FAO：全球粮食安全挑战及驱动因素

March2023

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E

COUNCIL

HundredandSeventy-secondSession

Rome,24-28April2023

Globalfoodsecuritychallengesanditsdrivers:conflictsandwarsin

Ukraineandothercountries,slowdownsanddownturns,and

climatechange

Executivesummary

BuildingontheCouncildocumentCL171/3,whichprovidedanupdateontheglobalfoodsecuritysituationandFAO’sresponse,thepresentdocumentconsidersthechallengestoglobalfoodsecurityanditsdriversanditalsoincludesaspecificsectionontheimpactsofthewarinUkraineonglobalfoodsecurity.Itidentifiescurrentandlonger-termthreatstoglobalfoodsecurity,anddescribesactionsneededtomitigatetheirimpacts,particularlyonthemostvulnerable.Themountingtrendsofchronichunger,acutefoodinsecurityandmalnutritionarearesultofcompoundingeffectsofconflictsandwars,climatevariabilityandweatherextremes,economicslowdownsanddownturns,increasingresourceconstraintsandsocialandpoliticalinstability.Underlyingconditions,suchaspovertyandinequality,sometimesunderpinnedbyunfavourablepolicies,hamperimprovementsinfoodsecurityandnutritionaloutcomes.Thelastsectionofthedocumentbrieflydescribesthemainactionsthatneedtobetakentoovercomethechallenges.

SuggestedactionbytheCouncil

TheCouncilisinvitedtonotetheinformationinthedocumentandprovideguidanceasdeemedappropriate.

Queriesonthesubstantivecontentofthisdocumentmaybeaddressedto:

MáximoToreroCullen

ChiefEconomist

Tel:+390657050869

Email:

Maximo.Torero@

Documentscanbeconsultedat

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I.Introduction

1.In2022,theworldcontinuedtocopewithoverlappingshocksandupsettingrecoveryfromtheCOVID-19pandemic.BuildingontheCouncildocumentCL171/3,whichprovidedanupdateontheglobalfoodsecuritysituationandassociatedrisks,andpresentedanoverviewofFAO’sworkinresponsetothecrisis,thepresentdocumentconsidersglobalfoodsecuritychallengesanditsdrivers,includingconflictsandwarsinUkraineandothercountries,economicslowdownsanddownturns,andclimatechange.Itidentifiescurrentandlonger-termthreatstoglobalfoodsecurityanddescribestheactionsneededtomitigatetheimpactsofthecrisis,particularlyonthemostvulnerable.

II.Globalfoodsecuritysituation

Chronicfoodinsecurity

2.Thelatesteditionof“TheStateofFoodSecurityandNutritionintheWorld(SOFI)”report,releasedinJuly2022,estimatedthatthenumberofundernourishedpeopleintheworldrosetoasmanyas828millionin2021,up150millionsincetheoutbreakoftheCOVID-19pandemicand

46millionmorepeoplethanin2020.Afterremainingrelativelyunchangedsince2015,theprevalenceofundernourishment(PoU)intheworldjumpedfrom8.0percentin2019to9.3percentin2020androsein2021,thoughataslowerpace,to9.8percent.

3.HungercontinuedtoriseinmostofAfrica,AsiaandLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanregionsin2021,butataslowerpacewithrespecttothepreviousyear.Comparedto2019,thelargestincreasewasobservedinAfrica,bothintermsofpercentageandnumberofundernourishedpeople.

4.Projectionssuggestthatnearly670millionpeoplewouldstillbeundernourishedgloballyin2030,78millionmorethaninascenariounderwhichthepandemichadnotoccurred.

5.Estimatesoftheglobalprevalenceofmoderateorseverefoodinsecurity,basedontheanalysisofdataonpeople’sreportedexperiencesassociatedwithlimitedaccesstofood,collectedusingtheFoodInsecurityExperienceScale(FIES),showthat,afterincreasingsharplyin2020(350millionmorecomparedtobeforetheoutbreakoftheCOVID-19pandemic),figuresremainedmostlyunchangedin2021,ataround2.3billionpeople,whichisnearly30percentoftheglobalpopulation.

6.Ofgreatconcernistheincreaseintheprevalenceofseverefoodinsecurityfrom9.3percentin2019to11.7percentin2021–theequivalentof207millionpeopleinonlytwoyears,providingadditionalevidenceofadeterioratingsituationmainlyforpeoplealreadyfacingserioushardships.

