2023欧盟AI网络安全与标准化报告

CYBERSECURITYOFAIANDSTANDARDISATION

0

MARCH2023

CYBERSECURITYOFAIANDSTANDARDISATION

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10

ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation

Definition

AI

ArtificialIntelligence

CEN-CENELEC

EuropeanCommitteeforStandardisation–EuropeanCommitteeforElectrotechnicalStandardisation

CIA

Confidentiality,IntegrityandAvailability

EN

EuropeanStandard

ESO

EuropeanStandardisationOrganisation

ETSI

EuropeanTelecommunicationsStandardsInstitute

GR

GroupReport

ICT

InformationAndCommunicationsTechnology

ISG

IndustrySpecificationGroup

ISO

InternationalOrganizationforStandardization

IT

InformationTechnology

JTC

JointTechnicalCommittee

ML

MachineLearning

NIST

NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology

R&D

ResearchAndDevelopment

SAI

SecurityofArtificialIntelligence

SC

Subcommittee

SDO

Standards-DevelopingOrganisation

TR

TechnicalReport

TS

TechnicalSpecifications

WI

WorkItem

ABOUTENISA

TheEuropeanUnionAgencyforCybersecurity,ENISA,istheUnion’sagencydedicatedtoachievingahighcommonlevelofcybersecurityacrossEurope.Establishedin2004andstrengthenedbytheEUCybersecurityAct,theEuropeanUnionAgencyforCybersecuritycontributestoEUcyberpolicy,enhancesthetrustworthinessofICTproducts,servicesandprocesseswithcybersecuritycertificationschemes,cooperateswithMemberStatesandEUbodies,andhelpsEuropeprepareforthecyberchallengesoftomorrow.Throughknowledgesharing,capacitybuildingandawarenessraising,theAgencyworkstogetherwithitskeystakeholderstostrengthentrustintheconnectedeconomy,toboostresilienceoftheUnion’sinfrastructure,and,ultimately,tokeepEurope’ssocietyandcitizensdigitallysecure.MoreinformationaboutENISAanditsworkcanbefoundhere:

www.enisa.europa.eu.

CONTACT

Forcontactingtheauthorspleaseuse

team@enisa.europa.eu

Formediaenquiriesaboutthispaper,pleaseuse

press@enisa.europa.eu.

AUTHORS

P.Bezombes,S.Brunessaux,S.Cadzow

EDITOR(S)

ENISA:

E.Magonara

S.Gorniak

P.Magnabosco

E.Tsekmezoglou

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

WewouldliketothanktheJointResearchCentreandtheEuropeanCommissionfortheiractivecontributionandcommentsduringthedraftingstage.Also,wewouldliketothanktheENISAAdHocExpertGrouponArtificialIntelligence(AI)cybersecurityforthevaluablefeed-backandcommentsinvalidatingthisreport.

LEGALNOTICE

ThispublicationrepresentstheviewsandinterpretationsofENISA,unlessstatedotherwise.ItdoesnotendorsearegulatoryobligationofENISAorofENISAbodiespursuanttotheRegulation(EU)No2019/881.

ENISAhastherighttoalter,updateorremovethepublicationoranyofitscontents.Itisintendedforinformationpurposesonlyanditmustbeaccessiblefreeofcharge.AllreferencestoitoritsuseasawholeorpartiallymustcontainENISAasitssource.

Third-partysourcesarequotedasappropriate.ENISAisnotresponsibleorliableforthecontentoftheexternalsourcesincludingexternalwebsitesreferencedinthispublication.

NeitherENISAnoranypersonactingonitsbehalfisresponsiblefortheusethatmightbemadeoftheinformationcontainedinthispublication.

ENISAmaintainsitsintellectualpropertyrightsinrelationtothispublication.

COPYRIGHTNOTICE

©EuropeanUnionAgencyforCybersecurity(ENISA),2023

ThispublicationislicencedunderCC-BY4.0“Unlessotherwisenoted,thereuseofthisdocumentisauthorisedundertheCreativeCommonsAttribution4.0International(CCBY4.0)licence/licenses/by/4.0/).Thismeansthatreuseisallowed,providedthatappropriatecreditisgivenandanychangesareindicated”.

Coverimage©.

