国际商务谈判精要（原书第7版）课件全套 罗伊 第1-12章　谈判的本质 -谈判的最佳实践

EssentialsofNegotiationPart01:FundamentalsofNegotiationChapter01:TheNatureofNegotiation©McGraw-HillEducation.Allrightsreserved.Authorizedonlyforinstructoruseintheclassroom.NoreproductionorfurtherdistributionpermittedwithoutthepriorwrittenconsentofMcGraw-HillEducation.StyleandApproachBargainingandnegotiationarenotthesame.Bargainingdescribescompetitivewin-losesituations.Negotiationreferstowin-winsituations.Give-and-takeisimportant,butfactorsshapingthenegotiationoccurbeforethenegotiation,orshapethecontextaroundthenegotiation.Theauthor’sinsightsaredrawnfromthreesources.Personalexperience.Media–television,radio,newspapers,magazines,andtheInternet.Socialscienceresearch.CharacteristicsofaNegotiationSituationTherearetwoormoreparties.Betweenindividuals,groups,ororganizations,orwithingroups.Thereisaconflictofneedsanddesiresbetweenparties.Eachsidesearchesforconflictresolution.Thepartiesnegotiatebychoice.Therearetimestonotengageinnegotiation.Agive-and-takeisexpected.Bothsidescompromise.Partiesprefertonegotiate.Ratherthanfightopenly,dominate,orbreakcontact.Negotiatorsmustmanagetangiblesandresolveintangibles.Tangiblesincludethepriceortermsoftheagreement.Intangiblesareunderlyingmotivations.Theneedto“win.”Theneedtomaintainagoodrelationship.InterdependenceWorkinginterdependentlyallowspartiestoachieveapossibleoutcomethatisbetterthantheycouldachievebyworkingontheirown.Relationshipsbetweenpartiesmaybecharacterizedinoneofthreeways.Independentpartiesareabletomeettheirown

needswithouttheassistanceofothers.Dependentpartiesmustrelyonothersforwhattheyneed;theymustacceptandaccommodatetothatprovider’swhimsandidiosyncrasies.Whentheparties

dependoneachothertoachievetheirownoutcometheyareinterdependent;characterizedbyinterlockinggoals.TypesofInterdependenceAffectOutcomesTheinterdependenceofpeople’sgoals,andthestructureofthesituation,stronglyshapesnegotiationprocessesandoutcomes.Zero-sum,ordistributive:Competitive–thereisonlyonewinner.Theindividualsaresolinkedtogetherthatthereisanegativecorrelationbetweentheirgoalattainments.Tothedegreethatonepersonachievestheirgoal,theother’sgoalattainmentisblocked.Inamutual-gainssituation,alsoknownasanon-zero-sumorintegrativesituation,thereisapositivecorrelationbetweenthegoalattainmentsofbothparties.Tothedegreethatonepersonachievestheirgoal,theother’sgoalsarenotnecessarilyblocked,andmayinfactbeenhanced.AlternativesShapeInterdependenceEvaluatinginterdependencealsodependsheavilyonthedesirabilityofalternativestoworkingtogether.BATNA:BestAlternativetoaNegotiatedAgreement.Whetheryoushouldorshouldnotagreeonsomethinginanegotiationdependsupontheattractivenessofyourbestavailablealternatives.NegotiatorsmustunderstandtheirownBATNA,andtheotherparties’.Thevalueofaperson’sBATNAisalwaysrelativetothepossiblesettlementsavailableinthecurrentnegotiation.ABATNAmayofferindependencefrom,dependenceon,orinterdependencewithsomeoneelse.Everypossibleinterdependencyhasanalternative–negotiatorscanwalkaway.MutualAdjustmentandConcessionMakingNegotiationisaprocessthattransformsovertime,andmutualadjustmentisoneofthekeycausesofthechangesthatoccurduringanegotiation.Negotiationsoftenbeginwithstatementsofopeningpositions.Eachpartystatesitsmostpreferredsettlementproposal.Iftheproposalisn’treadilyaccepted,negotiatorsbegintodefendtheirowninitialproposalsandcritiquetheothers’proposals.Eachparty’srejoinderusuallysuggestsalterationstotheotherparty’sproposalandperhapsachangeintheirownposition.Whenonepartyagreestomakeachange,aconcessionhasbeenmade.Whenaconcessionismade,thebargainingrange–therangeofpossibleagreementsbetweenthetwoparty’sminimallyacceptablesettlements–isfurtherconstrained.TwoDilemmasinMutualAdjustmentThedilemmaofhonestyconcernshowmuchtruthtotelltheother.Tellingtheotherpartyeverythingmaygivethemtheopportunitytotakeadvantage.Nottellingtheotherpersonanythingmayleadtostalemate.Thedilemmaoftrustishowmuchtobelievewhattheothertellsyou.Ifyoubelieveeverythingtheotherpartysays,thentheycouldtakeadvantageofyou.Ifyoubelievenothingtheysay,youwillhavedifficultyinreachinganagreement.OutcomesandProcessesConcessionsaregreatlyaidedbytrustandabelief.Twoeffortshelptocreatesuchtrustandbeliefs–oneisbasedonperceptionsofoutcomesandtheotheronperceptionsoftheprocess.Outcomeperceptionscanbeshapedbymanaginghowthereceiverviewstheproposedresult.Enhanceperceptionsofthecredibilityoftheprocessbysignalingfairnessandreciprocityinproposalsandconcessions.ValueClaimingandValueCreationThestructureoftheinterdependenceshapesthestrategiesandtacticsnegotiatorsemploy.Negotiatorsusewin-losestrategiesindistributivesituations.Indistributivebargaining,thenegotiator

