GWPF2026欧盟碳边境调节机制CBAM研究报告市场化路径还是市场失灵英文版

CBAM:MARKET-BASEDORMARKETBUST?

CatherineMcBride

TheGlobalWarmingPolicyFoundation

Report64

CBAM:Market-basedorMarketBust?

CatherineMcBrideReport64

©Copyright2026,TheGlobalWarmingPolicyFoundation

Contents

Abouttheauthoriii

Executivesummary1

Introduction2

1.Whatareexternalities?2

2.Commonsolutionstonegativeexternalities2

3.Marketsolutionstonegativeexternalities7

4.Emissionstradingschemesarenotmarketsolutions8

5.Carbonemissiontariffs—CBAM11

6.TheUK’sCBAMversustheEU’sCBAM25

7.AlternativestoCBAM28

8.Conclusions30

Notes33

AbouttheGlobalWarmingPolicyFoundation38

Abouttheauthor

CatherineMcBrideOBEistheCEOoftheGreatBritishBusinessCouncil.Aneconomistspecialis-ingintrade,sherecentlyservedontheUK’sTradeandAgricultureCommission.Beforethis,sheworkedforvariousthinktanks,writingonUKtradepolicyandfinancialservicesregulation,afteracareertradingcommodityderivativesintheCityofLondonforsomeoftheworld’slargestbanksandcommodityhouses.Catherinewasaco-authoroftheInstituteforFreeTrade’spaper:AnEco-nomicallySustainableGlobalClimateAccord.

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1

Executivesummary

•Carbontaxes,emissiontradingschemesandCarbonBorderAd-justmentMechanisms(CBAMs)arepresentedastoolsforreduc-ingemissions,butinpracticetheyoftenbecomerevenue-raisingmeasuresthatraisecostswithouteliminatingtheexternality.

•TheUK’sexperiencewithfuelduty,theClimateChangeLevy,theUKEmissionsTradingScheme(ETS)andCarbonPriceSupportshowshowenvironmentaltaxescanbecomeembeddedingov-ernmentfinanceswhileweakeningdomesticindustry.

•Despiteitsname,theUKETSisnotagenuine‘marketsolution’.Thegovernmentcontrolsthesupplyofallowances,manufacturersareforcedtobuythem,andfirmsthatremoveCO₂fromtheatmos-pherecannotsellreductionsintothescheme.

•ThesepolicieshaveincreasedUKproductioncosts,encouragedoffshoringandshiftedemissionsoverseasratherthanreducingthemglobally.Theresultisdeindustrialisation,higherimportsandweakercompetitiveness.

•TheproposedUKCBAMwillnotreversethis.Itisaimedatfiveimportedmaterials:aluminium,cement,fertiliser,hydrogenandferrousmetals.Butforaluminium,steelandfertilisers,muchdo-mesticproductionhasalreadyclosedormovedabroad.AddingaCBAMnowsimplyraisescostsfordownstreammanufacturers.

•Italsofailstosolvethelargerunderlyingproblemsfacedbymanu-facturingbusinesses:expensiveindustrialenergypricesandhighregulatoryburdens.

•Ifcarbontaxesremain,theyshouldaccountforproductlifespan.Long-livedmaterialsusedinaircraft,buildingsorinfrastructureshouldnotfacethesameeffectivechargeasshorter-livedprod-ucts.

•Abetterapproachinvolvesreducingthecostofinvestmentincleaner,moreefficientplantandequipmentsothatreductionsingreenhousegasemissionsbecomeahappyside-effectofeco-nomicgrowth.ProposalsforaGlobalClimateandFreedomAccord(CFA)showhowthiscouldbedoneinpracticethroughpoliciessuchastaxdeductionsforlowemissonsequipmentandRapidIn-novationFunds.

•Thecentralpolicychoiceiswhethertoprotectinefficientdomesticproductionwithbordertaxes,ortomakeUKproductionmoreef-ficient,competitiveandinvestable.Thelatterwouldreduceemis-sions,raiseproductivityandbettersupporteconomicgrowth

•Itwillalwaysbeinamanufacturer’sinteresttooperateasefficientlyaspossible.CementinginplaceinefficientmethodsbyprotectingthemwithemissionsbasedtariffswillnotboostUKproductivityor

UKGDP.

