地方政府对投资经济增长和就业的影响【外文翻译】

本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目：ThefectofLocalernntInvestntononocowth and oynt:idence fromTransitionalChina 出 处： ologicono作 者： Theeffectsoflocalgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthandemploymen：evidencefromtransitionalChinaBasedonthepaneldataof28provincesintheyearof1987-2001,thispaperexaminestheeffectsofthelocalgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthandemployment.Theempliricalresultshowathatthelocalgovernmentinvestmentplaysasignificantpositiveroleineconomicgrowthandemployment.However,whiletheproptionoflocalgovernmentinvestmenttoGDPhadaremarrkableriseafter1998,theelasticityoflocalgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthdeclined,whichshowsthatthereisabigroomforraisingtheefficiencyoflocalgovernmentinvestment.Moreover,theempiricalexaminationshowsthatalthoughlocalgovernmentinvestmenthadpositiveeffectonemployment,theelasticityhadadecreaseafter1994whenthetax-sharingsystemreformwasputintopractice.Thisshowsthatthepositiveroleoflocalgovernmentinvestmentonemploymentisalsolimited.Thispaperarguesthattheroleoflocalgovernmentiasinvestorsmustbeweakedandlocalgovernmentsofdifferentlevelsshouldlessendirecteconomicinterventionandconcerntrateonpublicregulation.ThetransitingprocessofChinafromtraditionalplanningeconomytomarketingeconomyisalsoaprocessforgovernmentstochangetheirroles．Inthistransitionprocess．Chinatakesapathofgradualreformation，andthecentralgovernmentgraduallyloosesitsdirectcontroloneconomyandlessensitsadministrativepoweronstate—ownedeconomy．However．theCentralGovernmentdidnotgiveenterprisesthecompleteadministrativepower；instead．itpassedthead．ministrativepowertolocalgovernments．Thus，thelocalgovernmentsgainedmorepowerineconomiedecision，inexamininglargeinvestmentprojects，andinissuinglicenseandincontrollinglandresources．ThismadethelocalgovernmentshavegreatpoweroninterveningIocaleconomicdevelopment．theotherhand，theestablishmentoffiscaldecentralizationsysteminagreatdegreeintensifledtheeconomicinterestoflocalgovernments．whichurgedthelocalgovernmentstohavemoreincentivetodevelopIocaleconomy．Underthefiscaldecentralizationrevenueoflocalgovernmentshighlydependsonthelocaleconomicwhenthelocaleconomyhasagoodperformance，couldthetaxbasebeexpanded，andrevenuebeincreased．Sothatthelocalgovernmentshavegreatincentivetodevelopthelocaleconomy．Inaddition．ThegrowthrateofGDPandtheemploymentsituationareveryimportantindexesforexaminingofficials’achievements；thisfurtherstrengthenstheincentivesofIocalofficialstodeveloplocaleconomylocalgovernmentsofdifierentlevelsusuallyplayaroleofentrepreneursinlocaleconomicdevelopment．ThemostdirecteffectivemeasureforIocalgovernmentstodeveloplocaleconomyistoraiselocalinvestmentlevelthroughvariousways．Inthiswaytheproportionoftheinvestmentprojectsoflocalgovernmentstonationalfixedinvestmentgrowscontinuously；theinvestmcntexpenditurefromlocalgovernmentsthemselveskeepsahighlevel．Withtheestablishmentoffiscaldecentralization,thecapabilityoflocalgovernmentsincontrollingtherevenueswithinbudgetincreasesremarkably．Inaddition，localgovernmentshavealargepertionofrightsindisposingtherevenuesbothoutsidethebudgetandoutsidethesystem；thismakeslocalgovernmentshavefinanceresourcestoinvestininfrastructureconstruction．Infact．inthetotalgovernmentalinvestment，theproportionofinvestmentwithinbudgetdecreasesincreasingly,andthatoutsidethebudgetincreasesincreasingly,andthemostofinvestmentoutsidethebudgetisraisedandusedbylocalgovernments．