说明50周年评论

1、50 年评论的想法:过去和未（于）尔系统”的架构到其他公司否。其中，15本文感觉非常理性，从那么多1234尔构架的时候，要点多达十几点，实在太多了点50 年评论的想法:过去和未（于）尔系统”的架构到其他公司否。其中，15本文感觉非常理性，从那么多1234尔构架的时候，要点多达十几点，实在太多了点TotheshareholdersofBerkshireway致Iclosely watchedthe 50-year history ofmon stIindependently supplement whatever ratory comment comes TotheshareholdersofB

2、erkshireway致Iclosely watchedthe 50-year history ofmon stIindependently supplement whatever ratory comment comes him.I willtry todofive(1) Describe the management system and t caused a and unfixably-doomed commodity usiness to o mightyt now（1）(2)Explainhowthemanagementsystemandpolicieso(3)Explain,tos

3、omeextent,whyBerkshiredidso(4) Predict whether abnormally good results would continue if weresoontodepart, (5)Considerwhether(4) Predict whether abnormally good results would continue if weresoontodepart, (5)ConsiderwhetherBerkshiresgreatresultsoverthelast50yearstmayproveusefulThe management system

4、and policies of Berkshire under Buffett together called “the Berkshire system”) were fixed early and described(1) Berkshire would be a diffuse conglomerate, averse only to aboutwhich itcouldnotmakeuseful尔的管理系统和政策（在此统称为“）尔将是一个分散的企, 其仅那些不能做出令人满(2) Its top company would do almost all business through y

5、incorporated subsidiaries whose CEOs would operate with very （2）CEO(3)Therewouldbealmostnothingatincorporated subsidiaries whose CEOs would operate with very （2）CEO(3)TherewouldbealmostnothingatconglomerateheadquartersatinyuitecontainingChairman, a CFO, and a few assistants who mostly helped the CFO

6、 ernalcontrol,席，一个CFO，一些主要帮助CFO做审计控制的助手(4) Berkshire subsidiaries would always prominently include insurers.Thoseinsurersasagroupwouldbeexpectedtoproduce,incourse, dependable underwriting gains while also producing “float” (fromunpaidinsuranceliabilities)for（自还未支付的保险负债）(5) There would be no signific

7、ant system-nel system, option system, other incentive system, retirement system, or the becausethesubsidiarieswouldhavetheirownsystems,often（5）(6)BerkshiresChairmanwouldreserveonlyafewactivitiesforbecausethesubsidiarieswouldhavetheirownsystems,often（5）(6)BerkshiresChairmanwouldreserveonlyafewactivit

8、iesfor(i)Hewouldmanagealmostallsecurityinvestments,withtheseresidinginBerkshirescasualty尔(ii)He wouldchoose all CEOs ofimportantsubsidiaries,andhe wouldtheir compensation and obtain from each a mendation a sorinaddenly中获得继任者（人选(iii)Hewoulddeploymostcashnotneededinsubsidiariesaftertheyincreased their

9、 competitive advantage, with the ideal deployment theusetcash toacquirenew（iii）他将在子公司增加了它们的竞争优势之后，配置其不需要的大部分现金(iv) He would make himself promptly available for almost any wanted by any subsidiary(iv) He would make himself promptly available for almost any wanted by any subsidiarys CEO, and he would

10、require almost additional（iv）若子公司 CEO(v) He would write a long, logical, and useful letter for in annual report, designed d wish it to be if he were only passive shareholder, and he would be available for hours of questionsatannualshareholders （v）(vi) He would try to be an exemplar in a twould work

11、well customers, shareholders, and other incumbents for a long time, beforeandafterhis(vii)prioritywouldbereservationofmuchtimeforquietand thinking, t ight advance his learning,nomatterhowoldhebecame;(viii) He would also and thinking, t ight advance his learning,nomatterhowoldhebecame;(viii) He would

12、 also spend much time in enthusiastically admiring others(7)Newsubsidiarieswouldusuallybeboughtwithcash,notnewly。(8)Berkshirewouldnotpaydividendssolongasnonedollarmarket value for shareholders was being created by each dollar retained（8）(9)Inbuyinganewsubsidiary,Berkshirewouldseektopayafairpricea go

13、od t the Chairman could pretty Berkshire would also want a good CEO in place, one expected to for a long time and manage well without need for help Berkshire would also want a good CEO in place, one expected to for a long time and manage well without need for help （9）是尔将同样希望（该公司）有一个好的 CEO司(10) In ch

14、oosing CEOs of subsidiaries, Berkshire would try to theCEOwas （10）关于选择子公司的 CEO(11) As an important matter of preferred conduct, Berkshire almostneversella(12)BerkshirewouldalmostnevertransferasubsidiarysCEOtounrelatedCEO（任职(13) Berkshire would never force the CEO of a subsidiary to retire accountofm

15、ereCEO(14)Berkshirewouldhavelittle(13) Berkshire would never force the CEO of a subsidiary to retire accountofmereCEO(14)Berkshirewouldhavelittledebtoutstandingasittriedtoainvirtually perfect nder all conditions and (ii) availability of cash and credit for imes unusual未清偿，因为它试图保持（i）上完美的信誉 和（ii）。(15)