2

Introduction

Thispaperdiscussesexternalitiesandthegov-ernmentpoliciesusedtomitigatethem.ItreviewstheUK’scurrentCBAMproposal,thepreviousgovernment’sproposals,andtheEU’sCBAM.ItanalysestheindustriescoveredbytheproposedCBAManddiscussesmoreeffec-tivefree-marketsolutionstoreduceindustrialGHGemissionswhileimprovingproductivitythroughinnovationandloweringCAPEXcosts.

ThispaperdoesnotquestionwhetherCO₂isbeneficialordetrimentaltotheenvironment.Instead,itexamineswhethertheUK’sEmissions

TradingScheme(ETS)andproposedCarbonBorderAdjustmentMechanism(CBAM)repre-sentacost-effectivewayofreducingemissionsoriftherearebetteralternatives.

Mosteconomistsagreethatnegativeexter-nalitiesshouldbereducedbutdisagreeonhowtodosoeffectively.Thereiscurrentlyatrendtowardimposingtaxesonthem,butthisrarelydetersthebehaviourthatcausedtheexternal-ity.Instead,thetaxbecomesusefulrevenuestreamforgovernments,whichbecomereliantontheadditionalincome.

1.Whatareexternalities?

Anexternalityoccurswhenamarkettransac-tionaffectspeopleorcommunitieswhoarenotpartiestothetransaction.Externalitiescanbepositiveornegative,andasingleexternalitymaybepositiveforsomepeople,butnegativeforothers.

Forexample,apositiveexternalitycouldbetheeradicationofadiseaseaftermostofthepopulationhasbeenvaccinatedagainstit.Anegativeexternalitycouldbefactorypollutionenteringariver,whichpreventslivestockfromusingthewaterdownstream.Orachildeatingtoomanysweets,sothestatemustpayfortheirdentalcare.Thechildenjoyedthesweets,thesweetcompanymademoney,butthestatewasleftwiththebillfortheexternality—cavities.

Externalitiescanflipfromnegativetopositive.Whenaneighbouringhouseisbeingrenovated,theneighbourssufferthenegativeexternalityofconstructionnoiseandtrafficdis-ruption,buttheymayalsobenefitfromaposi-tiveexternalitywhenthehouseisfinished,iftherenovationincreaseshousevaluesonthe

restofthestreet.

Similarly,theconstructionofanewairport,togetherwithahighwayortrainlineforairpas-sengerstoreachanddepartthecity,wouldhaveapositiveexternalityforpeoplelivingnearthehighwayortrainline,astheywouldbenefitfromimprovedconnectionstothecitycentre.However,peoplelivingundertheflightpathofthenewairportwouldsufferanegativeexternality:increasednoisepollution.Whetheranexternalityispositiveornegativeoftende-pendsontheattitudesofthepartiesinvolved.

Whilepeoplerarelycomplainaboutposi-tiveexternalitiesandoftentakethemforgrant-edwithoutrealisingtheyareawindfallfromsomeoneelse’seffortortransaction,negativeexternalitiesarerarelyacceptedaspartoflife.Negativeexternalitiesgenerallycreateacaseforthegovernmenttoeitherregulatetheac-tivity,taxittomakeitmoreexpensive,orusealternativemethodstopreventitfromcausingthenegativeexternality.

2.Commonsolutionstonegativeexternalities

Taxes

IntheUK,therearemanyexamplesoftaxingac-tivitiestoreduceexternalities.Forexample,tax-ingdriverswhodriveintocentralLondontodis-couragetrafficcongestionortaxingcigarettestolowerhealthcarecosts.Toreducecarbondioxideemissions,carbontaxeshavebeenap-pliedtoelectricityproduction.Theideaisthat

bymakingelectricitymoreexpensive,peoplewilluselessofitandgreenhousegasemissionsfromelectricityproductionwillbelower.

Atleastthatisthetheory.

InApril2001,theUKintroducedtheCli-mateChangeLevy(CCL)onbusinessesforgasandelectricityconsumptiononaper-kWhba-sis.1ThiswassupposedlytoreduceCO₂emis-

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sionsandencourageUKbusinessestouselessenergyandbecomemoreefficient.TheEUsubsequentlyintroducedtheEmissionsTradingScheme(ETS)in2005,andthentheUKaddeditsCarbonPriceSupport(CPS)carbonemissiontaxin2013.AllweremeanttocurbindustrialCO₂emissions.However,energyisessentialforindustry.So,whileUKemissionshavehalvedsince1990,themanufacturingshareoftheUKeconomyhastoo.

