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Forreleaseondelivery

12:30p.m.EDTJuly13,2026

MonetaryPolicyataCrossroads

Remarksby

ChristopherJ.Waller

Member

BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem

atthe

NewYorkAssociationforBusinessEconomics

NewYork,NewYork

July13,2026

Thankyou,Yelena,andthankyoufortheopportunitytospeaktoyoutoday.

1

MysubjectistheoutlookfortheU.S.economyandtheimplicationsformonetarypolicy.Spendingbyhouseholdsandbusinesseshasbeenresilient,despitehighergoodscostsgeneratedbytariffsandthesurgeinenergypricesfromtheMiddleEastconflict.

Thelabormarkethasalsobeenstable,withemploymentclosetotheFederalOpen

MarketCommittee’s(FOMC)maximum-employmentgoal.SoIfeeltherealsideoftheeconomyisingoodshape.ButIbelieveinflationandmonetarypolicyareata

crossroads.

Despitehighertariffsin2025,coreinflationheldsteadyformostoftheyear.ButitthenbegantoriseinJanuary.AftertheMiddleEastconflictdisruptedproductionandtransportationofpetroleumandothercommodities,thisincreaseaccelerated.

Conventionalwisdomamongcentralbankersistolookthroughone-timepriceincreases,suchasthoseassociatedwithhighertariffsandajumpinoilprices.But,atthispoint,I

amconcernedabouttheelevatedpaceofcoreinflationthisyear,whichhassteadily

movedup—asmeasuredbythe12-monthpersonalconsumptionexpenditures(PCE)

rate—from3percentinDecember2025to3.4percentinMay.Coreinflationexcludes

thedirecteffectsofconsumerenergyprices,andwearepastthepointwherewecan

attributelargepriceincreasestoearliertariffhikes.So,thequestionis,willcoreinflationcontinueonitsupwardtrajectory,orhasitreachedaturningpointwhereitwillbegintodeclinebacktowardour2percenttarget?Thedirectionittakeshasverydifferent

implicationsforthepathofmonetarypolicy.

1TheviewsexpressedherearemyownandarenotnecessarilythoseofmycolleaguesontheFederalReserveBoardortheFederalOpenMarketCommittee.

-2-

Becausecoreinflationisagoodguidetofutureinflation,Iamconcernedthat,ifthisupwardtrendcontinues,itwillbehardtopushinflationbacktowardthe

Committee’s2percentgoalwithmonetarypolicyatitscurrentsetting.AsIsaidina

May22speech,Iamcognizantofthemistakewemadein2021bynotrespondingsoonertothehighinflationweobserved,andIamdeterminedtoavoidrepeatingit.

2

Butthedesiretoavoidpastmistakesisoftentheauthorofnewones.IarguedinremarksonJuly6thatoneofthemostimportantjobsofapolicymakeristoclearly

assesscurrenteconomicconditionsandnotjustrelyonpastexperiencetoguide

judgmentsofwherepolicyshouldbeheaded.

3

AsIwillexplain,therearesomecrucialdifferencesnowcomparedwith2021,andthereisstillacrediblecaseforinflationto

begintofallbacktoour2percentgoalwithpolicyatitscurrentsetting.ButIam

concernedabouttheequallyplausiblecasethatdatainthecomingweekswillshowthatinflationwillremainatitselevatedleveloreventrendhigher,requiringtightermonetarypolicyinthenearterm.

IamcommittedtoreturninginflationtotheFOMC’s2percentgoalbutalso

determinedtoavoidovertighteningpolicyandriskingarecession.Tomorrow’sinflationdatawillbeoneofseveraldatareleasesI’llbelookingattodeterminetheappropriate

pathofpolicy.

Letmenowturntotheeconomicoutlook.Economicactivitycontinuestobe

solid.Whilehighenergypriceswerelikelyadragonconsumerspendinginthesecond

2SeeChristopherJ.Waller(2026),“PolicyRisksHaveChanged,”speechdeliveredattheFrankfurtSchoolofFinanceandManagement,Frankfurt,Germany,May22,

/newsevents/speech/waller20260522a.htm

.

3SeeChristopherJ.Waller(2026),“TwoThoughtsontheTransmissionofMonetaryPolicy,”speech

deliveredat“ChallengesforMonetaryPolicyTransmissioninaChangingWorld,”aconferencesponsoredbytheBankofItaly,Rome,Italy,July6,

/newsevents/speech/waller20260706a.htm

.

