经济学（微观）（英文版原书第7版）课件 第8章 　企业、股票市场和公司治理

EconomicsSeventhEditionChapter8Firms,theStockMarket,andCorporateGovernanceCopyright©2019,2017,2015PearsonEducation,Inc.AllRightsReserved.ChapterOutline8.1

TypesofFirms8.2

HowFirmsRaiseFunds8.3

UsingFinancialStatementstoEvaluateaCorporation8.4

RecentIssuesinCorporateGovernancePolicyAppendix

ToolstoAnalyzeFirm’sFinancialInformationWhyStudyFirmStructure,Finance,andGovernance?Inthischapterwewillexaminehowfirmsarerun:Howtheyareorganized,Howtheyobtainfinancing,Howtheyconveyinformationtothepublic,andWhethertheyactinthebestinterestoftheirowners.Eachoftheseitemsaffecthowfirmsbehave,andwhattheiroverallimpactontheeconomywillbe.8.1TypesofFirmsCategorizethemajortypesoffirmsintheUnitedStates.FirmsarelegallycategorizedintheU.S.asoneofthefollowing:Soleproprietorship:Afirmownedbyasingleindividualandnotorganizedasacorporation.Partnership:Afirmownedjointlybytwoormorepersonsandnotorganizedasacorporation.Corporation:Alegalformofbusinessthatprovidesownerswithprotectionfromlosingmorethantheirinvestmentshouldthebusinessfail.WhoIsLiable?LimitedandUnlimitedLiabilityInsoleproprietorshipsandpartnerships,nolegaldistinctionismadebetweentheassetsofthefirmandtheassetsofitsowner(s).Asset:Anythingofvalueownedbyapersonorafirm.Thisisnotthecaseforcorporations.Theownersofcorporationshavelimitedliability,alegalprovisionthatshieldsownersofthecorporationfromlosingmorethantheyhaveinvestedinthefirm.Limitedliabilitymakesraisingfundseasierforafirm;italsomakesinvestinginfirmseasierforindividuals.Table8.1DifferencesamongBusinessOrganizationsBlankSoleProprietorshipPartnershipCorporationAdvantagesControlbyownerAbilitytoshareworkLimitedpersonalliabilityBlankNolayersofmanagementAbilitytosharerisksGreaterabilitytoraisefundsDisadvantagesUnlimitedpersonalliabilityUnlimitedpersonalliabilityCostlytoorganizeBlankLimitedabilitytoraisefundsLimitedabilitytoraisefundsPossibledoubletaxationofincomeThereisnotauniquebestbusinessstructure.Corporationsbenefitfromlimitedliabilitybutareexpensivetoorganize.Also,theirprofitsmaybetaxedtwice:onceascorporateprofits,andagainwhentheprofitsaredisbursedtoinvestors.Figure8.1BusinessOrganizations:SoleProprietorships,Partnerships,andCorporations (a)Numberoffirms (b)Revenue (c)ProfitsNearly¾offirmsaresoleproprietorships,andjustoneinsixisacorporation.Butsincelargerfirmstendtobecorporations,mosteconomicactivitytakesplacethroughthem.ApplytheConcept:WhyAreFewerYoungPeopleStartingBusinesses?(1of2)Mosteconomistsarguethatsmallfirmsarevitaltothehealthoftheeconomy.Inatypicalyear,smallfirmscreate3.3millionjobs—40percentofallnewjobscreated.Butrecently,therehavebeenfewersmallfirms—inrelativeterms(seegraph),andinabsoluteterms(~25percentfewernewfirms).ApplytheConcept:WhyAreFewerYoungPeopleStartingBusinesses?(2of2)Whyhavefewerfirmsbeenstartingup?FeweryoungpeoplestartingfirmsPossibleslowdownintechnologicalprogressIncreaseinlicensingrequirements(nownearly25percentofpeopleworkinjobsrequiringlicenses)CorporateStructureandCorporateGovernanceInsoleproprietorshipsandpartnerships,theownersofthefirmaretypicallyinvolvedinday-to-daydecisionsatthefirm.Thisisnotthecaseforlargercorporations;theyusuallyhaveseparationofownershipfromcontrol.Separationofownershipfromcontrol:asituationinacorporationinwhichthetopmanagement,ratherthantheshareholders,controlsday-to-dayoperations.Ownersdesignateaboardofdirectors,whoappointachiefexecutiveofficer(CEO)tooverseeday-to-dayoperations,perhapsalongwithothermembersoftopmanagement.TheStructureofCorporationsandthePrincipal-AgentProblemCorporategovernanceisthewayinwhichacorporationisstructuredandtheeffectthatstructurehasonthecorporation’sbehavior.Whiletheboardofdirectorsandtopmanagementare,intheory,representingtheinterestsofthefirmowners,theymaysometimespursuetheirownagendas.Example:Managersmayprocureforthemselvesaveryhighsalary,orperkssuchascorporateprivatejets.Theconflictbetweentheinterestsofshareholdersandtheinterestsoftopmanagementisaprincipal-agentproblem.Principal-agentproblem:Aproblemcausedbyanagentpursuingtheagent’sowninterestsratherthantheinterestsoftheprincipalwhohiredtheagent.Figure8.2TheStructureofaTypicalCorporationWhileoutsidedirectorsareintendedtorepresenttheinterestsofshareholders—theownersofthefirm—theymaynotalwaysbewillingorabletodoso.Combinedwiththeindependentdecision-makingpowerthattopmanagershave,itisdifficulttoovercometheprincipal-agentproblem.CanthePrincipal-AgentProblemBeResolved?Theprincipal-agentproblemderivesfromeconomicincentivesbeingimproperlyaligned.Aremedyfortheproblemmustbebasedonaligningtheinterests.Thisiswhymanytopmanagersarepaidalargepartofthesalaryinstockorstockoptions:theirsalarybecomestiedtotheperformanceofthefirm.HoweversincetheCEOownsonlyafractionofthefirm,incentivescanneverbe100percentaligned.8.2HowFirmsRaiseFundsExplainhowfirmsraisethefundstheyneedtooperateandexpand.Smallbusinessownershavethreeprincipalmethodsofraisingfunds:RetainedearningsProfitsreinvestedinthefirm,insteadofpaidtofirmowners.RecruitadditionalownersSuchanarrangementwouldincreasethefirm’sfinancialcapital.BorrowFromfinancialinstitutions,orfromfriendsorfamily.RaisingFundsasYourFirmGrows:IndirectFinanceAsfirmsgetlarger,theneedtoobtainexternalfundstendstogrow.Theeconomy’sfinancialsystemfacilitatesthetransferoffundsfromsaverstoborrowers.Firmscanborrowmoneyfrombanks.Assuch,thebanksareactingasfinancialintermediaries,permittingindirectfinanceofthefirmbytheirsavers.Indirectfinance:Aflowoffundsfromsaverstoborrowersthroughfinancialintermediariessuchasbanks.Intermediariesraisefundsfromsaverstolendtofirms(andotherborrowers).RaisingFundsasYourFirmGrows:DirectFinanceAlternatively,firmscanappealdirectlytopotentialinvestorsforfunds.Thisisdirectfinance:theflowoffundsfromsaverstofirmsthroughfinancialmarkets,suchastheNewYorkStockExchange.Directfinancegenerallytakestheformofoneoftwofinancialsecurities:Bonds:Afinancialsecuritythatrepresentsapromisetorepayafixedamountoffunds.Stocks:Afinancialsecuritythatrepresentspartialownershipofafirm.BondsAbondisfinancialsecuritythatisessentiallyaloan.Afirmsellsabondforitsfacevalue,say$1,000,promisingtorepaythisprincipalattheendofsomematurity,say30years.Thebondwillalsoincludeaseriesofcouponpayments,interestpaidonthebond.Theseareintermediatepaymentsthatwillbemadetothebond-holder;say,$40everyyear.Theinterestrateisthecostofborrowingfunds,usuallyexpressedasapercentageoftheamountborrowed;inthiscase:Thehigherthedefaultrisk,thehigherthecouponpayment(hencetheinterestrate)thefirmwillhavetooffer.StocksUnlikebonds,stocksarefinancialsecuritiesthatrepresentpartialownershipofthefirm.Acorporationthatsellsastockactssimilarlytoapartnershiptakingonanewpartner,thoughthenewshareholdertypicallyownsatinyfractionofthefirm.Whenthecorporationmakesprofits,theseareeitherreinvestedinthefirm—causingacapitalgain,orincreaseinvalueofthestock—orpaidouttothefirm’sshareholdersasdividends.Bylaw,corporationsmustrepaybondholdersbeforeshareholders.Thishelpstoensurethatbondsaresubstantiallylessriskyfinancialsecuritiestoholdthanstocks.ApplytheConcept:AreGovernmentsLikelytoDefaultonTheirBonds?