Moreover，inordertoattractmoreinvestmentfromoutsidesoastopromotethelocaleconomicdevelopment．whiletherevenuesbothwithinandoutsidethebudgetareinsufficentforthedemandofinvestmentexpenditures．somelocalgovernmentstakeapathofraisingaloanfromoutsidetospeeduptheurbandevelopment．Inthepastyears，manylocalgovernmentswereengagedinthesocalmanagement”,speededupthecitydevelopment，renewedtheinfrastructureincitiesinlargescale．andestablishedeconomicdevelopingareas．Thesenvestmentstakealargeportioninnationaltotalinvestment．Fromaboveanalysiswecanseethatlocalgovernmentshavebeenoneofthemaininvestorsineconomicfixedinvestmenthaschangedfromthatthecentralgovernmentplaysadominantroletothatlocalgovernmentsplayadominantrole.Localgovernmentsofdifferentlevelshavebecomeanimportantparticipantineconomiclife．Wemustconsidertheeffectsoflocalgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthandemploymentwhenstudyingthelatteronthepaneldataof28provincesinthyearof1987-2001．thispaperexaminesandanalysestheeffectsofthelocalgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthandemployment．Thestructureofthepaperisasfollowing：thesecondpartisliteraturereview;thethirdpartisanalysisanddesign;theforthpartisthedataandresult；thefifthpartistheconclusionandrevelation.Weexpecttoexamineifthelocalgovernmentinvestmenthaveremarkableeffectsonemployment，sowetakethelocalgovernmentinvestmentasthemainexplanatoryvariableinmakingtherelevantmodel．Inaddition．inlinewithothervariablesaffectingemployment，weaddedsomecontrolvariables．Accordingto“Philipsisasubstitutionrelationshipbetweeninflationratesandunemploymentrates．ThispaperintroducesCPIintotheempiricaltestofemployment，soastotestiftheinflationlevelhasremarkableeffectsonemploymentinChina．Moreover,thenumberofemoloymentinstate-ownedenterprisestakesagreatratiooftotalemployment．Itshowsthattheestimationvalueisevidentlynot0，whichprovesthattheproportionofemploymentinstate-ownedsectorshasastrongexplanatorycapabilitytothegrowthrateofemployment．ThereareveryfewliteratureswhichdirectlystudytheeffectsoflocaIgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthandemployment．mostofliteraturesstartfromfiscaldecentraIization．AWoridBankreportpointsoutthatthoughChinahasasinglegovernmentalsystemhasastrongcharacteroffederalismbecausefinancesystemishighIydecentralizedonsomanydifferentlevelsasCentraIGovernment31provinces,331cities,2,109countiesand44,741towns，therefore.QianYingyiandWeingastregardthisfederalismofChina，whichformedfromfiscaldecentraIjzation,asmarketpreservingfederalismwithChinesecharacter,QianYingyiandRolandpointoutthattheincentiveofgovernmenttosubsideinefficientprojectsisdeterminedbythetradeofbetweenpoliticalinterestsandeconomiccosts,andtheeconomiccostsdependuponthedegreeofgovernmentaldecentraIization.Theyinsistthat,withthefreemovementofnonstate-ownedcapitals,fiscaldecentralizationhastheeffectofhardeningthebudgetrestrictionofthestate-ownedenterprisescontrolledbylocalgovernments．Thisisbecausethatthecompetitionofattractinginvestmentoflocalgovernmentsmaygenerateexternalities．Thismakestheopportunitycostofsubsidingtheinefficientstate,ownedenterprisestobehigh,thereforeweakenstheincentiveoflocalgovernmenttosaveIosingenterprises.Theyalsobelievethatsuchgovernmentorganizationalreformationasfiscaldecentralizationisanimportantaspectforthetransitionfromplanningeconomytomarketingeconomy.LinYifuandLiuZhiqiang,employingprovincialdataassessedtheeffectsoffiscaldecentralizationstartedfroml980sontheeconomicgrowth．