-3-

quarter,spendingappearstohaveheldupreasonablywell.Atthesametime,businessescontinuedtomakeinvestmentsrelatedtoartificialintelligence(AI).Together,private

domesticfinalpurchases,agoodindicatoroftheunderlyingmomentumofrealGDP,likelyrosestrongly.

AconsistentfeatureoftheU.S.economyoverthepastseveralyearshasbeentheresilienceofconsumers.Startingwithhighinflationin2021,followedbyhighinterest

ratesfrom2022through2024,theshockofimporttariffsin2025,andhigherenergy

pricesfromtheMiddleEastconflict,consumershavepoweredthroughandhave

continuedspendingatasolidpace.Withanodtothatresilience,Iexpectsolidconsumerspendinggrowthtocontinue,helpedbyenergypricesthathaverecentlyfallenfromtheirAprilhighs.And,despitesomeconcernsonWallStreetaboutwhetherAIdemandwill

continueitsfastgrowth,IexpectthatAI-relatedinvestmentwillcontinueatastrongpaceintheneartermandmostlikelynextyearaswell.

Meanwhile,althoughtherehasbeensomenoiseinthelabormarketdatarecently,Ibelievethestorythereisoneofstabilityandabalancebetweensupplyanddemand.

Afterthreemonthsofjobcreationaveragingareported188,000amonth,mostpeople

weresurprisedbytheinitialestimateofonly57,000jobsaddedinJuneandrevisionsthatcutAprilandMaybyanaverageof37,000jobsamonth.Despitethisrevision,thelabormarkethasstillcreatedanaverageof111,000jobsamonthforthepastthreemonths—

comparedwithanaverageof9,600jobsamonthin2025,ayearwhenrealGDP

expandedby2.1percent.Thisisasignificantimprovement,especiallyconsideringhowmuchslowerlaborsupplygrowthhasloweredthethresholdforhowmanynewjobs

-4-

constituteahealthy,balancedlabormarket.Bythesestandards,apaceof111,000jobsamonthreflectsastrongleveloflabordemandrelativetosupply.

OnecuriosityoftheJuneemploymentreportwasanunusuallylargedropinthe

prime-agelaborforceparticipationrate.Whilelowerparticipationcanbeasignofa

weakeninglabormarket,Idon’twanttoreadtoomuchintothisonedatapoint.First,thedropintheprime-agelaborforcewasconcentratedamong25-to34-year-olds,andaverylargemonthlydropinthatcohortcouldbenoise.Second,broadermeasuresoflabor

underutilization,includingpeoplemarginallyattachedtothelaborforce,declinedin

June,suggestingthatthefallinparticipationwasnotbecausediscouragedworkers

stoppedlookingforjobs.Bothofthesefactorstellmethisdeclineinparticipationcouldbereversed.

Otherdatainrecentmonthssupporttheideathatthelabormarketisstableand

balanced.JobopeningsandhireswereroughlyunchangedinMay,andtotalseparations,reflectingbothvoluntaryquitsandlayoffs,changedlittle.Theratioofjobvacanciestothoselookingforworkhasmovedupatouchinrecentmonths,indicatingalooserlabormarket,butisstillclosetoone,justabitlowerthanduringthetightlabormarketforthecoupleofyearsbeforethepandemic.

Insum,Ibelieveemploymentisclosetoitsmaximumsustainablelevel,neitherasourceofconcernforthestrengthofthesix-yeareconomicexpansionnorasourceof

inflationarypressure.UnlessIseeevidenceofasignificantlyweakeninglabormarket,myfocuswillbeoninflation.

Andnomatterhowyoucutit,orwhatmeasureyouwanttouse,inflationisup

thisyear:Evenaccountingforthelikelytemporarydirecteffectsoftheoilpriceshock,it

-5-

isrunningatlevelsinconsistentwiththeFOMC’s2percentobjective.HeadlinePCE

inflation—theratetargetedbytheFOMC—was4.1percentoverthe12monthsthroughMay,afterrunninginarangeof2.8percentto2.9percentfromSeptember2025throughFebruary.Thedirecteffectofhighpetroleumpricesuntilrecentlyhasbeenabigreasonforthissurge,andthegoodnewsisthat,iftheloweroilpricesofthepastfewweeksaresustained,theywilllowerheadlineinflationinthecomingmonths.