acceptsthe‘onewinner’conceptandpursuesactiontobethewinner.Thepurposeofthistypeofnegotiationistoclaimvalue.Negotiatorsusewin-winstrategiesinintegrativesituations.Integrativenegotiation

attemptssolutionssobothpartiescanachievetheirgoals.Thepurposeofthenegotiationistocreatevalue.ImplicationsofClaimingandCreatingValueMostnegotiationsareacombinationofclaimingandcreatingvalue,andtherearesignificantimplicationstothis.Negotiatorsmustbeabletorecognizewhentousemoreofoneapproachthantheother.Negotiatorsmustbeversatileintheiruseofbothstrategicapproaches.Negotiatorperceptionstendtoseeproblemsasmoredistributivethantheyreallyare.Peopletendtooverusedistributivestrategies.Asaconsequence,negotiatorsoftenleaveunclaimedvalueonthenegotiationtable.Successfulcoordinationofinterdependencehasthepotentialtoleadtosynergy,whichisthenotionthat“thewholeisgreaterthanthesumofitsparts.”ValueCreationandNegotiatorDifferencesValuemaybecreatedinnumerousways,andtheheartoftheprocessliesinexploitingthedifferencesbetweenthenegotiators.Differencesininterests.Findingcompatibilityisoftenthekeytovaluecreation.Differencesinjudgmentsaboutthefuture.Peopledifferintheirperceptionoffuturevalueofanitem.Differencesinrisktolerance.Acompanywithacashflowproblemcanassumelittlerisk.Differencesintimepreference.Onenegotiatormaywanttorealizegainsnow,whiletheothermaybehappytodefergainsintothefuture.Conflict–DefinitionsConflictarises:Fromthestronglydivergentneedsofthetwoparties.Frommisperceptionsandmisunderstandings.Whenthetwopartiesareworkingtowardthesamegoalandgenerallywantthesameoutcome.Whenbothpartieswantverydifferentoutcomes.Conflict

