博弈分析实施反倾销价格承诺协议纠纷【外文翻译】 .doc

本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目： game analysis of implementing price undertaking agreements in anti-dumping disputes 出 处： journal of donghua university, 2008 , (1): 65-68 作 者： xi jun-fang , cang ping , zhong gen-yuan 原文：game analysis of implementing price undertaking agreements in anti-dumping disputesxi jun-fang , cang ping , zhong gen-yuanabstractthe price undertaking agreement is one of the strategies a company accused of dumping often adopts in dealing with anti-dumping disputesusing static game analysis，this paper compares the impact that anti-dumping duties and price undertaking agreements may have on an importing countrys social welfare and an accused companys market performancewe conclude that，compared with anti-dumping duties，price undertakings improve the importing countrys social welfare and reduce the accused companys market share in the import countrywe also note that，in addition to the financial benefit，price undertakings can prevent escalation of trade disputes in international trade negotiationskey words：anti-dumping；price undertaking；anti-dumping dutyintroductiona price undertaking is a commitment in international trade to raise prices or to stop exporting goods at a price the importing country considers to be a dumping pricesuch an agreement，when accepted by the importing country，typically terminates any anti-dumping (ad) investigation and exempts the investigated dumping products from temporary or permanent ad dutiesprice undertakings may be initiated by the exporting firm or by the importing countrytypically， an undertakings specified increase in price does not entirely eliminate the exporting companys price advantage；rather，it is set at a level to eliminate a perceived dumping marginaccording to the wto anti-dumping (ad) agreement and worldwide ad laws，exporting firms can come to agreements with importing countries by raising exporting prices or by ceasing exports at prices the importing country considers to be dumpingwto data show that，among the 2 160 ad cases filed by wto members from 1995 to 2002，1 258 were settled with ad duties or price undertakings，with price undertaking cases representing 4176% of all the settlementstherefore, china and chinese companies will more effectively deal with future trade disputes when they understand the history and effect of price undertakings, specifically the relative effects of price undertakings and ad duties on importing and exporting countrieszanardis study demonstrated a big difference in implementing price undertakings among countries or regions with many ad casebetween 1981 and 2001, in eec and south korea, 41% of ecc and 40% of skorean ad disputes were settled with price undertakings, while only 5% of us cases werestegemann and palmeter compare the theory and filing process of the commitment of price undertakings with that of imposing ad dutiesin regards to the growing trade disputes against china，du introduced and analyzed the basic concepts，actual effects and specific operations of price undertakings，and concluded that price undertakings could be widely implemented in chinese ad cases as an alternative strategyyu and ding analyzed the pros and cons of price undertakings vsad duties, and suggested china-specific optionshowever，these studies have neither quantitatively compared the impact of price undertaking commitments with that of ad duties, nor have they used economic principles to suggest decision-making mechanisms for importing and exporting countries considering price undertakings or ad dutiesin this paper，we use static game analysis to compare the effects of price undertakings vsad duties on both country and firm welfareswe conclude with a decision-making mechanism for choosing solutions to trade disputes1 modelingin order to make the analysis simple, we assume two countries，named home and foreign respectively，in each of which there is only one firm who produces homogenous productsboth the home firm and the foreign firm compete in quantity in their domestic market with complete information, in order to maximize their profitsthus, these two firms become duopoly in a complete information marketwe suppose the marginal costs of the home firm and the foreign firm as c and c respectivelywhich are constant；the quantity of the sales in their domestic markets as x and y，respectively；price in home and foreign market as pd and pf，respectivelymeanwhile，we assume a linear