外文翻译 - 人力资源管理和澳大利亚工业关系的个体化

0附录外文翻译英文原文HUMANRESOURCEMANAGEMENTANDTHEINDIVIDUALISATIONOFAUSTRALIANINDUSTRIALRELATIONSABSTRACTBytradition,Australianindustrialrelationshasbeenregulatedbyindustrialawardsandcollectiveagreementsmadeby,orundertheauspicesof,industrialtribunals.Thecentralpartiestotheseagreementsandawardswereemployersandtradeunions.Theindividualemploymentcontractbetweenemployerandemployeewassubjecttothesecollectivearrangementswhich,generallyspeaking,settheminimumfloorofemploymentconditionsfromwhichthepartiescouldnotderogate.Incommonwithothercountries,therewasastrongpushforderegulationofthelabourmarketthroughoutthe1980sandthe1990sinAustralia.In1996theLiberal/NationalPartyCoalitionConservativegovernmentintroducednewfederallabourlawswhichpermittedemployersandemployeestoenterindividualisedemploymentrelationshipsbyexcludingtheoperationofmuchcollectiveregulationfromtheiraffairs.Thispaperexploresthesupposedrationalesforthislegaldevelopment,andoutlinesthelegalconditionswhichareimposeduponthisstatutoryindividualisationprocess.Italsoexaminestheevidenceinordertoaddresscertainquestions.HoweffectivehastheindividualisationprocessbeeninAustralia?Explicitlyorimplicitly,whatsortofemploymentsystemoutcomeswereenvisaged.Whatformsofflexibilityhasitbeenabletointroduceintotheemploymentrelationship?AndtowhatextenthasitbeenabletopromoteahighperformanceHRMagendainAustralianworkplaces?1INTRODUCTIONOverthepasttwodecadestheindividualemploymentrelationshiphasrisentoprominenceasacentralconcerninlabourrelations.Onesourceofthisinteresthas1emergedinthefieldofnewinstitutionaleconomicswhichhaspickedupanddevelopedearlierideasabouttheefficiencyofparticulartypesofemploymentrelationshipsandtheconsequentpreferenceforparticularlegalformsofthatrelationshipoverothers.UnderlyingonestrandofthisHRMoutlookisthedesiretoimprovebusinesscompetitivenessinaglobaleconomythroughastrategicintegrationofenterpriseobjectiveswithemployeeperformanceandcommitment.ThusHRMfocusesupontheelementswhichcanenhancethevalueoftheemployeescontributiontothebusiness-flexibilityinworkperformance(flexibleworkinghoursanddutiesforexample),empowermentoftheemployeethroughparticipationinworkplacedecision-making(includingteamwork,consultativecommitteesandsoon),performancerelatedrewardsystems(suchasprofitsharingandemployeeshareownershipschemes),commitmenttoqualityofserviceorproduct(totalqualitymanagement)andloyaltytothebusinessconcern.Thisis,essentially,amodelofanotionalhightrustorhighperformanceworksystementerprise.Whilstlabourlawyershaveengagedwiththeimplicationsofthenewinstitutionaleconomics,inadditiontograpplingwiththenumerousdifficultiesarisingintheirowndisciplinefromthechallengetothehegemonyofthestandardindividualemploymentcontract,theyhavebeenratherlessenthusiasticinexploringtheimplicationsandprospectsinherentintheHRMhightrustagendaforenterprisestrategyandgovernance.Forexampleasidefromoneortwopartialexercises,untilrecentlytherehadbeennoattemptinthefieldtoprovideathematicelaborationofthestrengthsandweaknessesofthecontractofemploymentasaninstrumentforthedevelopmentoftheHRMproject.OnereasonforthismightbethegeneralrhetoricalnatureofmuchHRMliterature:hightrust,flexibility,commitmentandparticipationarehighlyinexactterms.Asecondreasonundoubtedlyisconnectedwiththepurpose(s)oflabourlaw.Traditionallylabourlawyershaveviewedthepurposeoftheirfieldasdesignedtopromotethepowerof,andprotecttheinterestsof,employeesvis-a-vistheemployerratherthanthereverse.Asaresulttheyhavetendedtobemoreinterestedinthedeunionisationeffectsofindividualisation,thecorrespondingdeclineofcollectiveemployeepower,andtheconsequentenhancementofmanagerialprerogative,thanintheutilisationoftheindividual2relationshiptopromotecompetitiveness.Onesuspects,however,thatthisoutlookhasbeenfundamentallyalteredasaresultofveryrecentdevelopmentsinlabourlaw.ThecardinalcaseinpointistheBritishEmploymentRelationsAct1999,whichappearsatlasttohavebroughtintocloseexplicitrelationshipthecontentoflabourlawandtheagendaofmodernHRM.ThebasisofthisconnectionisthepartnershipatworkmodelwhichembodiesmanyofthecoreideasofhightrustHRM,andwhichalsosubtlyinformstheActsagendaforencouragingandnurturingvoluntaryarrangementsforconsultationandsharingofinformationbetweenmanagementandworkers.2STATUTORYINDIVIDUALISEDEMPLOYMENTAGREEMENTSANDTHEHRMAGENDAOneviewoftheindividualisationprocess,anditisapopularview,isthatitservesmerelytorestoreareasofjobcontroltomanagementpreviouslysharedwith,orexercisedexclusivelyby,unions,andthusallowsemployerstoreducecoststhroughgreaterexploitationoflabour.Thisperspectivealsofitswithmuchoftheavailableevidence,althoughtheevidenceiscontested.Itisclearthatthede-regulatorylabourmarketpoliciesofvariousAustraliangovernmentssincethelate1980s,includingthoseembodiedinthetermsoftheWRA,havetosomedegreebeeninfluencedbyargumentsbasedontheeconomictheorythatfreeandopencompetitivemarketsproducethemostefficientoutcomes.AsimilarsetofideasemergedinasuccessionofIndustrialRelationsPoliciesreleasedbytheConservativeCoalitionPartiesfrom1986onwards.Thosepoliciesalsocommonlystressedco-operation,commonintention,flexibility,andemployeeparticipation.Theassociatedproposaltosupportindividualisationofemploymentrelationswasinitiallyratheroblique.The1986Policyandits1988updatereferred,ratherdisingenuously,toVoluntaryAgreementswhichmightbenegotiatedindividuallybyemployeesorgroupsofemployees.IntheCoalitions1990policystatementVoluntaryAgreementswereatlastdefinedasseparateagreementsbetweentheemployerontheonehandandeachemployeeconcernedontheother.WiththereleaseoftheJobsbackPolicyin1992cautionwasfinallythrowntothewind.Directcontractualarrangementsbetweenemployerandemployee3weredeclaredtobethesinglemostimportantindustrialrelationsreforminAustralia.First,whetherbydesignoraccident,thelegislationassociatedwiththemakingandprocessingofAWAsdoesnotsupport,orevenseriouslysuggest,arequirementforindividualbargainingassuch.ItistruethatthelanguageoftheWRAiscouchedintermsofbargainingoverAWAs.Itallowsforbargainingagentsanditstipulatesthatsuchagentsmustberecognised.However,allthataside,legallytheWRAprovideslittleinthewayofsupportfortheindividualisationprocesstobeabargainedone.Inrealitytheobligationtorecogniseabargainingagentisvacuous.Thereisnoobligationupontheemployertobargain,nortoactingoodfaith.Intheabsenceofsuchrequirements,therecouldbenostatutoryresponsibilitytobargainovermattersarisingfromtheHRMagenda.Theempiricalevidenceresultingfromsurveyworkislessclearcut.Inhisreportbasedonthe1998NationalInstituteofLabourStudiesWorkplaceManagementSurvey,WoodenconcludedthatemployerspursuingindividualisticemploymentarrangementsweremorelikelyalsotobehighcommitmentworkplacescharacterisedbyHRMfeaturessuchasconsensusdecision-making,teamworkandinformationsharing.7ThisfindingisdirectlycontrarytothestudyofindividualisedworkplacesundertakenbyDeeryandWalshbasedupontheAustralianWorkplaceIndustrialRelationsSurvey1995.Thatstudyindicatedthatwhennegotiationsweretotakeplacetheoverwhelmingpreferenceofindividualisingfirmswasfordirectnegotiationswithindividualemployees,ratherthanwithunionofficialsorcollectivegroupsofemployees.Howeverthestudyalsofoundthatnegotiationsofanysortoverworkplaceissueswereuncommonamongstindividualisingemployers,thattheoverwhelmingmajorityofsuchfirmshadnotenteredintosuchnegotiationsduringtheprevious12months,andthatlessthanonethirdofthemhadnegotiatedoverstaffinglevels,wageincreases,occupationalhealthandsafety,technology,andchangesinworkpractices.Tocompoundthissituation,onlyaminorityofindividualisingworkplaceshadinplacequalitycircles,semi-autonomousgroupsandcontinuousimprovementmethods.Inshort,inemploymentpracticethereseemstobelittleevidenceofacausalconnectionbetweenindividualisationasaprocessandtheadoptionofahightrustagenda.4Oneveryobviouseffectoftheindividualisationprocesshasbeenthecorrespondingderecognitionorexclusionofunionsfromworkplacegovernance.ThisisalsoafindingcommontoAustraliaandBritain.InAustralia,twothirdsofindividualisedworkplaceshadnounionpresenceaccordingtoarecentstudy,andinmanyindustriesandenterpriseswherethereisunionpresencetheirresistancepowerhasbeenweakenedbylegalandlabourmarketfactors.Oneoutcomeofthis,ofcourse,hasbeenaconsequentrestorationofunilateralpowertomanagement,asunionrestraintsandcontrolsattheworkplacehavebeenrolledback.TheprovisionsoftheActofferassistancetoemployersincreatingtheconditionsinwhichunionsmaymoreeasilybeexcluded,andhencethroughwhichindividualisedemploymentrelationsmightbeintroduced,thoughitisclearthattherearelimitstothisprocess.However,asindicatedearlier,theevidencedoesnotsuggestthatemployersareseekingtoutilisetheirrecoveredand/orextendedmanagerialpowersforhightrustHRMpurposes.InAustralianworkplaceswheresubstantialdeunionisationwastakingplaceDeeryandWalshfoundnoevidencethathightrustHRMpolicieswerebeingusedasunionsubstitutiondevices.Ironicallytheirstudysuggestedthatteambuilding;taskforces/adhoccommittees;regularmeetingsbetweenemployeesandmanagement;jointconsultativecommittees;suggestionschemes;and,grievanceproceduresweresignificantlymorelikelytobeassociatedwithworkplacesthathadstableorincreasinglevelsofunionisation.InsomerespectsthisevidenceonceagainmatchestheBritishfindings.Greatermanagerialdiscretiontosettermsandconditionsofemployment,accordingtoamajorBritishstudy,didnotnecessarilyimplyanenhancedroleforindividualcontractsasincentivedevicesforelicitingemployeeco-operation.RathertheBritishevidenceindicatedthatthekeyeffectofindividualisationhasbeentheenhancedcapacityofmanagementtobringaboutdesiredflexibilities,includingfunctionalflexibilities,throughtheopportunitytosetemploymentconditionsatwill.IntheabsenceofprogressthroughthesetwoavailableroutestotheHRMorhighperformanceemploymentsystemtypeenterprise,itisnecessarytoreturntoa5considerationofwhatrolethestatemightplaythroughitslegislationandinstitutions,inpursuingthisagenda.Itisnecessarytobearinmindherethatitisonethingtolegislatefortheprotectionofminimumstandardsthroughtheestablishmentoflegalrights,andquiteanothertolegislatetoattempttobringaboutattitudinalchangeonthepartofthepartiestoarelationship.AsCollinshaspointedoutinthecaseofrecentBritishemploymentlegislation,regulatingfortrust,co-operationandflexibilitypresentsthelegislatorwithaverydifficulttask.Asaresulttheremaybeaconsiderablegapbetweenpolicyaspirationandregulatoryspecifics.UnliketheBritishEmploymentRelationsAct1999,theWRAcontainsnospecificprovisionforthespendingofmoneyonthepromotionofco-operativeworkpractices.HoweverthereisacleareducativeandpromotionalchartersetdownfortheEmploymentAdvocateinthetermsoftheWRA,muchofitfocussedupontheAWAregime.AmongitsfunctionstheEmploymentAdvocateischargedwithprovidingadvicetoemployersandemployees,inconnectionwithAWAs.Inperformingthisfunction,theEmploymentAdvocatemusthaveparticularregardtoassistingworkerstobalanceworkandfamilyresponsibilitiesandtopromotingbetterworkandmanagementpracticesthroughAustralianworkplaceagreements.Inshort,thereisclearscopeintheseprovisionsfortheEmploymentAdvocatetopromotetheHRMagendaandotherworkplacechangethroughadvice,suggestionandeducationofthepartiestotheemploymentrelationship.Aswasthecasewiththeindividualagreementsconcept,plansforthedevelopmentofahighproportionofemployeeshare-ownershipinenterpriseshasbeenontheagendasinceatleastthelate1980s,andinrelationtothisissueitisclearthatbothpolicyandregulatoryinitiativesfairlyunambiguouslyfittheco-operativeorpartnershipstrategy.SinceitcametoofficetheCoalitiongovernmenthaslegislatedtorestructurethetaxsysteminvariouswaysinordertofacilitateandencouragegreatershareownershipamongemployees,orinwayswhichareatleastbeneficialtosuchschemes.Inadditionthegovernmenthasintervenedinthecorporationslawarea,removingprospectusrequirementsforsomeclassesofemployeeshareschemes.Insummarythen,weseeinthesevariousregulatorymeasuresalegalandinstitutional6frameworknotnecessarilydirectedtowards,orsuitedto,thepropagationofacooperativehightrustmodelofHRMinAustralianenterprises.Thegovernmentiswillingtointerveneandleadthewayinrelationtosomeassociatedpolicies(suchasemployeeshareownership)butnotwithrespecttoothers(suchasemployeeparticipationindecision-making).Andapartfromverylimitedexceptions,individualisationsitsastheonemajorinitiativeintheWRAwhichcanclearlybeidentifiedasdirectlyassociatedwiththeHRMstrategy.3THELEGALFRAMEWORKForexampletheTaxationLawAmendmentAct(No.2)1995(Cth.)(providedamoregeneroustaxationbaseforemployeeshareholdingbyincreasingthetaxexemptionlimit);ANewTax(IncomeTaxLawAmendment)Act1999(Cth.)(reducedcapitalgainsratesandloweredincometaxratesonincomederivedfromemployeeheldshares);andtheCorporateLawEconomicReformAct1999(Cth).Aswenotedearlier,theActpayslipservicetotheideathatanAWAisaresultofnegotiation:itprovidesforthepartiestoappointbargainingagentsandtotakeprotectedindustrialactioninthecourseofnegotiations.However,theActanticipatesthatmorecommonlytheemployerwilldrafttheAWAandpresentittotheemployeeonatake-it-or-leave-itbasis.TheemployerisrequiredtogivetheemployeeacopyoftheAWAtogetherwithaninformationstatementpreparedbytheEAandmustexplaintheeffectoftheAWAtotheotherparty.Thereisaminimumcooling-offperiod(fivedaysforexistingemployees;14daysfornewemployees)beforesigning.Theonlyrecognitionoftheimbalanceofbargainingpowerisfoundinthelegislativeprohibitionsagainstduress,misleadinginformation,threatsandintimidation.ThecontentofanAWAislargelyleftforthepartiestodetermine,althoughaswenotedearlierthereisbroadgeneralscopefortheEAtoprovideassistanceandguidanceonthesematters.Section170VGoftheActimposesonlythreeexplicitrequirementsoncontent.First,eachAWAmustcontainaprovisionprohibitingvarioustypesofdiscriminationasproscribedbytheregulations;iftheAWAomitsthisclause,theAWAistakentoincludetheregulatorytext.Second,theAWAmustcontainadisputeresolutionprocedureofsomesort;ifoneis7notincluded,themodelprocedurefoundintheregulations(providingforbilateraldiscussionsbeforeconciliationorarbitration)applies.Finally,theAWAmustnotprohibitorrestrictdisclosureofitsdetailsbyeitherparty.InordertotakeeffectasanAWA,theagreementmustbelodgedfortheapprovaloftheEAwithin21daysofitssigning.TheemployermustattachadeclarationthattheAWAcomplieswiththestatutoryrequirementsanddisclosewhetherornotithasofferedanAWAinthesametermstoallcomparableemployees.TheEAmustissueafilingreceiptwherethesefilingrequirementshavebeenmet(or,iftheyhavenotbeenmet,wherethereisnodisadvantagetoeitherparty).TheEAmustapprovetheAWAifitissatisfiedthatallofthestatutoryrequirementsaremetandifitissurethatitpassestheno-disadvantagetest.38TheAWApassesthistestifitdoesnotdisadvantagetheemployeeinrelationtotheirtermsandconditionsofemploymentieifitdoesnotresult,onbalance,inareductionintheoveralltermsandconditionsofemploymentenjoyedunderthelegislationandtheawardwhichwouldotherwiseapplytotheemployee39(or,ifnoawardapplies,theawardwhichisdeemedbytheEAtobeappropriateforthepurposeofcomparison40).IftheEAisnotsurethattheAWApassesthetest,itcanresolveitsconcernsbyacceptingundertakingsfromtheemployer41orbycondoningotheraction.Ifitsconcernsarenotresolvedinthisway,theEAmustrefertheAWAtotheAustralianIndustrialRelationsCommission(theCommission).IftheCommissionissatisfiedthattheAWApassestheno-disadvantagetest(anditmayresolveitsownconcernsbyacceptingundertakings)itmustapprovetheAWA.EveniftheAWAfailstheno-disadvantagetestbutitisnotcontrarytothepublicinteresttoapprovetheAWA,theCommissionmustalsoapprovetheAWA;alegislativenotesuggeststhatthismightoccurwheremakingtheAWAispartofareasonablestrategytodealwithashort-termcrisisbusinesscrisis.Thefilingandapprovalprocessisprivateandconfidential.Thirdpartiesarenotpermittedtointerveneatanystagetheprocess.Allproceedingsoccurheldinprivateandtheofficialsinvolvedarenotpermittedtodisclosetheidentityofthepartiesonpainofimprisonment(subjecttosomeexceptions).8Duringitsperiodofoperation,breachesoftheAWAareprohibited,asisthetakingofindustrialactionbeforethenominalexpirydate.Apartymayenforcetheseprohibitionsincourtbyseekingapenalty(maximum$10,000forabodycorporateor$2,000inothercases),injunctionsand/ordamages.Threecrucialaspectsofthislegalframeworkshouldbenoted.First,amajorincentivetoemployersforusingAWAsliesinthefactthatitispossibleforthemtofashiontheiremploymentsystemsaroundtheuseofindividualisedarrangementstotheexclusionofmostexternalcollectiveformsofregulation.AwardsarecompletelyexcludedbyAWAs.Certifiedagreementsmadewithunionsmaybeexcludediftheemployerstructuresitsemploymentarrangementsaccordingly.Evenifcertifiedagreementsareoperativeintheworkplace,AWAsmaystillbeusedasanadditionalsourceofrightsandobligationsprovidedtheydonotconflictwiththetermsofthecertifiedagreement.Furthermore,manyotherstate-basedlabourlawsmaybeexcludedbyoperationofanAWA.Secondly,atthesametimethereseemslittledoubtthatthesheervolumeoftechnicalandadministrativerequirementsinmaking,negotiatingandfilingconstitutesamajordisincentivetoemployersinutilisingtheprocess.Thirdly,theevidenceseemstosuggestthatnodisadvantagetesthasnotprovedaveryeffectivelegaldeviceinpreventingunder-awarddealsbeingstruckthroughenterprise-basedbargaining.Wereturntothisissueintheconcludingsectionofthispaper.4THEPROGRESSOFINDIVIDUALISATIONANDTHEPROMOTIONOFPOLICYMeasuredintermsofAWAapprovalsonly,theprogressofindividualisationinAustralianworkplacesappearstobeslightatbest.TheAWAprovisionsoftheWRAbecameeffectiveinMarch1997.BytheendofOctoberthatyear,amere3,350AWAsinvolving164employershadbeenapprovedbytheEA,althoughafurther198hadbeenreferredonforconsiderationbytheAIRC.Subsequentincreasesweresteady,butslow.BytheendofOctober1998,thenumberofapprovalshadrisento7,500,withafurther6,500underconsideration.TheOfficeoftheEAannouncedthearrivalofamilestone,50,000AWAapprovalson23rdofFebruary1999.BytheendofOctober2000,thisfigurehadincreased9toalmost135,000.Atthatstageatotalof2,577AustralianemployershadsuccessfullyprocessedAWAscoveringsome,orall,oftheiremployees.Despitetheincreasingtrendintherateofapprovals,whichappearsinanycasetohavelevelledofftosomedegree,AWAsstatisticallyconstituteonlyaveryminoraspectofAustralianindustrialregulation,coveringatinyproportionofthew