ForanyuseorreproductionofphotosorothermaterialthatisnotundertheENISAcopyright,permissionmustbesoughtdirectlyfromthecopyrightholders.

ISBN978-92-9204-616-3,DOI10.2824/277479,TP-03-23-011-EN-C

TABLEOFCONTENTS

TOC\o"1-2"\h\z\u

INTRODUCTION 8

DOCUMENTPURPOSEANDOBJECTIVES 8

TARGETAUDIENCEANDPREREQUISITES 8

STRUCTUREOFTHESTUDY 8

2.SCOPEOFTHEREPORT:DEFINITIONOFAIANDCYBERSECURITY

OFAI

9

2.1ARTIFICIALINTELLIGENCE

9

2.2CYBERSECURITYOFAI

10

3.STANDARDISATIONINSUPPORTOFCYBERSECURITYOFAI

12

3.1RELEVANTACTIVITIESBYTHEMAINSTANDARDS-DEVELOPINGORGANISATIONS

12

3.1.1CEN-CENELEC

12

3.1.2ETSI

13

3.1.3ISO-IEC

14

3.1.4Others

14

4.ANALYSISOFCOVERAGE

16

4.1STANDARDISATIONINSUPPORTOFCYBERSECURITYOFAI–NARROWSENSE

16

4.2STANDARDISATIONINSUPPORTOFTHECYBERSECURITYOFAI–TRUSTWORTHINESS

19

4.3CYBERSECURITYANDSTANDARDISATIONINTHECONTEXTOFTHEDRAFTAIACT

21

5.CONCLUSIONS

24

5.1WRAP-UP

24

5.2RECOMMENDATIONS

25

5.2.1Recommendationstoallorganisations

25

5.2.2Recommendationstostandards-developingorganisations

25

5.2.3RecommendationsinpreparationfortheimplementationofthedraftAIAct

25

5.3FINALOBSERVATIONS

26

AANNEX:

27

A.1SELECTIONOFISO27000SERIESSTANDARDSRELEVANTTOTHECYBERSECURITYOFAI

27

RELEVANTISO/IECSTANDARDSPUBLISHEDORPLANNED/UNDERDEVELOPMENT 29

CEN-CENELECJOINTTECHNICALCOMMITTEE21ANDDRAFTAIACTREQUIREMENTS 31

ETSIACTIVITIESANDDRAFTAIACTREQUIREMENTS 33

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

Theoverallobjectiveofthepresentdocumentistoprovideanoverviewofstandards(existing,beingdrafted,underconsiderationandplanned)relatedtothecybersecurityofartificialintelligence(AI),assesstheircoverageandidentifygapsinstandardisation.ItdoessobyconsideringthespecificitiesofAI,andinparticularmachinelearning,andbyadoptingabroadviewofcybersecurity,encompassingboththe‘traditional’confidentiality–integrity–availabilityparadigmandthebroaderconceptofAItrustworthiness.Finally,thereportexamineshowstandardisationcansupporttheimplementationofthecybersecurityaspectsembeddedintheproposedEUregulationlayingdownharmonisedrulesonartificialintelligence(COM(2021)206final)(draftAIAct).

ThereportdescribesthestandardisationlandscapecoveringAI,bydepictingtheactivitiesofthemainStandards-DevelopingOrganisations(SDOs)thatseemtobeguidedbyconcernaboutinsufficientknowledgeoftheapplicationofexistingtechniquestocounterthreatsandvulnerabilitiesarisingfromAI.Thisresultsintheongoingdevelopmentofadhocreportsandguidance,andofadhocstandards.

Thereportarguesthatexistinggeneralpurposetechnicalandorganisationalstandards(suchasISO-IEC27001andISO-IEC9001)cancontributetomitigatingsomeoftherisksfacedbyAIwiththehelpofspecificguidanceonhowtheycanbeappliedinanAIcontext.Thisconsiderationstemsfromthefactthat,inessence,AIissoftwareandthereforesoftwaresecuritymeasurescanbetransposedtotheAIdomain.