7.Furthermore,itwasestimatedthatnearly3.1billionpeoplegloballycouldnotaffordahealthydietin2020,anincreaseof112millioncomparedto2019,duetohigherfoodprices.

8.Preparationofthe2023editionoftheSOFIreport,whichwillexaminethewaysurbanizationisreshapingfoodsystemsandimpactingfoodsecurityandnutrition,isunderway.

Acutefoodinsecurity

9.Overthepastsevenyears,thenumberofpeoplefacingacutefoodinsecurity,bothintermsofabsolutenumbersandthepercentageoftheanalysedpopulationinthethreehighestacutefoodinsecurityphases,witnessedanupwardtrend.Thisreflectsthedeterioratingfoodsecuritycontextsinanumberofcountriesbutalsoanincreasedavailabilityofdataandbroadergeographicalcoverageoftheanalysis.

10.AccordingtotheSeptember2022updateoftheGlobalReportonFoodCrises(GRFC),upto

205millionpeoplewereprojectedtofaceacutefoodinsecurityandtobeinneedofurgentassistance(IPC/CHPhase3oraboveorequivalent)in45countriesin2022.Ifadditionaldatafromthelatestavailableanalysisof2022isincludedforeightcountriesandterritories,thisnumberisprojectedtoreachupto222millionpeoplein53countries/territoriescoveredbytheGRFC2022.Thefigureishigherthantheonepresentedinthepreviouseditionofthereport,with193millionpeopleexperiencinghighlevelsofacutefoodinsecurityin53countries(GRFC2022).Thelatestsituation

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1FSINandGlobalNetworkAgainstFoodCrises.2022.GRFC2022Mid-YearUpdate.Rome.

willbeprovidedinthe2023GRFC,whichwillbereleasedinMay.However,preliminaryestimatessuggestthattheupwardtrendwillcontinue.

11.ThenumberofpeoplefacingEmergency(IPC/CHPhase4)–anextremelyseveresituationwhereurgentactionisneededtosavelivesandlivelihoodsandthefinalalerttoavoidextremeoutcomes–significantlyincreasedinthepastsevenyears,from14.5millionpeoplein14countriesin

2016to39millionacross34countriesin2022.1Thenumberofcountrieswithpopulationsfacing

Catastrophe(IPC/CHPhase5)issimilarlysteadilyincreasing–fromtwocountriesin2016tothreecountriesin2020,fourin2021,andsevenin2022.AsofJanuary2023,Catastrophe(IPC/CHPhase5)isalreadyprojectedforthepopulationsofsixcountries.

III.Driversoffoodinsecurity

12.Mountingtrendsofchronichunger,acutefoodinsecurityandmalnutritionarearesultofcompoundingeffectsofconflicts,climatevariabilityandweatherextremes,increasingresourceconstraints,economicdifficultiesandsocialandpoliticalinstability.Underlyingconditions,suchaspovertyandinequality,sometimesunderpinnedbyunfavourablepolicies,hampereffortsaimedatimprovingfoodsecurityandnutritionaloutcomes.

13.The2022GRFCidentifiedconflictandinsecurityastheprimarydriverofacutefoodinsecurityin2021,affecting139.1millionpeoplein24countries/territories.Economicshocksandweatherextremeswereacknowledgedasmajordriversofacutefoodinsecurityaffecting,respectively,30.2millionpeoplein21countriesand23.5millionpeopleineightcountries.Theincreasingimpactofeconomicshocksonacutefoodinsecurityfollowsaworryingtrendaswitnessedoverthepastyears.

Conflictandinsecurity

14.Conflictsandinsecuritydestroylivelihoodsanddisplacepopulations,oftenforlongperiodswithuncertainprospectsofreturnandrecovery.Conflictandhungeraremutuallyreinforcingandneedtobetackledtogether.Withoutsignificantimprovementsinconflictresolutionbasedonastrongandimmediatepoliticalwill,nosubstantialandlastingfoodsecuritygainscanbeachievedandviceversa.