(1of2)Thethreemaincredit-ratingagencies(Moody’s,StandardandPoor’s,andFitch)assignratingstobonds.BlankMoody’sInvestorsServicesStandardandPoors(S&P)FitchRatingsMeaningoftheRatingsInvestment-gradebondsAaaAAAAAAHighestcreditqualityBlankAaAAAAVeryhighcreditqualityBlankAAAHighcreditqualityBlankBaaBBBBBBGoodcreditqualityNon-investment-gradebondsBaBBBBSpeculativeBlankBBBHighlyspeculativeBlankCaaCCCCCCSubstantialdefaultriskBlankCaCCCCVeryhighlevelsofdefaultriskBlankCCCExceptionallyhighlevelsofdefaultrisk(forMoody’s:“typicallyindefault”Blank-DDDefaultApplytheConcept:AreGovernmentsLikelytoDefaultonTheirBonds?(2of2)Thisservicehelpsinvestorstodeterminewhichbondsaresafeandwhichatriskofdefault(non-payment).In2011,S&PdowngradedU.S.TreasurybondsfromAAAtoAA+,inresponsetocontinuinglargedeficits.During2016,S&Preducedratingsonfourstates’bonds,includingreducingIllinoisbonds’ratingtoBBB.ButtherateIllinoishadtopayonitsbondsroseonly1.5percentagepoints:investorsdidnotbelievetherewasasubstantialriskIllinoiswoulddefaultonitsbonds.StockandBondMarketsProvideCapital—andInformationAfterfirmsselltheirstocksand/orbonds,thesefinancialsecuritiescanbetradedinstockandbondmarkets.Theexistenceoftheseresalemarketsisbeneficialforsociety,sincewithoutthem,individualscouldnotinvestinfirmswithouttyinguptheirmoneyforalongtime.Thepriceatwhichastocktradesindicatesthedegreeofconfidenceinthefirm’sabilitytomakefutureprofits,sincetheseprofitsarewhatisusedtogenerateareturnforinvestors.Thepriceatwhichabondtradesisdeterminedbyitscouponpayment,relativetoothercouponpaymentsavailable.Butitalsoreflectstheconfidenceofinvestorsinthefirm’sabilitytomakethosepayments.Figure8.3MovementsinStockMarketIndices,1999to2017(1of2)Sinceastockrepresentsaclaimtoashareoffutureprofitsofafirm,changesinexpectationsaboutthoseprofitsgetreflectedinthestock’sprice.Recessionsandexpansionstendtoshiftmanyfirms’stockpricessimilarly—“arisingtideliftsallboats”.Figure8.3MovementsinStockMarketIndices,1999to2017(2of2)Thevaluesshownarestockmarketindexnumbers,createdasweightedaveragesoftheunderlyingstockprices.Byconvention,theindexissettoavalueof100insomebaseyear.Sincetheyearandinitialvaluearearbitrary,itischangesintheindexnumberthatarerelevantfordeterminingmarketperformance.ApplytheConcept:WhyAreManyPeoplePoorStockMarketInvestors?“Buylowandsellhigh”—whatcouldbesimpler?Stockpriceschangebecauseofnewinformationaboutthefutureprofitabilityofthecompany.ManyWallStreetprofessionalsspendlotsoftimeandmoneytryingtogainandunderstandthisnewinformation.Butgatheringandproperlyprocessingthisinformationisverydifficult.Manypeopleover-estimatetheirabilitytodoit.8.3UsingFinancialStatementstoEvaluateaCorporationDescribetheinformationcorporationsincludeintheirfinancialstatements.Investmentdecisionsarerelativelycomplicatedbutcanbemademoreintelligentlywithinformationfromafirm’sfinancialstatements.IntheU.S.,publiclyownedfirmsarerequiredtoreleaseregularfinancialstatementspreparedusingstandardaccountingmethodsknownasgenerallyacceptedaccountingprinciples.Ideally,suchstatementswouldpresentinformationinanunbiasedmanner,reducinginformationcostsforinvestors.Firmsspecializingininformationselltheirservicesinverifyingandinvestigatingthesereports.What’sinaFirm’sFinancialStatements?Thetwoprincipalitemsinafirm’sfinancialstatementsare:Incomestatement:Afinancialstatementthatshowsafirm’srevenues,costs,andprofitoveraperiodoftime.Typicallya12-monthfiscalyear,whichdoesnotnecessarilycoincidewiththecalendaryear.Balancesheet:Afinancialstatementthatsumsupafirm’sfinancialpositiononaparticularday,usuallytheendofaquarteroryear.Thissummarizestheliabilities(anythingowedbyapersonorfirm)andassetsofthefirm.Afirm’snetworthiscalculatedastheamountofitsassetsminustheamountofitsliabilities.AccountingProfitAfirm’sincomestatementrevealstheprofitthatthefirmmakes.Profitontheincomestatementisreferredtoasnetincomeandiscalculatedasrevenueminusoperatingexpensesandtaxespaid.Economistsrefertothisasaccounting