Theyfoundthat,aftercontrollingtheeffectsofotherreformationsoccurredatthesametime,fiscaldecentralizationraisestheprovincialGDPgrowthrateinpercapitaaspect,thisshowsthatfiscaldecentralizationpromoteseconomicgrowththroughraisingtheefficiencyofresourcedistribution.Theybelievethatthepositiveeffectsofficaldecentralizationoneconomicdevelopmentareduetothat,relativetocentralgovernment，theprovincialgovernmentshaveinformationadvantageinsatisfyinglocalcouldprovidebetterpublicgoodsandserviceswhichhavelargeeffectsonlocaleconomicenvironment．ZhangWeiyingandSuShuhearguethatthedecentralizationhappeningintheearlyof1980sledtoregionalcompetitionwhichledtoprivatization．Theestablishmentofdecentralizedsystemacceleratestheincentiveoflocalgovernmentstopursueprofit，whichcausesthehighcompetitionbetweenlocalgovernments,whichfacilitatesthemarketorientedmovementofthewholeeconomy.Duetotheintenseregionalcompetitionintheproductmarket，eachregionhastomakeeffortstodecreaseitsproductioncostsoastooccupyaspaceinthemarketcompetition.Inordertoeffectivelycutthecost,localgovernmentsmakesuchchoiceasgivingthewholeorpartofsharetomanagerstogivethemincentives,whichacceleratesthegrowthofmarketandeconomicdevelopment．Therearealsosomewriterswhohavenotedthenegativeeffectsoflocalgovernmentinvestingbehavior．Astotheaspectofreducingtheefficiencyofsocialresourcesdistribution,LuMing,ChenZhaoandYanJiwhotaketheangleoftheisolationofregionaleconomy，XuYingwhotaketheangleofconflictofregionaleconomy,HuRongtao，ZhangXuyingandSuMingbingwhotaketheangleofthesimilarizationofindustrialithgametheoryrespectivelyanalyzedthestrategicbehavioroflocalgovernmentspursuingself-profitwhichledtothelossofsocialresourcesdistributionefficiency．TheResearchGroupCompetitionofChineseLocalzedthenegativeperformanceoflocalgovernmentincompetition．Theresultshowsthat，afterChinapracticedanewpositivefiscalpolicy,thoughlocalgovernmentshadgreatincentivetoinvestincityinfrastructureconstructionwiththeimpetusofcentralgovernmentloan，whichmadetheinvestmentexpenditureoflocalgovernmentanditsproportiontoGDPareincreasing,theefIiciencyoftheseinvestmentdeclined．Theempiricalresultofthispapershowsthatthelocalgovernmentinvestmenthasaveryevidentpositiveeffectoneconomicgrowth．Theempiricalresultalsoprovesthataftertheestablishmentofthetax-sharingsystemin1994,theelasticityoflocalgovernmentinvestmenttoeconomicgrowthwentup．Butthiselasticitywentdownwhenlocalgovernmentinvestmentincreasedgreatlyafter1998．Theempiricaltestresultalsoshowsthattheelasticityoflocalgovernmentinvestmenttoemploymentdecreasedwhenthetax．sharingsystemreforInwasputintopracticeafter1994．Itshowsthatthoughthelocalgovernmentinvestmentincreasedrapidlyinthepastyearsandplayedanimportantroleineconomicdevelopment，itspositiveeffectonemploymentwaslimited．ThisexplainswhytheelasticityofGDPtoemploymenttendstodecreaseandtheemploymentpressurekeepshighwhileeconomykeepsrapidgrowth．Theempiricaltestresultshowsthat．intheprocessoftransition，centraIgovernmentgraduallydecentralizedmostofthecontrolpowerandpassedittolocalgovernments.Thelocalgovernments,asanindependenteconomicactor,participatedintheeconomiclifeactively,expandedtheinvestmentwithgreateffectssoastodevelopthelocaIeconomy．Thisisanimportantstepingradualreformation,whichpromotedtheeconomicdevelopmentandthegrowthofemployment．Butontheotherhand,localgovernmentsarenotrealentrepreneurs．