上市公司盈利分析外文资料翻译

Thepath-to-profitabilityofInternetIPOfirmsBharat;Narayanan;\o"Viewotherpapersbythisauthor"OmeshAbstractExtantempiricalevidenceindicatesthattheproportionoffirmsgoingpublicpriortoachievingprofitabilityhasbeenincreasingovertime.Thisphenomenonislargelydrivenbyanincreaseintheproportionoftechnologyfirmsgoingpublic.Sincethereisconsiderableuncertaintyregardingthelong-termeconomicviabilityofthesefirmsatthetimeofgoingpublic,identifyingfactorsthatinfluencetheirabilitytoattainkeypost-IPOmilestonessuchasachievingprofitabilityrepresentsanimportantareaofresearch.Weemployatheoreticalframeworkbuiltaroundagencyandsignalingconsiderationstoidentifyfactorsthatinfluencetheprobabilityandtimingofpost-IPOprofitabilityofInternetIPOfirms.WeestimateCoxProportionalHazardsmodelstotestwhetherfactorsidentifiedbyourtheoreticalframeworksignificantlyimpacttheprobabilityofpost-IPOprofitabilityasafunctionoftime.Wefindthattheprobabilityofpost-IPOprofitabilityincreaseswithpre-IPOinvestordemandandchangeinownershipattheIPOofthetopofficersanddirectors.Ontheotherhand,theprobabilityofpost-IPOprofitabilitydecreaseswiththeventurecapitalparticipation,proportionofoutsidersontheboard,andpre-marketvaluationuncertainty.Keywords:

Initialpublicofferings,Internetfirms,Path-to-profitability,Hazardmodels,Survival1.ExecutivesummaryTherehasbeenanincreasingtendencyforfirmstogopubliconthebasisofapromiseofprofitabilityratherthanactualprofitability.Further,thisphenomenonislargelydrivenbytheincreaseintheproportionoftechnologyfirmsgoingpublic.Theriskofpost-IPOfailureisparticularlyhighforunprofitablefirmsasshiftsininvestorsentimentleadingtonegativemarketperceptionsregardingtheirprospectsorunfavorablefinancingenvironmentscouldleadtoashutdownofexternalfinancingsourcestherebyimperilingfirmsurvival.Therefore,theactualaccomplishmentofpost-IPOprofitabilityrepresentsanimportantmilestoneinthecompany'sevolutionsinceitsignalsthelong-termeconomicviabilityofthefirm.Whiletheextantresearchinentrepreneurshiphasfocusedonfactorsinfluencingtheabilityofentrepreneurialfirmstoattainimportantmilestonespriortooratthetimeofgoingpublic,relativelylittleisknownregardingthetimingorabilityoffirmstoachievecriticalpost-IPOmilestones.Inthisstudy,weconstructatheoreticalframeworkanchoredonagencyandsignalingtheoriestounderstandtheimpactofpre-IPOfactorssuchasgovernanceandownershipstructure,managementquality,institutionalinvestordemand,andthirdpartycertificationonfirms'post-IPOpath-to-profitability.WeattempttovalidatethetestableimplicationsarisingfromourtheoreticalframeworkusingtheInternetindustryasoursetting.Achievingpost-issueprofitabilityinatimelymannerisofparticularinterestforInternetIPOfirmssincetheyarepredominantlyunprofitableatthetimeofgoingpublicandaretypicallycharacterizedbyhighcashburnratestherebyraisingquestionsregardingtheirlong-termeconomicviability.Sincethereisarepeatedtendencyforhightechnologyfirmsinvariousemergingsectorsoftheeconomytogopublicinwavesamidinvestoroptimismfollowedbydisappointingperformance,insightsgainedfromastudyoffactorsthatinfluencethepath-to-profitabilityofInternetIPOfirmswillhelpincreaseourunderstandingofthedevelopmentpathandlong-termeconomicviabilityofentrepreneurialfirmsinemerging,hightechnologyindustries.2.IntroductionThepastfewdecadeshavewitnessedtheformationanddevelopmentofseveralvitallyimportanttechnologicallyorientedemergingindustriessuchasdiskdrive,biotechnology,andmostrecentlytheInternetindustry.Entrepreneurialfirmsinsuchknowledgeintensiveindustriesareincreasinglygoingpublicearlierintheirlifecyclewhilethereisstillagreatdealofuncertaintyandinformationasymmetryregardingtheirfutureprospects(JaneyandFolta,2006).Anaturalconsequenceoftherapidtransitionfromfoundingstagefirmstopubliccorporationsisanincreasingtendencyforfirmstogopubliconthebasisofapromiseofprofitabilityratherthanactualprofitability.3Althoughsustainedprofitabilityisnolongerarequirementforfirmsinordertogopublic,actualaccomplishmentofpost-IPOprofitabilityrepresentsanimportantmilestoneinthefirm'sevolutionsinceitreducesuncertaintyregardingthelong-termeconomicviabilityofthefirm.Inthispaper,wefocusonidentifyingobservablefactorsatthetimeofgoingpublicthathavetheabilitytoinfluencethelikelihoodandtimingofattainingpost-IPOprofitabilitybyInternetfirms.WerestrictourstudytotheInternetindustrysinceitrepresentsanaturalsettingtostudythelong-termeconomicviabilityofanemergingindustrywherefirmstendtogopublicwhentheyarepredominantlyunprofitableandwherethereisconsiderablyuncertaintyandinformationasymmetryregardingtheirfutureprospects.4Theattainmentofpost-IPOprofitabilityassumessignificancesincetheIPOeventdoesnotprovidethesameleveloflegitimizingdifferentiationthatitdidinthepastassustainedprofitabilityisnolongeraprerequisitetogopublicparticularlyinperiodswherethemarketisfavorablyinclinedtowardsinvestmentsratherthandemonstrationofprofitability(Stuartetal.,1999;JaneyandFolta,2006).DuringtheInternetboom,investorsreadilyacceptedthemantraof“growthatallcosts”andenthusiasticallybidupthepost-IPOofferingpricestoirrationallevels(Langeetal.,2001).Infact,investorfocusonthepromiseofgrowthratherthanprofitabilityresultedinInternetstart-upsbeingvieweddifferentlyfromtypicalnewventuresinthattheywereabletomarshalsubstantialresourcesvirtuallyindependentofperformancebenchmarks(MudambiandTreichel,2005). SincetheInternetbubbleburstinApril2000,venturecapitalfundsdriedupandmanyfirmsthathadsuccessfulIPOswentbankruptorfacedsevereliquidityproblems(Chang,2004).Consequently,investors'attentionshiftedfromtheirpreviouslysingularfocusongrowthprospectstothequestionofprofitabilitywiththeirnewmantrabeing“path-to-profitability.”Assuch,marketparticipantsfocusedonnotjustwhethertheIPOfirmwouldbeabletoachieveprofitabilitybutalso“when”or“howsoon.”IPOfirmsunabletocrediblydemonstrateaclearpath-to-profitabilitywereswiftlypunishedwithsteeplylowervaluationsandconsequentlyfacedsignificantlyhigherfinancingconstraints.Sincecashflownegativefirmsarenotyetselfsufficientand,therefore,dependentonexternalfinancingtocontinuetooperate,theinabilitytoraiseadditionalcapitalresultsinaviciouscycleofeventsthatcanquicklyleadtodelistingandevenbankruptcy.5Therefore,theactualattainmentofpost-IPOprofitabilityrepresentsanimportantmilestoneintheevolutionofanIPOfirmprovidingitwithlegitimacyandsignalingitsabilitytoremaineconomicallyviablethroughtheupsanddownsassociatedwithchangingcapitalmarketconditions.ThetheoreticalframeworksupportingouranalysisdrawsfromsignalingandagencytheoriesastheyrelatetoIPOfirms.Inourstudy,signalingtheoryprovidesthetheoreticalbasistoevaluatethesignalingimpactoffactorssuchasmanagementquality,thirdpartycertification,institutionalinvestordemand,andpre-IPOvaluationuncertaintyonthepath-to-profitability.Similarly,agencytheoryprovidesthetheoreticalfoundationstoallowustoexaminetheimpactofgovernancestructureandchangeintopmanagementownershipatthetimeofgoingpublicontheprobabilityofachievingthepost-IPOprofitabilitymilestone.Ourempiricalanalysisisbasedonthehazardanalysismethodologytoidentifythedeterminantsoftheprobabilityofbecomingprofitableasafunctionoftimeforasampleof160InternetIPOsissuedduringtheperiod1996–2000.Ourstudymakesseveralcontributions.First,weconstructatheoreticalframeworkbasedonagencyandsignalingtheoriestoidentifyfactorsthatmayinfluencethepath-to-profitabilityofIPOfirms.Second,weprovideempiricalevidenceontheeconomicviabilityofnewlypublicfirms(path-to-profitabilityandfirmsurvival)intheInternetindustry.Third,weaddtothetheoreticalandempiricalentrepreneurshipliteraturethathasfocusedonfactorsinfluencingtheabilityofentrepreneurialfirmstoachievecriticalmilestonesduringthetransitionfromprivatetopublicownership.WhilepreviousstudieshavefocusedonmilestonesduringtheprivatephaseoffirmdevelopmentsuchasreceiptofVCfundingandsuccessfulcompletionofapublicoffering(Chang,2004;DimovandShepherd,2005;Beckmanetal.,2007),ourstudyextendsthisliteraturebyfocusingonpost-IPOmilestones.Finally,extantempiricalevidenceindicatesthatthephenomenonofyoung,earlystagefirmsbelongingtorelativelynewindustriesbeingtakenpublicamidawaveofinvestoroptimismfueledbythepromiseofgrowthratherthanprofitabilitytendstorepeatitselfovertime.6However,profitabilitytendstoremainelusiveandtakesmuchlongerthananticipatedwhichresultsininvestordisillusionmentandconsequentlyhighfailurerateamongfirmsinsuchsectors.7Therefore,ourstudyislikelytoprovideusefullessonstoinvestorswhenapplyingvaluationstoIPOfirmswhenthisphenomenonstartstorepeatitself.Thisarticlesproceedsasfollows.First,usingagencyandsignalingtheories,wedevelopourhypotheses.Second,wedescribeoursampleselectionproceduresandpresentdescriptivestatistics.Third,wedescribeourresearchmethodsandpresentourresults.Finally,wediscussourresultsandendthearticlewithourconcludingremarks.3.TheoryandhypothesesSignalingmodelsandagencytheoryhavebeenextensivelyappliedinthefinancialeconomics,management,andstrategyliteraturestoanalyzeawiderangeofeconomicphenomenathatrevolvearoundproblemsassociatedwithinformationasymmetry,moralhazard,andadverseselection.SignalingtheoryinparticularhasbeenwidelyappliedintheIPOmarketasaframeworktoanalyzemechanismsthatarepotentiallyeffectiveinresolvingtheadverseselectionproblemthatarisesasaresultofinformationasymmetrybetweenvariousmarketparticipants(Baron,1982;Rock,1986;Welch,1989).Inthisstudy,signalingtheoryprovidestheframeworktoevaluatetheimpactofpre-IPOfactorssuchasmanagementquality,thirdpartycertification,andinstitutionalinvestordemandonthepath-to-profitabilityofInternetIPOfirms.TheIPOmarketprovidesaparticularlyfertilesettingtoexploretheconsequencesofseparationofownershipandcontrolandpotentialremediesfortheresultingagencyproblemssincetheinterestsofpre-IPOandpost-IPOshareholderscandiverge.InthecontextoftheIPOmarket,agencyandsignalingeffectsarealsorelatedtotheextentthatinsideractionssuchasincreasingthepercentageofthefirmsoldattheIPO,percentageofmanagementstockholdingsliquidatedattheIPO,orpercentageofVCholdingsliquidatedattheIPOcanaccentuateagencyproblemswithoutsideinvestorsand,asaconsequence,signalpoorperformance(MudambiandTreichel,2005).We,therefore,applyagencytheorytoevaluatetheimpactofboardstructureandthechangeinpre-to-postIPOownershipoftopmanagementonthepath-to-profitabilityofInternetIPOfirms.3.1.GovernancestructureInthecontextofIPOfirms,thereareatleasttwodifferentagencyproblems(MudambiandTreichel,2005).Thefirstproblemarisesasaresultofopportunisticbehaviorofagentstoincreasetheirshareofthewealthattheexpenseofprincipals.Theintroductionofeffectivemonitoringandcontrolsystemscanhelpmitigateoreliminatethistypeofbehavioranditsnegativeimpactonpost-issueperformance.Theextantcorporategovernanceliteraturehasarguedthattheeffectivenessofmonitoringandcontrolfunctionsdependstoalargeextentonthecompositionoftheboardofdirectors.We,therefore,examinetherelationshipbetweenboardcompositionandthelikelihoodandtimingofpost-IPOprofitability.ThesecondtypeofagencyproblemthatarisesintheIPOmarketisduetouncertaintyregardingwhetherinsidersseektousetheIPOasanexitmechanismtocashoutorwhethertheyusetheIPOtoraisecapitaltoinvestinpositiveNPVprojects.TheextentofinsidersellingtheirsharesatthetimeoftheIPOcanprovideaneffectivesignalregardingwhichoftheabovetwomotivationsisthelikelyreasonfortheIPO.We,therefore,examinetheimpactofthechangeinownershipofofficersanddirectorsaroundtheIPOonthelikelihoodandtimingofattainingpost-issueprofitability.3.2.ManagementqualityAnextensivebodyofresearchhasexaminedtheimpactoftomanagementteam(TMT)characteristicsonfirmoutcomesforestablishedfirmsaswellasfornewventuresbydrawingfromhumancapitalanddemographytheories.Forinstance,researchersdrawingfromhumancapitaltheoriesstudytheimpactofcharacteristicssuchastypeandamountofexperienceofTMTsonperformance(Cooperetal.,1994;Gimenoetal.,1997;Burtonetal.,2002;BaumandSilverman,2004).Additionally,Beckmanetal.