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1、Chapter Twenty-Five,Monopoly Behavior,What do we do in this chapter?,We have studied the situation when a monopolist charges a uniform price for all. But often time, a monopolist can charge different prices to different people? E.g. student discount. Why and how?,Types of Price Discrimination,1st-de

2、gree: Each output unit is sold at a different price. Prices may differ across buyers. 2nd-degree: The price paid by a buyer can vary with the quantity demanded by the buyer. But all customers face the same price schedule. E.g. bulk-buying discounts.,Types of Price Discrimination,3rd-degree: Price pa

3、id by buyers in a given group is the same for all units purchased. But price may differ across buyer groups.E.g., senior citizen and student discounts vs. no discounts for middle-aged persons.,First-degree Price Discrimination,p(y),y,$/output unit,MC(y),Sell the th unit for $,First-degree Price Disc

4、rimination,p(y),y,$/output unit,MC(y),Sell the th unit for $ Later onsell the th unit for $ Finally sell the th unit for marginal cost, $,First-degree Price Discrimination,p(y),y,$/output unit,MC(y),The monopolist gets the maximum possible gains from trade.,PS,First-degree price discriminationis Par

5、eto-efficient.,Third-degree Price Discrimination,Price paid by buyers in a given group is the same for all units purchased. But price may differ across buyer groups.,Third-degree Price Discrimination,A monopolist manipulates market price by altering the quantity of product supplied to that market. S

6、o the question “What discriminatory prices will the monopolist set, one for each group?” is really the question “How many units of product will the monopolist supply to each group?”,Third-degree Price Discrimination,Two markets, 1 and 2. y1 is the quantity supplied to market 1. Market 1s inverse dem

7、and function is p1(y1). y2 is the quantity supplied to market 2. Market 2s inverse demand function is p2(y2).,Third-degree Price Discrimination,For given supply levels y1 and y2 the firms profit is What values of y1 and y2 maximize profit?,Third-degree Price Discrimination,The profit-maximization co

8、nditions are,Third-degree Price Discrimination,and,so,the profit-maximization conditions are,and,Third-degree Price Discrimination,MR1(y1) = MR2(y2) says that the allocation y1, y2 maximizes the revenue from selling y1 + y2 output units. E.g. if MR1(y1) MR2(y2) then an output unitshould be moved fro

9、m market 2 to market 1to increase total revenue.,Third-degree Price Discrimination,MR1(y1),MR2(y2),y1,y2,y1*,y2*,p1(y1*),p2(y2*),MC,MC,p1(y1),p2(y2),Market 1,Market 2,MR1(y1*) = MR2(y2*) = MC and p1(y1*) p2(y2*).,Third-degree Price Discrimination,In which market will the monopolist cause the higher

10、price? Recall that But,and,Third-degree Price Discrimination,So,Therefore, only if,The monopolist sets the higher price in the market where demand is least own-price elastic.,Two-Part Tariffs,A two-part tariff is a lump-sum fee, p1, plus a price p2 for each unit of product purchased. Thus the cost o

11、f buying x units of product isp1 + p2x.,Two-Part Tariffs,Should a monopolist prefer a two-part tariff to uniform pricing, or to any of the price-discrimination schemes discussed so far? If so, how should the monopolist design its two-part tariff?,Two-Part Tariffs,p1 + p2x Q: What is the largest that

12、 p1 can be?,Two-Part Tariffs,p1 + p2x Q: What is the largest that p1 can be? A: p1 is the “entrance fee” so the largest it can be is the surplus the buyer gains from entering the market. Set p1 = CS and now ask what should be p2?,Two-Part Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,MC(y),Should the monopolistset p

13、2 above MC?,Two-Part Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,CS,Should the monopolistset p2 above MC?p1 = CS.,MC(y),Two-Part Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,CS,Should the monopolistset p2 above MC?p1 = CS.PS is profit from sales.,MC(y),PS,Two-Part Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,CS,Should the monopolistset p2 above

14、MC?p1 = CS.PS is profit from sales.,MC(y),PS,Total profit,Two-Part Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,Should the monopolistset p2 = MC?,MC(y),Two-Part Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,Should the monopolistset p2 = MC?p1 = CS.,CS,MC(y),Two-Part Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,Should the monopolistset p2 = MC?p1 =

15、 CS.PS is profit from sales.,MC(y),CS,PS,Two-Part Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,Should the monopolistset p2 = MC?p1 = CS.PS is profit from sales.,MC(y),CS,Total profit,PS,Two-Part Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,Should the monopolistset p2 = MC?p1 = CS.PS is profit from sales.,MC(y),CS,PS,Two-Part Tariffs,p(y),y,$/output unit,Should the monopolistset p2 = MC?p1 = CS.PS is profit from sales.,MC(y),CS,Additional profit from setting p2 = MC.,PS,Two-Part Tariffs,A

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