经济学（微观）（英文版原书第7版）课件 第9章　比较优势和国际贸易增益

EconomicsSeventhEditionChapter9ComparativeAdvantageandtheGainsfromInternationalTradeCopyright©2019,2017,2015PearsonEducation,Inc.AllRightsReserved.ChapterOutline9.1

TheUnitedStatesintheInternationalEconomy9.2

ComparativeAdvantageinInternationalTrade9.3

HowCountriesGainfromInternationalTrade9.4

GovernmentPoliciesThatRestrictInternationalTrade9.5

TheDebateoverTradePoliciesandGlobalizationIsaTariffonIndustrialEquipmentGoodFortheUSA?In2016,U.S.-basedCaterpillarbothimportedfromandexportedtoMexico.Thevalueofitsexportswas$33millionmorethanitsimports.Freetradeagreementshavehelpedtoeliminatetaxesonimports(calledtariffs)bothintotheU.S.andintoMexico.Recentlysomepoliticiansandworkershavesupportedincreasedtariffs.Tariffsaredesignedtoprotectdomesticworkersfromoverseascompetition.Doyouthinkincreasedtariffswouldmakeyoubetterorworseoff?Whataboutthecompaniesinvolved?Theworkers?TheUSA?9.1TheUnitedStatesintheInternationalEconomyDiscusstheroleofinternationaltradeintheU.S.economy.Internationaltradehasgrownmoreandmoreimportanttotheworldeconomyoverthepast50years.Fallingshippingandtransportationcostshavemadeinternationaltrademoreprofitableanddesirable.Traditionally,countriesimposedhightariffsonimports,believingthatsuchmeasuresmadetheirownfirmsandconsumersbetteroff.Butthatmeanttheirexportsweresimilarlytaxed.Tariff:AtaximposedbyagovernmentonimportsImports:Goodsandservicesboughtdomesticallybutproducedinothercountries.Exports:Goodsandservicesproduceddomesticallybutsoldinothercountries.Figure9.1TheIncreasingImportanceofInternationalTradetotheUnitedStatesSince1970,bothimportsandexportshavebeensteadilyrisingasafractionofU.S.grossdomesticproduct(GDP).InternationaltradehasbeenbecomingamoreandmoreimportantpartoftheAmericaneconomy.Figure9.2TheEightLeadingExportingCountriesTherapidgrowthoftheChineseeconomyhasmadeittheworld’slargestexporter,with12.1percentofworldexports.ChinatookovertheleadfromtheU.S.,whichaccountsfor10.3percentofworldexports.Figure9.3InternationalTradeasaPercentageofGDPTrademakesuparelativelysmallpartoftheeconomyfortheUnitedStates(andChina,toalesserextent),especiallycomparedwithsmallercountries.Thisismostlyduetotherelativesizesoftheeconomies.9.2ComparativeAdvantageinInternationalTradeExplainthedifferencebetweencomparativeadvantageandabsoluteadvantageininternationaltrade.Recallthatcomparativeadvantageistheabilityofanindividual,afirm,oracountrytoproduceagoodorserviceataloweropportunitycostthancompetitors.Comparativeadvantagearisesfromhavingaloweropportunitycostthanyourcompetitor.Opportunitycost:Thehighest-valuedalternativethatmustbegivenuptoengageinanactivity.Table9.1AnExampleofChineseWorkersBeingMoreProductiveThanU.S.WorkersBlankOutputperHourofWorkBlankBlankSmartphonesWheat(bushels)China126UnitedStates24Chinahasanabsoluteadvantageinproducingbothsmartphonesandwheat.Absoluteadvantage:Theabilitytoproducemoreofagoodorservicethancompetitorswhenusingthesameamountofresources.Butcomparativeadvantagemeansthattradecanstillbeadvantageousforbothnations.Table9.2TheOpportunityCostofProducingSmartphonesandWheatBlankOpportunityCostsBlankBlankSmartphonesWheat(bushels)China0.5bushelofwheat2smartphonesUnitedStates2bushelsofwheat0.5smartphonesThistableshowswhathastobegivenuptocreateeachgood:theopportunitycost.Ifthenationswereinautarky,asituationinwhichacountrydoesnottradewithothercountries,thesewouldalsobetherelativepricesineachcountry:asmartphonewouldtradeforhalfthepriceofabushelofwheatinChina,anddoublethepriceofabushelofwheatinAmerica.ChinawouldliketotradeitssmartphonesforAmericanwheat,andviceversa.9.3HowCountriesGainfromInternationalTradeExplainhowcountriesgainfrominternationaltrade.Ifcountriesdidnottrade,theywouldconsumewhattheyproduced.Butifcountrieshavedifferentopportunitycosts,theymighteachbewillingtotradesomeofwhattheyhaveacomparativeadvantageatproducingforwhattheothercountryis(relatively)goodatproducing.Bothcountriesmightbemadebetteroffbysuchatrade.Table9.3ProductionwithoutTradeBlankProductionandConsumptionBlankBlankSmartphonesWheat(bushels)China9,0001,500UnitedStates1,5001,000Supposethatinitiallyeachcountryhas1000hourstospend.Inthattime,Chinamightproduce9,000smartphonesand1,500bushelsofwheat.Inthesametime,theU.S.mightproduce1,500smartphonesand1,000bushelsofwheat.Intotal,10,500smartphonesand2,500bushelsofwheatareproduced.ProductioninAutarky—PreparingforTradeProductionandConsumption→SmartphonesWheatChina12,0000UnitedStates04,000Observewhathappensifeachcountryspecializesinitscomparativeadvantage:Chinacanproduce12,000smartphones.TheU.S.canproduce4,000bushelsofwheat.Intotal,12,000smartphonesand4,000bushelsofwheatareproduced.Observethatmoreofbothgoodsareproduced.DecidingonTermsofTradeThetermsoftrade

istheratioatwhichacountrycantradeitsexportsforimportsfromothercountries.Nocountrywouldaccepttermsoftradeworsethanitsopportunitycost—itwouldbebetteroffproducingbyitselfthegoodsthatitwasimporting.Termsoftradeofone-for-onecouldbeacceptabletobothChinaandtheUnitedStates.Withtheseterms,theymighttrade1,500smartphonesfor1,500bushelsofwheat,endingwiththeconsumptiononthefollowingslide:Table9.4GainsfromTradeforChinaandtheUnitedStatesWhyDon’tWeSeeCompleteSpecialization?Intherealworld,productsarenotgenerallyproducedbyonlyonenation.Reasonsinclude:Notallgoodsandservicescanbetradedinternationally(medicalservices,forexample).Productionofmanygoodsinvolvesincreasingopportunitycosts(sosmallamountsofproductionarelikelytotakeplaceinseveralcountries).Tastesforproductsdiffer(cars,forexample);countriesmighthavecomparativeadvantagesindifferentsub-typesofproducts.DoesAnyoneLoseasaResultofInternationalTrade?Sofar,wehavemadeitappearthatinternationaltradeisgoingtobegoodforeverybody.Butthisistrueonlyonanationallevel.Someindividualfirmsandconsumerswillloseoutduetointernationaltrade.Inourexample:ChinesewheatfarmsandtheirworkersAmericansmartphonesfirmsandtheirworkersThesegroupswouldlikelyasktheirgovernmentstoimplementprotectionistmeasuresliketariffsandquotas,inordertoprotectthemfromforeigncompetition.ApplytheConcept:WhoGainsandWhoLosesfromU.S.TradewithChina?(1of3)AsChinahasadoptedmoremarket-basedreforms,itsexportshaveincreasedgreatly.ChineseexportstotheUnitedStatesarenowworthaboutfourtimesasmuchasU.S.exportstoChina.ApplytheConcept:WhoGainsandWhoLosesfromU.S.TradewithChina?(2of3)ManyofthegoodsimportedfromChinawerepreviouslymanufacturedintheU.S.Lowerincomeconsumersbenefitfromtheincreasedavailabilityofthesegoods;sodothefirmsatwhichtheyspendtheirsavedmoney.ApplytheConcept:WhoGainsandWhoLosesfromU.S.TradewithChina?