isadisagreementoropposition,andincludesthebeliefthattheparties’currentneedscannotbeachievedsimultaneously.LevelsofConflictIntrapersonalorintrapsychicconflict.Conflictoccurswithinanindividual.Interpersonalconflict.Thisisconflictbetweenindividuals.Intragroupconflict.Thisisconflictwithinagroup.Intergroupconflict.Thisisconflictbetweenorganizations,ethnicgroups,warringnations,orfeudingfamiliesorwithinsplintered,fragmentedcommunities.Negotiationsatthislevelarethemostcomplex.FunctionsandDysfunctionsofConflictElementsthatcontributetoconflict’sdestructiveimage.Competitive,win-losegoals. Emotionality.Misperceptionandbias. Blurredissues.Decreasedcommunication. Rigidcommitments.Magnifieddifference,minimizedsimilarities. Conflictescalation.Conflict’sproductive

aspects.Discussionraisesawarenessandcopingability.Conflictleadstochangeandadaptation.Conflictstrengthensrelationshipsandmorale.Conflictpromotesawarenessofselfandothers.Conflictenhancespersonaldevelopment.Conflictencouragespsychologicaldevelopment.Conflictcanbestimulatingandfun.Theobjectiveisnottoeliminateconflictbuttolearnhowtomanageittocontrolthedestructiveelementswhileenjoyingtheproductiveaspects.Figure1.2:ConflictDiagnosticModelSource:ReprintedfromLeonardGreenhalgh,ManagingConflict,SloanManagementReview27,no.6(1986),pp.45–51.DimensionDifficulttoResolveEasytoResolveIssueinquestionMatterof“principle”DivisibleissueSizeofstakesLargeSmallInterdependence

ZerosumPositivesumContinuityofinteractionSingletransactionLong-termrelationshipPartystructureDisorganizedOrganized