16、 Berkshire would always be user-friendly to a prospective seller of large business. An offer of such a business would get No onebutthe Chairmanand one ortwo others at Berkshirewould know about the offer if it did not lead to a ion. And they loutsiders about（15）Both the elements of the Berkshire syst

17、em and their collected size quite unusual. No other large corporation I know of has half Both the elements of the Berkshire system and their collected size quite unusual. No other large corporation I know of has half of elementsinHow did Berkshire happen to get a ality so fromtheWell, Buffett, even

18、when only 34 years old, controlled about 45% Berkshires shares and was y trusted by all the other shareholders.Hecouldinstallwhateversystemhewanted.AndhedidcreatingtheBerkshire，即使当年仅有34岁而已，控制了大约45尔Almost every element was chosen because Buffett t, him,itwouldizeBerkshiresachievement.Hewasnotto creat

19、e a one-type-fits-all system for other ,bsidiarieswerenotrequiredtousetheBerkshiresystemtheirownoperations.Andsomeflourishedwhileusingdifferent克的成就。他不打算为其他的企业，创造一个适用于所有的系统。事实上（注： while 这里可以做 时间 解， 可以做“虽然” 解，可以做 转折“但是却” 解， 联系上句这里取时间解释WhatwasBuffettaimingat ashedesignedthetheirownoperations.Andsomeflo

20、urishedwhileusingdifferent克的成就。他不打算为其他的企业，创造一个适用于所有的系统。事实上（注： while 这里可以做 时间 解， 可以做“虽然” 解，可以做 转折“但是却” 解， 联系上句这里取时间解释WhatwasBuffettaimingat ashedesignedtheBerkshire当Well,overtheyears Idiagnosedseveralimportant(1) He particularly wanted ization of the skills,and devotionofthe most important he system,

21、 with(2)Hewantedwin/winresultseverywhere-ingainingloyaltybygivingfor(3)Hewantedstizedlong-termresults,seekingfrom makers who usually stayed long enough in place to theof(4) He wanted to minimize the bad t would almost comefromalargebureaucracyat(5)Hewantedallycontribute,likeProfessorBenGraham,tospre

22、adofwisdom：comefromalargebureaucracyat(5)Hewantedallycontribute,likeProfessorBenGraham,tospreadofwisdom：（2）诚（3）决定结果的决策者那里寻求（/参考教授那样他所获得的When Buffett developed the Berkshire system, did he foresee all t followed?No. Buffetto somebenefits strengthenedtheir当WhydidBerkshireunderBuffettdoso 的Onlyfourlarg

23、efactorsoccurto(1)Theconstructivepeculiaritiesof(2)TheconstructiveWhydidBerkshireunderBuffettdoso 的Onlyfourlargefactorsoccurto(1)Theconstructivepeculiaritiesof(2)TheconstructivepeculiaritiesoftheBerkshire(3) Good luck, (4) The ense, contagious devotion of some shareholders otheradmirers,includinghe：

24、（4）界I ve all four factors were present and helpful. But the heavy was carried by the constructive peculiarities, the weird devotion, tolimitivitiestoafewkindsandizehisattentiontothem,and tong sofor 50years,tolimitivitiestoafewkindsandizehisattentiontothem,and tong sofor 50years,was lollapalooza. Buf

25、fett succeeded for the same reason Roger becamegoodatBuffettwas,ineffect,usingthewinningmethodofthefamouscoach, John Wooden, who won most regularly after he had learned assign virtually all playing time to his seven best t opponentsalwaysfacedhisbestplayers,insteadofhissecondbest.with the extra play

26、ing time, the best players improved n ，事实上，使用了著名棒球John Wooden 的致胜方法。 WoodenAnd Buffett much out-Woodened Wooden, because in his case exercise of skill was concentrated in , not seven, and his improved and improved as he got older and older during 50 insteadofdeterioratingliketheskillofabasketballpla

27、yer了 Wooden是七个，随着他变得越来越老，他的技动员的技能那Moreover, by concentrating so er often-long-serving CEOs了 Wooden是七个，随着他变得越来越老，他的技动员的技能那Moreover, by concentrating so er often-long-serving CEOs of important Buffett was creating strong Wooden-type effects there. And such theskillsoftheCEOsandtheachievementsoftheCEO也

28、创造了强大的 Wooden 式效果。并且此类效果提高了 CEO 的能力和Then, as the Berkshire system bestowed much-desired autonomy many subsidiaries and their CEOs, and Berkshire became sful wellknown,esattracted both moreand betteroBerkshire,andbetterCEOsas尔系统授予了许多子公司和它们的 CEO尔CEOAnd the better subsidiaries and CEOs then required le

29、ss attention headquarters,creatingwhatisoftencalleda “virtuousCEO（的局面HowwelldiditworkoutforBerkshiretoalwaysincludecasualty as important CEO（的局面HowwelldiditworkoutforBerkshiretoalwaysincludecasualty as important evenso, itgot whatit Casualtyinsurers often invest in common stocks valueroughly to thei

