麦肯锡 -不要直接叫停或姑息存在风险的资本项目而要对其提出严苛审视 Dont cancel or coddle at-risk capital projects-challenge them

July2025

Mckunsey

&company

OperationsPractice

Don’tcancelorcoddle

at-riskcapitalprojects—challengethem

Today’svolatilityleavesmultibillion-dollarcapitalprojectswithlittleroomforerror.Anewapproachtostresstestinghelpskeepthemontrack.

ThisarticleisacollaborativeeffortbyErikhansKok,MartinLinder,SamLinder,andTomBrinded,withMichaelBrock,representingviewsfromMcKinsey’sOperationsPractice.

FindingsfromeconomicgeographerBentFlyvbjerg,editorofTheOxfordHandbookof

MegaprojectManagement(OxfordUniversityPress,June2017),confirmastarkreality:Outofadatabaseof16,000projects,only8.5percentmettheircostandscheduletargets,andamere0.5percentachievedallpromisedbenefits.Thisphenomenon,whichhecallsthe“ironlawof

megaprojects,”underscoresthatunderperformanceisthenorm.

Weagree,asourin-depthreviewofmorethan300billion-dollar-plusmegaprojectsshowedaveragecostoverrunsofapproximately80percentandscheduledelaysofabout50percent.Forexecutivesoverseeingsuchsignificantinvestments,thesestatisticshighlightthecriticalneedforrobustprojectmanagementandriskmitigationstrategies.

Theproblemisonlygrowing.Worldwide,anestimated$24trillionincapitalisreadyfor

deploymentoverthenextfiveyearsacrossheavy-industrialprojects,withChinaaccountingforapproximately39percent,theEuropeanUnionfor15percent,theUnitedStatesfor12percent,andIndiafor8percent(exhibit).Twosegments,energyandmanufacturing,accountformuchoftherisingdemandascompaniesscrambletobuildeverythingfromliquefied-natural-gas

facilitiesandpharmaceuticalplantstodatacentersandchipfabs.

Risksarerisingasuncertaintygrowsabout

geopolitics,tariffs,trade

,interestrates,and

macroeconomicconditions.Thishasledtoaworldlitteredwithmultibillion-dollarprojects

whoseeconomicassumptionscollapsed,sometimesmidconstruction—especiallyincomplex,resource-intensiveindustriessuchasenergy,chemicals,andtechnology.

Companieshavetriedtoadjust,butwithoutconsistentsuccess.Peer-reviewpanelsareusuallycomposedofinternalsubjectmatterexpertschargedwithassessingaproject’stechnicalandbusinessassumptions.Butthatcompositioncanbeineffective,asthosepanelsoftenfocustoomuchontechnicalrisksratherthaninvestmentthesis—andlacktheauthoritytoadvance

projects.Attheotherextreme,“cancelauthority”structures,basedontheinvestmentcommitteestypicalin

privateequity

,arelesseffectiveinlargeorganizationswithmanycompetingconstituencies.

Afeworganizationsaregeneratingbetterresultswithahappymedium:the“independent

projectchallengeteam.”Byfocusingonafewcoreelements,theseteamscanworkwitha

broaderspectrumofexpertsthanpeerreviewpanelsdoandoperatewithalessdemanding

structurethanacancelauthoritydoes.Oneglobalenergycompanyhasusedthisapproachtorevampitsentire$50billioncapital-projectsportfolio,whileautilityadaptedittosuccessfullydeliveramajorgenerationfacilitydespitecostincreasesofmorethan40percentoverbaselineassumptions.

Theelementsofanindependentprojectchallengeteam

Inthisarticle,we’lllookathow—andwhy—anindependentprojectchallengeteamstructure

offersapragmaticalternativetopeerreviewsandcancelauthorities.Butfirst,let’sexaminethedownsidesofexistingreviewstructures.

Don’tcancelorcoddleat-riskcapitalprojects—challengethem2

Don’tcancelorcoddleat-riskcapitalprojects—challengethem3

Exhibit1

Don’tcancelorcoddleat-riskcapitalprojects—challengethem4

Inapeerreviewstructure,companysubjectmatterexpertsfromoutsidethecoreprojectteam

assesstheproject’sscopeandkeyassumptions.Thegoalistoconfirmearly-stageproject

readiness,technicaldesignvalidity,andbusiness-casecredibility.Yet,mostpeer-reviewpanelslackdeepcommercial,financial,andmarketexpertise,resultinginaheavyfocusontechnical

maturityandriskexposureratherthanwhethertheprojectiscompetitive.Drawingonlyon

internalperspectives,peerreviewsaremorevulnerableto

biasedthinking

,particularlyifthe

panel’sanalysesdependondatasourcesthattheprojectteamhasused.Andthepanels

generallylackdecisionauthority,providingadvisoryrecommendationsthatproject-teamleadersfindeasytoignore,particularlyonceaprojecthasmomentum.

