让可变几何结构为更高效的世界贸易组织（WTO）发挥作用 Making variable geometry work for a more effective WTO 2025

hinrichfoundationDECEMBER2025

advancingsustainableglobaltrade

Makingvariablegeometrywork

foramoreeffectiveWTO

BYBERNARDHOEKMAN

2

Contents

INTRODUCTION

3

HEADWINDSINGENEVA

4

THEURGENCYOFREFORM

7

AMAPBACKTOAROADONCETRAVELLED

9

Digitaltraderegulations11

Industrialpolicies11

Climateandenvironmentalpolicies13

MOVINGFORWARD

14

DESIGNANDPARTICIPATION

15

InoroutsidetheWTO?15

Inclusivenessandparticipation15

Engagingbusinessesandinternationalorganizations16

CONCLUSION

17

AUTHORBIO:BERNARDHOEKMAN

18

ENDNOTES

19

REFERENCES

20

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3

Introduction

Tradepolicyisnolongerprimarilyatechnicalmatterfortradeministries

tomanageinlightofinternationallyagreedlegalframeworks,butitisalsoatoolofforeignpolicywheremorepowerfulstatesonceagainseektodefinethetermsoftrade.

Therules-basedmultilateraltradeorderiscomingundone.Theglobaltrade

environmenthaschangedsignificantlyinthethreedecadessincetheWorld

TradeOrganization(WTO)wasfounded.Securityconsiderationshavebecome

morecentraltointernationaltraderelations.Nationscannolongerrelyon

thetwolargestandmostpowerfulstatesintheglobaleconomytoabideby

negotiatedtradeagreements.Instead,theymustconsidertheirvulnerabilitytothepossibilitythattradedependenceisweaponizedandtakeactionstoreducesuchdependence.

Tradepolicyisnolongerprimarilyatechnicalmatterfortradeministriesto

manageinlightofinternationallyagreedlegalframeworks.Theyhavebecomeatoolofforeignpolicywheremorepowerfulstatesonceagainseektodefinethetermsoftrade—aswasthecaseinthe1930s.1

Nationscannolongerrelyonthetwolargestandmostpowerfulstatesintheglobaleconomytoabidebynegotiatedtradeagreements.

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4

HeadwindsinGeneva

Thepracticeofconsensusatthe

WTOimpedesthepursuitofvariablegeometry.

TheinertiathathasbeenevidentattheWTOforsometimeisinmanyways

aconsequenceofbusiness-as-usualthinkingbymanyWTOmembers.Thisis

reflectedinanunwillingnesstorecognizethatthetradecontexthaschangedfundamentallygiventherepeatedrecoursetoweaponizationoftradepolicybytheUnitedStatesandChina,theworld’stwolargesteconomies,andEuropeanUnion(EU)tradepolicyactivisminpursuitofnon-tradeobjectives.

Akeyfeatureofthebusiness-as-usualmindsetisadherencetotheworking

practicesofconsensus-baseddecision-making.TheruleisenshrinedunderArticleIXoftheMarrakeshAgreementthatestablishedtheWTOin1995:“TheWTOshallcontinuethepracticeofdecision-makingbyconsensusfollowedunderGATT

1947.”ConsensusisdesirabletoensureallWTOmembersperceivetheoutcomeofmultilateralnegotiationstobeintheirinterest.

However,thewaytheWTOpracticesconsensusalsoappliestotheday-to-dayoperationoftheorganization,downtothelevelofsettingtheagendaofcommitteemeetings,engagingwithstakeholders,solicitingoutsideexpertiseorpermittingtheWTOSecretariattoprovidememberswithinformationandanalyticalinputonanexofficiobasis.

TheconsensusworkingpracticehasmadetheWTOlessrelevantasaplatformforgoverninginternationaltrade.AbuseoftheprovisionforconsensuswasacauseofthefailureoftheWTO’sDohaRoundofmultilateraltradeliberalizationnegotiations,launchedin2001tolowerglobaltradebarriersandmaketrade

rulesfairer.Aquarter-centurylater,theDohaRoundremainsunattained,notwithstandingdraftagreementsthatwereacceptabletomostcountries.

