《外部性与公共物品》PPT课件.ppt

,Chapter18,ExternalitiesandPublicGoods,Chapter18,Slide2,TopicstobeDiscussed,ExternalitiesWaysofCorrectingMarketFailureExternalitiesandPropertyRightsCommonPropertyResources,Chapter18,Slide3,TopicstobeDiscussed,PublicGoodsPrivatePreferencesforPublicGoods,Chapter18,Slide4,Externalities,NegativeActionbyonepartyimposesacostonanotherpartyPositiveActionbyonepartybenefitsanotherparty,Chapter18,Slide5,ExternalCost,ScenarioSteelplantdumpingwasteinariverTheentiresteelmarketeffluentcanbereducedbyloweringoutput(fixedproportionsproductionfunction),Chapter18,Slide6,ExternalCost,ScenarioMarginalExternalCost(MEC)isthecostimposedonfishermendownstreamforeachlevelofproduction.MarginalSocialCost(MSC)isMCplusMEC.,ExternalCosts,Firmoutput,Price,Industryoutput,Price,Chapter18,Slide8,ExternalCost,NegativeExternalitiesencourageinefficientfirmstoremainintheindustryandcreateexcessiveproductioninthelongrun.,Chapter18,Slide9,Externalities,PositiveExternalitiesandInefficiencyExternalitiescanalsoresultintoolittleproduction,ascanbeshowninanexampleofhomerepairandlandscaping.,Chapter18,Slide10,ExternalBenefits,RepairLevel,Value,Isresearchanddevelopmentdiscouragedbypositiveexternalities?,Chapter18,Slide11,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,Assumption:ThemarketfailureispollutionFixed-proportionproductiontechnologyMustreduceoutputtoreduceemissionsUseanoutputtaxtoreduceoutputInputsubstitutionpossiblebyalteringtechnology,Chapter18,Slide12,TheEfficientLevelofEmissions,LevelofEmissions,2,4,6,DollarsperunitofEmissions,0,2,4,6,8,10,12,14,16,18,20,22,24,26,Assume:1)Competitivemarket2)Outputandemissionsdecisionsareindependent3)Profitmaximizingoutputchosen,Whyisthismoreefficientthanzeroemissions?,Chapter18,Slide13,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,OptionsforReducingEmissionstoE*EmissionStandardSetalegallimitonemissionsatE*(12)EnforcedbymonetaryandcriminalpenaltiesIncreasesthecostofproductionandthethresholdpricetoentertheindustry,Chapter18,Slide14,StandardsandFees,LevelofEmissions,DollarsperunitofEmissions,Chapter18,Slide15,OptionsforReducingEmissionstoE*EmissionsFeeChargeleviedoneachunitofemission,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,Chapter18,Slide16,StandardsandFees,LevelofEmissions,DollarsperunitofEmissions,Chapter18,Slide17,StandardsVersusFeesAssumptionsPolicymakershaveasymmetricinformationAdministrativecostsrequirethesamefeeorstandardforallfirms,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,Chapter18,Slide18,TheCaseforFees,LevelofEmissions,2,4,6,FeeperUnitofEmissions,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,1,3,5,14,Thecostminimizingsolutionwouldbeanabatementof6forfirm1and8forfirm2andMCA1=MCA2=$3.,Chapter18,Slide19,AdvantagesofFeesWhenequalstandardsmustbeused,feesachievethesameemissionabatementatlowercost.Feescreateanincentivetoinstallequipmentthatwouldreduceemissionsfurther.,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,Chapter18,Slide20,TheCaseforStandards,LevelofEmissions,FeeperUnitofEmissions,0,2,4,6,8,10,12,14,16,2,4,6,8,10,12,14,16,Chapter18,Slide21,Summary:Feesvs.StandardsStandardsarepreferredwhenMSCissteepandMCAisflat.Standards(incompleteinformation)yieldmorecertaintyonemissionlevelsandlesscertaintyonthecostofabatement.,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,Chapter18,Slide22,Summary:Feesvs.StandardsFeeshavecertaintyoncostanduncertaintyonemissions.Preferredpolicydependsonthenatureofuncertaintyandtheslopesofthecostcurves.,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,Chapter18,Slide23,TransferableEmissionsPermitsPermitshelpdevelopacompetitivemarketforexternalities.AgencydeterminesthelevelofemissionsandnumberofpermitsPermitsaremarketableHighcostfirmwillpurchasepermitsfromlowcostfirms,