Cancelauthoritystructuresalsorelyoninternalexpertise,butdifferfrompeerreviewsinafewimportantrespects.Forexample,asinprivateequityinvestmentcommittees,cancelauthoritiesdrawmorerepresentationfromacompany’sfinancialandcommercialfunctions—whichare

independentoftheprojectteamandbetterabletoevaluateitseconomics.Themostimportantchange,however,isinthepowertheywield:Assuggestedbytheirname,cancelauthoritiescandecideaproject’sfate.Butthatcapabilityhasmadethestructuredifficulttotranslatetolarge,capital-intensiveorganizations,whichtendtohavefarmoreinternalconstituenciestosatisfy

thanprivateequitycompanies.

Independentprojectchallengeteamsturnthereviewintoamorerealisticpressuretestofaproject’sbusinesscase,includingitsscope,costs,schedule,commercialterms,and

assumptionsastooverallreturns.Theydosoinfiveways:

1.Ensureobjectivity.Challengeteamsshouldbetrulyindependent,withnostakeinaproject’ssuccessorfailure.Instead,theirsolemissionistouncovertheraw,unfilteredfactsabouta

project’sviability.Effectivechallengeteamsfromleadingorganizationsaresponsoredbytheexecutiveteamwithamandatetoprovideindependentoversightseparatefromtheprojectteam.

2.Bringinexternalperspectives.Tofurthercounterbias,thecompanyshouldsetaclear

expectationthattheteamincorporatelearningsfromindustryassociations,research

centers,orotherthird-partyinstitutions.Leadingorganizationsusetheseinsightsto

challengeexistingbeliefsandintroducediverseperspectives.Forexample,oneenergy

organizationrunsared-team,blue-teamexercisetointerrogateplansbeforemakingfinalinvestmentdecisions.

3.Takeaninvestormindset.Eachelementofthereviewshouldpaintaclearpictureofthe

project’sinvestmentprofile,resiliency,andcompetitiveness.Teamswillneedcross-

functionalcapabilitiestoscrutinizecriticalvulnerabilitiesandassesstheinvestmentthesis,

withafocusoneconomicreturns.Takingapagefromprivateinvestors’disciplinedapproachtodealselection,challengeteamsshouldmaintainaruthlessfocusonvalue

Don’tcancelorcoddleat-riskcapitalprojects—challengethem5

creationanddevelopstandardcriteriaforallevaluationstoenablediscussionsonthemeritsoftheinvestment.

4.Focusoncompetitiveness.Effectivechallengeteamsforcediscussionsonhowtheprojectwillcompeteinitsmarketandwhatmustbetrue(coveringfactorsfromgeopoliticalriskstodetailedperformancebenchmarkstheassetmustmeet)inorderfortheundertakingto

succeed.Theseassumptionsrequirecontinualupdating,particularlygivenchronicvolatilityincapitalmarkets,macroeconomicconditions,andgeopoliticalevents.Industrycostcurves,basedondetailedcompetitiveintelligenceanddynamicallyadaptedtolocalcontexts,can

provideanimportantcounterweighttoexcessiveoptimism.

5.Exerciserealdecisioninfluence.Ratherthanissueeasilydismissedrecommendationsorathumbs-up,thumbs-downdecisionontheproject’sfuture,theteaminsteadshouldsubmititsevaluationdirectlytocompanyleadership—whichthendetermineswhethertheprojectstillalignswithstrategicpriorities.Inpractice,oneminingcompanyauthorizesitschallengeteamstopauseorevenreshapeprojectsaspartofastandardstage-gatereview.

Theseelementsareessentialforenhancingprojectoutcomesandaligningwithstrategicgoals.Below,welookatthesuccessofanindependentprojectteamataglobalenergycompanywithmorethan$20billioninmajorcapitalprojects.

Anenergycompany’sdilemma

Companyleaderswerefacedwithastartlingfindingfromaninternalanalysis:Theirworld-

spanningcapital-projectsportfoliohadyieldedonlyminimalnetpresentvalue,withmorethanhalfofitspotentiallosttounderperformance.Thereasonsforsubparreturnsvariedfromrosyassumptionsaboutinputcosts,productivitylevels,andwork-hourrequirementstounrealisticviewsonmarketdynamics.Butallsharedarootcause—bias—resultinginsignificantcostandscheduleoverruns.

Thefindingsledcompanyleaderstorethinktheircapitaloperatingmodel,particularlythe

processforapprovingmajorprojectinvestments.Theorganization’sbusinessunit–led

approach,whichgavethecentralteamlimitedfunctionalauthorityandleftcoreresponsibilitiestoothers,createdsignificanthurdles.Functionalandbusinessleaderswerereluctanttocedecontrolandresistedtheideaofindependentreviews,especiallythoseconductedbyexternal

parties.

Historically,projectleaderswouldinsteadconductinformalpeerreviews,whichreliedonin-

houseexpertsfromotherbusinesses.Whilethesereviewssometimesresultedinmajor

changes,moreoftentheyyieldedlittlemorethansuperficialsanitychecksontheproject’s

assumptions.Peersoftenusedthesamedataandprojectexperienceastheproject’ssponsors,andunsurprisingly,tendedtoreinforcegroupthink.

Don’tcancelorcoddleat-riskcapitalprojects—challengethem6

Leadersconductedabottom-upreviewthatinvolvedextensiveinterviews,athoroughanalysisofpastprojects,andadeepdiveintothelessonslearned.Thebreakthroughrevelation:An

outsideviewwasneededtoprovideacontrarianperspectivethatwouldbetterinformcriticaldecisionsandminimizerisk.Businessleaderscametounderstandthatonlyarigorousnew

assessmentstructure,onewithanexplicitmandateandinformedbyexternalperspectives,couldprovidethenecessaryobjectivitytoprotectthecompany’shealth.

Forseveralyears,theorganizationhasintegratedindependentchallenge-teamreviewsintothedevelopmentprocess,bringinginexternalpartiestotestexistingbeliefsandclassifyprojects

intothreecategories.Soundprojectsareonesthatcanbecomemoreresilientandvaluablewithrelativelyminorchanges—suchasthe$1.5billionoffshoreenergyprojectwhere$250millioninengineeringcuts(effectivelyareductioninprojectscope)wouldkeeptheprojectviableeven

underrelativelyextremelowpricingscenarios.Projectswithclearsignposts,ontheotherhand,canbeconsidered“sound”onlyoncetheoverallmarketenvironment,includingprice,regulatory,geopolitical,andotherrisks,shiftssignificantly.Lastly,projectsrequiringrethinkingface

cancellationforanynumberofreasonsthatcannotbeviablymitigated.

Thechallengeteaminaction:Newtechnologies

Theindependentchallengeteamwascalledintoevaluateanewtechnologyprojectwiththe

potentialtogenerate$5billioninfuturevalue—ifthecompanycouldmanagearegulatory

contextinvolvingmultiplejurisdictions,complextaxandfinancialimplications,noprecedentsformodelingprices,andlittlemarketintelligenceandcustomerinsightstounderstandhowtobeststructurecommercialrelationships.Notsurprisingly,thecompanydefaultedtohighly

conservativeassumptions.Notsurprisingly,theprojectstagnated.

Thechallengeteamquicklyrealizedthattheoriginalassumptionswereneedlesslypessimistic,basedongeneralunfamiliarityratherthanin-depthanalysis.Oncloserexamination,the

challengeteamfoundthattheproject’smajorcomponentswerelargelywellstudiedandlowrisk,withbenchmarksavailabletocreateamorerealisticrangeofoutcomes.Thisexercise

revealedsignificantopportunitiestoworkwithengineering,procurement,andconstructioncontractorsonafasterandlower-costprojectplanthatwouldstillprovideadequaterisk

guardrails.

Moreover,theproject’smarketpotentialturnedouttobesubstantiallyhigherthaninitial

projections,whichwerebasedmainlyonanecdotalevidence.Thechallengeteambuiltasimplesupply-and-demandoutlooktocreatepriceforecastsandestablishafactbaseforthe

commercialteamtoengagewithcustomers.

Thefinalsurpriseconcernedtheproject’spositioningagainstcompetitors.Projectleadershadinitiallybelievedthecompanyshouldproceedcautiously.Thechallengeteamuncoveredthat,withrealisticassumptions,theprojectwasactuallyhighlycompetitiveifexecutedcorrectly.Infact,theprojectwouldneedtomovequicklytocapturethefirstwaveofcustomerdemandandlockin

increasinglyscarceskilledlaborintheregion

.

Don’tcancelorcoddleat-riskcapitalprojects—challengethem7

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Oneutility’scoalconundrum

Alarge,regionalutilitydecidedtoreplaceitsagingcoal-burningcapacitytomeetbothrising

demandandclean-energystandards.Itsnextstepwastodevelopaneffectivereplacement.

Onesolutionthatcompanyleaderswantedtoexplorewouldcombinenewpowergeneration

capacitywithcarboncapture,utilization,andstorage(CCUS)technology.ButthenascentstateofCCUSleftleadersgraspingatstrawstoestimatecostandschedulerisks.

Enterthechallengedevelopmentteam.

Theteam’sfirststepwastodevelopadetailedcostbenchmarkforeachcomponent.The

benchmarkingrevealedthatthepowergenerationcomponentalonewasalready40percent

morecostlythansimilarrecent