ButasIsaid,moreconcerningistheescalationincoreinflation,which,ata12-monthrateof3.4percentinMay,wasmorethan0.5percentagepointhigherthanlast

October.

4

TheFOMCdoesnottargetcoreinflationbut,whenenergyorfoodishavinganoutsizedeffectonoverallprices,coreisamongthealternativemeasuresthathelpus

understandtheunderlyingforcesdrivinginflation.Inthiscase,wecanseethatthistrendbeganrisingwellbeforetheoilpriceshock.

Sometimesabigchangeinonlyonecomponentofcorepricescanmovethetotalsignificantlywithoutreflectingbroaderpressuresfromescalatinginflation,butthat

doesn’tappeartobethecasethistime.Bothcoregoodspricesandcoreservicesinflationareuprelativetolastyear.And,theystandwellabovetheiraveragesattimeswhen

inflationwasrunningpersistentlycloseto2percent,suchasthesixyearsfrom2002

through2007.Theincreasesrecentlyarequitebroad.Forcoreservices,whichaccountsfor75percentofcoreprices,nearly70percentofitscategorieshave3-monthand12-

4TheBureauofEconomicAnalysisrecentlyannouncedanupcomingmethodologicalchangethatis

expectedtolower12-monthcorePCEinflationuptoafewtenths.Knowingthisrevisiondoesnotchangethebigpicturethatcoreinflationistoohigh.

-6-

monthinflationover3percent.Alternativemeasuresofinflationmayshowdifferenttrajectories,buttheresultsaresensitivetohowtheyarecalculated.

5

Lookingahead,Idoexpectadecelerationofheadlineinflationduetodeclining

oilprices,startingwiththeinflationdatawegetthisweek.MarketpricesforthedeliveryofcrudeoilbetweennowandtheendofDecemberhavegivenbackmuchoftheirearlierincreases,andthatwillputdownwardpressureonheadlineinflationinthecoming

months.ButIwillbefocusedoncoreinflation,andonthatcount,therearerecentsignsofcontinuedpressureongoodsprices.Coreintermediategoodspricestrackedinthe

producerpriceindex,whichmayfeedthroughtoPCEprices,haveincreasednoticeablyinrecentmonths.Also,purchasingmanagersformanufacturingbusinessesreportedinJunethattheirinputpriceshavecontinuedtoincrease,the21ststraightmonththeysaidso.

So,whatisdrivingthisupwardpressureoninflation?TherearethreefactorsthateverysurveynotesandeveryconversationIhavewithbusinesscontactsechoes—tariffs,energyprices,andspilloversfromdemandfortheAIbuildout.

FederalReserveresearchfindsthattheeffectsofimporttariffsongoodspriceswererelativelymodestandthatthevastmajorityoftheeffectoninflationofthatone-

timeadjustmentinthepricelevelismostlyover.

6

Oneunknownistheextenttowhichtariffsmayriseagaininconnectionwithnewtradeinvestigationsandwhetherimporters

5Forexample,theDallastrimmedmeancutsmoreofthefastest-growingpricesthantheslowest-growingprices.Asaresult,skewnessinthedatacandistortthesignalfromthismeasure.Forafulldiscussionofthisissue,seeTylerAtkinson,JimDolmas,andRebeccaZarutskie(2026),“SkewnessWarrantsCautionasTrimmedMeanPCEInflationEases,”FederalReserveBankofDallas,DallasFedEconomics,April16,

/research/economics/2026/0416

.

6Foradetaileddiscussionofthemethodologytodetecttariffeffectsoninflation,seeRobertMinton,

MadeleineRay,andMarianoSomale(2026),“DetectingTariffEffectsonConsumerPricesinRealTime–PartII,”FEDSNotes(Washington:BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem,April8),

/10.17016/2380-7172.4040

.

-7-

trytobelatedlyrecoversomeofthesubstantialshareoftariffcoststhattheyreportedlyabsorbedlastyearandinto2026.

Onenergy,earlierconcernsthathigheroilpricescouldbepassedthroughto

inflationforothergoodsandserviceshavegreatlydiminished,basedoninflationdatasofarandtherecentfallinoilprices.Thatsaid,crudeoilpricesarestillvolatile,farther-

datedfuturespricesremainhigherthanbeforetheMiddleEastconflict,andeventheearliersurgeinspotpricescouldshowupincoreinflation.