Thereportalsospecifiesthatthisapproachisnotexhaustiveandthatithassomelimitations.Forexample,whilethereportfocusesonsoftwareaspects,thenotionofAIcanincludebothtechnicalandorganisationalelementsbeyondsoftware,suchashardwareorinfrastructure.Otherexamplesincludethefactthatdeterminingappropriatesecuritymeasuresreliesonasystem-specificanalysis,andthefactthatsomeaspectsofcybersecurityarestillthesubjectofresearchanddevelopment,andthereforemightbenotmatureenoughtobeexhaustivelystandardised.Inaddition,existingstandardsseemnottoaddressspecificaspectssuchasthetraceabilityandlineageofbothdataandAIcomponents,ormetricson,forexample,robustness.

Thereportalsolooksbeyondthemereprotectionofassets,ascybersecuritycanbeconsideredasinstrumentaltothecorrectimplementationoftrustworthinessfeaturesofAIand–conversely

–thecorrectimplementationoftrustworthinessfeaturesiskeytoensuringcybersecurity.Inthiscontext,itisnotedthatthereisariskthattrustworthinessishandledseparatelywithinAI-specificandcybersecurity-specificstandardisationinitiatives.Oneexampleofanareawherethismighthappenisconformityassessment.

Lastbutnotleast,thereportcomplementstheobservationsabovebyextendingtheanalysistothedraftAIAct.Firstly,thereportstressestheimportanceoftheinclusionofcybersecurityaspectsintheriskassessmentofhigh-risksystemsinordertodeterminethecybersecurityrisksthatarespecifictotheintendeduseofeachsystem.Secondly,thereporthighlightsthelackofstandardscoveringthecompetencesandtoolsoftheactorsperformingconformityassessments.Thirdly,itnotesthatthegovernancesystemsdrawnupbythedraftAIActandthe

CybersecurityAct(CSA)1shouldworkinharmonytoavoidduplicationofeffortsatnationallevel.

Finally,thereportconcludesthatsomestandardisationgapsmightbecomeapparentonlyastheAItechnologiesadvanceandwithfurtherstudyofhowstandardisationcansupportcybersecurity.

1Regulation(EU)2019/881oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof17April2019onENISA(theEuropeanUnionAgencyforCybersecurity)andoninformationandcommunicationstechnologycybersecuritycertificationandrepealingRegulation(EU)No526/2013(CybersecurityAct)(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/881/oj).

INTRODUCTION

DOCUMENTPURPOSEANDOBJECTIVES

Theoverallobjectiveofthepresentdocumentistoprovideanoverviewofstandards(existing,beingdrafted,underconsiderationandplanned)relatedtothecybersecurityofartificialintelligence(AI),assesstheircoverageandidentifygapsinstandardisation.ThereportisintendedtocontributetotheactivitiespreparatorytotheimplementationoftheproposedEUregulationlayingdownharmonisedrulesonartificialintelligence(COM(2021)206final)(thedraftAIAct)onaspectsrelevanttocybersecurity.

TARGETAUDIENCEANDPREREQUISITES

ThetargetaudienceofthisreportincludesanumberofdifferentstakeholdersthatareconcernedbythecybersecurityofAIandstandardisation.

Theprimaryaddresseesofthisreportarestandards-developingorganisations(SDOs)andpublicsector/governmentbodiesdealingwiththeregulationofAItechnologies.

Theambitionofthereportistobeausefultoolthatcaninformabroadersetofstakeholdersoftheroleofstandardsinhelpingtoaddresscybersecurityissues,inparticular:

academiaandtheresearchcommunity;

theAItechnicalcommunity,AIcybersecurityexpertsandAIexperts(designers,developers,machinelearning(ML)experts,datascientists,etc.)withaninterestindevelopingsecuresolutionsandinintegratingsecurityandprivacybydesignintheirsolutions;

businesses(includingsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises)thatmakeuseofAIsolutionsand/orareengagedincybersecurity,includingoperatorsofessentialservices.

Thereaderisexpectedtohaveadegreeoffamiliaritywithsoftwaredevelopmentandwiththeconfidentiality,integrityandavailability(CIA)securitymodel,andwiththetechniquesofbothvulnerabilityanalysisandriskanalysis.

STRUCTUREOFTHESTUDY

Thereportisstructuredasfollows:

definitionoftheperimeteroftheanalysis(Chapter

2

):introductiontotheconceptsofAIandcybersecurityofAI;

inventoryofstandardisationactivitiesrelevanttothecybersecurityofAI(Chapter

3

):overviewofstandardisationactivities(bothAI-specificandnon-AIspecific)supportingthecybersecurityofAI;

analysisofcoverage(Chapter

4

):analysisofthecoverageofthemostrelevantstandardsidentifiedinChapter3withrespecttotheCIAsecuritymodelandtotrustworthinesscharacteristicssupportingcybersecurity;

wrap-upandconclusions(Chapter

5

):buildingontheprevioussections,recommendationsonactionstoensurestandardisationsupporttothecybersecurityofAI,andonpreparationfortheimplementationofthedraftAIAct.

SCOPEOFTHEREPORT:DEFINITIONOFAIANDCYBERSECURITYOFAI

ARTIFICIALINTELLIGENCE

UnderstandingAIanditsscopeseemstobetheveryfirststeptowardsdefiningcybersecurityofAI.Still,acleardefinitionandscopeofAIhaveproventobeelusive.TheconceptofAIisevolvingandthedebateoverwhatitis,andwhatitisnot,isstilllargelyunresolved–partlyduetotheinfluenceofmarketingbehindtheterm‘AI’.Evenatthescientificlevel,theexactscopeofAIremainsverycontroversial.Inthiscontext,numerousforumshaveadopted/proposeddefinitionsofAI.2

Initsdraftversion,theAIActproposesadefinitioninArticle3(1):

‘artificialintelligencesystem’(AIsystem)meanssoftwarethatisdevelopedwithoneormoreofthetechniquesandapproacheslistedinAnnexIandcan,foragivensetofhuman-definedobjectives,generateoutputssuchascontent,predictions,recommendations,ordecisionsinfluencingtheenvironmentstheyinteractwith.ThetechniquesandapproachesreferredtoinAnnexIare:

Machinelearningapproaches,includingsupervised,unsupervisedandreinforcementlearning,usingawidevarietyofmethodsincludingdeeplearning;

logic-andknowledge-basedapproaches,includingknowledgerepresentation,inductive(logic)programming,knowledgebases,inferenceanddeductiveengines,(symbolic)reasoningandexpertsystems;

statisticalapproaches,Bayesianestimation,searchandoptimisationmethods

Box1:Example–DefinitionofAI,asincludedinthedraftAIAct

InlinewithpreviousENISAwork,whichconsidersitthedrivingforceintermsofAItechnologies,thereportmainlyfocusesonML.ThischoiceisfurthersupportedbythefactthatthereseemtobeageneralconsensusonthefactthatMLtechniquesarepredominantincurrentAIapplications.Lastbutnotleast,itisconsideredthatthespecificitiesofMLresultinvulnerabilitiesthataffectthecybersecurityofAIinadistinctivemanner.ItistobenotedthatthereportconsidersAIfromalifecycleperspective3.ConsiderationsconcerningMLonlyhavebeenflagged.

2Forexample,theUnitedNationsEducational,ScientificandCulturalOrganization(UNESCO)inthe‘Firstdraftoftherecommendationontheethicsofartificialintelligence’,andtheEuropeanCommission’sHigh-LevelExpertGrouponArtificialIntelligence.

3SeethelifecycleapproachportrayedintheENISAreportSecuringMachineLearningAlgorithms

(https:/

/www

.

enisa.europa.eu/publications/securing-machine-learning-algorithms).

Box2:Specificitiesofmachinelearning–examplesfromasupervisedlearningmodel4

MLsystemscannotachieve100%inbothprecisionandrecall.Dependingonthesituation,MLneedstotradeoffprecisionforrecallandviceversa.ItmeansthatAIsystemswill,onceinawhile,makewrongpredictions.ThisisallthemoreimportantbecauseitisstilldifficulttounderstandwhentheAIsystemwillfail,butitwilleventually.

ThisisoneofthereasonsfortheneedforexplainabilityofAIsystems.Inessence,algorithmsaredeemedtobeexplainableifthedecisionstheymakecanbeunderstoodbyahuman(e.g.,adeveloperoranauditor)andthenexplainedtoanenduser(ENISA,SecuringMachineLearningAlgorithms).