ThepracticeofconsensusattheWTOimpedesthepursuitofvariable

geometry.2AlthoughtheWTOmakesexplicitprovisionforthenegotiation

andincorporationofplurilateralagreementsthatapplyonlytosignatoriesandnotitsfullmembership,consensusacrossthefullmembershipisrequiredfor

suchagreementstobeincorporatedintotheWTO.Thus,countriesthatdo

notparticipateandarenotrequiredtotakeanyactionsubjecttoaplurilateral

agreementcannonethelessblockotherWTOmembersfrommovingforwardontheagreement.3SeveralWTOmembers,notablyIndia,havetakentheviewthatasamatterofprinciple,newplurilateralagreementshavenoplaceintheWTO.Ineffect,theproponentsofsuchagreementsaretoldtopursuetheircooperationoutsidetheWTO,anoptionthatmosthadbeenunwillingtoconsidertoavoidfragmentationoftraderulesandtokeeptheagreementsundertheWTO’ssinglecomprehensiveframework,withassociatedmechanismstoensureopenness,

transparency,andtosettledisputes.

TheunwillingnessofsomeWTOmemberstoallowforplurilateralagreementstomoveaheadignoresthehistoryofthemultilateraltradingsystem.Priortothe

creationoftheWTO,newagreementsnegotiatedundertheauspicesoftheWTO’spredecessorGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(GATT)appliedonanàla

cartebasis—theywerebindingonlyforthoseGATTpartiesthatsignedthem.

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5

HEADWINDSINGENEVA

AIthoughtheTokyoRoundcodes

becameimportantpartsofthebedrockofcIarityofruIesforcross-border

trade,withthebenefitofhindsight,the“singIeundertaking”wasmisconceived.

DuringtheTokyoRound(1973-79)oftradeIiberaIizationunderGATT,severaI

newagreementswerenegotiatedaddressingmatterssuchasprocedurestobefoIIowedbeforeimposingantidumpingorcountervaiIingdutymeasures,ruIesforvaIuingconsignmentsforpurposesoftariffcoIIectionandissuingimportIicenses,andprincipIesthatappIytotechnicaIstandardsandheaIthandsafetyreguIationsforgoods.TheseagreementsweremostIynegotiatedandagreedamong

deveIopednations.ManydeveIopingcountriesdidnotsignthem.Therewassomedebateastowhetherbenefitsofthenew’codesofconduct’appIiedtoaIIGATTcontractingparties,butthosethatdidnotjoinwerenotrequiredtoappIytheir

provisions.4

YetthisacceptanceofvariabIegeometrywasessentiaIIyabandonedwhentheWTOwascreatedaspartoftheoutcomeoftheUruguayRoundconcIudedin

1994.TheneworganizationrequiredWTOmemberstoimpIementvirtuaIIyaIItheagreementsthathadbeennegotiatedduringtheGATTyears(1948-1986)and

thosenegotiatedintheUruguayRound(1986-1993).Thiswasknownasthe“singIeundertaking,”aconditionforWTOmembership.Thus,theGATT’codesofconduct’,aIsoknownastheTokyoCodes,becamepartoftheWTO’sIegaIarchitecture.

AIthoughtheTokyoRoundcodesbecameimportantpartsofthebedrockofcIarityofruIesforcross-bordertrade,withthebenefitofhindsight,the“singIeundertaking”wasmisconceived.

BecauseWTOmembershipentailedanobligationtoacceptallagreements,

incIudingtheGATTcodesofconduct,itIedtowhattheIateandgreateconomistMichaeIFinger,whoservedbothattheUSTreasuryandtheWorIdBank,in2007caIIeda“UruguayRoundhangover”formanydeveIopingcountries,astheywererequiredtoacceptnewpoIicydiscipIinestheydidnotperceivetobeintheir

TheunwillingnessofsomeWTOmemberstoallowforplurilateralagreementstomoveaheadignoresthehistoryofthemuItiIateraItradingsystem.

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HEADWINDSINGENEVA

6

Whatisneededwhenthesource

oftradecostarisesfromdomestic

regulationisnotareciprocalexchangeofchangestoappliedpolicies,but

reducingthedifferencesinnational

regulatoryregimesthroughthemutualadoptionofagreedgoodregulatorypractices.

interestortobeapriority,notablytheWTOAgreementonTrade-RelatedAspectsofIntellectualPropertyRights(TRIPS).This”hangover”helpsexplainwhymany

developingcountriessubsequentlyresistedeffortstoexpandthecoverageof

WTOagreements,whichinturnwasafactorinducingashiftbymanyhigh-incomecountriestonegotiatedeeppreferentialtradeagreementswithlike-minded

states,includingmattersnotaddressedintheWTOsuchasclimatechange,5andtherisingresorttounilateralism.