(2007)arguethatdemographicargumentsaredistinctfromhumancapitalargumentsinthattheyexamineteamcompositionanddiversityinadditiontoexperience.Theauthorsconsequentlyexaminetheimpactofcharacteristicssuchasbackgroundaffiliation,composition,andturnoverofTMTmembersonthelikelihoodoffirmscompletinganIPO.Overall,researchershavegenerallyfoundevidencetosupportargumentsthathumancapitalanddemographiccharacteristicsofTMTmembersinfluencefirmoutcomes.Drawingfromsignalingtheory,wearguethatthequalityoftheTMTofIPOfirmscanserveasasignaloftheabilityofafirmtoattainpost-IPOprofitability.Sincemanagementqualityiscostlytoacquire,signalingtheoryimpliesthatbyhiringhigherqualitymanagement,highvaluefirmscansignaltheirsuperiorprospectsandseparatethemselvesfromlowvaluefirmswithlesscapablemanagers.ThebeneficialimpactofmanagementqualityintheIPOmarketincludestheabilitytoattractmoreprestigiousinvestmentbankers,generatestrongerinstitutionalinvestordemand,raisecapitalmoreeffectively,lowerunderwritingexpenses,attractstrongeranalystfollowing,makebetterinvestmentandfinancingdecisions,andconsequentlyinfluencetheshortandlong-runpost-IPOoperatingandstockperformance(ChemmanurandPaeglis,2005).Thus,agencytheory,inturn,wouldarguethathigherqualitymanagementismorelikelytoearntheirmarginalproductivityoflaborandthushavealowerincentivetoshirk,therebyalsoleadingtomorefavorablepost-IPOoutcomes.8WefocusouranalysesonthesignalingimpactofCEOandCFOqualityonpost-IPOperformance.WefocusonthesetwomembersoftheTMTofIPOfirmssincetheyareparticularlyinfluentialinestablishingbeneficialnetworks,providinglegitimacytotheorganization,andareinstrumentalindesigning,communicating,andimplementingthevariousstrategicchoicesandstandardoperatingproceduresthatarelikelytoinfluencepost-IPOperformance.3.3.ThirdpartycertificationTheextantliteraturehaswidelyrecognizedthepotentialforthirdpartycertificationasasolutiontotheinformationasymmetryproblemintheIPOmarket(Beatty,1989;CarterandManaster,1990;MegginsonandWeiss,1991;JainandKini,1995,1999b;ZimmermanandZeitz,2002).Thetheoreticalbasisforthirdpartycertificationisdrawnfromthesignalingmodelswhicharguethatintermediariessuchasinvestmentbankers,venturecapitalists,andauditorshavetheabilitytomitigatetheproblemofinformationasymmetrybyvirtueoftheirreputationcapital(BoothandSmith,1986;MegginsonandWeiss,1991;JainandKini,1995,Carteretal.,1998).InadditiontocertificationattheIPO,intermediaries,throughtheircontinuedinvolvement,monitoring,andadvisingrolehavetheabilitytoenhanceperformanceaftertheIPO.Inthediscussionbelow,wefocusonthesignalingimpactofventurecapitalistsinvolvementandinvestmentbankprestigeonpost-IPOoutcomes3.4.InstitutionalinvestordemandPriortomarketingtheissuetoinvestors,theissuingfirmandtheirinvestmentbankersarerequiredtofileanestimatedpricerangeintheregistrationstatement.ThefinalpricingoftheIPOfirmistypicallydoneonthedaybeforetheIPObasedupontheperceiveddemandfrompotentialinvestors.Further,thefinalofferpriceisdeterminedafterinvestmentbankersaveconductedroadshowsandobtainedindicationsofinterestfrominstitutionalinvestors.Therefore,theinitialpricerangerelativetothefinalIPOofferpriceisameasureofinstitutionalinvestoruncertaintyregardingthevalueofthefirm.Sinceinstitutionalinvestorstypicallyconductsophisticatedvaluationanalysespriortoprovidingtheirindicationsofdemand,divergenceofopiniononvaluationamongstthemisareflectionoftheriskanduncertaintyassociatedwiththeprospectsoftheIPOfirmduringthepost-IPOphase.Consistentwiththisview,Hougeetal.(2001)findempiricalevidencetoindicatethatgreaterdivergenceofopinionandinvestoruncertaintyaboutanIPOcangenerateshort-runovervaluationandlong-rununderperformance.Therefore,higherdivergenceofopinionamonginstitutionalinvestorsislikelytobenegativelyrelatedtotheprobabilityofpost-IPOprofitabilityandpositivelyrelatedtotime-to-profitability.Arelatedissueistheextentofpre-marketdemandbyinstitutionalinvestorsforallocationofsharesintheIPOfirm.Higherpre-issuedemandrepresentsafavorableconsensusofsophisticatedinstitutionalinvestorsregardingtheprospectsoftheissuingfirm.Institutionalinvestorconsensusaswellastheirhigherholdingsinthepost-IPOfirmislikelytobeaninformativesignalregardingthepost-IPOprospectsofthefirm.4.SampledescriptionandvariablemeasurementOurinitialsampleof325InternetIPOsovertheperiodJanuary1996toFebruary2000wasobtainedfromtheMorganStanleyDeanWitterInternetResearchReportdatedFebruary17，2000.TheunavailabilityofIPOofferingprospectusesandexclusionofforeignfirmsreducesthesamplesizeto205firms.Further,tobeincludedinoursample,werequirethatfinancialandaccountinginformationforsamplefirmsisavailableontheCenterforResearchinSecurityPrices(CRSP)andCompustatfilesandIPOofferingrelatedinformationisaccessiblefromtheSecuritiesDataCorporation's(SDC)GlobalNewIssuesdatabase.Asaresultoftheseadditionaldatarequirements,ourfinalsampleconsistsof160InternetIPOfirms.Informationoncorporategovernancevariables(ownership,boardcomposition,pastexperienceoftheCEOandCFO),andnumberofriskfactorsiscollectedfromtheofferingprospectuses.OurfinalsampleofInternetIPOfirmshasthefollowingattributes.ThemeanofferpriceforoursampleofIPOfirmsis$16.12.Theaveragefirminoursampleraised$99.48million.Thegrossunderwritingfeespreadisaroundsevenpercent.About79%ofthefirmsinoursamplehadventurecapitalbacking.Boththemeanandmedianreturnsonassetsforfirmsinoursampleatthetimeofgoingpublicaresignificantlynegative.Forexample,theaverageoperatingreturnonassetsforoursampleoffirmsis−56.3%.Theaveragenumberofemployeesforthefirmsinoursampleis287.Theaverageboardsizeis6.57foroursample.Inabout7.5%ofoursample,theCEOandCFOcamefromthesamefirm.Inaddition,wefindthat59firmsrepresenting37%ofthesampleattainedprofitabilityduringthepost-IPOperiodwiththemediantime-to-profitabilitybeingthreequartersfromtheIPOdate.5.DiscussionofresultsandconcludingremarksThedevelopmentpathofvariousemergingindustriestendtobesimilarinthattheyarecharacterizedbyhighfirmfoundingrates,rapidgrowthrates,substantialinvestmentsinR&Dandcapitalexpenditures,potentialforproduct/processbreakthroughs,investorexuberance,hugedemandforcapital,largenumberoffirmsgoingpublicwhilerelativelyyoung,andastruggleforsurvivalduringthepost-IPOphaseasprofitabilityandgrowthtargetsremainelusiveandshiftsininvestorsentimentsubstantiallyraisefinancingconstraints.Recently,theInternethasrapidlyemergedasavitallyimportantindustrythathasfundamentallyimpactedtheglobaleconomywithstart-upfirmsintheindustryattracting$108billionofinvestmentcapitalduringtheperiod1995–2000。WefindthatfirmandofferingcharacteristicshaveaneconomicallysignificantimpactontheabilityoftheIPOfirmtoattainpost-IPOprofitability.WefindthattheamountraisedattheIPOisnegativelyrelatedtotheprobabilityofprofitabilityandpositivelyrelatedtothetime-to-profitability.AplausibleexplanationforthisresultisthateasyaccesstocapitalallowedtechnologyfirmsduringtheInternetbubbleperiodtoraisemorethantherequisiteamountofcapitalbothpriortoandattheirinitialpublicofferings.Consistentwiththisconjecture,LjunqvistandWilhelm(2003)reportthatthemeangrossproceedsraisedbyIPOfirmsnearlytripledduringthe1996–2000period.Theextracashprovidedthesefirmswithampleincentivestopursuenegativenetpresentvalueprojectsresultinginalowerprobabilityofattainingprofitabilityandalongertime-to-profitability.Inaddition,wefindthatboththeageofthefirmandthenumberofemployeesemployedbythefirmatthetimeofgoingpublicarepositivelyrelatedtotheprobabilityofattainingpost-IPOprofitability.Oneofthelimitationsofourstudyisthattheremaybeaproblemofgeneralizabilityofourresultstoothertimeperiodsandotheremergingindustries.Oursampleperiodof1996–2000representsaperiodintheIPOmarketwheredisproportionatenumbersoffirmsparticularlyinthetechnologysectorwereabletogopublicrelativelyeasilysoonafterfoundingandwhilestillunprofitable.Further,IPOinvestorsduringthisperiodappearedtowillinglyaccepttheargumentstressinggrowthoverprofitabilityandtendedtooptimisticallyvaluefirmsundertheassumptionthatthehighpre-IPOgrowthratescouldbesustainedforanunrealisticallylongperiodoftime.However,aspointedoutearlierinthepaper,althoughtheInternetphenomenonrepresentedanunusualsituation,similarperiodshaveoccurredintheIPOmarketinavarietyofemergingindustriessuchasbiotechnologyanddiskdrivesandarelikelytooccuragaininthefuture.Further,suchwavesofhotandcoldIPOmarketstendtorepeatovertimeevenforthesameindustriesandsectorsoftheeconomy.We,therefore,believethatourstudyofthepost-IPOpath-to-profitabilityforInternetfirmsallowsustodevelopinsightsthatarelikelytobeusefultoinvestorswhensimilarperiodsofIPOwavesandover-investmentinemergingindustriesoccur.