Weshouldn’tbesurprisedbythisresult.Taxesonexternalitiesgenerallydon’tworkandendupservingonlyasasourceofgovernmentrevenue.TheFuelDutyEscalator,introducedin1993,wasexplicitlylinkedtoenvironmentalgoals.YetfueldutyhasbecomesoimportanttoHMRCrevenuesthat,asEVadoptiongrowsandfueldutyreceiptsdecline,thegovernmentisintroducingapay-per-mileroadtaxtoreplacethelostincome.Althoughtheescalator’spur-posewastoencourageashiftfromICEvehiclestoEVs,thetaxburdenisbeingretainedunderadifferentnamebecausetherevenuehasbe-comeindispensabletogovernmentfinances.

TheUKmandateforallnewcarpurchasestobeEVsby20352,3hasbeensosuccessfulthatthegovernmentnowneedstoreplaceitsFuelDutyrevenuewithanewmileage-basedtaxforelectricvehiclesandplug-inhybrids,theElectricVehicleExciseDuty(eVED).ThedutywillstartinApril2028andwillbepricedat3ppermileforEVsand1.5ppermileforplug-inHybrids,andtheOBRexpectsittoraise£1.1billioninitsfirstyearofoperation.4TheOBRalsoexpectsthenewtaxtoreduceEVsalesby440,0005vehiclesby2031.Ironically,thetaxdesignedtodiscour-ageICEvehiclesandpromoteEVuseisnowbe-ingreplacedbyanewtaxthatispredictedtodiscourageEVuse.

Someenvironmentaltaxesintroducedtodiscourageactivitiesthatproducenegativeex-ternalitieshaveoftengeneratedtheirownex-ternalitieswhenpeopleavoidpayingthem.Forexample,fly-tippingisendemicintheUKduetothecostsandregulationsassociatedwithlegallydisposingofconstructionwasteandotherunwantedhouseholditems.6Therewere1.15millionfly-tippingincidentsinEnglandin2023/24,up6%fromtheyearbefore,costinglo-calcouncilsover£13.1milliontoclear.7

Prohibitions

Ifthegoalistoremoveanegativeexternality,prohibitionsaremoreeffectivethantaxeswhenrigorouslyenforced.Someexamplesincludethebanonleadedpetrol,thebanonsmokinginenclosedpublicplaces,andthebanonchildlabour.However,thisimposesacostonthegovernment,whichmustenforcethebanbutreceivesnofinancialbenefitunlesssubstantialfinesareimposedforviolations.Thus,thegov-ernmenttendstoprefertaxestoprohibitions.Governmentsgenerallyprefertherevenuestreamandpoliticalgainfrom‘virtuous’taxa-tionratherthanthecostofenforcingregula-tions,eventhoughprohibitionseliminatetheexternality.

Regulations

Regulationssometimesworkif,likeprohibi-tions,theyareproperlyenforced.Forexample,theU.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgencyintro-ducedgreenhousegasemissionsstandardsforpassengervehiclesandlighttrucksformodelsmanufacturedfrom2023to2026.Theemis-sionsstandardsreduceeachyearfrom202gofCO₂/milein2023to161gofCO₂/milein2026.8Theseareexpectedtoprevent3billiontonsofGHGemissionsby2050ifthelimitsaremet.

Similarly,theAmericanInnovationandManufacturingActof2020requiresan85%re-ductionintheuseofhydrofluorocarbons(HFCs)by2036.9HFCsareusedinrefrigeration,aircon-ditioning,aerosols,firesuppressionandsemi-conductormanufacturing.HFCsweredevel-opedasareplacementforCFCs,whichhadtheunfortunateexternalityofdepletingtheOzonelayer.However,HFCsaresyntheticgreenhousegaseswithhighglobalwarmingpotential.Thus,thesolutiontooneexternalitynowproducesanotherandneedstobephasedout.

Promotingalternativegoodsorpro-cesses

Anothermethodofreducingnegativeexter-nalitiesistopromoteorsubsidisealternativeactivitiessothattheybecomepreferabletotheactivitythatproducesthenegativeexternality.

Obviousexamplesincludethesubsidiesavailableforsolarpanelsandwindturbines,whichreducethecosttothegeneratorofpro-

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ducingrenewableelectricity,therebymakingitmorecompetitivewithdispatchablepowerfromgasorcoal.Thisonlyencouragesoff-gridconsumerstoswitchtorenewablepoweriftheyhaveachoicebetweenthetwo.However,mostUKconsumersdon’thavethischoice,asthepowerfromallsourcesis‘mixed’onthenationalgrid.