demand function of the importing-country (home) market as p=abq , in which p and q denote the price and total quantity in the home market；a and b are positive constants，a is the highest price consumers are willing to pay, b is the slope of the demand curvewe also assume home country products can not be sold in the foreign market in other words，the foreign firm dominates the foreign market ( this assumption simplifies the analysis and does not affect the results )，with the supply quantity y we also assume a linear demand function in the foreign market as p=a-bq，in which p and q denote the price and total quantity in the foreign market；a and b are positive constantsdumping is defined as the practice that the exporter in one country or region sells goods at a price lower than either the price in its domestic market or the production cost, in order to defeat to competitors and capture the market，which must cause material injury to a competing industry in the importing countryit means if pfpd ，the home country can file ad petitionsif dumping is finally convicted，there are two solutions：(a) the home country imposes ad duty on the foreign firm which is equivalent to the dumping margin；(b) the foreign firm implements price undertakings to raise the exporting price so as to counteract the dumping marginin the following parts，we will analyze the two solutions based on the above assumptions and compare welfare effects under the two different solutions11 imposing anti-dumping dutieswe assume that home and foreign firms simultaneously decide their output in their own domestic marketshowever，the home country government imposes an ad duty with the rate t on foreign firms products in the importing market ( assuming zero tariff for the import goods, which does not affect the analysis )therefore，these two firms become duopoly with complete information under the supervision of importing-countrys governmentconsequently，the home country firm，the foreign country firm and the home country government will be the three players in a static game with complete information to make their decisionsthe profit functions of the foreign and home firms are：兀f = (aby)y+ab（x+y）y-c(y+y)-ty兀d = xa-b(x+y)-cx (1)in eq(1)，兀f and兀d represent the profit of the foreign and home firm respectivelybecause both firms decide their output simultaneouslythe reaction functions of the home firm and the foreign firm (respectively) are：a-bx-2by-t-c=0a-2bx-by-c=0 (2)from eq(2)，we can derive the cournot-nash equilibrium output in the static game of imposing ad duties with complete information：y=(a+c-2c-2t)/3bx=(a+c-2c+t)/3b (3)total home country social welfare (wt) is equal to the sum of cs, profit of the home firm and ad duties t(based on specific duty).the above function demonstrates that when imposing ad duties, the home country s total social welfare is relevant to a，a，c，c，tparameters a and a are the highest prices consumers in home and foreign market are willing to paythey also represent the size of the home and foreign market respectivelythe bigger a and a，the larger the size of the home and foreign market12 foreign firm implementing price undertakingswe assume that under the commitment of price undertaking，the foreign firm will set its price as pc；total profit of the foreign firm in both home and foreign markets is兀ffirstly，we work out the market price pf in the foreign marketin the foreign market，the foreign firm is the only supplier，with its output ythe demand function in the foreign market is p=a-bq，and the profit function of the foreign firm is兀f =(a-by)y+a-b(x+y)-c(y+y) (7)where pf is the minimum price under the price undertaking commitmentthat is，the price pc, the foreign firm set under price undertaking commitment, has to be equal to or higher than pfotherwise dumping still existssecondly，implementing price undertakings forces the foreign firm to raise its price to pc. based on the principle of fair competition under price undertakings commitment，the home firm also needs to increase its price to pcin this case，sales in the home country market of the foreign firm and the home firm are y，and x, respectivelynow we have 2a-3a+2c-c0t=2(a-c”)/3b (17)therefore if eq(17) is satisfied，it is better for the home firm to accept foreign firms price undertaking commitment than to impose ad duties against the foreign firm，and the whole social welfare of the importing country increases accordinglyby analyzing the above inequation，factors that are