30、r shareholders equity, as did Berkshires subsidiaries. And the S&P 500 Index produced about 10% per pre-tax,duringthelast50years,creatingasignificanthe early decades of the Buffett era, common stocks Berkshire s ubsidiaries y outperformed the exactly as Buffett expected. And, later, when both the la

31、rge size Berkshires stockholdings e tax considerations caused index-beating part of returns to fade to exactly as Buffett expected. And, later, when both the large size Berkshires stockholdings e tax considerations caused index-beating part of returns to fade to insignificance (perhaps forever), oth

32、er and better advantage came. Ajit Jain created out nothing an immense reinsurance t produced and a large underwriting gain. And all of GEICO oBerkshire,followed by a quadrupling of GEICOs market share. And of ional advantage, underwriting discipline, finding and withingoodniches,andrecruitingandhol

33、dingoutstanding尔庞大 的持股规模和收入考虑，导致战胜指数部分的收到不重要的时候（或许不的其他的和更好的优势出现了。AjitJain 从零开始创造了一个庞大的再保险公司GEICOGEICO（老鼠备注： Ajit Jain， 本科就读于印IIT， MBA 在80ality and large size became well known, its got and seized many attractive opportunities, not available to others, buy y ed securities. Most of these securities ha

34、dality and large size became well known, its got and seized many attractive opportunities, not available to others, buy y ed securities. Most of these securities had maturitiesandproducedoutstandingBerkshires e in insurance was not a natural Ordinarily, a casualty insurance business is a producer of

35、 results, even when very well managed. And such results are of little BerkshiresewassoastoundinglytItBuffett would now fail to recreate it if he returned to a small base retaininghissmarts andregaininghis现在难以再次创造它Did Berkshire suffer from being a diffuse conglomerate? No, opportunities were usefully

36、 enlarged by a widened area for Andbadeffects,commonelsewhere,werepreventedbyBuffettsWhy did Berkshire prefer to buy companies with cash, instead ofits stock? Well, it was hard to get anythingAndbadeffects,commonelsewhere,werepreventedbyBuffettsWhy did Berkshire prefer to buy companies with cash, in

37、stead ofits stock? Well, it was hard to get anything in exchange for Berkshire twasasvaluableaswhatwasgiven尔Why Berkshires acquisition companies outside the business work out so well for Berkshire shareholders when the resultinsuchacquisitionsisbadforshareholdersofthe此类收购的通常结果，对于（其他公司的）supplement it

38、s better It never had the equivalent of “departmentofacquisitions” retobuy.Anditneverdonadvicefrom “helpers” suretobeprejudicedinfavorofAndBuffettheldself-at bay as heunderclaimed expertise he knew n most corporate executives what worked and didnt in business, aided by his long experience sive And,f

39、inally, AndBuffettheldself-at bay as heunderclaimed expertise he knew n most corporate executives what worked and didnt in business, aided by his long experience sive And,finally, even when Berkshire was getting much better n most others, Buffett often displayed almost inhuman patience seldom bought

40、. For instance, during ten years in control Berkshire, Buffett saw one business (textiles) move close to businessescomein,foranetgainof投资者的 长期经验。并且，最后的尔公司的前十 年里，看着一个公司（纺织WhatwerethebigmistakesmadebyBerkshireunderBuffett?Well,mistakes of were common, almost all huge errors were not making a purchase,

41、 including not purchasing Walmart stock t re to work out enormously well. The errors of of much importance. Berkshires net worth would now east billionhigherifdseized severalopportunitiesitwasnotquiteenoughtorecognizeasvirtuallysure在的会至少多出500（会）billionhigherifdseized severalopportunitiesitwasnotquit

42、eenoughtorecognizeasvirtuallysure在的会至少多出500（会）The next to last task on my list was: Predict whether abnormally resultswouldcontinueatBerkshireifBuffettweresoontoTheanswerisyes.Berkshirehasinplaceinbsidiariesmuchmomentumuchdurablecompetitive尔在它的子公司中已经具备许多公司（可延续的）势头Moreover,itsrailroadandutilitysubsid

43、iariesnowprovidemuchopportunity to invest large sums in new fixed assets. And subsidiariesarenowakingwise “bolt-on” t most of the Berkshire system remains in place, combined momentum and opportunity now present is so tBerkshirewould almostsurely remain a n-normalt most of the Berkshire system remain

44、s in place, combined momentum and opportunity now present is so tBerkshirewould almostsurely remain a n-normalcompanyavery long timeevenif(1) Buffettleft tomorrow,(2) csors s of only moderate ability, and (3) Berkshire purchasedalarge（2）But,underthisBuffett-soon-leavesmption,csorswouldbe “ofonlymoderateability.” Forinstance,AjitJainandGregAbel“world-class.” “World-leading” would be the description I choose.Insomeimportantways,eachisabetterbusinessn的。例如，AjitJainGreg Abel更好的 企业管理者。这50提到了这2And I ve neither Jain nor Abel would (1) leave Berkshire