ThirdpartiesNoneutralpartyavailablePowerfulthirdpartyavailableConflictprogressUnbalancedBalancedFigure1.3:TheDualConcernsModelAccessthetextalternativeforthisimage.Source:ReprintedfromDeanG.Pruitt,JeffreyZ.Rubin,andSungH.Kim,SocialConflict:Escalation,Stalemate,andSettlement,2nded.(NewYork:TheMcGraw-HillCompanies,1994).EndofMainContent©McGraw-HillEducation.Allrightsreserved.Authorizedonlyforinstructoruseintheclassroom.NoreproductionorfurtherdistributionpermittedwithoutthepriorwrittenconsentofMcGraw-HillEducation.AccessibilityContent:TextAlternativesforImagesFigure1.3:TheDualConcernsModel–TextAlternativeThisisasimpleX,Yaxisgraphwithconcernaboutyourownoutcomesrepresentedonthehorizontaldimension,andconcernabouttheother’soutcomesrepresentedontheverticaldimension.Concernscanberepresentedatanypointfromnone(representingverylowconcern)tohigh(representingveryhighconcern).Thecontendingstrategyisinthelowerright-handcorner,negotiatorspursuetheirownoutcomesstronglyandshowlittleconcernforwhethertheotherpartyobtainstheirdesiredoutcomes.Inactionisthestrategyinthelowerleft-handcorner–wherenegotiatorsshowlittleinterestinwhethertheyattaintheirownoutcomes,aswellaslittleconcernaboutwhethertheotherpartyattainstheiroutcomes.Yieldingstrategyisintheupperleft-handcorner,wherenegotiatorsshowlowconcernfortheirownoutcomesandhighconcernforwhethertheotherpartyattainstheiroutcomes.Theproblemsolvingstrategyisintheupperright-handcorner–wherenegotiatorsshowhighconcernforattainingtheirownoutcomesandhighconcernforwhethertheotherpartyattainstheiroutcomes.Thecompromisingstrategyrepresentsamoderateefforttopursueone’sownoutcomesandamoderateefforttohelptheotherpartyachievetheiroutcomes,locatedinthemiddleofthegrid.Returntoslidecontainingoriginalimage.EssentialsofNegotiationPart01:FundamentalsofNegotiationChapter02: StrategyandTacticsofDistributiveBargaining©McGraw-HillEducation.Allrightsreserved.Authorizedonlyforinstructoruseintheclassroom.NoreproductionorfurtherdistributionpermittedwithoutthepriorwrittenconsentofMcGraw-HillEducation.OverviewDistributivebargainingisbasicallyacompetitionoverwhoisgoingtogetthemostofalimitedresource.Threereasonstounderstanddistributivebargaining.Someinterdependentsituationsaredistributive.Youshouldknowhowtocounterdistributivetactics.Everynegotiationmayrequiredistributiveskillsduringthe“claimingvalue”stage.Understandingtheseconceptsallownegotiatorsnotcomfortablewithdistributivebargainingtomanagethesituationsproactively.TheDistributiveBargainingSituationAtargetpointisanegotiator’soptimalgoal.Aresistancepointisanegotiator’sbottomline.Theaskingpriceistheinitialpricesetbytheseller.Thebuyermaycounterwithaninitialoffer.Bothpartiesshouldsettheirstarting,target,andresistancepointsbeforenegotiating.Staringpointsarepublic.Targetpointsareinferred.Resistancepointsaresecret.Thespreadbetweentheresistancepointsisthebargainingrange,settlementrange,orzoneofpotentialagreement.Whenabuyer’sresistancepointisabovetheseller’s:Thereisapositivebargainingrange.Whentheseller’sresistancepointisabovebuyer’s:Thereisanegativebargainingrange.Targetpoints,resistancepoints,andinitialoffersallplayimportantrolesindistributivebargaining.PriceContinuumforCondoPurchaseNegotiationAccessthetextalternativefortheseimages.TheRoleofAlternativestoaNegotiatedAgreementNegotiatorsalsoneedtoconsiderwhattheirBATNAs,orWATNAsare.Alternativesgivenegotiatorsthepowertowalkaway.Attractivealternativesmeannegotiatorscansettheirgoalshigherandmakefewerconcessions.GoodbargainersknowtheirBATNAsfromthestartbutcontinuallytrytoimprovetheBATNAduringthenegotiation.StrongBATNAsinfluencehowanegotiationunfolds.Accesstextalternativeforthisimage.SettlementPointThefundamentalprocessofdistributivebargainingistoreachasettlementwithinapositivebargainingrange.Theobjectiveofbothpartiesistoobtainasmuchofthebargainingrangeaspossible.Inotherwords,toreachanagreementasclosetotheotherparty’sresistancepointaspossible.Bothpartiesknowtheymighthavetosettleforlessthantheirtargetpoint,buthopetheagreementwillbebetterthantheirownresistancepoint.Foragreementtooccur,bothpartiesmustbelievethatthesettlementisthebestthattheycanget(withinapositivebargainingrange).DiscoveringtheOtherParty’sResistancePointInformationisthelifeforceofnegotiation.Themoreyoucanlearnabouttheotherparty’sinformation,themoreableyouwillbetostrikeafavorablesettlement.Atthesametime,youdonotwanttheotherpartytoknowyourresistancepoint,someofyourtargets,andinformationaboutaweakstrategicpositionoranemotionalvulnerability.Eachsidewantstoobtainandconcealinformation,andcommunicationcanbecomecomplex–evolvingintoacodedlanguage.InfluencingtheOtherParty’sResistancePointCentraltoplanningthestrategyandtacticsislocatingtheotherparty’sresistancepointandtherelationshipofthatresistancepointtoyourown.Theresistancepointisestablishedby:Thevaluetheotherattachestoaparticularoutcome.Thecoststheotherattachestodelayordifficultyinnegotiations.Thecosttheotherattachestohavingthenegotiationsaborted.Wheninfluencingtheother’sviewpoint,youmustalsodealwith:theotherparty’sunderstandingofyourvalueforaparticularoutcome,thecostsyouattachtodelayordifficultyinnegotiation,andyourcostofhavingthenegotiationaborted.WeakeningtheOtherParty’sResistancePointTherearefourmajorwaystoweakentheotherparty’sresistancepoint.Reducetheotherparty’sestimateofyourcostofdelayorimpasse.Increasetheotherparty’sestimateoftheirown

costofdelayorimpasse.Reducetheotherparty’sperceptionofthevalueofanissue.Increasetheotherparty’sperceptionthatyouvalueanissue.TacticalTasksTherearefourimportanttacticaltasksforanegotiatortoconsiderinadistributivebargainingsituation:Assesstheotherparty’starget,resistancepoint,andcostofterminatingnegotiations.Managetheotherparty’simpressionofyourtarget,resistancepoint,andcostofterminatingnegotiations.Modifytheotherparty’sperceptionoftheirowntarget,resistancepoint,andcostofterminatingnegotiations.Manipulatetheactualcostsofdelayingorterminatingnegotiations.AssesstheOtherParty’sTarget,ResistancePoint,andCostsofTerminatingNegotiationsThepurposeistoidentifywhattheotherpartyreallywantstoachieve,aswellashowmuchtheyarewillingtopay.IndirectAssessment.Obtaininformationindirectlyaboutthebackgroundfactorsbehindanissue.Determinewhatinformationanegotiatorusedtosettargetandresistancepoints.Studyhowtheymayhaveinterpretedtheinformation.DirectAssessment.Obtaininformationdirectlyfromtheotherpartyabouttheirtargetandresistancepoints.Whenatthelimit,theotherpartymayrevealinformation.Mostofthetime,theotherpartyisnotforthcomingandmethodsofobtaininginformationarecomplex.ManagetheOtherParty’sImpressionsofYourTarget,ResistancePoint,andCostofTerminatingNegotiationsNegotiatorsneedtoscreeninformationabouttheirownpositionsandrepresentthemastheywouldliketheothertobelieve.Screeningactivitiesaremoreimportantatthebeginningofnegotiation,anddirectactionismoreusefullateron.ScreeningActivities.Concealmentisthemostgeneralscreeningactivity.Calculatedincompetencemaybeausefulapproach.Channelcommunicationthroughateamspokesperson.Presentmanyitems,onlyafewimportanttoyou.DirectAction.Selectivepresentation–revealonlythenecessaryfacts.Explainorinterpretknownfactstopresentalogicalargument.Displayanemotionalreaction.Ethicsareaconcern.

Itmaybackfire.ModifytheOtherParty’sPerceptionsofHisorHerTarget,ResistancePoint,andCostofTerminatingNegotiationsAnegotiatorcanaltertheotherparty’simpressionsoftheirownobjectivesbymakingoutcomesappearlessattractiveorbymakingthecostofobtainingthemappearhigher.Thenegotiatormayalsotrytomakedemandsandpositionsappearmoreattractiveorlessunattractivetotheotherparty.Thereareseveralapproachestomodifyingtheotherparty’sperceptions.Oneapproachistointerpretfortheotherpartywhattheoutcomesoftheirproposalwillreallybe.ManipulatetheActualCostsofDelayingorTerminatingNegotiationsExtendingnegotiationsbeyondadeadlinecanbecostly.Theultimateweaponinnegotiationistothreatentoterminatenegotiations,denyingbothpartiesthepossibilityofasettlement.Therearethreewaystomanipulatethecostsofdelayinnegotiation.DisruptiveAction.Publicpicketing,boycottingaproductorcompany,andlockingnegotiatorsinaroomuntilanagreementisreached.AlliancewithOutsiders.Involveotherpartieswhocaninfluencetheoutcomeintheprocess.ScheduleManipulation.Negotiationschedulescanbeusedtoincreasetimepressure.PositionsTakenDuringNegotiation