Treatingmultilateral,multi-issuenegotiationsasasingleundertakingand

subjectingvariable-geometryapproachestoconsensusbecomesmisconceivedwhentheimplicatedpoliciescomprisedomesticregulatorymeasures.Asingle

undertakingapproachallowsforissuelinkage—agreeingonaproposalinone

areaonlyifconcessionsaremadeinanotherarea.Suchlinkagemakesgoodsenseifnegotiationscenteron‘policybads’suchastariffs,asitoffersthepossibilityofbargainsthathelpgovernments,asnegotiators,overcomedomesticresistancetotradeliberalizationbymobilizingexportindustrieswithaninterestinimprovingaccesstoforeignmarkets.

Thispoliticaleconomybargainingdynamicdoesnotworkwhenthesourceofthetradecostsarisesfromdomesticregulation.Reciprocityinthesenseofcountriesagreeingtoequivalentreductionsintradebarriersoftenwillnotbepossible

forregulatorystandardsthatarenotintendedtobeprotectionist(i.e.,aimedat

discriminatingagainstforeignproducts)butaremotivatedbyhealthandsafety

concerns,nationalsecurity,consumerorworkerprotection,dataprivacy,ormorebroadly,humanrights.Thenationalagenciestaskedwithimplementingregulationstoachievesuchgoalsgenerallywillnotwant—eveniftheyarepermitted—to

adjustregulatorynormssimplytofacilitatetrade.Indeed,doingsomaywellreducenationalwelfare.

Whatisneededinsuchcasesisnotareciprocalexchangeofchangestoappliedpoliciesbutreducingthecostsforfirms(nationalandforeign)ofcomplying

withregulatorystandards.Onewaythiscanbepursuedistoreducedifferencesinnationalregulatoryregimesthroughthemutualadoptionofagreedgood

regulatorypractices.Sucheffortsarelikelytobebestpursuedamonglike-mindedstates—thatis,onaplurilateralandvariable-geometrybasis.

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7

Theurgencyofreform

Thisyear’ssharptariffescalations

accelerateatrendstartedunderthe

firstTrumpadministrationin2016andcontinuedbytheBidenadministrationofrestrictingtradewithChinaand

providingsupporttodomesticindustries.

Theneedtoapplyvariablegeometryinaneffectivewayhasreturnedwith

mountingurgencytotheWTOastheinternationaltradingorderthathasstoodforthelast80yearsconfrontsunprecedentedchallenges.

Sincethe2008globalfinancialcrisis,numerouscountrieshaveimplemented

discriminatorytradeandindustrialpolicyinterventions,rangingfromtariffsto

subsidiesofdifferenttypesandlocalcontentrequirements.6Thesemeasurestiltinternationalcompetitioninfavorofdomesticindustries,oftenviolatingthespiritifnottheletterofmultilateraltreatyobligations.

Theshifthascomesharplyintofocusin2025withtheUSdecisiontounilaterallyincreaseitsimporttariffsfromanaverageoflessthan2%toaminimumof

10%,subjectingmostcountriestotariffsof15%–20%,risingto50%ormoreforspecificcountriesandproducts.ThejustificationofferedbyWashingtonisthat

tariffswereneededtoaddressaneconomicemergency,whichitperceivesin

itsmerchandisetradedeficitsandthedeclineintheshareofmanufacturingin

employmentastheUSbecameaservices-driveneconomy.7Thisyear’ssharptariffescalationsaccelerateatrendstartedunderthefirstTrumpadministrationin2016andcontinuedbytheBidenadministrationofrestrictingtradewithChinaand

providingsupporttodomesticindustries.

TheUStradepolicymeasuresviolateWTOobligations.ThetariffsgreatlyexceedthemaximumlevelsagreedbytheUS.Demandsfordiscriminatoryaccess

Sincethe2008globalfinancialcrisis,numerouscountrieshaveimplementeddiscriminatorytradeandindustrialpolicyinterventions.