15.In2000,thetotalnumberofconflicts(includingstate-basedviolence,non-stateviolenceandone-sidedviolence)trackedbytheUppsalaConflictDataProgramtotalled121,increasingto175in

2017.Thelatestdataindicate170conflictsin2021,whileconflictandinsecuritywereacriticaldriverofacutefoodinsecurityinallofthe10largestfoodcrises:Afghanistan,theDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,Ethiopia,Haiti,northernNigeria,Pakistan,SouthSudan,theSudan,theSyrianArabRepublicandYemen.In2022,conflictandinsecurityremainedadriverofacutefoodinsecurityinallthesecountries.

16.ThewarinUkraineengagingtwomajoragriculturalcountries,hasaggravatedtheglobalfoodinsecuritysituation(seepartIVofthisdocumentfordetailsonthespecificimpactsofthewarinUkraine).TheRussianFederationandUkrainearemajorproducersoffoodcommoditiesintheworld.Bothcountriesarenetexportersofagriculturalproductsandplayleadingsupplyrolesinglobalmarketsoffoodstuffs,whereexportablesuppliesareoftenhighlyconcentrated.Furthermore,theRussianFederationisatopexporteroffertilizersandakeyplayerintheglobalenergymarket.Thewarhasposedanumberofriskstofoodandagriculturalmarketsandtrade,includingtradeandlogisticsrisks,pricerisks,productionrisksandenergyrisks.Manyleastdevelopedcountries(LDCs)andlow-incomefood-deficitcountries(LIFDCs)arehighlydependentontheRussianFederationandUkrainefortheirimportsoffoodstuffsandfertilizer.

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Climatevariabilityandweatherextremes

17.Greaterclimatevariabilitynotonlyimpactsthelevelofagriculturalproduction,butitcarriesincreasedrisksofextremeweatherevents,changingplantingpatterns,andpestanddiseaseoutbreaks.Overthelongerterm,changingweatherpatternsalsocontributetogreaterpressureonlimitednaturalresources,provokinglocaldisputesthatnegativelyimpactfoodsecurityandnutrition,andeventuallydrivemigrationwhenagriculturefailstoprovideadequatelivelihoodopportunities.

18.Thenumberofweather-relateddisastershasrisen.TheWorldBankindicatedthatbetween

1976and1990,smallcountries2werefacedonaveragewithsevenclimatedisastersperyear,whilebetween2006and2021thisfigureincreasedto13,withthelargestincreaserelatedtodroughtevents.Thenumberofstormsremainedrelativelystable,althoughwithmoredamagingconsequences.

19.In2022,largepartsofthenorthernhemispherewereexceptionallyhotanddry,withmanyriversatcriticallylowlevels,amplifyingsupplychainbottlenecks.Forinstance,inPakistan,recordbreakingraininJulyandAugustledtoextensivefloodingandapproximately1700deaths,with

7.9millionpeopledisplacedand33millionaffected.3InEastAfrica,asofMarch2023,rainfallhasbeenbelowaverageforfiveconsecutiveseasons,thelongestsequencein40years,witharealriskofasixthoneforthcoming(MarchtoMay2023).

20.Smallholders,whoseresiliencecapacityissubjecttomultipleshocks,areparticularlyvulnerable.InAfrica,70to80percentofsmallholderfarmersaredependentonagricultureandrenewablenaturalresourcesfortheirincomes,employment,food,nutritionandoverallwellbeing.Overthelast10years,climateextremesaffectedanaverageof16millionpeopleinAfricaandcausedanestimatedUSD0.67billionindamageannually.4

21.Theuncertaintyofclimatechangeandthecomplexfeedbackloopsbetweenclimateandlandpresentagriculturewithamplifiedlevelsofriskthatneedtobemanaged.Assessmentsoftheplanet’snaturalresourceshighlightoveruse,misuse,degradation,pollutionandincreasingscarcity.5

Human-induceddegradationaffects35percent(1660millionha)ofagriculturalland,withafifthofhuman-induceddegradedlandlocatedinsub-SaharanAfrica.