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,Chapter18,Slide24,QuestionWhatfactorscouldlimittheefficiencyofthisapproach?,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,Chapter18,Slide25,TheCostsandBenefitsofReducedSulfurDioxideEmissions,CostofReducingEmissionsConversiontonaturalgasfromcoalandoilEmissioncontrolequipment,Chapter18,Slide26,BenefitsofReducingEmissionsHealthReductionincorrosionAesthetic,TheCostsandBenefitsofReducedSulfurDioxideEmissions,Chapter18,Slide27,SulfurDioxideEmissionsReductions,Sulfurdioxideconcentration(ppm),20,40,60,0,Dollarsperunitofreduction,0.02,0.04,0.06,0.08,ObservationsMAC=MSC.0275.0275isslightlybelowactualemissionlevelEconomicefficiencyimproved,Chapter18,Slide28,EmissionsTradingandCleanAir,BubblesFirmcanadjustpollutioncontrolsforindividualsourcesofpollutantsaslongasatotalpollutantlimitisnotexceeded.OffsetsNewemissionsmustbeoffsetbyreducingexistingemissions2000offsetssince1979,Chapter18,Slide29,Costofachievingan85%reductioninhydrocarbonemissionsforDuPontThreeOptions85%reductionateachsourceplant(totalcost=$105.7million)85%reductionateachplantwithinternaltrading(totalcost=$42.6million)85%reductionatallplantswithinternalandexternaltrading(totalcost=$14.6million),EmissionsTradingandCleanAir,Chapter18,Slide30,1990CleanAirActSince1990,thecostofthepermitshasfallenfromanexpected$300tobelow$100.CausesofthedropinpermitpricesMoreefficientabatementtechniquesPriceoflowsulfurcoalhasfallen,EmissionsTradingandCleanAir,Chapter18,Slide31,RecyclingHouseholdscandisposeofglassandothergarbageatverylowcost.Thelowcostofdisposalcreatesadivergencebetweentheprivateandthesocialcostofdisposal.,WaysofCorrectingMarketFailure,Chapter18,Slide32,TheEfficientAmountofRecycling,Scrap,Cost,0,4,8,12,Chapter18,Slide33,RefundableDeposits,AmountofGlass,$,PricefallstoPandtheamountofrecycledglassincreasestoM*.,Chapter18,Slide34,ExternalitiesandPropertyRights,PropertyRightsLegalrulesdescribingwhatpeopleorfirmsmaydowiththeirpropertyForexampleIfresidentsdownstreamownedtheriver(cleanwater)theycontrolupstreamemissions.,Chapter18,Slide35,BargainingandEconomicEfficiencyEconomicefficiencycanbeachievedwithoutgovernmentinterventionwhentheexternalityaffectsrelativelyfewpartiesandwhenpropertyrightsarewellspecified.,ExternalitiesandPropertyRights,Chapter18,Slide36,ProfitsUnderAlternativeEmissionsChoices(Daily),Nofilter,nottreatmentplant500100600Filter,notreatmentplant300500800Nofilter,treatmentplant500200700Filter,treatmentplant300300600,FactorysFishermensTotalProfitProfitProfit,Chapter18,Slide37,AssumptionsFactorypaysforthefilterFishermenpayforthetreatmentplantEfficientSolutionBuythefilteranddonotbuildtheplant,ExternalitiesandPropertyRights,Chapter18,Slide38,BargainingwithAlternativePropertyRights,NoCooperationProfitoffactory$500$300Profitoffishermen$200$500CooperationProfitoffactory$550$300Profitoffishermen$250$500,RighttoDumpRighttoCleanWater,Chapter18,Slide39,Conclusion:CoaseTheoremWhenpartiescanbargainwithoutcostandtotheirmutualadvantage,theresultingoutcomewillbeefficient,regardlessofhowthepropertyrightsarespecified.,ExternalitiesandPropertyRights,Chapter18,Slide40,CostlyBargaining-TheRoleofStrategicBehaviorBargainingrequiresclearlydefinedrulesandpropertyrights.,ExternalitiesandPropertyRights,Chapter18,Slide41,ALegalSolution-SuingforDamagesFishermenhavetherighttocleanwaterFactoryhastwooptionsNofilter,paydamagesProfit=$100($500-$400)Filter,nodamagesProfit=$300($500-$200),ExternalitiesandPropertyRights,Chapter18,Slide42,ALegalSolution-SuingforDamagesFactoryhastherighttoemiteffluentFishermenhavethreeoptionsPutintreatmentplantProfit=$200FilterandpaydamagesProfit=$300($500-$200)Noplant,nofilterProfit=$100,ExternalitiesandPropertyRights,Chapter18,Slide43,ConclusionAsuitfordamagesresultsinanefficientoutcome