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8

THEURGENCYOFREFORM

Thedriversoftherisingrecourse

totradepolicyactivism—whether

motivatedbycompetitiveness,nationalsecurity,supplychainresilience,

protectionoftheenvironment,ornationalvalues—haveshakenthefoundationsofthepostwarinternationaltradeorder.

topartner-countrymarkets,commitmentsbypartner-countriestoinvestin

theUnitedStates,andalignmentwithAmericanforeignpolicygoals,notably

decouplingfromChina,furtherundermineWTOprinciples.Countriesthatacceptsuchconditionsinabilateral“deal”withtheUSriskconsequencesfromChina.

ThosethatdonotacceptsuchconditionsfacetheprospectofUStariffsthataresubstantiallyhigherthanthoseappliedtopeercompetitorsthatdoacceptthem.TheutilityofcontestingUSmeasuresandbilateraldealsthatviolatemultilateralrulesthroughWTOdisputesettlementislowgiventhattheUShasmadeclearitwillnotcomplywithrulingsofadjudicationpanels—andmaypunishcountries

thatcomplywithrulingsagainstmeasurestheyhaveimplementedtodiscriminateinfavoroftheUS.8

TherisingrecoursetotradepolicyactivismhasmanydriversbeyondUSconcernswithChinaandadesiretoexpanddomesticmanufacturingactivity.TheseincludeChina’swillingnesstoemploytradeasacoerciveinstrumentforforeignpolicy

purposes;effortsbystatestobolsternationalcompetitivenessandretainpolicyautonomy;andtheuseoftradebytheEUasatooltoachievenon-economic

objectivessuchascombatingclimatechangeandprotectinghumanrightsby

conditioningaccesstoitsmarketoncompliancewithEU-definedproduction

processstandardsforimportedgoodsandservices(Hoekman,TasandTicku,

2025).Theresultingmixofpolicies—whethermotivatedbycompetitiveness,

nationalsecurity,supplychainresilience,protectionoftheenvironment,or

nationalvalues—haveshakenthefoundationsofthepostwarinternationaltradeorder.

Unilateralactionbylargetradingpowerstoconditionaccesstotheirmarkets

andexportstothirdcountrieshavebecomeamajortradeirritant.Inresponse,

countriescaneitherseektooffsetthenegativeeffectsofforeignpoliciesby

adoptingsimilarmeasures,furtheraffectingcompetitiveconditionsonworld

markets,oragreeto‘mutualdisarmament’throughinternationalnegotiationsand/orcooperationtopursuesharednon-economicobjectivesonaconcertedbasis.Whatisneededisbalancingtheachievementofunderlyingobjectivesagainst

competitive(trade)spillovers.

Inprinciple,theforumtodosoistheWTO,establishedinparttostrengthen

aninternationalmeansofassistingstatestosettletradedisputesandagreetoreducethetrade-distortingeffectsofnationalpolicies.TheWTOhasnotbeenabletoservethispurposebecauseofsubstantivepolicydisagreementsamongitsmajormembersandAmericandissatisfactionwiththeoperationoftheWTO’sindependent,third-partydisputesettlementsystem,whichledWashingtontosystematicallyblocktheoperationoftheWTOAppellateBodyin2019.Open

plurilateralagreements(OPAs)—agreementsbetweengroupsofcountries

onspecificpoliciesthatsignificantlyaffectinternationaltradecostsandthat

areopentoparticipationtoanycountrywillingtoimplementasetofagreed

rulesanddisciplines—canhelppartiesunderstandandlearnaboutalternativepolicyoptionsandidentifyapproachesthataremoreeffectiveandefficientthanrecoursetounilateraleffortstoleverageaccesstomarkets.9

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Amapbacktoa

roadoncetravelled

Variablegeometryprovedpossibleinseveralpastagreementsbecausethe

subjectsinvolvedtradeliberalizationonaMFNbasis,thusbenefitingallWTOmembers,includingthosethatdidnotparticipate,targetedLDCs,orwere

coveredbyprovisionsinexistingWTOagreements.