andtheywiilnotbeartherisksofinvestmentfailurelikerealentrepreneurs.Theirinvestmentcriteriaarealsodifferentfromtheywouldnotmaketheinvestmentdecisionaccordingtotheprofitofinvestment.Infact,theinvestmentandconstructionssponsoredbylocalgovernmentsusuallyhavesuchcharacterassoftbudgetrestrietionandsoftresourcerestriction．whichcausethelocalgovernmentstohavestrongincentivetoinvest．Theinvestmentwithoutstrictbudgetrestrictionisgenerallyinetiicient．Asaresult．theinvestmentsponsoredbylocalgovernmentisnotParetoefficientandtheresourcesaresomewhatwastedwhichhinderedtheoptimaldistributionofresources．Asaresult,abundantlocalgovernmentinvestmentcouldhardlydrawmoreprivateinvestment．andthemultipliereffectofinvestmentislow．Moreover,theinvestmentsponsoredbylocalgovernments．suchasjnvestmentincityinfrastructure．Inhigh—techgardenetc.,ismostlycapitalintensive．Thoughthiskindofinvestmentishugeandhasaremarkablepositiveeffectonshorttermeconomicgrowth,suchcapitalintensiveinvestmentcouldhardlyincreaseemployment．Thisresultedinthattheemploymentelasticitywentdownsharply,andthattheemploymentgrowthwasdiscrepantwitheconomichichhasbroughtsomenegativeeffectsonChina’seconomicdevelopment．Thelocalgovernmentsbecomethemainactorofinvestmentandimpetusofeconomicgrowth,whichisonlyonestepintheprocessofgraduaIreformation．ratherthanthewhole．Inthefuture，withthefurtherdevelopmentandperfectionofChina’smarketingeconomy，theroleoflocalgovernmentsininvestmentshouldbeweakened．Thelocalgovernmentsofdifferentlevelsmustlessentheirdirectinterventionineconomyandgivethecontrollinganddecisionpowertoenterprises．Thus，enterprisesbecometherealactorofsocialinvestment，andthelocalgovernmentsofdifferentlevelsconcentratethemselvesonpublicadministration．译 文：地方政府对投资经济增长和就业的影响——中国经济转型期研究基于1987—2001年28个省的面板数据，本文讨论了政府投资对经济发展和就业的影响，实验结果表明，当地政府在促进经济增长和就业上扮演着重要的积极作用，然而当地政府在1998年后投资比例在中显著上升，地方政府投资增长下降，结果表明，提高当地政府投资有很大空间，而且实证检查显示，尽管当地政府投资对就业有正面影响，但这降低了1994年以后分税制改革的实现概率，这就表明，地方政府作用于就业的手段是投资有限公司，本文认为，地方政府作为投资者的角色被削弱了，各地方政府应当按着经济学的规律减少干预，集中精力。中国的传统计划经济向市场经济转变的过程，同样也是政府改变自身角色的过程。在这一过程中，中国采取逐渐改革的路径，减少政府集中及直接对经济的控制以及减少对私人经济的行政权。然而，中央政府并没有给企业公司完整的管理权；取代的是对地方经济的管理权。因此，地方政府获得了更多的权利对经济做决定，如重大投资方案，发行执照以及对土地资源的控制。这使得地方政府有地方经济的发展保持着重大的权力弹性下降以及当中国经济高速增长时就业压力仍然居高不下的原因。从另外一面来讲，财政分权制度的建立从很大程度上加强了地方政府的经济利益。在财政分权制度下，地方政府的收入主要取决于地方经济的发展。只有在地方经济有了好的表现，税收基础可以增加，收入得到增长。所以地方政府对经济发展采取很高的经济鼓励。此外，GDP的增长以及就业情况也是主要官方财政收入的指针；这也扩大了地方办公室的经济鼓励来发展地方经济。所以，不同级别上的地方政府通常扮演企业家在地方经济发展的角色最直接有效的衡量地方政府对地方经济的发展就是通过多种方式增加地方投资项目及级别通过这种方法，地方投资项目的比例对国家固定投资是逐渐增长的；地方政府的投资支出自身保持在一个较高的水平。随着财政分权的建立，地方政府对控制收入增加及预算方面能力显著。此外，地方政府的大部分权利在处理体系外收入及预算的系统上；这使得地方政府有经济资源去投资在基础设施建设上面。实际上，政府的总投资在预算之内的投资比重日益下降，预算之外日益上涨。大多预算外的投资增长着被地方政府所用。而且，为了吸引更多的外来投资从而促进当地经济增长。而内外预算的收入对于投资的支出需求不足。一些地方政府通过增加外部贷款而促进城市化发展。在过去的几年中，一些地方官员从事所谓的“城市管理”，大范围的加速城市的发展以及基础建设的改建。这些投资占了总投资的很大部分。通过以上的分析，我们可以看到地方政府是中国经济的主要投资者。现今，中国财政投资从中央控制为主转变为地方政府控制。不同级别的地方政府变成中国经济种重要的参与者。我们必须考虑到地方政府在经济方面的投资增长，就业情况。基于1987到2001的28个省所获得的数据。本文分析了当地政府的投资对于经济增长以及就业所带来的影响。本文的结构如下。第二部分是文献回顾，第三部分是分析以及设计，第四部分是数据和结果，第五部分是相关结论。很少有文献是直接对当地政府的经济增长和就业的投资效应的研究。大部分的文献从财政分权开始。一个世界银行报告指出尽管中国有一个单一的政府体制，因此中国的系统有一个很明显的联邦制特征，因为中国的金融体系是高度分散到不同程度的中央政府31Yingyi和Weingast把这种从财政分权形成的联邦制中国，与汉字作为维护市场的联邦Yingyi和Roland指出减弱低效项目的政府动机是由政治利益之间的贸易和经济成本决定，经济成本取决于政府权力下放的程度。他们坚持认为,非国有的自由流动资金、财政分权的效果是硬化预算软约束国有企业被地方政府控制。这是因为地方政府吸引投资的竞争可能产生的外部性。这使得下降的低效率国有企业的机会成本变高。因此削弱了当地政府挽救亏损企业的动机。他们也认为,这样的政府组织改革,正如财政分权是一个很重要的方面过渡从计划经济向市场经济。林毅夫、刘志强以省级数据的影响评估中国财政分权始于我80年代对经济增长。他们发现,在控