AnotherpossiblesourceofinflationarypressureisfromAI-relateddemand.Thisisbeingreflectedinsomelargepriceincreasesonselectedgoodssuchassemiconductors,computerchips,servers,computers,andperipherals.Whiletheseincreaseshavehada

limitedeffectonoverallinflationsofar,itispossibletheycouldbealargerfactoriftheinvestmentsurgeforAIcontinues.Therearereportsthatshortagesofmemoryand

storagechipsandcentralprocessingunitsforservers—allusedinrampingupAI

capabilities—aredrivinguppricesforretailgoodsthatalsousethosecomponents.

7

Thesearegoodsthat,becauseofever-improvingcapabilities,historicallysawpricesfalland,therefore,subtractedfrominflation.

Overall,Iammonitoringpricemovementsandamalerttotheriskthatthe

increaseincoreinflationisasignthatinflationarypressuresarespreadingthroughthe

economy.TheFOMChastobereadytotightenmonetarypolicytopreventarepeatof

the2021-to-2022inflationepisode.Buttherearetwodifferencesbetweennowandthenthatmakemecautiousaboutleaningtooheavilyonthatexperiencetomakethisdecision.

7SeeLayaNeelakandan(2026),“RiseinMemoryChipCostsPutsPressureonRetailersofLaptopsand

Smartphones,”CNBC,June26,

/2026/06/26/ai-memory-chip-shortage-consumer-

electronics-prices.html

.

-8-

Thefirstisthattoday’slabormarketisn’tnearlyastight.WhentheFOMC

startedraisingratesin2022,thereweretwojobvacanciesforeveryunemployedperson,andnowtheratioisnearlyonetoone.Whilethemaineffectofhigherratesthenwastoreducevacancies—ratherthanemployment—thereisamuchgreaterrisknowthattightermonetarypolicycoulddriveupunemploymentandevenriskarecession.

8

Anothersignthatthelabormarketisn’tastightisprovidedbydataonnominalwagegrowth.Averagehourlyearningsgrewatanannualrateofbetween5percentand6percentin2022butareonlygrowingaround3.5percentthisyear,apacethatisconsistentwith2percent

inflation,givensolidtrendlaborproductivitygrowth.

Anotherdifferencewith2022isthatinflationexpectationstodayseemwell

anchored.Measuresofinflationexpectationsescalatedsharplyin2022,andtheFOMCconsidereditariskthattheycouldbecomeunanchored.Thiswasabigfactorinthe

FOMC’sdecisiontoquicklyraiseratesandmakeclearthatweintendedtokeepthemhighforsometime.Bycontrast,today,themarket-basedmeasuresofinflation

compensationthatIlookatoverthetwo-tofive-yearhorizonareactuallydownabitinrecentweeks.

9

Two-andfive-yearTreasuryInflation-ProtectedSecuritiesindicate

expectationsof2.1percentand2.3percentinflation,respectively,overthosetime

frames.Fromthis,itseemstocleartomethatinflationexpectationsareanchorednearour2percenttarget.

8ForadetaileddiscussionofwhytheFedcouldraiseratesandachieveasoftlandinginthelabormarket,

seeAndrewFiguraandChristopherJ.Waller(2024),“WhatDoestheBeveridgeCurveTellUsaboutthe

LikelihoodofSoftLandings?”FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries2024-073(Washington:BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem,September),

/10.17016/FEDS.2024.073

.

9Itiscommontohearmeasuresofinflationexpectations5to10yearsaheadcitedasthemostrelevantformonetarypolicy,butIdon’tagree.Isuspectneitherinvestorsnorconsumersplanforinflationuptoa

decadeahead,andIdon’tconsiderithelpfulformonetarypolicymaking,wherethehorizonismuchshorter.

-9-

Ioftenhearpeoplesaythatbecauseinflationexpectationsareanchored,centralbankersdonothavetorespondtoabove-targetinflation.Thisviewiswrong.When

inflationiswellaboveitstargetandthelabormarketisnearfullemploymentandstable,anyseriouspolicyrulecallsforraisingthepolicyratetobringdowninflation.Sternlystaringatinflationuntilitmeltsbeforeourwitheringgazeisnotanoption.Anchored

expectationsassistpolicymakerstryingtobringdowninflationbyallowingustomovemoredeliberately,anditallowsratehikestobelesspersistent.Inthissituation,the

centralbankonlyfacesoneproblem—gettinginflationbacktotarget.

Butifinflationisabovetargetandinflationexpectationsareunanchored,the

centralbankfacestwoproblems—gettinginflationbackdownandr

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