.QuestionHowwouldimperfectinformationimpacttheoutcome?,ExternalitiesandPropertyRights,Chapter18,Slide44,TheCoaseTheorematWork,NegotiatinganEfficientSolution1987-NewYorkgarbagespill(200tons)litteredtheNewJerseybeachesThepotentialcostoflitigationresultedinasolutionthatwasmutuallybeneficialtobothparties.,Chapter18,Slide45,CommonPropertyResources,CommonPropertyResourceEveryonehasfreeaccess.LikelytobeoverutilizedExamplesAirandwaterFishandanimalpopulationsMinerals,Chapter18,Slide46,CommonPropertyResources,FishperMonth,Benefits,Costs($perfish),Chapter18,Slide47,CommonPropertyResources,SolutionPrivateownershipQuestionWhenwouldprivateownershipbeimpractical?,Chapter18,Slide48,CrawfishFishinginLousiana,FindingtheEfficientCrawfishCatchF=crawfishcatchinmillionsofpounds/yrC=costindollars/pound,Chapter18,Slide49,CrawfishFishinginLousiana,DemandC=0.401=0.0064FMSCC=-5.645+0.6509FPCC=-0.357+0.0573F,Chapter18,Slide50,CrawfishFishinginLousiana,EfficientCatch9.2millionpoundsD=MSC,Chapter18,Slide51,CrawfishCatch(millionsofpounds),CCost(dollars/pound),CrawfishasaCommonPropertyResource,Chapter18,Slide52,PublicGoods,QuestionWhenshouldgovernmentreplacefirmsastheproducerofgoodsandservices?,Chapter18,Slide53,PublicGoods,PublicGoodCharacteristicsNonrivalForanygivenlevelofproductionthemarginalcostofprovidingittoanadditionalconsumeriszero.NonexclusivePeoplecannotbeexcludedfromconsumingthegood.,Chapter18,Slide54,PublicGoods,NotallgovernmentproducedgoodsarepublicgoodsSomearerivalandnonexclusiveEducationParks,Chapter18,Slide55,EfficientPublicGoodProvision,Output,0,Benefits(dollars),1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,9,$4.00,$5.50,$7.00,Chapter18,Slide56,PublicGoods,PublicGoodsandMarketFailureHowmuchnationaldefensedidyouconsumelastweek?,Chapter18,Slide57,PublicGoods,FreeRidersThereisnowaytoprovidesomegoodsandserviceswithoutbenefitingeveryone.Householdsdonothavetheincentivetopaywhattheitemisworthtothem.Freeridersunderstatethevalueofagoodorservicesothattheycanenjoyitsbenefitwithoutpayingforit.,Chapter18,Slide58,PublicGoods,EstablishingamosquitoabatementcompanyHowdoyoumeasureoutput?Whodoyoucharge?Amosquitometer?,Chapter18,Slide59,TheDemandforCleanAir,CleanAirisapublicgoodNonexclusiveandnonrivalWhatisthepriceofcleanair?,Chapter18,Slide60,TheDemandforCleanAir,ChoosingwheretoliveStudyinBostoncorrelateshousingpriceswiththequalityofairandothercharacteristicsofthehousesandtheirneighborhoods.,Chapter18,Slide61,TheDemandforCleanAir,NitrogenOxides(pphm),0,Dollars,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,9,2000,2500,3000,500,1500,1000,Chapter18,Slide62,TheDemandforCleanAir,FindingsAmountpeoplearewillingtopayforcleanairincreasessubstantiallyaspollutionincreases.Higherincomeearnersarewillingtopaymore(thegapbetweenthedemandcurveswiden)NationalAcademyofSciencesfoundthata10%reductioninautoemissionsyieldedabenefitof$2billion-somewhatgreaterthanthecost.,Chapter18,Slide63,PrivatePreferencesforPublicGoods,Governmentproductionofapublicgoodisadvantageousbecausethegovernmentcanassesstaxesorfeestopayforit.Determininghowmuchofapublicgoodtoprovidewhenfreeridersexistisdifficult.,Chapter18,Slide64,DeterminingtheLevelofEducationalSpending,Educationalspendingperpupil,$0,Willingnesstopay$,$1200,$600,$1800,$2400,Theefficientlevelofeducationalspendingisdeterminedbysummingthewillingnesstopayforeducationforeachofthreecitizens.,Chapter18,Slide65,DeterminingtheLevelofEducationalSpending,Educationalspendingperpupil,$0,Willingnesstopay$,$1200,$600,$1800,$2400,Willmajorityruleyieldanefficientoutcome?W1willvotefor$600W2andW3willvotefor$1200Themedianvotewillalwayswininamajorityruleelection.,Chapter18,Slide66,QuestionWillthemedianvoterselectionalwaysbeefficient?AnswerIftwoofthethreepreferred$1200therewouldbeoverinvestment.Iftwoof