profit,andcallthelistedexpensesexplicitcosts,coststhatinvolveactuallyspendingmoney.PurposesofAccountantsvs.EconomistsEconomistsdifferfromaccountantswhencalculatingprofit,becauseeconomistsandaccountantshavedifferentintents:Accountantspresentfinancialinformationinordertoallowpeopletomakejudgmentsoninvestments.Economistsareinterestedindecision-making;whetherinvestinginthefirmiswiseandwhetherthefirmshouldcontinuetooperate.EconomicProfitBecauseofthedifferenceinpurposes,economiststhinkofprofitdifferentlyfromaccountants.Economistsconsiderthewholeopportunitycostofthefirm’sactivities,includingbothexplicitandimplicitcosts.Economicprofit=Revenue−ExplicitCosts−ImplicitCosts;Economicprofit=(AccountingProfit)−ImplicitCostsOpportunitycost:ThehighestvaluedalternativethatmustbegivenuptoengageinsomeactivityImplicitcost:Anonmonetaryopportunitycost.Implicitcostsincludeitemslikeafirmowner’stimeorthenextbestusefortheirinvestedfunds.8.4RecentIssuesinCorporateGovernanceDiscussthedebateovercorporategovernancepolicy.Accurateandtruthfulfinancialstatementsarecriticalforinvestorstomakeinvestmentdecisions.Investmentshelpguideresourceallocationwithintheeconomy.Firmsdisclosefinancialstatementsinperiodicfilingstothefederalgovernmentandinannualreportstoshareholders.Ifthesefinancialstatementsareinaccurate,thewholeeconomysuffers,asresourcesareallocatedtolessproductiveactivities.Thisreduceseconomicgrowthdirectlyandreducesinvestorconfidencewhichfurthererodesgrowth.TheAccountingScandalsoftheEarly2000sIntheearly2000s,topmanagersatEnronandWorldComwereshowntohavefalsifiedtheirfirms’financialstatements.Someofthesemanagersservedjailtime,butthedamagedonetomanyinvestorswassevere.Thegovernmentcreatesregulationstotrytominimizethechanceofsuchdeception.Example:TheSarbanes-OxleyAct(2002),requiringthatCEOspersonallycertifyfinancialstatementsandrequiringdisclosureofconflictsofinterestfromauditors,theaccountantschargedwithcheckingtheaccuracyoffinancialstatements.TheFinancialCrisisof2007-2009Beginningin2007andlastinginto2009,theU.S.economysuffereditsworstfinancialcrisissincetheGreatDepression.Atitsheartwerefinancialinstrumentsbasedonhomemortgageloans:mortgage-backedsecurities(MBS).MBSappearedtobemuchlikebonds,andthoughmanyoftheunderlyingmortgageswererisky(madeto“subprime”borrowers),peopleincorrectlyperceivedthemtobelow-risk.Whenpricesfellinmanyhousingmarkets,theunderlyingmortgageswentintodefault,andthevalueofMBSplunged.GovernmentResponsetoFinancialCrisisMBShadbecomepopularwithmanyinvestors,includinglargeinvestmentbanksandinsurancecompanies.Thesecompaniessufferedheavylosses,andseveralwereabletoremaininbusinessonlythroughfederalgovernmentaid.ThecrisispromptedtheWallStreetReformandConsumerProtectionAct(Dodd-FrankAct)of2010,legislationintendedtoreformregulationofthefinancialsystem.CreatedConsumerFinancialProtectionBureau,intendedtoprotectconsumersintheirborrowingandinvestingactivities.EstablishedFinancialStabilityOversightCouncil,intendedtoidentifyandactonrisksinthefinancialsystem.Overalleffectonlikelihoodoffuturefinancialcrises:unknown.Principal-AgentProblemsandtheFinancialCrisisInvestmentbanks(financialinstitutionsthat,amongotherthings,aidedcorporationsinstock-andbond-issuance)weretraditionallyorganizedaspartnerships.By2000,theyhadallconvertedtocorporations.Themanagersnowhadmoreshort-termperspectivesandlessincentivetoavoidrisk:“Noinvestmentbankownedbyitsemployeeswouldhave…boughtandheld$50billionin[exoticMBS].…orevenallow[thesesecurities]tobesoldtoitscustomers.Thehoped-forshort-termgainwouldnothavejustifiedthelong-termhit.” -MichaelLewis,formerWallStreetbondsalesmanApplytheConcept:CorporateGovernanceatSnapchat(1of2)InMarch2017,Snapsoldstockinaninitialpublicoffering(IPO);butinvestorswereonlyabletopurchaseClassAshares.ClassofStockVotingRightsRelevancetoSnap’sIPOClassANovotingrightsTheIPOconsistedonlyofClassAshares,meaningthatinvestorswhoboughtthemwouldhavenovotesinelectingmembersofSnap’sboardofdirectorsClassB1votepershareClassBsharesweresoldtoearlyinvestorswhohadprovidedfundstothefirmpriortotheIPO.ClassC10votespershareEvanSpiegelandBobbyMurphy,Snap’scofounders,retainedalloftheClassCshares.ApplytheConcept:CorporateGovernanceatSnapchat(2of2)SnapbecamethefirstfirminU.S.financialhistorywithanIPOconsistingentirelyofnon-votingshares.Manyinvestorsweren’tworried:Snap’sIPOraised$3.4billion.SomeworriedthatifSnap’sfoundersweren’tabletomakeSnapprofitable,shareholderswouldbeunabletoforcethemout.Butthefoundersbelievetheywillmakebetterdecisionsforthecompanythan(short-sighted)shareholders;theybelieveretainingpowerisasolutiontotheprincipal-agentproblem.Appendix:ToolstoAnalyzeFirms’FinancialInformationExplaintheconceptofpresentvalueanddescribetheinformationcontainedonafirm’sincomestatementandbalancesheet.Whenpeoplelendmoney,theyexpecttoreceivebackmorethantheylend.$1,000todayisworthmorethan$1,000ayearfromnow,andthatinturnisworthlessthan$1,000twoyearsfromnow.Howmucharefundsinthefutureworthtoyou?Economistsrefertothisamountasthepresentvalueofthosefunds:thevalueintoday’sdollarsoffundstobepaidorreceivedinthefuture.Thegeneralformulais:PresentandFutureValue