TheUKalsosubsidisesbyupto£3,750thepurchaseofnewEVs(pricedunder£37,000),10andofferspreferentialcompanycartaxratesandotherdiscounts,includingreducedconges-tionchargesandparkingfeesforEVs.11TheseincentivesaredesignedtomakedrivinganEVcheaperthananICEvehicle.However,ifelec-tricityismoreexpensivethanpetrol,orifpeoplelackoff-streetparkingoraccesstofastchargingfacilities,thefinancialincentivetoswitchtoanEVmaynotbelargeenoughtoencourageachangeinconsumerbehaviour.

Licences,allowancesandcarbontariffs

Inthecaseofgreenhousegasemissions,severalcountrieshaveadoptedasuperficially‘market-based’systeminwhichcompanieswithhighCO₂emissionscanbuypermitsfortheiremis-sions,effectivelyalicencetopollute.Inatruemarket,theseemissionpermitswouldbesoldonlybyindividualsorcompaniesthatownbusi-nessesorlandthatsequestercarbondioxide.

IntheUKandEU’sEmissionsTradingSys-tems(ETSs),therespectivegovernmentscre-atethedemandforemissionsallowancesandcontroltheirsupply.Byreducingthenumberofallowancesavailable,theyaimtoincreasecarbonpricesovertime.Theyalsograntfreeal-lowancestoselectedindustriestoprotectthemfromhighercostsandreducetheriskofproduc-tionmovingabroad.Despitetheseprotections,manybusinesseshaverelocatedmanufacturingtocountrieswithoutcarbontaxes,wheretheyoftenbenefitfromlowerlabourcostsandlessstringentenvironmentalregulations.

TheUKhasfurtherincreasedenergycostsbyimposingadditionalcarbontaxesonelec-tricitygeneration.BusinessesmustpayClimateChangeLeviesandpurchaseETSallowances,whileelectricitypricesalsoreflecttheCarbonPriceSupport(CPS),ataxintroducedin2013onelectricitygeneratedfromfossilfuels.TheCPSwasintendedtoacceleratethephase-outof

coalbyguaranteeingaminimumcarbonpriceforpowergenerators.AlthoughtheUK’slastcoal-firedpowerstationclosedin2024,thetaxremainsinplaceandisscheduledtocontinueuntilApril2028.12TheadditionalburdenpushesUKelectricitypriceshigherthanmostotherEUcountries.

Theoffshoringofmanufacturingtocar-bon-tax-freecountriesisknownascarbonleak-age.Tocombatthis‘carbonleakage’,theEUhasintroducedanewtariffonimportedmaterialsproducedwithhighGHGemissions.ThistariffiscalledtheCarbonBorderAdjustmentMecha-nism(CBAM).

TheUKGovernmentalsoproposestointro-duceaCBAMfromJanuary2027,andtheLabourgovernmenthaverecentlypublishedapolicyupdateoftheConservativegovernment’spro-posedCBAM.13BoththepresentLabourandtheformerConservativegovernmentsbelievethataCBAMonimportswouldprotectUKindustrieswithhighCO₂emissions.TheseindustriesmustpurchaseemissionallowancesontheUK’sETSmarketbutalsocompetewithimportedgoodsproducedincountrieswithoutcarbontaxes.14WhilethecurrentLabourGovernmenthasalsoproposedthattheUKshouldjointheEU’sETSandCBAM,whichwillbediscussedinmorede-tailinChapter5.15,16

Promotinginvestmentinefficientequipmentandinnovation

Themosteffectivemethodofreducinganex-ternalityistoencouragethedevelopmentofin-novationsthateliminateitandtoencouragein-dustriesandmanufacturerstoadoptthem.Thisisanotherwayofreducingexternalities,butitistheoppositeoftaxingemissions,whichre-ducesthemoneyavailabletomanufacturersforinvestmentinresearchanddevelopmentandnewequipment.Studiesshowthatcompetitivemarketsdecarbonisefasterthanregulatedmar-ketsbecausetheymakeiteasier,cheaper,andfasterforcompetitorstodeployinnovations.

