《企业理论》授课纲要及阅读文献

1、企业理论授课纲要及阅读文献张维迎，蔡洪滨，周黎安，马捷，邓峰2008/9/18授课人：本课程由张维迎教授、蔡洪滨教授、周黎安副教授、邓峰副教授（法学院）和马捷博士联合讲授。课程助教：雍家胜; 联系方式：email: yongjiasheng; tel:课对象：2006级产业经济学硕士研究生和博士研究生、应用经济学硕博连读必修；企业管理博士生选修。授课时间：2007年秋季学期，每周三上午24节（9：00-12：00）；授课地点：北大光华管理学院216教室。考试方式：完成一篇论文（可以是理论模型，实证研究，或案例研究；必须有学术贡献）。另有课间作业。内容简介：企业理论又称

2、合约理论、激励理论，或组织经济学，是当代微观经济学的前沿领域。它从个人选择出发，解释企业的存在，企业内部的结构，及不同组织结构的竞争均衡。本课程将主要介绍有关企业理论研究的最新理论成果和实证研究，也将讨论与中国企业改革有关的理论和实践问题。本课程内容也将涉及政府、大学等非盈利性组织的治理结构问题。鉴于企业的制度安排涉及重要的法律问题，本课程也将讨论有关公司法，特别是信托责任等方面的最新研究成果。课程的目的是使学生从经济学和法学两方面深刻理解企业的制度安排和实际运行，培养学生从事企业理论和实证研究的能力。主要内容包括：第1讲：资本主义企业制度解剖 （张维迎）第2讲：交易成本与产权理论（张维迎）第

3、3讲：激励理论与实证（I）: 风险、团队生产与多任务理论（周黎安）第4讲：激励理论与实证（II）: 经理人市场和职业声誉（周黎安）第5讲：激励理论在政府组织的应用：中国地方官员的激励（周黎安）第6讲：声誉基础上的企业理论（蔡洪滨）第7讲：关系契约与企业内部激励理论（蔡洪滨）第8讲：竞争与反垄断（蔡洪滨）第9讲：企业理论与国际贸易I（马捷）第10讲：企业理论与国际贸易II（马捷）第11讲：企业理论与国际贸易III（马捷）第12讲：公司的人格理论 Personality of Corporation in Law（邓峰）第13讲：资本规制（邓峰）第14讲：诚信义务Fiduciary Duty（邓峰

4、）第15讲：中国国有企业改革的理论与实践（张维迎）参考文献：第1讲：资本主义企业制度解剖 （张维迎）*Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz, (1972), “Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization”, American Economic Review, December.*Coase, R. (1937), “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica 4: 386-405.Dow, Gregory, (1993), “Why Capital Hires Labour?”, Am

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