PresentValueofaSeriesofPaymentsWhencalculatingthepresentvalueofaseriesofpayments,weaddthepresentvaluesofeachindividualpayment.Forexample,supposeyouwillreceive$50,000immediately,and$50,000eachyearforfouradditionalyears.Thepresentvalueofthisseriesofpayments,assuminga10percentinterestrate,is:UsingPresentValuetoCalculateAssetPricesFinancialassetsrepresentaclaimtofuturefunds:Bonds:CouponpaymentsandrepaymentofprincipalStocks:DividendpaymentsTocalculatewhatafinancialassetisworthtoday,weconsiderthevalueofthesefuturefunds:Thepriceofafinancialassetshouldbeequaltothepresentvalueofthepaymentstobereceivedfromowningthatasset.UsingPresentValuetoCalculateBondPrices(1of2)Supposethatin2016,youareconsideringbuyinga$1,000bondwith$80couponpayments(in2017and2018)anda2018maturitydate.Soyouwillreceive$80in2017and$1,080in2018.Iftheappropriateinterestrateisi=10percent,youvaluethisbondat:UsingPresentValuetoCalculateBondPrices(2of2)

Moregenerally,UsingPresentValuetoCalculateStockPrices(1of2)Valuingastockisalittletrickier,sincethereisnoenddateonastock—youownashareofthefirmforever.Thevalueofastockderivesfromtheexpecteddividendpaymentsofthestock:Noteth