外文翻译-上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策

Reasonsandcountermeasuresoflistedcompanies'financialfraudPickto:financialfraudaccompaniedbyChina'sreformandopeningprocessandcontinuousdevelopment,bringsocialharmismoreandmoreapparent,whethertofinancialfraudeffectivemanagementbythepeople'swidespreadconcern.Onthelistedcompany'sfinancialfraudconceptsandmethodsweresummarized,fromtheinterestdrive,corporategovernance,accountingpersonneloccupationmoralstandards,accountingandauditingsystem,in-depthanalysisofthecausesoffinancialfraud,andinviewoftheabovereasonsputforwardthecorrespondingcontrolmeasuresKeywords:financialfraud;reasons;controlcountermeasures;listedcompanyIntroductionSincethebeginningofEnroninlate2001,casesoffinancialfraudinlistedcompaniesathomeandabroadfrequentlyburstout.Inearly2006,theShanghainationalaccountingInstituteResearchCenterforfinancialfraud(snaiFFRC)disclosedto"kelong"headedbythe"2005toptenmostfraudulentfinancialcompaniesofthelistedcompanies"meansismoreamazingthefinancialfraudof"smart".Self,circulatingtrading,tradingofyinandYang,thepackingchannels,alwaysaccountingerrors,largebath,mergersandacquisitions,restructuring,concealedstocks,thereportcashtraps,thisisatoptenlistingcompaniesfinancialfraudtrick.One,theconceptoffinancialfraudandwayFinancialfraudisthesubjectoffalsefinancialinformationprocessinginaccountingandreportingprocess,toobtainundueeconomicinterests,useddeceptivemeanstointentionallyliedabouttheimportanceandfinancialfactsofviolationsoflawsandsubstantiveviolations.Financialfraudhasfourcharacteristics:unlawful,intentionalsexuality,danger,andconcealment.Specificmeansoffinancialfraudcanbesaidtobeendless,butthecoreisintact.Incomefraudincludingfictitiousearningsandrevenueacrossperiods;costoffraudincludingcross-phasemetercostlessandadjustmentcostsaswellascostsofcapital;corruptcashfraud,shouldbetheprojectassets,suchasfraud,lessprovisionforimpairment;liabilitiesaregenerallyless-totalliabilitiesoffraud.Financialfraudmeansbasicallyhasthefollowingseveralaspects:theuseofimproperaccountingpoliciesandaccountingfraud.Managementtypicallyuseintertemporalamortizationclassaccountsformanyshare,sharemore,lessorlesscosttoadjustprofit.(1)theselectionofinappropriateborrowingcostsaccountingmethod.Inpractice,manylistedcompanythroughmisuseofborrowingcostsaccounting,inbuildaprojectcompletedandnotthefinal.(2)improperselectionofequityinvestmentaccountingmethods.Principlesofenterpriseaccountingregulations:investmententerprisesofjointcontrolorsignificantinfluence,shouldadoptequitymethod;instead,itusesthecostmethod.Butmanycompaniesuse,whentheinvesteecompanyprofit,shouldnotusetheequitymethodinvestmentusingtheequitymethodofaccounting;whentheinvesteecompanyloss,theequitymethodtothecostmethod.(3)improperselectionofmergingpolicy.(4)theimproperselectionofdepreciationmethod.Extendeddepreciation,byacceleratingmethodischangedintothestraightlinemethod,in

practiceitisoftenseen.(5)theimproperselectionofincome,costconfirmationmethod.Advanceordelaytheconfirmationofincomeorexpenseisalsolistedcompaniesgenerallyadoptcheating.(6)theimproperselectionoftheimpairmentprovisionmethod.useofenterpriseinternalcontrolsystemdefectsandtheweaklinkoffraud.Asthecashierpersonneluseenterpriseblankcheck,financialdedicatedseal,legalpersonsealdoesnotseparatekeepingmalpractice,privatelyissuedchecks,misappropriationofpublicfunds.Cozywithhisdutiesincompatiblestaffcolludewithafraud.relatedpartytransactionfraud.Therelatedpartytransactionfraud,referstothemanagementusingtherelatedpartytransactiontohidelosses,fictitiousprofits,andnotinthestatementsandnotesinaccordancewiththeprovisionsasappropriate,fulldisclosure,theresultinginformationwillhaveontheusersoffinancialstatementsmisleadingafraudmethod.Typically,Chineselistedcompaniesusingthepurchaseandsaleofrelatedfraud,fraud,entrustedwiththeoperationoffundsembezzlement,fraudandotherfourkindsofcostsharingrelatedtransactionsbywayoffictitiousprofit.theassetsoffraud.Assetrestructuring,mergersandacquisitions,debtrestructuring,assetreplacementform,occurringbetweentherelatedparties.Assetsreorganizationofcorruptcorruptcorruptmajormergersandacquisitionsanddebtrestructuringintwoways.coverupfraudtransactionorfact.Hidetransactionorfactoffraudisthroughtheuseofaccountingstatementstohidetransactionsoflistedcompaniesorthetruth,orhasnotbeenfullydisclosedinthenotestothereportdealstruthanfraudmethods.Second,thecausesoflistedcompanies'financialmalpracticeListedcompanies'financialmalpracticecausedseveralofthefollowingreasons:financialreturnfargreaterthanthecostoffraud.Tomeetlistingstandardsatsomecompaniesdesperatetofindwaystomakefinancialfraud,andfraud,tomeetthepolicyrequirements.Inaddition,becausethesharepriceistimestheincomeandearningspershare,andhighstockmarketprice/earningsratioofdeformityinChina,sothemainpurposeoflistedcompany'sfinancialfraudisfalseprofits.Falseprofitsof$1,thecirculationmarketvalueoflistedcompanieswillincrease10timestimestimes.Relativetothefraudfraudincome,costistoolow,fromacertainextent,itistoolowafraudcostcontributedsomefraud.corporategovernancestructureisnotperfect.Corporategovernancestructureisinfactaboutbetweenowners,theBoardofDirectorsandseniorexecutiveofficersrightsassignedandthearrangementofasystemofchecksandbalances,therealityinChina,leddirectlytotheequitystructureoflistedcompaniesmalformationsincludethegeneralmeetingofshareholders,BoardofDirectors,Boardofsupervisors,whichdistorttherelationshipbetweencorporategovernancestructureofchecksandbalances,whichhasprovidedanopportunityforfinancialfraudinlistedcompanies.Thisismainlymanifestedinthefollowingaspects:(1)theownershipstructureisnotreasonable.Asofthesecondhalfof2006,theShanghaiandShenzhenstockmarket,sharesofover

50listedcompaniesonly185,largestshareholderholdingratioofnomorethan25andonly219,60〜70listedcompanieshaveinvadedandoccupiedbylargeshareholdersoflistedcompany'sfunds.Inthecaseofhighconcentrationofownership,possibilitiesoftreatmentfailureoflistedcompaniesincreased,listedcompanies,thegreaterpossibilityoffinancialfraud.(2)theindependenceoftheBoardisnotstrong,internalcontrolisaseriousproblem.ChinalistedcompanyDirectorservedasSeniorManagerofthephenomenonismoreprevalent,DirectorservesastheSeniorManager(internalcontrol)morethan50percentofthesamplecompany32,morethan30percentofasampleof65companies.Inthiscase,theoperationoftheBoardisusually"Insider"orshareholdercontrol,ratherthanbasedonthecollectiveinterest.Thishasledtothephenomenonoffrequentcorporatefinancialfraud.(3)theSupervisoryBoardweakeningtheoversightfunction,financialreportdifficultyindischargingitsoversightfunctions.Basedonanalysisoflistedcompanyfinancialreportingfraud,BoardofsupervisorssysteminsuppressionoffinancialfraudinChinadidnotplayaroleofDirectorsandmanagersofmonitoring.Listedcompaniesarerequiredbylawtosetupasupervisoryboard,Boardofsupervisorsactuallyareinaveryawkwardposition,lowerrightorupperrightofvulnerablerightsofsupervisionorstrongerright.accountingstafflackofprofessionalethics.Financeandaccountingpersonnelwhoaredirectlyinvolvedinfinancialfraud,fromthemacroperspective,ismainlylongtermandnotenoughonaccountingethicseducation,lackofaccountingprofessionalstandards;micro-perspective,strongsenseofcompanyaccountantslaw,inordertomeetcompanyleadersofunhealthypsychological,thusviolatingtheethicsofbeingpracticalandrealistic,objectiveandfair.Inaddition,individualsdrivenbyeconomicinterests,hasalsoledtosomeaccountantsdeliberatelyforged,altered,hidinganddestroyedtheaccountinginformation,takingadvantageofhispositionoffinancialfraud.accountingandauditsystemisnotsound.Inrecentyears,althoughChinaismakingalotofaccountingandauditinglegislation,butfromthepracticalpointofviewarenotperfectandsound.Pooroperabilityofsomeprovisions,resultinginaccountingfraudanopportunity.Newaccountinglaw"legalresponsibility"chapterreferredto"serious","criminal","significantlosses"arenotquantified,hasnospecificexplanation.2006implementationofnewaccountingstandards,providedmoreaccountingoptionsformanagement,whichprovidesmanagementwithmoreprofitopportunities.Inaddition,lackofpunishmentmeasures,socialsupervisionisnotstrong,qualityperformanceevaluationofaccountingdoesnotwork,noabilitytodetectfraud,alsocanleadtooccurrenceoflistedcompanies'financialmalpractice.Third,thegovernanceoflistedcompanies'financialfraudcountermeasurescoordinatingtherelationshipbetweenbenefitsandcostsoffinancialfraud.Weshouldincreasethepenaltiesforfinancialfraud,financialfraudcostsmorethanitgains,soyoucanbasicallystopfinancialfraud.Atthesametime,inchargeoffinancialmalpracticeshouldbearunlimitedjointandseveralfinancialresponsibility,whichcantoalargeextent,inhibittheirimpulsesofillegalcounterfeiting.Forthosewhodaretoreporttheaccountingofficershallprovideamplerewards,sothatitsbehaviorisgreaterthanthelossofincometoreportfinancialfraud.Inthisway,financialmalpracticeliabilityandtheywilltaketheinitiativetogiveuptheideaoffinancialfraud.perfectthecorporategovernancestructure.Improvetheinternalgovernancestructureofthe

company,istopreventfinancialfraud,improvethequalityofaccountinginformation.(1)toimprovethecompany'sownershipstructure,cansolvethestatusofminorityshareholdersandthecontrollingshareholderisnotsymmetric.(2)theperfectionoflistedcompany'sBoard.IntheestablishmentofexternalindependentdirectorsontheBoardofthecompany,andprovidesthatacertainproportionoftheexternalindependentdirectors,andestablishedanumberofspecializedcommittees,raisethelevelofprofessionalizationoftheBoard,toplaytheroleoftheBoard.(3)improvementBoardofsupervisorsoflistedcompanies.AstheBoardofsupervisorsamereformality,onlytostandinthegovernancestructureofthecompany,tofurtherimprovethesystemofBoardofsupervisors.raisingthelevelofprofessionalethicsofaccountants.Statemanagementandaccountingdepartments,shouldcontinuouslystrengthentheideologicaleducationofaccountantsandaccountingstafflevelscontinuetoimprove,makingitabletoconsciouslyresistfinancialmalpractice,graduallyestablishingaccountingintegrityandfairimage.accountingandauditingsystems.Accountingstandardsandtheflexibilityofthesystemistheimportantbasisforfinancialfraudtoachieve.Firstofall,accordingtoChina'sactualconditions,principlesofsystemofaccountingstandardsandmakeappropriateadjustments,ingenerallackofethicalcultureinChinanow,improvingthereliabilityoftheaccountingreportisthekey.Second,correctlyhandletherelationshipbetweenconsistencyandflexibility,reducingtheoptionsavailabletothecompanywithinthescopeofaccountingsystemasmuchaspossible,especiallywhenitcomestoincomeandexpensesrecognizedmeasuringprinciple,thedepreciationoffixedassets,eight-assetimpairmentprovisionratioandmaximumdetailedprovisionsshouldbemade.Introducespecificimplementationdetailswillbequantitativeandspecificlegalresponsibilitytoexplain,thishastheadvantageofpartiesaclearfinancialconsequencesoffraud,alsoinfavouroftherelevantdepartmentstodeterminethefinancialfraudandpunishablebyappropriatepenalties.Finally,givefullplaytotheroleofpublicopinionandthemedia.Astheperfectionofthesecuritiesmarket,marketsupervisionisnotlimitedtocertifiedpublicaccountantsandtheGovernment,thegeneralpublicandthemediahasalsobeeninvolvedintheregulatoryprocess.TheendAtpresent,Chinaisinanearlystageofmarketeconomy,allkindsofdeceptivebehaviorsemerge,accountingactivityasameasureofeconomicactivity,inevitablyfinancialfraud.Financialfraudisnotonlyaneconomicphenomenon,isalsoavisualizationofthedeepmoralconviction.So,onthegovernanceoffinancialfraudisasystemsengineering,business,communityandgovernmentsupervisionofTrinitysystemisrequiredinalldepartmentsandmakeconcertedefforts,coordinatewitheachother.Onlyanintegratedapproachtogovernance,tocreategoodinformationenvironmentforChina'seconomicdevelopment.Reference.HouYanlei,ZhaiYingmin.Thefinancialfraudoflistedcompaniesanalysis[J].Economyandmanagement,2006,(7):71-73.