22.Agricultureaccountsfor72percentofglobalfreshwaterwithdrawals.TheSustainableDevelopmentGoal(SDG)indicator6.4.2onwaterstress,takenasanoverallmeasureofphysicalwaterscarcity,averaged18percent(correspondingtono-stress)in2018atthegloballevel,whileitwasabove100percent(criticalstress)inNorthernAfrica.6Climatechangecanmodifyandincreasefutureriskandvulnerabilityofcropproductionrelatedtowatersupplyandwateravailability.Moreover,theglobalwatercyclewillcontinuetointensifyasglobaltemperaturesrise,withprecipitationandsurfacewaterflowsprojectedtobecomemorevariableovermostlandregionswithinseasonsandfromyeartoyear.Thesewillallhaveimpactsontheagriculturalsectorsandrelatedvaluechains,livelihoodsandecosystems.7

23.Climatechangecanalsoimpactbiodiversityandthusfoodsecurityandnutrition.Biodiversitysuppliesecosystemservices,includingcreatingandmaintaininghealthysoils,pollinatingplants,controllingpests,providinghabitatforwildlife,andcontainingspeciesvitaltoagricultural

production.Biodiversity,whilevulnerabletoclimatechange,makesproductionsystemsandlivelihoodsmoreresilienttoshocksandstresses,includingthosecausedbyclimateevents.8

2Countrieswithapopulationof1.5millionpeopleorless3

/doc_num.php?explnum_id=11359

4

/3/nc665en/nc665en.pdf

5TheStateoftheWorld’sLandandWaterResourcesforFoodandAgriculture–Systemsatbreakingpoint:

/3/cb7654en/cb7654en.pdf

6

/3/cb1447en/cb1447en.pdf

7FAOStrategyonClimateChange2022-31:

/3/cc2274en/cc2274en.pdf

8

/3/CA3129EN/CA3129EN.pdf

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Economicdrivers

24.Economicshocksinitiateeconomicslowdownsordownturnswithbroadfoodsecurityimpacts.Athouseholdlevel,theyreducelivelihoodopportunitiesandincomes,whileatthenationallevel,theyconstrainthecapacitytomaintainlong-terminvestments(researchanddevelopment,infrastructure,etc.)oreventopayforshort-termneeds(health,socialsafetynets,etc.).Recessionsalsospurlossofconfidenceinforeigninvestorsandcapitalflight,leadingtocurrencyanddebtcrisis.Economicshocksprolongandworsentheseverityoffoodcrises,especiallyincountriesexperiencingacutefoodinsecuritythatrequiresurgenthumanitarianassistance.

25.Conflictandeconomicslowdownsaremutuallyreinforcing.Notonlyisconflictthemaindriverbehindfoodcrises,butitalsotriggerseconomicslowdowns,downturnsanddeepeconomicrecessionsthatcompoundtheseverityanddurationofthefoodcrisis.

26.Economicdependencyoncommoditiesworsensthecapacityforcopingwithshocks.Changesincommoditypricesaffecttherelativevalueoftrade.Forinstance,80percentofthecountriesthatexperiencedariseinhungerduringrecenteconomicshockswerehighlydependentontradeinprimarycommodities.Foreignexchangedrains,depreciationanddevaluationofcurrenciesmaypassthroughtheeconomicsystem,resultinginrisingdomesticprices,unemploymentandincomelosses.

27.Thelackofeconomicstabilitywidensinequalitiesandthreatenspovertyalleviationandfoodsecurity,asprovenduringtheCOVID-19pandemic.Economicinstabilityforcespoorhouseholdstoemploynegativecopingstrategies,bolsteringstructuralfoodinsecurityandunevendistributionalimpacts.Lossofrealincomeleadstocutsinspendingonbasicservices,suchaseducationandhealth,andpusheshouseholdstoreducethequantityofconsumedfoodand/orshiftawayfromnutrient-richtowardsmoreenergy-densefoods,underminingthenutritionalstatusofthepopulation.

28.Fooddemandislesssensitivetoshort-termincomevariation,andagricultureisgenerallyindependentofthebusinesscycle.Althoughtheirresilienceactsasastabilizer,ruraleconomies–andsmallholdersinparticularasnetbuyersofvariousgoods–alsosufferfromhighinflation.Decreasesinremittancesaffectincomes,andareturntoruralareasbythoseescapingurbanunemploymentreducespercapitaincomeinagriculture,limitingopportunitiestomaintaininvestmentlevels.

29.Economicslowdowns,stagnationandoutrightrecessionsremainpartoftheglobaleconomiclandscape.IntheyearsprecedingtheCOVID-19pandemic,growthofrealpercapitagrossdomesticproduct(GDP)declinedonaverageinsevensub-regions,fiveofwhichregisterednegativegrowthindifferentyears(SOFI,2019).Thesefivesub-regionswerehomein2018toalmost263millionundernourishedpeopleandmorethan56millionstuntedchildrenundertheageoffive.

