经济学（微观）（英文版原书第7版）课件 第18章　公共选择、税收和收入

EconomicsSeventhEditionChapter18PublicChoice,Taxes,andtheDistributionofIncomeCopyright©2019,2017,2015PearsonEducation,Inc.AllRightsReserved.ChapterOutline18.1

PublicChoice18.2

TheTaxSystem18.3

TaxIncidenceRevisited:TheEffectofPriceElasticity18.4

IncomeDistributionandPovertyWhatRoleShouldGovernmentPlay?Sofar,wehaveseenrelativelylimitedevidenceforgovernmentinterventioninmarkets.Governmentshavebeenabletoreducedeadweightloss(improveeconomicefficiency)by:EnsuringpublicgoodsareprovidedRegulatingmarketswithfewfirmsAlteringthequantitytradedinthepresenceofexternalitiesButhowcanwetellwhatgovernmentshoulddo,forexample:Whenchoosingbetweencompetingpublicprojects?Whendecidingwhomtotax?Wewillstudythesetypesofquestionsinthischapter.18.1PublicChoiceDescribethepublicchoicemodelanduseittoanalyzegovernmentdecisionmaking.Animportantinsightofrecentresearchongovernmentalactivitiesisthatgovernmentpolicymakersarepeopletoo,rationallyinterestedinthemselvesjustlikeconsumersandfirmmanagers.Theyseektomakethemselvesaswelloffaspossible,whichofteninvolvesincreasingtheirre-electionchances.Thepublicchoicemodelisamodelthatapplieseconomicanalysistogovernmentdecisionmakingandcanprovideinsightintothedecisionsthatgovernmentsmake.Table18.1TheVotingParadox(1of3)PolicyLenaDavidKathleenCancerresearch1st2nd3rdMasstransit2nd3rd1stBordersecurity3rd1st2ndVotesOutcomeCancerresearchversusmasstransitCancerresearchwinsMasstransitversusbordersecurityMasstransitwinsBordersecurityversuscancerresearchBordersecuritywinsSupposeCongressmustspend$1billionononlyoneofthreealternatives:ResearchonbreastcancerSubsidiesformasstransitIncreasedbordersecurityForsimplicity,assumethereareonlythreevoters,withpreferencesgiveninthetable.Table18.1TheVotingParadox(2of3)PolicyLenaDavidKathleenCancerresearch1st2nd3rdMasstransit2nd3rd1stBordersecurity3rd1st2ndVotesOutcomeCancerresearchversusmasstransitCancerresearchwinsMasstransitversusbordersecurityMasstransitwinsBordersecurityversuscancerresearchBordersecuritywinsIfthesepoliciescameupforpairwisevotes,andthevotersvotedaccordingtotheirpreferences,theoutcomeswouldbeasinthesecondtable.Sothereappearstobenowaywithmajorityvotingtoaggregatepreferencesintoasensiblepreferenceorderingforsociety.Table18.1TheVotingParadox(3of3)PolicyLenaDavidKathleenCancerresearch1st2nd3rdMasstransit2nd3rd1stBordersecurity3rd1st2ndVotesOutcomeCancerresearchversusmasstransitCancerresearchwinsMasstransitversusbordersecurityMasstransitwinsBordersecurityversuscancerresearchBordersecuritywinsThisisknownasthevotingparadox:thefailureofmajorityvotingtoalwaysresultinconsistentchoices.Butitturnsoutthatnotonlycanmajorityvotingfail,socananyothersystemofvoting.Arrowimpossibilitytheorem:amathematicaltheoremthatholdsthatnosystemofvotingcanbedevisedthatwillconsistentlyrepresenttheunderlyingpreferencesofvoters.Figure18.1TheMedianVoterTheoremSincemajorityruleissoprevalent,itisimportanttounderstanditsconsequences.Oneconsequence,knownasthemedianvotertheorem,isthepropositionthattheoutcomeofamajorityvoteislikelytorepresentthepreferencesofthevoterwhoisinthepoliticalmiddle.Thefigureshowstheidealpoliciesoffivevoters.