OneshouldnotignorethefactthatWTOmembershaverealizedimportant

achievements.Morethan600disputeswereadjudicatedattheWTObeforetheUSdefenestratedtheAppellateBody.Everyyear,themanytechnicalcommitteesandCouncilsoftheWTOholdhundredsofmeetings,addressingmattersfalling

underthepurviewofaWTOagreement—rangingfromtransparencyofnationaltradepoliciestotechnicalbarrierstotrade(productstandards),customsvaluation,tradefacilitation,tradeinservices,andintellectualpropertyrightsprotection.

AlthoughconsensuscouldnotbeachievedintheDohaRoundnegotiations,newagreementswereconcluded,includingtheInformationTechnologyAgreement

(ITA),abolishingimporttariffsoninformationtechnologyproducts(1997,expandedin2015);theDuty-Free,Quota-FreeinitiativeremovingtariffsonexportsofLeastDevelopedCountries(LDCs)(2005);theAgreementonTradeFacilitation(2014);

theestablishmentoftheMulti-PartyInterimAppealArbitrationArrangement(MPIA)(2019),andtheAgreementonFisheriesSubsidies(2022).

OnlytwooftheseagreementsapplytoallWTOmembers;theothersare

plurilateral,applyingonlytosignatories.Variablegeometryprovedpossiblein

thesecasesbecausethesubjectsinvolvedtradeliberalizationonamost-favoured-nation(MFN)basis(theITA),thusbenefitingallWTOmembers,includingthose

thatdidnotparticipate;targetedLDCs,asexplicitlypermittedundertheWTO;

CountriesintheAsia-PacifichavebeenleadersinpursuingplurilateraltradeinitiativesoutsidetheWTO.Examplesincludethe2020DigitalEconomyPartnershipAgreement,the2022IPEFandthe2025FIT-P.

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AMAPBACKTOAROADONCETRAVELLED

Giventhelimitedprospectsfor

negotiatingmultilateralagreements

thatspanallWTOmembers,the

continuedacceptanceoftheconsensusworkingpracticeimpliesthatefforts

tofacilitatetradeanddeepentraderelationsamonglike-mindedcountriesmustbepursuedoutsidetheWTO

architecture.

orwerecoveredbyprovisionsinexistingWTOagreements—aswasthecasefortheMPIA,whichbuildsonanarticleallowingforvoluntaryarbitrationtosettledisputes.

Thevariable-geometrypathwaspursuedmoreintensivelystartingin2017,withgroupsofWTOmemberslaunchingissue-specificnegotiationsonaplurilateral

basis,includingondomesticregulationofservices,investmentfacilitation,

ande-commerce(HoekmanandSabel,2021).Thefirstofthesewasconcluded

successfullywithsignatoriesincorporatingtheresultingJointInitiativeon

ServicesDomesticRegulationintotheirservicescommitmentsundertheGeneralAgreementonTradeinServices(GATS).ThesecondledtoanInvestment

FacilitationforDevelopmentagreement(with130signatories)buthasyetto

beincorporatedintotheWTObecauseofoppositionbyIndiaandafewother

countries.10Thethird,one-commerce,generatedalargelyagreedtextinJuly2024among91members—itsplurilateralmembershiphasdwindledsince—buthereagainamajoroutstandinghurdletoitsincorporationasalegalWTOagreementistheconsensusconstraintstackedagainsttheinclusionofaplurilateralagreementunderAnnex4oftheMarrakeshAgreement,theinstitutionalmechanismwhich

wasexpresslycreatedtohouseplurilateralagreements.

IfWTOmembersareunable(i.e.,unwilling)torelaxtheconsensusconstraint

forplurilateralagreementsaspartofongoingWTOreformdeliberations,like-

mindedstatesinterestedinpursuingvariable-geometryapproacheshavetwo

avenues.Oneistopursue“deeppreferentialtradeagreements,”i.e.,goingbeyondtraditionaltariffreductiontoincludeabroadrangeofpoliciesaimedatdeepeningeconomicintegrationbetweenpartners.Theseinvolvediscriminatorytrade

liberalizationinfavorofsignatories—whichispermittedunderWTOrules.The

otheristopursueissue-orpolicy-specificplurilateralagreementsoutsidethe

WTO,seekingtodesignthesetoenable‘docking’intheWTOatsuchtimeasthisismadepossiblebyWTOreforms.