Forexample,theaverageinternalcombus-tionenginecarin2025ismorethantwiceasfuel-efficientasonein1975.Theaveragefuelefficiencyofa1975carwasjust13milespergal-lon(mpg),butitisnow28mpg.17Thisfigurein-cludescars,SUVsandpickups.ThemodernICE

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caralsoproduces95%lessCO,90%lessNOx,99%fewerhydrocarbonsand99%fewerpar-ticulatesthana1975car.EncouragingdriverstoupgradetothelatestICEvehicleswouldsig-nificantlyreducefuelconsumptionandharmfulemissions,andmaywellbeaneasier‘sell’thanEVmandates,whichforcedriversandcompanyfleetstoconverttoEVs.ForcedconversiontoEVsisespeciallydifficultifdriversregularlytrav-ellongdistancesordon’thaveoff-streetpark-ingandeasyaccesstocheap,fastcharging.

EncouragingupgradestomodernICEcarshastheaddedbenefitofnotplacingexcessivestrainontheUK’selectricitygrid.TherecentweekofrecordtemperaturesinJune2026forcedtheUKtoincreaseitsgaselectricitygen-erationtocopewithincreasedairconditioninguse,partiallyoffsettingtheCO₂reductionfromdriversconvertingtoEVs.IfallUKdrivershadconvertedtoEVsovernightthecountrywouldhavebeenbroughttoastandstill.FuelefficientICEcarswouldnotputthisadditionalpressureontheelectricitygrid.Tocopewiththeextrademand,NESOwasforcedtopay20timesthepriceforimportedelectricitythanitpaidinJune2025.18

Similarly,industrialmachinery,plant,andequipmenthavebecomemorefuel-efficientandsafer,andproducefeweremissions.Inno-vationdrivesenergyefficiency,whichlowerscostsandserendipitouslylowersemissions.Re-ducingbusinesscostsiskeytobothimprovingcompetitivenessandacceleratinginnovation.

Onewaytoencouragethisisbytaxde-ductionsortaxratecutsforinvestmentsinthelatest,mostefficientplantandequipment,acceleratinginnovationanddecarbonisationsimultaneously.MuchoftheUK’slackofindus-trialcompetitivenessstemsfromitsoutdatedfactories,oldblastfurnaces,smelters,refineries,andpowerplants.HighcarbontaxesandhighindustrialelectricityandfuelcostshaveleftUKcompanieswithinsufficientcashflowtoinvestinupgrades;replacingthetaxeswithtaxratecutsfornewequipmentinvestmentswouldre-duceemissionswhileboostingGDP.

Itwillalwaysbeinamanufacturer’sinter-esttooperateasefficientlyaspossible.Anditwillalwaysbeinacountry’sinteresttohaveef-ficientindustries.

Encouraginginnovationandinvestmentin

new,moreefficientplantandequipmentisaneffectivewaytoloweremissionsandislikelytoyieldbetterresultsthanprotectinginefficientequipmentandproductionmethodswithcar-bontariffsonimportedmaterials.Especiallycarbontaxesonimportedmaterialsthatarenecessaryinputsusedbydownstreamindus-tries.

Investmentinnewplantandequipmentcanbefurtherenhancedbyofferinginvestorstax-freereturnsoninvestmentfundsspecifi-callyusedtolendmoneytocompaniesinvest-inginnewplantandequipmentortofinanceresearchanddevelopment.Someofthesepro-grams,suchasRapidInnovationFunds,aredis-cussedindetailinChapter7.

Balancingeconomicactivityandexternalitysolutions

Apartfromcompleteprohibition,themethodsofdealingwithexternalitieslistedabovedon’tpreventexternalitiesfromoccurring,althoughsomereducethem.However,unlessanalter-nativeprocessormethodisreadilyavailable,prohibitionwouldalsopreventconsumersfrombenefitingfromtheactivity,therebycre-atinganotherexternality.Examplesofeffectiveprohibitions:banningleadedpetrol,smokingindoors,andchildlabourallworkedbecauseeffectivealternativeswereavailable:unleadedpetrol,smokingoutdoors,andmechanisedpro-duction.

However,thegovernmentcannotprohibitallCO₂emissions,asthiswouldprohibit:mostmanufacturingindustries;34%ofUKelectricityproduction;78%ofUKdomesticheating;80%ofUKcars;96%ofUKvans;99%ofUKtrucks;andalmostallnitrogen-basedfertilisers.So,thenegativeexternalitytotheUKpopulationoflostgoodsandservicesandlostjobsandincomeswouldbeimmense,farexceedingthecostoftheexternality.ThisiswhyreducingCO₂emissionshasbeensodifficult.

