentiveswiththehuman/agentoperatingmodel.

Theagentguidelinesestablishthesedecision

rightsattheenterpriselevelandrequirethem

tobeexplicitlyassignedforeachdeployment.

Thispreventsfragmentationofresponsibilityandensuresthattheauthoritytoactremainsalignedwithaccountabilityforoutcomes,frominitial

authorizationtoin-productionsupervision.

1.3

Definingwhenagenticsystems

aretheappropriatesolution

Acorecomponentoftheagentguidelinesisto

determineifdeployinganAIagentistheright

approachtobeginwith.Establishingdeploymentcriteriaearlypreventsagenticsolutionsfrombeingappliedwheresimpler,morepredictablesolutionswouldbesaferandeasiertomaintain.

Thekeytestiswhethersuccesscanbedefinedwithoutspecifyingeverystep.Ifthegoals

andconstraintscanbeclearlydescribedbut

thestepstoreachthemarenot,anagentic

approachislikelyappropriate.Thisdistinction

hasnothingtodowithcomplexity,asanagentcanusesimpleordeterministiclogic.What

mattersiswhethertheexecutionispre-specifiedandfixed.Fullypre-scriptedworkflowsare

automation,notagents.

Agentsaddvaluewhentheproblemsrequireongoingorchestrationacrossmultiplesteps,managingtheir

sequenceandcontrolloop.Thisincludesconditionalbranching,revisitingofearlierdecisionsormanagingintermediatestateswhennecessary.

Theyarealsousefulwhenthestate,memoryor

contextevolvesandshapesdownstreamdecisions.Ifretainingpriorinteractions,intermediatefindingsoremerginghypotheseschangewhathappens

next,anagenticarchitectureismoreeffective.

Finally,agentsareappropriatewhenthesystemmustdecidehowtoact:dynamicallyselect,

sequenceorcombinetools,orcoordinateacrossmultiplesystems,actors,humanhandoffand

escalationpoints.11

AIAgentsinAction10

1.4

Sequencingadoptionandprioritizingearlyusecases

Agentguidelinesdefinehowusecasesshould

beprioritizedtosupportadoption,particularlyfor

organizationsatanearlystageofadoption.Initial

deploymentsshouldstrengthenorganizational

capabilityandconfidencewhilekeepingoperational,reputationalandbusinessriskexposurecontained.Thistypicallymeansselectingworkflowswhere

errorsarelowinconsequenceandcanbereversedwithoutlastingimpact,allowingteamstolearnin

realconditionswithoutcausingmaterialharm.

Equallyimportantisthepresenceofclearreferencepointsforbothperformanceandvalue.Agentscanonlybeevaluated,governedandimprovedwhenacceptableoutcomesareobservableandsharedacrosstechnical,operationalandcontrolfunctions.Well-definedexamples,benchmarksor“gold

standards”makeitpossibletoassessbehaviourconsistently,calibratesupervisionandestablishcrediblepromotiongatesforexpandedauthority.

Earlyusecasesshoulddelivervaluequicklyandbedeployableinweeksusingexistinginfrastructure

andoperatingmodels,soorganizationscan

buildexperiencewithsupervision,evaluationand

authorizationbeforemovingtomorecomplex,higher-impactcontexts.

Inpractice,notallagentdeploymentsemerge

throughastructured,top-downadoptionprocess.Aslow-codeandagent-buildingplatformsbecomewidelyavailable,employeesandteamsmay

experimentwithcreatingagentsdirectlywithintheirworkflows.Someoftheseprototypesmayremainlocaltools,whileothersmaydiffuseorganically

acrossteamsiftheyproveuseful.

Organizationsshouldthereforeestablishclear

signalsforwhensuchbottom-upinnovations

transitionintoformallygoverneddeployments.