30.Atthegloballevel,in2022,theworldGDPwas3.1percentlowerthanitsexpectedlevelwithoutCOVID-19,withslowergrowthinlowandmiddleincomecountries.ThepandemichasexacerbatedinequalitieswithinandacrosscountriesduetotheunequalpatternofeconomicrecoveryamongcountriesandunrecoveredincomelossesamongthosemostaffectedbyCOVID-19.Thiseconomicgrowthlosswasestimatedtohaveincreasedthenumberofchronicallyhungrypeoplein

2021byabout150millionsincetheoutbreakofthepandemic(SOFI,2022).

31.ThewarinUkrainehasresultedinincreaseduncertaintyandaggravatedthemacroeconomicchallengestheworldisfacing.Ittriggeredrippleeffectsthroughmultiplechannels,includingcommodityandenergymarkets,trade,financialflowsandthedisplacementofmillionsofpeople.

IV.TheimpactofthewarinUkraineonglobalfoodsecurity

32.ThewarinUkraineengagedtwomajorproducersofagriculturalcommoditiesintheworld.BothUkraineandtheRussianFederationarenetexportersofagriculturalproductsandplayleadingsupplyrolesintheworldmarketsoffoodcommodities,whereexportablesuppliesareoftenhighlyconcentrated.Furthermore,Russiaisatopexporteroffertilizers.

33.Theircriticalroleisallthemoreevidentfromatradeperspective.Theyarekeyexportersofbasicfoodstomanycountriesthatarehighlydependentonimportedfoodstuffsandfertilizers,

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includingmanyLeastDevelopedCountries(LDCs)andLow-IncomeFood-DeficitCountries(LIFDCs).

34.Consideringtheleadingroleofbothcountries,itisclearthatthewarhasresultedinanumberofnewriskstofoodandagriculturalmarketsandtrade.

35.Asaresult,thewarinUkrainecontinuestobeasourceofuncertaintyforglobalagriculturalmarkets.ReducedplantingsinUkrainemeanthatothercountrieswillneedtoproduceadditionalgrainsandoilseedstohelprebuildglobalstocksandmoderatepricelevels.

ProspectsfortheUkrainianGrainsSector

36.InUkraine,severefinancialconstraints,infrastructuredamageandobstructedaccesstofieldsinpartsofthecountryhaveresultedinanestimated40percentyear-on-yearreductioninthe2023winterwheatarea,andawellbelow-averagewheatoutputisanticipatedin2023.

37.TheMinistryofAgrarianPolicyandFoodofUkraineforecaststhatin2023sownareascanreducebyatleast20percentcomparedto2021duetotemporaryoccupationandminecontamination.AccordingtotheStateEmergencyService,upto25,000km2ofagriculturallandareestimatedtobecontaminatedwithexplosives.

38.ThewarcausedsignificantdamagetotheinfrastructureandlogisticscapacitiesinUkraine,includinginlandtransportationnetworks,seaports,aswellasstorageandprocessingfacilities.Currently,thetotalavailablestoragecapacityinUkraineis69-71milliontons.It’s15-17milliontonesor20percentlesscomparedtothepre-warcapacity(86milliontons).Theplasticstoragesleeves,providedbytheinternationaldonors,providedadditional7milliontons.TheestimatedrepairandreplacementcostforthestoragefacilitiesapproachUSD1.1billion.9

39.ThesedamagessignificantlyloweredUkraine'sexportingcapacityandraisedthecostoftradinggrainandproductioncosts.10Whilesignificanteffortshavebeenmadetocompensateforsomeofthesedisruptions,solutionsarefrequentlyinsufficientoronlyprovidetemporaryrelief.Thedistributionofsleevebags,forexample,increasedthecountry'sstoragecapacitiesaspreviouslymentioned,buttheseremaininadequate.Inadditiontohigherstoragecosts,sleevebagsmightalsolowerthequalityofthestoredgrain.Insufficientstoragespacealsoimposedeconomicpressuresonfarmers,whichforcedthemtosellatalossandmightreducefutureplantings.