involved include home and foreign market sizes，which are represented by a and a respectively，marginal costs of home and foreign firms(c and c), and the anticipated ad duty t which the importing country may impose against the foreign firmgenerally speaking，when home market size is relatively larger，the marginal cost of the home firm is bigger，the anticipated rate of ad duty is higher，it is rational for the importing country to accept foreign firms price undertaking commitment than to impose ad duties，which will also increase the total social welfare of the home country2 conclusionfirstly，we conclude from the dumping firmsperspective by analyzing the difference of their sales in the home country market between implementing price undertakings and being imposed ad dutiesby eqs(3) ，we see that by implementing price undertaking the foreign firm enjoys a bigger sale，with the gap 2t/3bthis means for a dumping firm，the loss of market share is less when implementing price undertakings than being imposed ad dutiesthis conclusion is of positive and profound significance for chinese companies to choose the right strategy when facing frequent ad petitionsuntil dec31，2005，there have been 726 ad investigations against chinese companiesaccording to the wtos statistics，china has been the no1 ad target country for 11 years from 1995 to 2005recentlv，chinese companies are able to overcome the fears they had and positively confront ad petitionswhen facing ad files，we should take initiative to negotiate on price undertakings in order to make our counter-partners accept price undertakings and stop ad investigationsthis will help chinese companies to retain market share as much as possible in the importing countrysecondly，from the perspective of ad filing countries，in certain conditions, for example condition eq(17)，filing countries can choose to accept price undertakings of dumping firms to increase the total social welfare of the filing countriesthirdly，price undertakings can prevent further trade disputes caused by imposing ad duties, beeause price undertakings can give the plaintiff country a proactive impression in solving trade dispute problemsin conclusion, under certain conditions implementing price undertakings instead of imposing ad duties can increase the total social welfare of the filing countries，help dumping firms to some degree retain their market share in the importing countries, and prevent escalation of trade disputes译文： 博弈分析实施反倾销价格承诺协议纠纷 摘要价格承诺协议是被指控倾销的公司往往采取的一种应对国外反倾销纠纷的策略。利用静态博弈分析，本文通过比较征收反倾销税，以及价格承诺协议对进口国家的社会福利和被指控公司的市场执行的影响。我们总结出，与反倾销税相比，价格承诺改善了出口国家的社会福利以及减少了被指控公司在进口国家的市场份额。我们也注意到，除了经济效益之外，价格承诺还能够防止在国际贸易谈判中的贸易争端升级。关键词：反倾销；价格承诺；反倾销税 介绍价格承诺是指在国际贸易中，当进口国家认为是倾销价格时，出口国家应当提高价格或者停止出口货物的一种承诺。当进口国家接受这个协议时，通常会终止进行任何反倾销（ad）的调查以及避免征收倾销产品的临时性或永久性的反倾销税。价格承诺一般是由出口企业或进口国发起的。一般地，承诺在指定的价格上升并不能完全消除出口公司的价格优势；相反地，它设置在一个水平上，消除了倾销边缘。根据世贸组织反倾销（ad）的协定和全世界反倾销的法律，当进口国认为是倾销价格时，出口企业可以通过与进口国达成协议来提高出口价格或减少产品出口。世贸组织数据显示，从1995年到2002年，在世贸组织成员国提出的2160件反倾销案中，1258件已经通过反倾销税或价格承诺解决，其中具有代表性的41.76案例通过价格承诺和解。因此，中国和中国的公司在了解历史和价格承诺影响，特别是反倾销税和价格承诺对进口国和出口国的相对作用的影响后，将能够更有效地应对未来的贸易争端。zanardi的研究证实国家或地区之间在许多反倾销案例中实施的价格承诺存在着很大的差异。在1981年到2001年期间，在欧洲经济共同体和韩国，41的欧洲经济共同体和40的韩国反倾销纠纷通过价格承诺解决，而美国只有5的案件通过价格承诺解决。stegemann和palmeter通过比较理论和实施价格承诺的备案过程来研究反倾销税。针对中国日益增长的贸易纠纷，du介绍和分析了价格承诺的基本概念，实际效果和具体操作，并认为价格承诺能够作为替代策略在中国的反倾销案例中广泛实施。yu和ding分析了价格承诺和反倾销税替代的优点和缺点，并建议选择具有中国特色措施。然而，这些研究既没有进行定量比较与反倾销税的承诺价格的影响，也没有用经济原则建议进口国和出口国对价格承诺或反倾销税的决策考虑。在本文中，我们使用静态博弈分析比较价格承诺和反倾销税在国家和企业福利中的影响。综上所述，我们总结出了一个决策机制来选择如何解决贸易纠纷。1 建模为了简化分析，我们假设有两个国家，分别命名为国内和国外，而且它们均生产同一种产品。国内企业与国外企业为了最大限度地获得利润，分别利用它们在各自国内市场上获得的完全信息，进行数量上的竞争。这样，这两个企业在分别拥有完整的市场信息的前提下，就分别成为了双寡头垄断。现在，我们假设国内企业和国外企业的边际成本分别为c和c，而且它们是恒定不变的；它们在各自的国内市场销售数量分别为x和y；在国内市场和国外市场上的价格分别为pd和pf。同时，我们假设进口国（家）的国内市场上的线性需求函数为p =a-bq，其中p和q分别表示在国内市场上的价格和需求总量；a和b都是正的常数，a为消费者愿意支付的最高价格，b是需求曲线的斜率。我们同时假设国内的产品不能在国外市场上出售。换句话来说，也就是国外企业的供应数量在国外市场上占主导地位（这一假设不但简化了分析，而且同时也不会影响最终的结果）。我们也假设在国外市场上的线性需求函数为p= a - bq，其中p和q分别表示在国外市场上的价格和需求总量；a和b都是正的常数。倾销被实际定义为，出口商为了击败竞争对手以及占领市场，在一个国家或某个地区以低于其在国内市场上的销售价格或者底于商品的生产成本的价格出售商品，这就对进口国的竞争性行业造成了重大的损害。也就是说，如果pfpd，国内就可以提交反倾销申请。如果最终认定为倾销，则有两个解决方案：（一）国内对国外企业征收相当于倾销幅度的反倾销税；（二）国外企业实行价格承诺，提高出口价格，以便抵消倾销幅度。在接下来的部分中，我们将基于上述的两个假设分析解决方案，并比较两种不同的解决方案下的社会福利效果。1.1 征收反倾销税我们假设国内企业与国外企业同时决定在自己的国内市场输出产品。然而，国内政府在进口市场上对国外产品征收利率为t的反倾销税（假定对进口货物实行零关税，而这不影响分析）。因此，这两家企业利用完整的信息，在进口国政府的监督下，成为双寡头垄断。所以，国内企业，国外企业和国内政府三者将在完全的信息静态博弈中作出各自的决定。国内企业和国外企业的利润职能如下：兀f = (aby)y+ab（x+y）y-c(y+y)-ty兀d = xa-b(x+y)-cx (1)在方程（1）中，兀f 和兀d分别代表了国外企业的利润和国内企业的利润。因为两家企业同时决