译文互联网上市公司的盈利能力分析巴拉特；纳拉亚南；奥米什摘要当前的实证研究证据显示，上市公司的盈利的利润的比例一直在增加。这种现象特别是在科技上市公司表现的更明显。其比例增加的很快。既然对于经济的长期生存能力有相当大的不确定性，对这些上市公司，找出其影响因素，他们就有能力实现关键IPO完成后的里程碑，如实现盈利这个重要的研究领域。我们建立在机构间和信令的考虑使用一个理论框架，以确定影响上市公司的盈利概率和时间因素。我们估计，Cox比例风险模型，将上市后的盈利作为一个时间的函数，以测试因素对我们的理论框架影响的概率。我们发现上市后的盈利增幅可能与上市前的投资者需求和在首次公开发行的高级管理人员和董事所有权变更的有关。另一方面，关于上市后的盈利能力下降可能与风险资本的参与，董事会的股东比例以及市场预估价偏差有关。关键词:首次公开发行(上市)；互联网公司；盈利能力；风险模型；生存1要点概述对于上市公司来说在理论上有一个上升趋势的盈利能力，而不是实际的盈利能力。这是因为科技公司上市比例有所增加。完成后的IPO失败风险特别高，尤其是对于一些不赚钱的企业。在投资者情绪的影响下导致消极的市场看法，关于他们的前景或不利的融资环境有可能导致一个停止的外部资金来源，从而危及公司的生存。因此，实际完成了上市后的盈利能力是一个重要的里程碑，在该公司的业务进化，因为它预示着经济的长期生存能力的坚强。相对很少知道公司达到关键首次公开发行股票里程碑的时间和能力，现存的研究已经集中在企业公司的能力达到重要里程碑之前或当时公开上市。我们试图验证可暗示所产生的影响，我们的理论框架是利用互联网产业作为我们的背景。实现盈利问题，主要是在他们无利可图的时候首次公开招股，公众和一般特点是高现金燃烧率，从而提高其长期的经济活力。既然是一个反复的趋势，高科技企业在各种新兴经济部门，从公开上市浪潮投资者的乐观之后是令人失望的表现中，我们可以获得的深刻见解：从研究的影响因素，实现盈利途径，互联网公司首次公开招股都将有助于我们进一步理解在新兴的，高科技的产业公司的创业公司发展道路和长期经济活力2引言过去几十年来，目睹形成和发展的几个非常重要的技术导向的新兴产业，如磁盘驱动器，生物技术，以及最近的互联网产业创业公司，在这种知识密集的行业越来越多，生命周期上市较早的公司中，存在着很大的不确定性和信息不对称.对一个迅速转型的从创始阶段到公众的公司，在企业上市基础上的一个承诺的盈利能力，而不是实际的盈利能力是一个不断增加的趋势，这是一个很自然的后果。虽然持续盈利能力不再是公司上市的一个要求，但在该公司的演变过程中，实际完成了上市后的盈利能力是一个重要的里程碑，因为它降低公司对于经济的长期生存能力的不确定性。在这篇文章中，我们侧重于识别公司上市时在公众认为有能力影响的可能性和上市后实现盈利的互联网公司看得见的因素。我们限制我们的研究在互联网行业，因为它代表了一种自然环境，研究长远的经济可行性是一个新兴的行业，企业倾向于上市时，他们主要是无利可图的，而且有关其未来前景有相当大的不确定性和信息不对称。实现上市后盈利假设的意义，是因为首次公开招股活动不提供同样程度的合法化分化，它在过去持续盈利能力不再是上市的一个前提，特别是在上市时期，市场是有利倾向于投资而非示范盈利。在网络热潮，投资者易于接受的口头禅是"成长不惜一切代价"，并以非理性的水平热情地提高了IPO完成后所提供的价格。事实上，投资者着眼于承诺的增长，而不是盈利能力，导致互联网创业者被外界解读成不同的典型新的合资企业，主要是因为他们能够调动大量资源以及几乎独立的业绩基准。自从互联网泡沫破灭，在2000年4月，风险资本基金干涸，许多企业已成功上市后破产或面临着严重的资金周转问题，因此，投资者的关注重点从它们以前特别关注增长前景的问题，盈利能力到他们的新的口头禅"路径-收益"。因此，市场参与者的重点不只是是否上市公司将能够实现盈利，还有“何时”或"如何尽快"。上市公司如果无法令人信服地展示一个清晰的实现利润率的路径，就将被迅速地急剧降低估价，并因此面临显着高额融资约束。由于现金流的负面影响公司也不能自给自足，因此，必须依赖于外部资金，以继续运作，但是无法筹集更多的资金将导致一个恶性循环的事件，可迅速导致退市甚至破产。因此，实际的实现上市后盈利能力代表一个重要里程碑，在进化的一个上市公司向它提供合法性和信令能力，以保持在经济上可行的，这通过曲折丘陵与不断变化的资本市场情况而定，因为它们关系到上市公司，所以通过从信令和代理理论框架支撑，我们可以分析得出。在我们的研究中，信令理论提供了理论依据，以评估该信号的影响因素，如质量管理，第三方认证机构投资者需求，以及以首次公开招股前的盈利能力估值不确定性。同样，代理理论提供了理论基础，以使我们能够审查造成的治理结构，并改变高层管理人员拥有率的时间，以达到上市后盈利能力的里程碑。我们的实证分析的基础上，危险性分析方法，作一个时间函数的一个样本以确定该因素的概率变得有利可图。在1996-2000年期间，160互联网首次公开募股发行。我们的研究提出了几项贡献。首先，我们构建一个理论框架基于代理和信令理论，以确定哪些因素可能会影响到上市公司的盈利道路。其次，我们所提供的经验证据研究经济可行性，在互联网产业新建公共事务所（盈利能力的途径和坚强的生存）。第三，我们增加了理论与实证创业文学，即聚焦于影响创业公司达到关键里程碑过渡期间的能力，又注意由私有制到公有制的转化。而以往的研究都集中于里程碑，在私人阶段确实的发展，如收到的VC资金，并成功地完成公开招股，我们的研究扩展了此文学并着眼于上市后的里程碑。最后，现存的经验证据表明，这是早期的现象。早期阶段公司属于比较新的产业，将掀起投资者乐观情绪，刺激了许诺利润的增长，但是随着时间的推移，盈利能力往往不会重演。然而，盈利性倾向仍然渺茫，并远远长于预期，导致投资者失望，并导致这些行业的企业的高失败率。因此，我们的研究有可能提供有益的经验教训，以使投资者申请时正确估值，以免下次有公司首次公开招股的时候这一现象开始重演。这篇文章如下：首先，以机构和信令理论，我们可以发展我们的假说。第二，我们描述我们的样本选择程序，以及目前的描述性统计。第三，我们描述我们的研究方法和目前我们的结果。最后，我们讨论我们的研究结果和结束文章，我们的结束语。3理论和假设信令模式和代理理论已广泛应用在金融经济学，管理和战略文献分析范围，广泛的经济现象，围绕相关