OpeningOffersMakingthefirstofferisadvantageousasitcananchoranegotiation.Higherinitialoffershaveastrongeffectonnegotiationoutcomes.Exaggeratinganopeningofferisadvantageous.Itgivesthenegotiatorroomformovement.Itmaycreateanimpressionintheotherparty’smindofalongwaytoasettlement.Itwillalsosuggesttherewillbemanyconcessionstomake.Itmaymaketheotherpartyreconsidertheirownresistancepoint.Twodisadvantagestoexaggeratinganopeningofferinclude:Potentialrejectionbytheotherparty,haltingnegotiationsprematurely.Theperceptionofa“tough”attitudecanharmalong-termrelationship.PositionsTakenDuringNegotiation

OpeningStanceAseconddecisionnegotiatorsshouldmakeconcernsthestance,orattitude,toadoptduringthenegotiation.Competitiveormoderate?Negotiatorstendtomatchdistributivetacticsfromtheotherpartywiththeirowndistributivetactics.Tocommunicateeffectively,anegotiatorshouldtrytosendaconsistentmessagethroughboththeopeningofferandopeningstance.Whenthemessagesareinconflict,theotherpartywillfindthemconfusingtointerpretandanswer.Timingalsoplaysapart.PositionsTakenDuringNegotiation

InitialConcessionsAnopeningofferisusuallymetwithacounteroffer,andthesetwooffersdefinetheinitialbargainingrange.Thefirstconcessionconveysamessage,frequentlyasymbolicone,totheotherpartyabouthowyouwillproceed.Negotiatorswhotakeahardlineachievebettereconomicoutcomes,butatacostofbeingperceivednegativelybytheotherparty.Therearegoodreasonsforadoptingaflexibleposition.Whentakingdifferentstancesthroughoutthenegotiation,youcanlearnabouttheotherparty’stargetsandperceivedpossibilities.Byobservinghowtheyrespondtodifferentproposals.Flexibilitykeepsthenegotiationsproceeding–themoreflexibleyouseem,themoretheotherpartywillbelieveasettlementispossible.PositionsTakenDuringNegotiation

RoleofConcessionsConcessionsarecentral–withoutthem,negotiationwouldnotexist.Immediateconcessionsareperceivedlessvaluablethangradual,delayedconcessions.Negotiatorsgenerallyresentatake-it-or-leave-itapproach.Partiesfeelbetteraboutasettlementwhenthenegotiationinvolvesaprogressionofconcessions.Concessionsimplyrecognitionoftheother’spositionanditslegitimacy.Areciprocalconcessioncannotbehaphazard.Negotiatorsmaynotacceptinadequatereciprocalconcessions.Packagingconcessionscanleadtobetteroutcomesthanmakingconcessionssinglyonindividualissues.PositionsTakenDuringNegotiation

PatternofConcessionMakingThepatternofconcessionscontainsinformation,butitmaybedifficulttointerpret.Whensuccessiveconcessionsgetsmaller,theconcessionmaker’spositionisgettingfirmerandtheresistancepointisbeingapproached.Notethataconcessionlateinnegotiationsmayalsoindicatethatthereislittleroomlefttomove.Accesstextalternativeforthisimage.PositionsTakenDuringNegotiation

FinalOffersEventually,anegotiatorwantstoconveythemessagethatthereisnofurtherroomformovement.Asimpleabsenceoffurtherconcessionsconveysthemessage,buttheotherpartymayfeelthepatternofconcessionsisbeingviolated.Onewaytoaccomplishthisistomakethelastconcessionmoresubstantial.Largeenoughtobedramaticyetnotsolargeitcreatessuspicionthatthenegotiatorhasbeenholdingback.Aconcessionmayalsobepersonalizedtotheotherpartysignalingthisisthelastconcessionthenegotiatorwillmake.“Iwenttomybossandgotaspecialdealjustforyou.”PositionsTakenDuringNegotiation