Whenanagentbeginstointeractwithenterprise

systems,operateacrossteamsorperform

consequentialevents,itshouldenterthestructuredlifecycledescribedinthisplaybookandbe

documentedthroughanACAP.Organizations

shoulddocumenttheexpectedvaluecase–

efficiencygains,capabilityexpansionorrisk

reduction–beforecommittingtodeployment,sothatgovernanceoverheadcanbeweighedagainstanticipatedbenefit.

AIAgentsinAction11

1.5

Forglobalor

cross-borderuse

cases,concepts

suchasan“agentpassport”may

berequiredto

enableagentsto

presentverifiable,machine-readableclaimsofidentity,authorizationandjurisdiction-specificcompliance.

Deploymentcontextsandbaselinegovernance

Agentguidelinesmustaccountforthestructuralcontextinwhichagentsaredeployed.Thesameagentcanhaveverydifferentriskandgovernanceimplicationsdependingonwhichorganizationalortechnicalboundariesitcrosses.

Thecoredistinctioniswhetheragentsoperate

withinanestablishedtrustboundaryoracross

sharedoropenecosystems.Deploymentcontextdetermineswhichidentity,authorization,oversightandaccountabilitymechanismscanberelieduponandwhereadditionalgovernanceisrequired.

Single-organizationdeploymentstypicallyoperatewithinexistingtrustboundariesandcanuse

internalidentityandaccessmanagementand

controls.Multi-organizationalormulti-platform

deploymentsintroducenewtrustassumptionsandgovernanceresponsibilities,particularlywherenosingleauthorityexists.

Organizationsshouldthereforesegmentdeploymentcontextsbyriskandassurancelevel.Thesetiers

definebaselinegovernanceexpectationsthatmustbespecifiedatthedeploymentlevel.

Asagentecosystemsmatureandtasksare

distributedacrossshiftingcombinationsofcapabilities,thiscontexttieringmayrequirecomponent-level

authorizationtopreventgovernanceblindspots.

Deploymentcontexttiers:

Level1:Single-organizationdeploymentAgentsoperatewithininternalsystemsandidentityframeworks.Governancecanuseexistingidentityandaccessmanagement(IAM)andinternalcontrols.

Level2:Multi-organization,single-platformAgentsinteractwithinacontrolled

ecosystemgovernedbysharedplatformrules.Governancedependsontransitivetrustmediatedthroughplatform-

enforcedstandards.

Level3:Multi-platform,

cross-boundaryinteraction

Agentsinteractacrossorganizationsandplatformswithoutacentralauthority,

requiringstrongermechanismsforidentity,authorization,auditabilityandcompliance.

Inmulti-organizationalandmulti-platformsettings,agentsrepresentingdifferentorganizationsmay

interactunderdifferentauthorizationmodels,

operatingconstraintsandaccountabilitystructures.Forexample,abuyeragentandavendoragent

actingfordistinctorganizationsmayoperate

underdifferentauthoritylimitsorapprovalrules,creatingambiguitywhenthoseauthorizationsdo

notalign.Whilethisplaybookdoesnotdefinea

universalconflictresolutionmechanism,ithighlightsthisasanemerginggovernancechallengeand

reinforcestheimportanceofinteroperableidentity,auditableauthorizationrecordsandclearhumanaccountabilityacrosstrustboundaries.

Asagentsbegintooperateacrossorganizational

andplatformboundaries,newtrustinfrastructuresareemergingtosupportsecurediscovery.These

includetheAgentNameService(ANS)12andModelContextProtocol-Identity(MCP-I),13whichproposepersistentagentidentity,delegationlayerand

versionedlifecyclemetadata.Atthesametime,

newagent-to-agentprotocolssupportdiscovery

andcoordinationbetweenagents.Together,thesedevelopmentspointtoaclearneedforastandardwaytodefineandverifywhatagentsareallowedtodowherevertheyoperate.

ConnectionsviaMCPrepresentafurtherformofcapabilityextensionthatcrossestoolandsystemboundaries.EachMCPconnectionshouldbe

listedintheACAPwithit