40.Thewarhasalsoimpactedmaritimetradelogistics,disruptingtheoperationsofkeyseaportsintheglobalgraintrade.Tomitigatethesechallenges,theBlackSeaGrainInitiativeandotherinternationalprogrammeshavebeeninstrumental,includingthepromotionofalternativetransportationmethods,suchastrainandriverfreightthroughtheso-calledSolidarityLanes.

41.AlthoughincreasedsupplylevelsandtheeasingoftradedisruptionsforUkraine(sinceAugust,thankstotheBlackSeaGrainInitiative,whichby12Marchhasshipped24millionmetrictonsequivalenttoUSD9.4billion)havehelpedbringglobalwheatpricesandothercoarsegrainsdownfromthehighlevelsreachedin2022,globalwheatpricesremainelevated.InFebruary2023,

9KSE,November2022-

https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Damages_report_issue2-1.pdf

/BasedontherapiddamageassessmentmethodologycompliantwiththeonesoftheWorldBankandFAO.

10BasedontheFAOUkraine,assessmentontheimpactofthewaronagriculturalenterpriseswithlandupto

200ha,nation-widesurvey,forthcoming(April2023)thefollowingproblemshadbeenidentified:(a)over

90percentoftheagriculturalenterprisesinvolvedincropsproductionreportedanincreaseintheproductioncost,withovertwothirdsofthem(81percent)recordingsignificant/drasticincrease,meaningover25percentofincreasedproductioncostssincethestartofthewar;(b)almost90percentoftheagriculturalenterprisesinvolvedincropsproductionreportedadecreaseinsalerevenues,withover70percentofthemrecordingasignificant/drasticdecrease;and(c)aapproximately11percentoftheagriculturalenterprisesreportedtohavepartoftheirlandpotentiallycontaminatedbyunexplodedordinances.Oblastsalongthefront-lineappearedtobethemostaffected,withoveroneeveryfour(26percent)respondentsreportingso.

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globalwheatpricesweredown5percentfromtheirFebruary2022level,butstill29percentabovetheir5-year-average-Februarylevel.11

42.However,theseeffortshaveyettorestorethepre-warexportpaceandcontinuetobecostly.InthecaseoftheBlackSeaGrainInitiative,thereducedscopeintermsofportandroutecoverageremainlimitingfactors.

43.ShippingfromUkraineisalsoimpactedbyhighinsurancecostsassomereinsurershaveexcludedtheBlackSeafromcoverageandbanksarehesitantinfinancingdealsfromtheBlackSeaduetothehighrisksinvolvedandfearofpotentialsanctions.Intheabsenceofanendtotheconflict,significantuncertaintycontinuestosurroundUkraine’sabilitytofarm,harvestandtradeinupcominggrowingseasons.

ExportrestrictionsasaresultoftheWarinUkraine

44.Exportrestrictionshaveimpactedboththefood,feedandfertilizermarkets.InthissectionthefocusisonwhathasbeentriggeredandismoreindirectlylinkedtothewarinUkraine.

45.2022startedwithrestrictionsonvegetableoilandoilseeds,especiallydrivenbysomeshortagesassociatedwithbadharvestin2021.ThewarinUkrainecreatedanadditionalshockthroughthesunfloweroilmarketsandthedisruptionofthesupplycomingfromUkraineandtheRussianFederation(thetwocountriesrepresentthreequartersoftheworldmarketofsunfloweroil).StartinginJuneandJuly,restrictionsontheseproductswerephasedoutinmostplaces.

46.AtthetimeofthebeginningofthewarinUkraine,andasaresponsetoit,restrictionsonmaizeandwheat(twocoreexportsofUkraine)jumped.RestrictionsonmaizestartedtobephasedoutinMay-June2022,andonlyexporttaxesonRussianFederationwheatremainanimportantrestrictionaswellastheexportcontrolsputinplacebyIndiaonitsownwheatexports.

47.StartinginSeptember2022,wehaveseennewrestrictionsintheexportofrice(fromIndia),raisingsomethreatsforthisnarrowmarket.Thesepoliciesweredrivenbyaseriesoflocalshocksonsupply(heatwaveinIndia,thenfloodinPakistan),butalsoasaresponsetothedemandshockcomingfromthewarinUkraine:withveryhighpricesoffeedbasedonmaizeandwheat,thedemandshiftedtobrokenricein