(3of3)ButtheincreasedcompetitionfromChinesemanufacturershashurtmanyU.S.manufacturingfirmsandtheirworkers—about25%ofthedeclineinmanufacturingjobs.ThesefirmsandworkersaremostlylocatedintheMidwestandSoutheast.WhereDoesComparativeAdvantageComeFrom?(1of2)Comparativeadvantagecanderivefromavarietyofnaturalandman-madesources:ClimateandnaturalresourcesSomenationsarebettersuitedtoparticulartypesofproduction;particularlyimportantforagriculturalgoods.Example:bananasinCostaRicavs.wheatinU.S.Relativeabundanceoflaborand/orcapitalSomenationshavelotsofhigh-orlow-skilledworkers,orrelativelymuchorlittleinfrastructure.Example:Chinahaslotsoflow-skilledworkers,vs.relativelymanyhigh-skilledworkersintheU.S.WhereDoesComparativeAdvantageComeFrom?(2of2)Comparativeadvantagecanderivefromavarietyofnaturalandman-madesources:TechnologicaldifferencesTechnologiesmaynotdiffusequicklyoruniformly.Example:U.S.isstronginproducttechnologies—theabilitytodevelopnewproducts;Japanisstronginprocesstechnologies,involvingtheabilitytoimproveprocessestomakeexistingproductsExternaleconomiesExternaleconomiesarereductionsinafirm’scoststhatresultfromanincreaseinthesizeofanindustry.Examples:SiliconValley,Hollywood,Swisswatchmakers9.4GovernmentPoliciesThatRestrictInternationalTradeAnalyzetheeconomiceffectsofgovernmentpoliciesthatrestrictinternationaltrade.Whenacountrylosesitscomparativeadvantageinproducingagood:Itsincomewillbehigherfromthegoodsithasacomparativeadvantageatproducing.Itcanconsumethegoodsothercountriesarerelativelygoodatmaking,atalowercost.Thissuggestscountriesshouldnotproducegoodsatwhichtheydonothaveacomparativeadvantage.Butthereisoftenpoliticalpressureongovernmentstopreserveindustriesthathavelosttheircomparativeadvantage,orthatneverhadoneinthefirstplace.Figure9.4TheU.S.MarketforEthanolUnderAutarkyIftradeisnotallowedintheU.S.marketforethanol,alldomesticconsumptionwillbemetbydomesticproduction.Consumerswhoarewillingtopayatleast$2.00pergallonpurchaseethanolandobtainconsumersurplus.Domesticproducerswithcostslowerthan$2.00pergallonselltheirethanolandobtainproducersurplus.JoiningtheGlobalEthanolMarketNowsupposetheAmericangovernmentdecidestoopenupimportsand/orexportsofethanol.Assumethattheworldpriceofethanolis$1.00pergallon:Americawillimportethanol.Americanconsumerswillbenefitfromcheaperethanol.Americanethanolproducerswillsuffer,withalowerprice.HowcanwedecidewhetherallowingfreetrademakesAmericansbetteroffoverall?Bycomparingtheeconomicsurplusinthemarketwithandwithoutfreetrade.Freetrade:Tradebetweencountriesthatiswithoutgovernmentrestrictions.Figure9.5TheEffectofImportsontheU.S.EthanolMarketWhenimportsareallowed,pricefallsto$1.00pergallon.U.S.productionfallsto3.0billion;U.S.consumptionrisesto9.0billion.Hence6.0milliongallonsareimported.ConsumersurplusrisestoA+B+C+D.ProducersurplusfallstoE.Overall,economicsurplusrises;thegainstoconsumersoutweighthelossestoproducers.GovernmentPoliciesRestrictingTradeFirmsthatfacecompetitionfromimportedgoodsloseoutwhentradeisallowed.Thesefirmsappeartodeservesympathy,especiallywhentheirworkersstarttolosetheirjobs.Consequently,theycanoftenconvincegovernmentstorestricttrade;usuallywithoneofthefollowing:Tariffs:Taxesimposedbyagovernmentonimports.QuotasandVoluntaryexportrestraints(VERs):Numericallimitsimposedupon(quotas)ornegotiatedbetween(VERs)countriesonthequantityofagoodimportedbyonecountryfromanother.Figure9.6TheEffectsofaTariffonEthanolIfthegovernmentimposesa$0.50pergallontariff,theU.S.pricerisesto$1.50.U.S.productionrises,andU.S.consumptionfalls.ProducersurplusrisesbyA.Thegovernmentgainstariffrevenues(T).ButconsumersurplusfallsbyA+C+T+D.Overall,economicsurplusfallsbyC+D:deadweightloss.ImportQuotaintheU.S.SugarMarketQuotasandvoluntaryexportrestraintsareeffectivelysimilar;thedifferenceisthatquotasareimposedunilaterally(byonecountry),whereasVERsarenegotiatedagreements.TheUnitedStatesimposesasugarquota,allowingnomorethan6.7billionpoundsofsugartobeimported.ThiskeepstheU.S.priceofsugar($0.28perpound)higherthantheworldprice($0.18),generatinglargebenefitsforU.S.sugarproducers,attheexpenseofU.S.sugarconsumers.Onthenextslide,wewillcalculatejusthowmucheachpartyishurtorhelped.Figure9.7TheEconomicEffectoftheU.S.SugarQuota(1of2)Ifunlimitedimportswereallowed,Americawouldimportabouttwiceasmuchsugaraswouldbeproduceddomestically.Thesugarquotarestrictsimports,raisingtheU.S.price.QuantitysuppliedbyU.S.firmsincreases,resultinginincreasedproducersurplusforU.S.firms.Figure9.7TheEconomicEffectoftheU.S.SugarQuota(2of2)Foreignsugarproducersalsogain,bysellingattheU.S.price.ConsumersurplusfallsbyA+C+B+D(lowerconsumption,higherprice).SodeadweightlossofC+Doccurs.CoststoSocietyfromMaintainingImportRestrictionsAcommonargumentinfavorofmaintainingimportrestrictionsisthatitsavesdomesticjobs.Economistsestimatethatwithoutthesugarimportrestrictions,about3,000jobsintheU.S.sugarindustrywouldbelost.ThatmeanseachjobiscostingU.S.consumers$2.59billion/3,000jobs=$860,000perjob.Andthisisprobablyanunderestimate,sincecheapersugarwouldopenupmorejobs(inthecandyindustry,etc.),andencouragesugarusingmanufacturerstoremaininAmerica.Sugarproducersareabletolobbyforthequotabecausethecosttosocietyofthequotaisspreadovermanyconsumers,andthebenefitisconcentratedamongjustafewpeople.TheHighCostofPreservingJobswithTariffsandQuotasThesugarquotaisnottheonlygovernmentpolicyimposingahighcostofU.S.consumerstosavejobsatU.S.firms:Shoeimporttariffscost$300,000perjobperyear.Tiretariffscost$900,000perjobperyear.Evenworse:whenoneindustryreceivestarifforquotaprotection,otherdomesticindustrieslosejobs.Thetiretariffcost~3,000jobsinretailstoresbecausethehigherpriceoftiresleftU.S.consumerswithlessmoneytospendonothergoods.ApplytheConcept:Smoot-HawleyandthePoliticsofTariffs(1of3)Tariffsonforeign-madeshoesintheU.S.tracebacktothe1920s:U.S.farmerswerestrugglingandlobbiedforprotectionfromimports.Politiciansintheirdistrictschampionedtheseprotections.Otherpoliticianspromisedtheirsupportinexchangefortariffsonothergoodsproducedintheirdistricts,suchasshoes;thisprocessisknownaslogrolling.ApplytheConcept:Smoot-HawleyandthePoliticsofTariffs(2of3)ThesenegotiationsresultedintheSmoot-HawleyTariffAct(1930).Smoot-HawleyraisedtariffstotheirhighestvalueinU.S.history(~60percentofvalueofimports,onaverage)Itseffectscontinuetothisday;e.g.the2015U.S.tariffonshoescontainshundredsofentries,detailingtarifflevelsondifferenttypesofshoes.ApplytheConcept:Smoot-HawleyandthePoliticsofTariffs(3of3)Evenworse:thesetariffsnowprotectaverysmallindustry.Employmentintheshoeindustrywas275,000workers,now<15,000workers.Andothercountriesimposedretaliatorytariffsonourexportsalso!Moderntradenegotiationsarelargelyaimedatreducingthesetradeprotections.ShouldWeUnilaterallyRemoveTariffsandQuotas?Somepoliticiansarguethatweshoulddropourtariffsandquotas,butonlyiftheothercountriesagreetodothesame.Thismakesiteasiertogainpoliticalsupportforactionsthatwillgenuinelycauseeconomicpain,albeittoalimitednumberofpeople.ButouranalysisofthesugarquotashowedthatthereissufficientreasonforAmericatounilaterallyremoveitsrestrictions.TheU.S.economywouldgainfromtheeliminationoftariffsandquotasevenifothercountriesdidnotreducetheirtariffsandquotas!OtherBarrierstoTradeAless-commonbutstillimportantbarriertotradeistheimpositionofhigherstandardsonimportedgoods.Example:RawmilkcanbesoldinmanyU.S.statesbutcannotbesoldacrossstatelines.Manygovernmentsalsorestrictimportsofcertainproductsonnationalsecuritygrounds,fearingthatintimesofwar,theywouldnothaveaccesstothoseproducts.Theseargumentsoftenseemquiteself-serving,however.Example:TheDefenseDepartmentgivesarmyrecruitsavoucherforanewpairofsneakers;NewBalancelobbied(unsuccessfully)forthesetoberestrictedtoU.S.-madesneakers.9.5TheDebateoverTradePoliciesandGlobalizationEvaluatethedebateovertradepoliciesandglobalization.Moretradetakesplacebetweennationswhentheirgovernmentsencourageratherthandiscourageit.Astradegenerallymakesnationsbetteroff,economistsaregenerallyinfavoroffreertrade.Buttherearemanypeoplewhodonotbelievefreertrademakeseveryonebetteroffandhenceopposeit.TradeAgreementsinthe20thCentury1930:U.S.institutesSmoot-HawleyTariff,increasingtariffsto>50percent.Goalisto“protect”domesticindustry,encourageemployment.Othercountriesretaliatewiththeirownrestrictions.1948:WesterncountriesseekingtoreviveinternationaltradeformGATT(GeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade).Several“rounds”ofmultilateraltariffreductionfollowed.1995:WorldTradeOrganization(WTO)replacesGATT;>150memberstatesagreetoliberalizeinternationaltrade.WTOalsoprovidesdisputeresolutionprocessfortradedisputes.Bettercoveragefornon-physicalproducts(intellectualproperty,etc.).WorldTradeOrganization(WTO):Aninternationalorganizationthatoverseesinternationaltradeagreements.OppositiontoWTOandTradeinGeneral(1of2)Twomainsources:Anti-globalizationforcesGlobalization:Theprocessofcountriesbecomingmoreopentoforeigntradeandinvestment.Lesser-developedcountries(LDCs)havelessstrictregulations,creatingperceptionofunfairness.Butregulationsareachoice;inrichcountries,wechoosesuchregulationsbecausewethinktheymakeusbetteroff.Freetradeandforeigninvestmentmight“destroy”distinctivecultures.MatterofopinionwhetherLDCsarebetteroffwithMcDonaldsandWalmart;butiftheywanttoeatandshopthere,shouldwedenythemthatright?OppositiontoWTOandTradeinGeneral(2of2)“Old-fashioned”protectionistsProtectionism:Theuseoftradebarrierstoshielddomesticfirmsfromforeigncompetition.Restrictingtrade“savesjobs”and“protectshighwages”Wehaveseenthatoverallpeoplearebetteroffwithtrade,eventhoughsomeindividualsareworseoff.“Infantindustries”needprotectionIndustriesmightneedsometimeto“start-up”andbecomecompetitive;buttariffsmusteventuallyberemoved.ProtectingnationalsecurityMaybeweshouldn’timportallourgunsfromelsewhere...DumpingInrecentyears,TheU.S.hasprotectedsomedomesticindustriesusingaWTOprovisionagainstdumping.Dumping:sellingaproductf