AmajorspecificcharacteristicofMListhatitreliesontheuseoflargeamountsofdatatodevelopMLmodels.Manuallycontrollingthequalityofthedatacanthenbecomeimpossible.Specifictraceabilityordataqualityproceduresneedtobeputinplacetoensurethat,tothegreatestextentpossible,thedatabeinguseddonotcontainbiases(e.g.forgettingtoincludefacesofpeoplewithspecifictraits),havenotbeendeliberatelypoisoned(e.g.addingdatatomodifytheoutcomeofthemodel)andhavenotbeendeliberatelyorunintentionallymislabelled(e.g.apictureofadoglabelledasawolf).

CYBERSECURITYOFAI

AIandcybersecurityhavebeenwidelyaddressedbytheliteraturebothseparatelyandincombination.TheENISAreportSecuringMachineLearningAlgorithms5describesthemultidimensionalrelationshipbetweenAIandcybersecurity,andidentifiesthreedimensions:

cybersecurityofAI:lackofrobustnessandthevulnerabilitiesofAImodelsandalgorithms,

AItosupportcybersecurity:AIusedasatool/meanstocreateadvancedcybersecurity(e.g.,bydevelopingmoreeffectivesecuritycontrols)andtofacilitatetheeffortsoflawenforcementandotherpublicauthoritiestobetterrespondtocybercrime,

malicioususeofAI:malicious/adversarialuseofAItocreatemoresophisticatedtypesofattacks.

Thecurrentreportfocusesonthefirstofthesedimensions,namelythecybersecurityofAI.Still,therearedifferentinterpretationsofthecybersecurityofAIthatcouldbeenvisaged:

anarrowandtraditionalscope,intendedasprotectionagainstattacksontheconfidentiality,integrityandavailabilityofassets(AIcomponents,andassociateddataandprocesses)acrossthelifecycleofanAIsystem,

abroadandextendedscope,supportingandcomplementingthenarrowscopewithtrustworthinessfeaturessuchasdataquality,oversight,robustness,accuracy,explainability,transparencyandtraceability.

Thereportadoptsanarrowinterpretationofcybersecurity,butitalsoincludesconsiderationsaboutthecybersecurityofAIfromabroaderandextendedperspective.Thereasonisthatlinksbetweencybersecurityandtrustworthinessarecomplexandcannotbeignored:therequirementsoftrustworthinesscomplementandsometimesoverlapwiththoseofAIcybersecurityinensuringproperfunctioning.Asanexample,oversightisnecessarynotonlyforthegeneralmonitoringofanAIsysteminacomplexenvironment,butalsotodetectabnormalbehavioursduetocyberattacks.Inthesameway,adataqualityprocess(includingdatatraceability)isanaddedvaluealongsidepuredataprotectionfromcyberattack.Hence,

4Besidestheonesmentionedinthebox,the‘FalseNegativeRate”andthe‘FalsePositiveRate”andthe‘Fmeasure”areexamplesofotherrelevantmetrics.

5https:/

/www.e

n

isa.europa.eu/publications/securing-machine-learning-algorithms

trustworthinessfeaturessuchasrobustness,oversight,accuracy,traceability,explainabilityandtransparencyinherentlysupportandcomplementcybersecurity.

STANDARDISATIONINSUPPORTOFCYBERSECURITYOFAI

RELEVANTACTIVITIESBYTHEMAINSTANDARDS-DEVELOPINGORGANISATIONS

ItisrecognisedthatmanySDOsarelookingatAIandpreparingguidesandstandardisationdeliverablestoaddressAI.Therationaleformuchofthisworkisthatwheneversomethingnew(inthisinstanceAI)isdevelopedthereisabroadrequirementtoidentifyifexistingprovisionsapplytothenewdomainandhow.Suchstudiesmayhelptounderstandthenatureofthenewandtodetermineifthenewissufficientlydivergentfromwhathasgonebeforetojustify,orrequire,thedevelopmentandapplicationofnewtechniques.Theycouldalsogivedetailedguidanceontheapplicationofexistingtechniquestothenew,ordefineadditionaltechniquestofillthegaps.