Theeconomycannotfunctionwithouthydrocarbon-basedenergy,manufacturing,foodproduction,transport,andheating;there-fore,wecannotsimplybangreenhousegasemissions.Buttaxingemissionsandemissionstradingschemeshaven’tworkedeither.Atleasttheyhaven’tworkediftheintentionwas

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tolowerglobalemissions(seeGraph1,below),buttheyhavepushedupUKpricesofenergy,manufacturedgoods,foodproduction,trans-port,andheating,andhavehelpedindustrialiseChinaandotherdevelopingAsianeconomies.Althoughunintended,thedevelopmentandrisingincomesinAsiancountrieshavedonemore‘good’thancuttingCO2emissionswouldhaveachieved.

Unfortunately,muchofthepurportedemis-sionsreductionhasmerelyshiftedemissionsfromthedevelopedworldtothelessdevelopedworld,asisevidentinFigure1below.Therehasalsobeenconsiderablegreenwashing,withcompaniesindevelopedcountriespurchasing‘carboncredits’frompurportedownersoffic-tionalforestsinSouthAmerica.

40

BilliontonnesofCO₂

30

20

10

0

1750180018501900195020002024

InternationalaviationAsia(excl.ChinaandIndia)AfricaUnitedStates

InternationalshippingChinaSouthAmericaEuropeanUnion(27)

OceaniaIndiaNorthAmerica(excl.USA)Europe(excl.EU)

Figure1:GlobalCO₂emissions

Source:OurWorldinData.

3.Marketsolutionstonegativeexternalities

Pseudo-marketversusgenuinemarketsolutions

Iflow-emissiontechnologiesbecomecheaper,moreproductive,andmorereliablethanexist-ingalternatives,businessesandconsumerswilladoptthemvoluntarily.Theprincipalpolicyob-jectiveshouldthereforebetoreducethecostofinnovationandinvestmentwhileincreasingtherewardsforsuccessfulemissions-reducingtechnologies.

Broadlydefined,‘market-based’policies

includemanycoerciveinstrumentswhichusepseudo-marketmechanismstopursuegov-ernment-definedobjectives.Forexample,anemissionstradingscheme(ETS)inwhichthegovernmentcreatesdemandforemissional-lowancesthroughregulationandcontrolsthesupplyofallowancesissued,therebyinfluenc-ingtheprice.

Agenuinefree-marketsolution,bycon-trast,seekstoreduceexternalitiesbystrength-eningpropertyrights,encouraginginnovation,allowingpricestoreflectrealcostsandbenefits,

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promotingvoluntaryexchange,andremov-ingbarrierstoinvestmentandtechnologicaldevelopment.Ratherthanforcingbehaviouralchange,free-marketapproachesfocusoncreat-ingtheconditionsinwhichcleanerandmoreefficienttechnologiesemergebecausetheyareeconomicallysuperior.

Thisperspectiveseessustainableenviron-mentalimprovementsasbeingmostlikelytocomefrominnovation,economicgrowth,andcapitalinvestmentratherthanfromcoerciverestrictionsonproductionandconsumption.Inshort,itholdsthatcompetitionandinnovation,ratherthancoercion,arethebestwaytoloweremissions.

Analternativeframeworktoreduceemissions

TheClimateandFreedomAccord(CFA)propos-alasoutlinedbytheInstituteforFreeTrade19providesanalternativeframeworkforreducingmarketdistortionsaswellasemissionsthroughfree-marketprinciples.Itarguesthatconven-tionalclimatepoliciessuchasemissionstradingschemesandrenewableenergysubsidieshavedistortedinternationalmarketsbyincreasingcostsfordomesticproducers,reducingtheirinternationalcompetitiveness,encouragingtheoffshoringofproduction,andshiftingemis-sionsgeographicallyratherthansignificantlyreducingglobalemissions.

TheCFAframeworkenvisagesthedevelop-mentofasystemofpositiveincentivesdesignedtoaccelerateinnovationandinvestment.Inthisway,reductionsofGHGemissionsbecomeahappyside-effectofgrowth,ratherthansome-thingthathastobetradedoffagainstmodernlifestylesasiscurrentlybeingproposedbythe

UKgovernment.

Tradeliberalisationandinternationalco-operation

Climatepolicyhasincreasinglybecomeassoci-atedwithtraderestrictions,carbontariffs,andborderadjustmentmeasures.Suchpoliciesre-ducecompetitiveness,raiseconsumerprices,andimpedethespreadofnewtechnologies.TheEUhasaddedcarbonemissionsallowanc-estomaritimetransport,whichhasincreasedcostsformostimportedgoods;thisisi