HuangXinjian.Chineselistedcompany'sfinancialfraudandtheCountermeasuresResearch[J].Economicsurvey,2006,(4):77-79.WangJianxin.Thefinancialfraudoflistedcompanies:motivesandmanagement[J].Marketmodernization,2008,(2):346-347.YangYunshu.Thefinancialfraudoflistedcompaniesanalysis[J].Accountingresearch,2006,:62-63.YouXiaofeng.ChineseResearchonfinancialgovernanceofListedCompanies[M].Beijing:EconomicSciencePress,2005:144-145.ZhangAimin.Thecombinationofinternalandexternal,preventionoffinancialfraudofListedCompanies[J].Contemporaryeconomy,2006,(2):18-19.HongGe.Fraudinfinancialreportsoflistedcompaniesgovernanceapproach[J].Economicreview,2005,(9):117-137.WangHaixia.Internalgovernancestructureinlistedcompaniesandthepreventionoffinancialfraud[J].Auditing&Finance,2005,(7):23-24.上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策摘要：财务舞弊行为伴随着中国改革开放的进程而不断演进发展，带给社会的危害也愈来愈明显，能否对财务舞弊行为进行切实有效地治理受到人们的普遍关注。对上市公司财务舞弊行为的概念和方式进行了归纳，从利益驱动、公司治理机制、财会人员职业道德水平、会计和审计制度等方面深入分析财务舞弊的成因，并且针对以上成因提出了相应的治理措施。关键词：财务舞弊；原因；治理对策；上市公司引言2001年末的安然事件以来，国内外上市公司财务舞弊案件频繁爆出。2006年初，上海国家会计学院财务舞弊研究中心（snaiFFRC）披露的以“科龙电器”为首的伐005年度上市公司十大财务舞弊公司排行榜”则更加让人惊叹其财务舞弊手段之“高明”。自我交易、循环交易、阴阳交易、填塞渠道、不断并购、会计差错、大洗澡、报表重组、隐瞒炒股、现金陷阱此乃上市公司财务舞弊十大绝招。一、财务舞弊的概念及方式财务舞弊是财务造假主体在会计信息加工处理和报告过程中，为获取不正当的经济利益，采用欺骗性手段故意谎报重要性和实质性财务事实的违法、违纪行为。财务舞弊具有四个方面的特点：违法性、有意性、危害性和隐蔽性。财务舞弊的具体手段可以说是层出不穷，但核心是不变的。其中收入舞弊包括虚构收入和跨期调整收入；费用舞弊包括少计费用、跨期调整费用以及滥用费用资本化；资产舞弊有现金舞弊、应收项目舞弊、少提减值准备等；负债舞弊一般是少计负债。财务舞弊的方式主要有以下几个方面：利用不当的会计政策和会计估计舞弊。管理当局通常利用跨期摊提类会计科目进行多摊、少摊或多提、少提费用以调节利润。（1）选用不当的借款费用核算方法。在实际工作中，不少上市公司通过滥用借款费用的会计处理，在建工程完工而不进行竣工决算。（2）选用不当的股权投资核算方法。