GiventhelimitedprospectsfornegotiatingmultilateralagreementsthatspanallWTOmembers,thecontinuedacceptanceoftheconsensusworkingpracticeimpliesthateffortstofacilitatetradeanddeepentraderelationsamonglike-

mindedcountriesmustbepursuedoutsidetheWTOarchitecture.

CountriesintheAsia-Pacifichavebeenleadersinpursuingplurilateraltrade

initiativesoutsidetheWTO.Examplesincludethe2020

DigitalEconomy

PartnershipAgreement,

the2022

Indo-PacificEconomicFrameworkforProsperity

(IPEF)andthe

FutureofInvestmentandTradePartnership

(FIT-P),mootedbyNewZealand,Singapore,Switzerland,andtheUnitedArabEmirates,andconvened

with14membersinSeptember2025(whichhadgrownto16byNovember).

Alltheseinitiativesaremodular—participatingcountriescandeterminewhichactivitiesoragreementstojoin.11Theyofferameansofbuildingbridgesbetweenmembersofdeeptradeagreementstocooperateonpoliciesthatincreasetradecostsordistorttrade.Thiswouldnotonlysupportgreatertradeandinvestmentamongparticipatingcountriesbutmayserveassteppingstonesfordeeper

integrationofmarketsandupdatingtheWTOrulebook.

Whileplurilateralinitiativesarealreadybeingpursuedinarangeofareas,bothwithinandoutsidetheWTO,manyareexploratoryandinvolvediscussions

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AMAPBACKTOAROADONCETRAVELLED

11

Plurilateraleffortstoreducethe

incidenceofrestrictivedigitaltradepoliciescanincludeafocuson

understandingthemotivationforsuchpoliciesandidentifydifferentapproachestoreducedigitaltradecostswhileensuringthatnationalregulatoryobjectivesareattained.

ontopicsasopposedtoformalnegotiations.Tobesalienttosustainingand

expandingrules-basedtraderelations,plurilateralengagementmust“movetheneedle”inreducingpolicyuncertaintyandfacilitatingtradeinaneconomically

meaningfulwayforinternationalbusiness—thekeystakeholderintheglobal

traderegime.Topicsthatmeetthiscriterioninclude(i)regulationandtaxationofdigitalservicestrade,(ii)reducingcompetitivespilloversofindustrialpolicies,and(iii)governingtheuseoftrade(policy)toachieveclimateorenvironment-relatedobjectives.

Digitaltraderegulations

Theabilitytoengageindigitaltradeisaffectedbymarketaccessrestrictions,

discriminatorytreatmentofforeignsuppliers,andnationalregulationsthat

conditionaccesstodataaswellasdatagovernancerequirementsandprivacyprotection.Digitaltradecanbefacilitatedbycooperationtoagreeongood

practices,internationalstandards,andmutualrecognitionofregulatoryregimes.

Asmentioned,plurilateraldiscussionsintheWTOone-commerceareongoing,focusedonreducingtrade-restrictivepoliciesanddigitaltradefacilitation,

includingtheregulationofcross-borderdataflows,electronicsignatures,

e-invoicing,cross-borderpayments,andconsumerprotection.Inparallel,countrieshavebeenpursuingplurilateralinitiativesoutsidetheWTOtowardsimilargoals.Inpart,thishasoccurredasanelementofdeepeningtradeagreements.In

part,itispursuedthroughstand-alonedigitalagreements.Anexampleisthe

DigitalEconomyPartnershipAgreement(Chile,SouthKorea,NewZealand,and

Singapore),12whichaddressesmatterssuchascross-bordertransferofdataand

datalocalization,protectionofsourcecode,standardsfore-invoicing,e-paymentanddigitalidentity,andincludesastrongfocusoncooperationandlearningfromexperience.13AnotherplurilateralinitiativeistheGlobalCross-BorderPrivacyRulesForum,whichaimstoestablishacertificationregimetofacilitatetradeanddataflowsbyhelpingfirmsdemonstratecompliancewithinternationallyrecognizeddataprivacystandards,whileacceptingdifferencesindomesticpreferencesandregulation.14

Plurilateraleffortstoreducetheincidenceofrestrictivedigitaltradepoliciescanincludeafocusonunderstandingthemotivationforsuchpoliciesandidentify

differentapproachestoreducedigitaltradecostswhileensuringthatnational

regulatoryobjectivesareattained.Notwithstandingdiff