Still,inthescopeofthisreport,thefocusismainlyonstandardsthatcanbeharmonised.ThislimitsthescopeofanalysistothoseoftheInternationalOrganizationforStandardization(ISO)andInternationalElectrotechnicalCommission(IEC),theEuropeanCommitteeforStandardization(CEN)andEuropeanCommitteeforElectrotechnicalStandardization(CENELEC),andtheEuropeanTelecommunicationsStandardsInstitute(ETSI).CENandCENELECmaytransposestandardsfromISOandIEC,respectively,toEUstandardsundertheauspicesof,respectively,theViennaandFrankfurtagreements.

CEN-CENELEC

CEN-CENELECaddressesAIandCybersecuritymainlywithintwojointtechnicalcommittees(JTCs).

JTC13‘Cybersecurityanddataprotection’hasasitsprimaryobjectivetotransposerelevantinternationalstandards(especiallyfromISO/IECJTC1subcommittee(SC)27)asEuropeanstandards(ENs)intheinformationtechnology(IT)domain.Italsodevelops‘homegrown’ENs,wheregapsexist,insupportofEUdirectivesandregulations.

JTC21‘Artificialintelligence’isresponsibleforthedevelopmentandadoptionofstandardsforAIandrelateddata(especiallyfromISO/IECJTC1SC42),andprovidingguidancetoothertechnicalcommitteesconcernedwithAI.

JTC13addresseswhatisdescribedasthenarrowscopeofcybersecurity(seeSection2.2).ThecommitteehasidentifiedalistofstandardsfromISO-IECthatareofinterestforAIcybersecurityandmightbeadopted/adaptedbyCEN-CENELECbasedontheirtechnicalcooperationagreement.ThemostprominentidentifiedstandardsbelongtotheISO27000seriesoninformationsecuritymanagementsystems,whichmaybecomplementedbytheISO15408seriesforthedevelopment,evaluationand/orprocurementofITproductswithsecurityfunctionality,aswellassector-specificguidance,e.g.ISO/IEC27019:2017Informationtechnology–Securitytechniques–Informationsecuritycontrolsfortheenergyutilityindustry(seetheannex

A.1,

forthefulllistofrelevantISO27000seriesstandardsthathavebeenidentifiedbyCEN-CENELEC).

Inaddition,thefollowingguidanceandusecasedocumentsaredraftsunderdevelopment(someataveryearlystage)andexploreAImorespecifically.Itisprematuretoevaluatetheimpactsofthesestandards.

ISO/IECAWI27090,Cybersecurity–Artificialintelligence–Guidanceforaddressingsecuritythreatsandfailuresinartificialintelligencesystems:ThedocumentaimstoprovideinformationtoorganisationstohelpthembetterunderstandtheconsequencesofsecuritythreatstoAIsystems,throughouttheirlifecycles,anddescribeshowtodetectandmitigatesuchthreats.Thedocumentisatthepreparatorystage.

ISO/IECCDTR27563,Cybersecurity–ArtificialIntelligence–Impactofsecurityandprivacyinartificialintelligenceusecases:Thedocumentisatthecommitteestage.

Bydesign,JTC21isaddressingtheextendedscopeofcybersecurity(seeSection

4.2

),whichincludestrustworthinesscharacteristics,dataquality,AIgovernance,AImanagementsystems,etc.Giventhis,afirstlistofISO-IEC/SC42standardshasbeenidentifiedashavingdirectapplicabilitytothedraftAIActandisbeingconsideredforadoption/adaptionbyJTC21:

ISO/IEC22989:2022,Artificialintelligenceconceptsandterminology(published),

ISO/IEC23053:2022,Frameworkforartificialintelligence(AI)systemsusingmachinelearning(ML)(published),

ISO/IECDIS42001,AImanagementsystem(underdevelopment),

ISO/IEC23894,GuidanceonAIriskmanagement(publicationpending),

ISO/IECTS4213,Assessmentofmachinelearningclassificationperformance(published),

ISO/IECFDIS24029-2,Methodologyfortheuseofformalmethods(underdevelopment),

ISO/IECCD5259series:DataqualityforanalyticsandML(underdevelopment).