企业会计准则中规定：投资企业具有共同控制或重大影响时，应采用权益法；反之，则采用成本法。但很多公司运用时，当被投资公司盈利时，不该用权益法的投资也用权益法核算；当被投资公司亏损时，该用权益法的又改成成本法核算。（3）选用不当的合并政策。（4）选用不当的折旧方法。延长折旧年限、由加速法改为直线法等情况在实际操作中屡见不鲜。（5）选用不当的收入、费用确认方法。提前或推迟确认收入或费用也是上市公司普遍采用的舞弊方法。（6）选用不当的减值准备计提方法。利用企业内部控制制度的缺陷和薄弱环节进行舞弊。如出纳人员利用企业空白支票、财务专用章、法人印鉴未予分离保管的弊端、私自开具支票、挪用公款等。拉拢与自己职责不相容的人员串通舞弊等。3.关联方交易舞弊。所谓关联方交易舞弊，是指管理当局利用关联方交易掩饰亏损，虚构利润，并且未在报表及附注中按规定做恰当、充分的披露，由此生成的信息将会对报表使用者产生误导的一种舞弊方法。通常，中国上市公司采用关联购销舞弊、受托经营舞弊、资金往来舞弊、费用分担舞弊等四种关联交易舞弊方式来虚构利润。4.资产重组舞弊。资产重组有资产置换、并购、债务重组等形式，多发生在关联方之间。资产重组舞弊主要有并购舞弊和债务重组舞弊两种。5.掩饰交易或事实舞弊。掩饰交易或事实舞弊是指上市公司通过利用会计报表项目掩饰交易或事实真相，或者在报表附注中未能完全披露交易真相的一种欺诈方法。二、上市公司财务舞弊行为产生的原因造成上市公司财务舞弊行为有以下几方面原因：财务舞弊的收益远远大于成本一些公司为了达到股票上市标准不惜铤而走险想方设法、弄虚作假进行财务舞弊，以达到政策要求。此外，由于股价是每股收益与市盈率的乘积，而中国证券市场的市盈率畸形偏高，所以上市公司财务舞弊的主要目的就是虚增利润。每虚增1元的利润，上市公司的流通市值便会10倍甚至百倍的增加。相对于舞弊的收益而言，舞弊的成本显然太低，从一定程度来讲，正是过低的舞弊成本助长了一些舞弊的发生。公司治理结构不完善公司治理结构实际上就是有关所有者、董事会和高级执行人员三者之间权利分配和制衡关系的一种制度安排，在中国的现实情况下，上市公司股权结构的畸形直接导致了包括股东大会、董事会、监事会在内的公司治理结构相互制衡关系的扭曲，这为上市公司进行财务舞弊提供了契机。这主要表现在以下几个方面：（1）股权结构不合理。截至2006年下半年，沪深股市，流通股比例超过50%的上市公司只有185家，第一大股东控股比例没有超过25%的只有219家，60%~70%的上市公司都存在着大股东侵占上市公司款项的情况。在所有权高度集中的情况下，上市公司治理失效的可能性随之增大，上市公司财务舞弊的可能性也就越大。（2）董事会的独立性不强，内部人控制问题相当严重。中国上市公司董事兼任高级经理的现象比较普遍，董事兼任高级经理的比例（内部人控制度）超过了50%的占样本公司的32%，超过30%的占样本公司的65%。在这种情况下，公司董事会的运作通常被“内部人”或股东控制，而不是以集体利益为基础的。这种现象的出现导致公司财务舞弊现象时有发生。（3）监事会监督功能弱化，对财务报告难以履行监督职能。根据对发生财务报告舞弊上市公司的分析可知，中国的监事会制度在抑制财务舞弊方面没有发挥对董事和经理层监控应有的作用。上市公司虽然按法律规定设置了监事会，但监事会实际处于一种十分尴尬的地位，即下位权利或弱势权利监督上位权利或强势权利。2.财会人员缺乏职业道德财会人员是财务舞弊的直接参与者，从宏观方面讲，主要是长期不够重视会计职业道德教育，没有制定会计职业准则；从微观方面讲，公司财会人员的法律意识不强，为了迎合公司领导的不良心理，从而违反了实事求是、客观公正的道德规范。另外，个人受经济利益的驱使，也导致部分财会人