$2billion,thepreferredpolicyofthemedianvoter,wouldbeatanyotheroptioninapairwisevote.GovernmentFailureWehaveseenpreviouslythatmarketsmightfailtoachievethemaximumpossiblesurplusforsociety.Butgovernmentsmightfailinthisrespecttoo.Wewillconsiderthreewaysinwhichgovernmentscanfail:RentseekingLogrollingandrationalignoranceRegulatorycapture1.RentSeekingRentseekingreferstoattemptsbyindividualsandfirmstousegovernmentactiontomakethemselvesbetteroffattheexpenseofothers.Example:U.S.sugarfirmshavesuccessfullylobbiedthegovernmentforaquotaonsugarimports,whichkeepsthepriceoftheirproducthigh.Firmsmayoffercampaigncontributionstopolicymakersinexchangeforspecial-interestlegislation.2.LogrollingandRationalIgnorancePoliticiansgainsupportfortheirownproposalsbyofferingtosupportthoseoftheircolleagues.Thisisknownaslogrollingandcanhelptoexplainwhysugarquotascontinuetoexist,evenwhentheybenefitrelativelyfewpeople.Butwhywouldn’tvotersvoteoutofofficepeoplewhosupportsuchinefficientpolicies?Becausemostsuchpolicieshurtindividualvotersverylittle.Thelossofsurplusperpersontothesugarquotaisonlyabout$8;manyvotersremainrationallyignorantofsuch“irrelevant”ideas.3.RegulatoryCaptureInprinciple,regulatoryagenciesliketheFoodandDrugAdministration(FDA)existinordertosafeguardconsumers.Butfirmsthataresignificantlyaffectedbyregulatoryagencieshaveanincentivetomakesuretheagenciesare“ontheirside.”Anagencywhichisactingmoreintheinterestofthefirmsitissupposedtoregulatehasbeensubjecttoregulatorycapture.Example:ThedefunctInterstateCommerceCommissionwassetuptoregulaterailroadsandtruckingfirms,butendeduppreventingcompetitionintheindustryinstead.IsGovernmentRegulationNecessary?Theprecedingslidespaintagrimviewofgovernmentregulation,perhapsenoughtomakeuswonderifgovernmentregulationdoesn’tjustmakeusworseoff.Recentestimatessuggestthatthecostsoffederalregulationmaybeseveralthousanddollarspertaxpayer.Howevermanyagenciesdoimportantworkinprotectingconsumersandsafeguardingtheenvironment.Economistscanhelptoidentifythecostsandbenefitsofregulationsinordertohelppolicymakersmakegoodchoices.18.2TheTaxSystemExplainthetaxsystemintheUnitedStates,includingtheprinciplesthatgovernmentsusetocreatetaxpolicy.Governmentspendingmustbefinancedsomehow;mostrevenuereliesontaxation,including:IndividualincometaxesSocialinsurancetaxesCorporateincometaxesSalestaxesPropertytaxesExcisetaxesThenextslideswillshowhowcommoneachoftheseareintheU.S.Figure18.2Federal,State,andLocalSourcesofRevenue,2016:FederalSocialinsurance(SocialSecurityandMedicare)taxesandindividualincometaxesconstitutethemajorityofthefederalgovernment’staxrevenue.Corporateincometaxesarerelativelylessimportant,asareexcisetaxes(taxesonspecificgoodslikegasoline).Figure18.2Federal,State,andLocalSourcesofRevenue,2016:StateandLocalThesourcesofrevenueforstateandlocalgovernmentsaremorevaried.Grantsfromthefederalgovernmenttopayforfederally-mandatedprogramsareasignificantsourceofrevenueforstates.Incometaxesarelessprevalent;instead,salestaxes(ongoodsandservices)andpropertytaxes(onlandandimprovements)areused.SocialInsuranceProgramsAnimportantroleofgovernmentistoassureminimumlevelsofincometoneedygroups.SocialSecurityprovidescashpaymentstoelderlyretiredworkers,thedisabled,andwidows/widowerswithchildrenMedicareisaformofmedicalinsurancefortheelderlyMedicaidprovideshealthcaretopoorpeopleTemporaryAssistanceforNeedyFamilies(TANF)providesvariousformsoffinancialassistanceforalimitedtimetopoorfamiliesThefirsttwoprogramsareadministeredbythefederalgovernment;thelattertwoareadministeredbystatesbutarefederallymandatedandfundedthroughfederalgrants.ClassificationsofTaxesAtaxissaidtoberegressiveifpeoplewithlowerincomespayahigherpercentageoftheirincomeintaxthanpeoplewithhigherincomes.Ataxissaidtobeprogressiveifpeoplewithlowerincomespayalowerpercentageoftheirincomeintaxthanpeoplewithhigherincomes.Taxesthatconstitutethesamepercentageofincomeforlower-incomepeopleasforhigher-incomepeopleareproportional.Whilesomeparticulartaxesareregressiveorproportional,taxesoverallintheU.S.aregenerallyprogressive.Table18.2FederalIncomeTaxBracketsandTaxRatesforSingleTaxpayers,2017Federalincometaxesareprogressive,withsuccessivelyhighermarginaltaxratesonincomeinsucceedingtaxbrackets(rangesinwhichtheratesapply),resultinginanincreasingaveragetaxrate.Thetableshowsthetaxrateswithineachbracket,in2017,forasingletaxpayer.Taxesarepaidonadjustedgrossincome,calculatedbysubtractingexemptionsanddeductionsfromyouractualincome.IncomeTaxRate$0–$9,32510%$9,326–$37,95015$37,951–$91,90025$91,901–$191,65028$191,651–$416,70033$416,701–$418,40035Over$418,40039.6Source:InternalRevenueService.Table18.3FederalIncomeTaxPaidonTaxableIncomeof$100,000AssumeMattearns$100,000inadjustedgrossincome.Mattwillpay10percenttaxonthefirst$9,325,…,and28percenttaxonthelast$8,100ofhisAGI.OnMatt’s…Mattpaystaxof…first$9,325ofincome$932.50next$28,625ofincome4,293.75next$53,950ofincome13,487.00last$8,100ofincome2,268.00Histotalfederalincometaxpaymentis$20,981.75MarginalandAverageTaxRatesMarginaltaxrate:Thefractionofeachadditionaldollarofincomethatmustbepaidintaxes.Averagetaxrate:Totaltaxpaiddividedbytotalincome.Inourpriorexample,Mattpaid$20,981.75intaxon$100,000income;sohisaveragetaxratewas21.0percent.Buthewasinthe28percenttaxbracket;hismarginaltaxratewas28percent.Economiststendtoconcentrateonmarginaltaxrates,sincethesearemostrelevantforlaborsupplydecisions:theyapplytoanyadditionalincomethatpeopleearn.ApplytheConcept:WhichGroupsPaytheMostinFederalTaxes?IncomeCategoryShareofTotalIncomeEarnedShareofTotalFederalTaxesPaidAllFederalTaxesPaidasaFractionofIncome(averagefederaltaxrate)Lowest20%4.4%1.0%4.2%Second20%8.73.98.8Third20%14.210.014.0Fourth20%20.818.417.4Highest20%52.166.625.7Total100.0%100.0%20.4%Highest1%15.325.132.9Arefederalincometaxestrulyprogressive?Thedeductionsavailablecouldconceivablymakethemnotso.Thetableshowsthatthefederaltaxesareprogressive.Whetherthefederaltaxsystemshouldbemademoreorless

progressiveremainsasourceofpoliticaldebate.TheCorporateIncomeTaxThefederalgovernmenttaxescorporationsontheirprofitsviacorporateincometaxes.Thesearealsoprogressive,withtaxratesfrom15percentto35percent,butunlikeforindividuals,mostcorporateearningsaretaxedatthe35percentlevel.Someeconomistsarguethattaxesoughttobeassessedonlyattheindividuallevel,ratherthanalsoatthecorporatelevel.Thiswouldavoid“doubletaxation.”Anotheralternativeistotaxonlyatthecorporatelevel,leavingincomeobtainedviainvestment(“capitalgains”)untaxed.Table18.4CorporateIncomeTaxRatesaroundtheWorldThetableshowscorporatetaxrates(includingstatetaxes)intheUnitedStatesandseveralcomparisoncountries.Manycountrieshavebeenreducingtheirtaxratesrecently,ineffortstoattractcompanies.Forexample,IrelandhasbeenabletoattractsomeforeigncompanieslikeMicrosoft,Intel,andDelltolocatefacilitiesthere.Becauseoflocatingoverseas,andforotherreasons,manyU.S.firmspayamarginaltaxratemuchlowerthan40percent.CountryTaxRatein2000TaxRatein2017Canada42%27%France3733Germany5230Ireland2413Italy4124Japan4231Spain3525Sweden2822UnitedKingdom3020UnitedStates4040Note:Theratesgivenincludetaxesatalllevelsofgovernment.IntheUnitedStates,therateincludesstateaswellasfederaltaxes..EvaluatingTaxesInselectingwhichtaxestouse,governmentstakeintoaccountthefollowinggoalsandprinciples:ThegoalofeconomicefficiencyTheability-to-payprincipleThehorizontal-equityprincipleThebenefits-receivedprincipleThegoalofattainingsocialobjectivesEachofthesesuggestdifferentcombinationsandlevelsoftaxes.Figure18.3TheEfficiencyLossfromaSalesTax(1of2)Inthetaxliterature,deadweightlossresultingfromataxisknownasexcessburden.Excessburden:Ameasureoftheefficiencylosstotheeconomythatresultsfromataxhavingreducedthequantityofagoodproduced;alsoknownasdeadweightloss.Lowexcessburdenisadesirablefeatureoftaxsystems.Figure18.3TheEfficiencyLossfromaSalesTax(2of2)Excessburdenwillbelargerelativetothetaxrevenuesifthequantitychangesalotinresponsetothetax.Thatis,iftheelasticityofdemandand/orsupplyishigh.Economistsareparticularlyconcernedaboutwhetherhightaxratesonincomeleadpeopletoworkless.TheGoalofEconomicEfficiencyTaxesareefficientiftheyimposesmallexcessburdenrelativetothetaxrevenueraised.Theadministrativeburdenoftaxesisalsoimportant:Thetimeandmoneyindividualsandcorporationsspendontaxplanningandtaxreturns.Theexpenseofenforcingincreasingly-complextaxlaws.Taxcodesimplificationwouldhavesubstantialbenefits;butthisisnotapriorityformosttaxpayers—andsomepowerfulspecialinterestgroupsseektomaintain“taxloopholes”ofbenefittothem.TheAbility-to-PayPrincipleTheability-to-pay

principleholdsthatrevenuefromtaxesoughttomostlybepaidbytherich—thatis,thosewhohaveahigherabilitytopay.Inpractice,thismeansthatpeoplewithhigherincomesenduppayingmoretaxes,aconceptknownasverticalequity.Incomeandwealthdocorrelatebutnotperfectly.Incometaxesareprogressive,reflectingtheability-to-payprinciple.Howeversalestaxesareregressive,sinceconsumptionconstitutesalargerproportionofincomeforthepoorthantherich;sothesegoagainsttheability-to-payprinciple.TheHorizontal-EquityPrincipleThehorizontal-equityprincipleholdsthatpeopleinthesameeconomicsituationoughttopaysimilaramountsintaxes.Thisisnoteasytoapplyinpractice.Iftwopeopleeachearn$50,000,horizontal-equityseemstosuggesttaxingeachthesameamount.Butifonereceivestheincomebyworkingtwo40-houraweekjobs,whiletheotherreceivestheincomefromalotteryannuity,thesetwopeopledonotseemtobeinthe“sameeconomicsituation.”Doyouthinktheyshouldpaythesameamountoftax?TheBenefits-ReceivedPrincipleThebenefits-receivedprincipleholdsthatgovernmentsoughttochargemoreintaxestopeoplereceivingmorebenefitsfromtaxes.Fundinglocally-operatedserviceslikesnow-plowingandroad-maintenanceatthelocaltownorcountylevelfollowsthebenefits-receivedprinciple.Howeversomegovernmentservicesaredesignedtohelppoorpeople;taxingthosepeopletopayforthoseservicesisprobablycounter-productive.Similarly,itisoftendifficulttoidentifyexactlywhichgroupsarehelpedbyparticulargovernmentactivities.Example:Howwouldwedividethebenefitsfromnationaldefense?TheGoalofAttainingSocialObjectivesTaxesaresometimesusedtoattainsocialobjectives.Homeownershiphasbeenencouragedbyallowingmortgageinterestpaymentstobedeductiblefromtaxes.Alcoholandcigarettesareoftenseenasundesirableforpeopletoconsume.Sogovernmentstendtotaxthesegoodsrelativelyhighly,inordertodiscouragetheirconsumption.Usingthetaxcodetoattainsocialobjectivesisofteninconflictwithoneormoreoftheforegoingprinciplesoftaxation.18.3TaxIncidenceRevisited:TheEffectofPriceElasticityExplaintheeffectofpriceelasticityontaxincidence.Recallthatwhiletaxesmaybelegallyassessedonbuyersoronsellers,thetaxincidenceisgenerallyshared.Taxincidence:Theactualdivisionoftheburdenofataxbetweenbuyersandsellersinamarket.Taxincidencecanbethoughtofas“whoreallypaysthetax?”,asdistinctfrom“whoislegallyobligatedtopaythetax?”Therelativepriceelasticitiesofdemandandsupplydeterminethistaxincidence.Figure18.4TheEffectofElasticityonTaxIncidence(1of2)Thefigureshowsa10-cents-per-gallontaxongasoline.Whilethisislegallyassessedonsellers,thepricebuyerspayincreases2cents;buyershave20percentoftheburdenofthistax.Figure18.4TheEffectofElasticityonTaxIncidence(2of2)Howeverifbuyershadlessprice-elasticdemandforgasoline,theywouldadjusttheirpurchaseslessinresponsetopricechanges.Inthiscase,thepricebuyerspayendsupincreasingby8cents;buyerspay80percentofthetax,effectively.Taxincidenceisdeterminedbytherelativepriceelasticitiesofthedemandandsupplycurves.ApplytheConcept:WhoReallyBearstheBurdenofCorporateIncomeTaxes?Corporationsarenotpeople;butalltaxespaidbycorporationsareeventuallypaidbypeople.Taxesoncorporateincomediscourageinvestmentincorporations,reducingcapitalavailabletofirms,workerproductivity,andwages.TheCongressionalBudgetOfficeestimatesthat25%ofthecorporateincometaxisintheformoflowerwages.Italsoestimatesthattheexcessburdenfromcorporateincometaxesmaybehalfaslargeasthetaxrevenuesgenerated,makingitaveryinefficientformoftax.18.4IncomeDistributionandPovertyDiscussincomedistributionandincomemobilityandtheroleofpolicyinaddressingtheseissues.Therearealwaysrelativelyrichandrelativelypoorpeoplewithineverysociety.Whetherornotthereisabestamountofinequalityisanopen(andverymuchnormative)question.Morestraightforwardistoask:HowhastheincomedistributionintheUnitedStateschangedovertime?Howdotaxsystemsaffecttheincomedistribution?HowdoestheincomedistributionintheUnitedStatescomparewithothercountries?Table18.5TheDistributionofHouseholdIncomeintheUnitedStates,2016AnnualIncomePercentageofAllHouseholds$0–$24,99921%$25,000–$49,99922$50,000–$74,99917$75,000–$99,99912$100,000–$199,99921$200,000andabove7Thistableshowsincomeinvariousbracketsin2016.Withoutcontext,itishardtoevaluate.Table18.6HowHastheDistributionofIncomeintheUnitedStatesChangedoverTime?YearLowest20%Second20%Middle20%Fourth20%Highest20%20163.1%8.3%14.2%22.9%51.5%20003.68.914.823.049.819903.99.615.924.046.619804.310.316.924.943.719704.110.817.424.543.319603.210.617.624.744.019503.110.517.324.145.019364.19.214.120.951.7Wecanachievesomecontextbyconsideringhowtheincomedistributionhaschangedovertime.Figure18.5PovertyintheUnitedStates,1960-2016(1of2)HowmanyAmericansarepoor?Whatdoesitmeantobepoor?Thefederalgovernmentdefinesahouseholdas“poor”ifitsannualcashincomeisbelowthepovertyline,alevelofannualincomeequaltothreetimestheamountofmoneynecessarytopurchasetheminimumquantityoffoodrequiredforadequatenutrition.Figure18.5PovertyintheUnitedStates,1960-2012(2of2)Thepovertyrate(shownabove)isthepercentageofthepopulationthatispooraccordingtothefederalgovernment’sdefinition.Decreasesinthepovertyrateinthe1960scamelargelyfromtheexpansionofSocialSecurity.Table18.7PovertyRatesVaryacrossGroups,2016GroupPovertyRateTotalpopulation12.7%Femaleheadoffamily,nohusbandpresent(allraces)28.8Blacks22.0Hispanics19.4Asians10.1White,notHispanic8.8Marriedcouplefamilies(allraces)5.1Differentgroupswithinsocietyhavedifferentpovertyrates.Figure18.6TheLorenzCurveandGiniCoefficient(1of2)ALorenzcurveshowsthedistributionofincomebyarrayingincomesfromlowesttohighestonthehorizontalaxisandindicatingthecumulativefractionofincomeearnedbyeachfractionofhouseholdsontheverticalaxis.ThefigureshowsLorenzcurvesfortheUnitedStatesfor1980and2016.Ifincomeswereperfectlyequal,theLorenzcurvewouldbethediagonalline.Figure18.6TheLorenzCurveandGiniCoefficient(2of2)ThelargertheareabetweentheactualLorenzcurveandtheperfectequalityLorenzcurve,themoreunequalareincomes.WemeasurethisinequalitywiththeGinicoefficient:PerfectequalityinincomeswouldgiveaGinicoefficientof0;ifallincomewasearnedbyoneperson,theGinicoefficientwouldbe1.TheU.S.Ginicoefficientforincomesrosefrom0.403in1980to0.481in2016.ProblemsinMeasuringPovertyandtheDistributionofIncomeOurmeasuressofarmaybemisleadingastothetruenatureofpoverty:Theyignoreincomemobility.Theyignoretheeffectsofgovernmentprogramsmeanttoreducepoverty.Wewilladdresstheseshortcomingsonthefollowingslides.Figure18.7IncomeMobilityintheUnitedStates,2004-2007Incomeinequalityismoreconcerningifpeoplearepermanentlypoorand/orrich.Thefigureshowsasubstantialamountofincomemobility,eveninashortperiodoftime.Example:Only69.1percentofhouseholdswhowereinthelowest20percentofincomein2004continuedtobeinthelowest20percentin2007.TheEffectofTaxesandTransfersInequalityisalsolessconcerningiftheactionsofthegovernmentreducetheinequality.Federalincometaxesareprogressive,automaticallyreducingincomeinequality.Therearetransferpaymentstoindividualsfromthegovernment,likeSocialSecurityandunemploymentbenefits.Thefigureswehaveseenarebeforetaxesandtransferpayments.Incomeinequalityaftertheseissubstantiallysmaller.Also,manypoorpeoplereceivenoncashbenefits,likeSupplementalNutritionAssistanceProgram(foodstamp)benefitsandhousingbenefits.Thesefurtherreduceinequality.Thereissubstantialdebateoverhowmuchactionthegovernmentoughttotakeinthisregard.Table18.8TheEffectofTaxesandTransfersontheDistributionofHouseholdIncomeintheUnitedStates,2013QuintileRatioofHighestIncomeQuintiletoOtherIncomeQuintilesbeforeTaxesandTransfersRatioofHighestIncomeQuintiletoOtherIncomeQuintilesafterTaxesandTransfersLowest20%16.08.0Second20%8.14.5Middle20%4.83.2Fourth20%2.92.3Highest20%1.01.0Thetableshowshowmuchtheratiooftheincomeearnedbythehighestquintileearnerstotheotherquintileschangesduetotaxesandtransferpayments.Withoutconsideringtaxesandtransfers,thetopquintileearnsabout16timeswhatthebottomquintiledoes.Thisdropstoabout8timesaftertaxesandtransfers.ExplainingIncomeInequality:DifferencesinReturnstoFactorsofProductionThemarginalproductivitytheoryofincomedistribution(fromchapter17)suggestseachfactorofproduction(includinglabor)ispaiditsmarginalrevenueproduct.Aworker’sproductivitydependsinpartonhisorherhumancapital,theaccumulatedknowledgeandskillsthatworkersacquirefromformaltrainingandeducationorfromlifeexperiences.Sincehumancapitalisnotdistributedequallyacrossworkers,neitherwillincomebe.Similarly,ownershipofotherfactorsofproductionsuchascapitalisnotdistributedequallyeither.ExplainingIncomeInequality:TheEffectsofTechnologicalChangeandInternationalTradeTable18.6showedthatincomeinequalityintheUnitedStateshasbeenrisingoverthelastfewdecades.Somefactorsthathelptoexplainthisinclude:Rapidtechnologicalchangehasdecreasedthedemandfor“unskilled”workersrelativeto“skilled”workers.Expandinginternationaltradehashadthesameeffect.Increasedimmigration(legalandnot)hasbroughtmo