ClosingtheDealProvideAlternatives.Providetwoorthreealternativepackagesfortheotherpartythatareroughlyequalinvalue.AssumetheClose.Afteradiscussionaboutbuyerneedsandpositions,actasifthedecisiontopurchasehasalreadybeenmade.SplittheDifference.Thenegotiatorsummarizesthenegotiationandsuggests“whynotjustsplitthedifference?”ExplodingOffers.Containsanextremelytightdeadlineinordertopressuretheotherpartytoagreequickly.Thepurposeistoconvincetheotherpartytoacceptthesettlementandtostopconsideringoutcomes.Sweeteners.Saveaspecialconcessionfortheclose.“I’llgiveyouXifyouagreetothedeal.”HardballTacticsWenowturntoadiscussionofhardballtacticsinnegotiation.Hardballtacticsworkbestagainstpoorlypreparednegotiators.Theycanalsobackfire.Manyfindthetacticsoffensiveandout-of-bounds.Difficulttoenact,eachinvolvesriskforthepersonusingit.Itisimportanttounderstandhardballtacticsandhowtheyworksoyoucanrecognizeifhardballtacticsareusedagainstyou.DealingwithTypicalHardballTacticsTherearefourmainoptionsnegotiatorshaveforrespondingtotypicalhardballtactics.DiscussThem.Labelthetacticandoffertonegotiatetheprocessitselfbeforecontinuing.IgnoreThem.Ignoringahardballtacticcanbeverypowerful–thetacticstakealotofenergytoenactproperly.RespondinKind.Maybethemostusefulwhendealingwithanotherpartywhoistestingyourresolveorasaresponsetoexaggeratedpositions.Co-opttheOtherParty.Itismoredifficulttoattackafriendthananenemy.TypicalHardballTactics

GoodCop/BadCopItoftenleadstoconcessionsandnegotiatedagreementsbutthetactichasmanyweaknesses.Relativelytransparent,especiallywithrepeateduse.Easilycounteredbytheotherpartywhomaycallyououtonthetactic.Difficulttoenact–requiresalotofenergyinmakingthetacticwork.Itmayalienatetheotherparty.Negotiatorsmaygetinvolvedinthegameandfailtoconcentrateontheirgoals.TypicalHardballTactics

Lowball/HighballNegotiatorsstartwitharidiculouslylow(orhigh)openingoffertheyknowtheywillneverachieve.Theoryistheextremeofferwillcausetheotherpartytoreevaluatetheiropeningofferandmoveclosetoorbeyondtheirresistancepoint.Riskinusingthistactic-theotherpartymaythinkitisawasteoftimetonegotiateandstoptheprocess.Thebestwaytodealwithalowball/highballtacticisnottomakeacounteroffer.InsisttheotherpartystartwithareasonableopeningofferandrefusetonegotiatefurtheruntiltheydoShowtheotherpartythatyouwon’tbetricked.Threatentoleavethenegotiation.Respondwithanextremecounteroffer.TypicalHardballTactics

TheBogeyNegotiatorsusethistactictopretendthatanissueisoflittleornoimportancetothem,whenitactuallyisquiteimportant.Laterthisissuecanbetradedformajorconcessionsonissuesthatareactuallyimportanttothem.Mosteffectivewhenanegotiatoridentifiesanissuethatisquiteimportanttotheothersidebutoflittlevaluetothemselves.Thistacticisfundamentallydeceptive,andcanbedifficulttoenact.Althoughdifficulttodefendagainst,beingwellpreparedforthenegotiationwillmakeyoulesssusceptibletoit.Iftheotherpartytakesapositionoppositeofyourexpectations,suspectabogeytacticandaskprobingquestions.Becautiousaboutsuddenreversalsinpositions,especiallylateinthenegotiation–again,questiontheotherpartycarefully.TypicalHardballTactics

TheNibbleNegotiatorsusethenibbletacticforaproportionallysmallconcessiononanitemthathasn’tbeendiscussedpreviouslyinordertoclosethedeal.Weaknessesinusingthenibble.Manyfeelthepartyusingthenibbledidnotbargainingoodfaith.Thepersonbeingnibbledwillnotfeelgoodabouttheprocess.Combatingthenib