Inaddition,JTC21hasidentifiedtwogapsandhaslaunchedaccordinglytwoadhocgroupswiththeambitionofpreparingnewworkitemproposals(NWIPs)supportingthedraftAIAct.Thepotentialfuturestandardsare:

AIsystemsriskcatalogueandriskmanagement,

AItrustworthinesscharacterisation(e.g.,robustness,accuracy,safety,explainability,transparencyandtraceability).

Finally,ithasbeendeterminedthatISO-IEC42001onAImanagementsystemsandISO-IEC27001oncybersecuritymanagementsystemsmaybecomplementedbyISO9001onqualitymanagementsystemsinordertohavepropercoverageofAIanddataqualitymanagement.

ETSI

ETSIhassetupadedicatedOperationalCo-ordinationGrouponArtificialIntelligence,whichcoordinatesthestandardisationactivitiesrelatedtoAIthatarehandledinthetechnicalbodies,committeesandindustryspecificationgroups(ISGs)ofETSI.Inaddition,ETSIhasaspecificgrouponthesecurityofAI(SAI)thathasbeenactivesince2019indevelopingreportsthatgiveamoredetailedunderstandingoftheproblemsthatAIbringstosystems.Inaddition,alargenumberofETSI’stechnicalbodieshavebeenaddressingtheroleofAIindifferentareas,e.g.,zerotouchnetworkandservicemanagement(ISGZSM),healthTCeHEALTH)andtransport(TCITS).

ISGSAIisapre-standardisationgroupidentifyingpathstoprotectsystemsfromAI,andAIfromattack.Thisgroupisworkingonatechnicallevel,addressingspecificcharacteristicsofAI.Ithaspublishedanumberofreportsandiscontinuingtodevelopreportstopromoteawiderunderstandingandtogiveasetofrequirementsformoredetailednormativestandardsifsuchareproventoberequired.

Thefollowingarepublishedgroupreports(GRs)fromISGSAIthatapplytounderstandinganddevelopingprotectionstoandfromAI:

ETSIGRSAI-001:AIThreatOntology,

ETSIGRSAI-002:DataSupplyChainSecurity,

ETSIGRSAI-004:ProblemStatement,

ETSIGRSAI-005:MitigationStrategyReport,

ETSIGRSAI-006:TheRoleofHardwareinSecurityofAI.

ThefollowingworkitemsofISGSAIareindevelopment/pendingpublicationatthetimeofwriting:

ETSIDGRSAI-007:ExplicabilityandTransparencyofAIProcessing(pendingpublication),

ETSIDGRSAI-008:PrivacyAspectsofAI/MLSystems(finaldraft),

ETSIDGRSAI-009:ArtificialIntelligenceComputingPlatformSecurityFramework(pendingpublication),

ETSIDGRSAI-010:TraceabilityofAIModels(underdevelopment–earlydraft),

ETSIDGR/SAI-0011:Automatedmanipulationofmultimediaidentityrepresentations(earlydraft),

ETSIDGR/SAI-003:SecuritytestingofAI(stabledraft),

ETSIDGR/SAI-0012:CollaborativeAI(earlydraft).

Inadditiontotheworkalreadypublishedandbeingdeveloped,thegroupmaintainsa‘roadmap’thatidentifiesthelonger-termplanningofworkandhowvariousstakeholdersinteract.

Inaddition,asadirectconsequenceofthedraftAIActandtheCybersecurityAct,thefollowingpotentialfutureWIsarebeingdiscussed:AIreadinessandtransition,testing,andcertification.

TheworkinETSIISGSAIiswithinthewidercontextofETSI’sworkinAI,whichincludescontributionsfromtheotherETSIbodies,includingitscybersecuritytechnicalcommittee(TCCyber).Amongotherprojects,thecommitteeisspecificallyextendingTS102165-1,Methodsandprotocols;Part1:Methodandproformaforthreat,vulnerability,riskanalysis(TVRA).

ISO-IEC

ISO-IECcarriesoutitsworkonAIinJTC1SC42.Thelistintheannex

A.2

presentsthestandardspublishedorunderdevelopmentwiththeirpublicationtargetdates(unlessalreadymentionedintheprevioussections).

Others

AlmostallhorizontalandsectorialstandardisationorganisationshavelaunchedAI-relatedstandardisationactivitieswithverylittleconsistencyamongthem.ThereportLandscapeofAIstandardsAIstandardisat