高盛-全球经济学分析：评估中东供应短缺带来的全球增长风险-Assessing Global Growth Risks from Middle Eastern Supply Shortages-20260529

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ntsi:c/s/wse.vaaruhelist

29May2026|12:11AMBST

GLOBALECONOMICSANALYST

AssessingGlobalGrowthRisksfromMiddleEasternSupplyShortages

MeganPeters

+44(20)7051-2058|

nThreemonthsintotheIranWaranddespiteongoingnegotiations,transits

megan.l.peters@

GoldmanSachsInternational

throughtheStraitofHormuzremaindepressed.Whileglobalgrowthhassofarheldupreasonablywell,concernspersistthatitisjustamatteroftimebefore

accumulatingsupplyshortagesleadtooutsizedreductionsinactivity.Inthis

GlobalEconomicsAnalystweevaluatetheeconomicimpactsofariskscenario

wherepersistentclosureofthestraitleadstoanindefinitelossofMiddleEasterncommoditysupplies.

nWecontinuetoexpectthatmostofthedemanddestructionrequiredtoclear

marketswillbedrivenbyprices,whichhaverisensharplyforhighlyexposed

products.Thisisespeciallytrueforoil,wherewecontinuetoseeourgrowthrulesofthumbasappropriate.Thatsaid,ifsupplyconstraintsweretostartbindingforoil,thegrowthimpactscouldrisebeyondthe1-1.5%impliedbyourseverely

adversepricescenario.

nThebiggerriskofoutrightstockoutsprobablyresideswithnon-oilcommodities,wheremarketsarelessglobalandsupplyisoftenregional.Non-oilcommoditysupplyfromtheMiddleEastonlyaccountsfor1.3%ofglobalGDP,butunderanextremeassumptioninwhicheachinputiscriticalandoutputineachindustrydeclinesinproportiontothebindingcommoditysupplyrestriction—what

economistscallaLeontiefproductionfunction—supplylossescoulddriveverylargereductionstooutput.

nTherearethreereasonswhywewouldexpectthegrowthhittoremainmore

contained,however.First,theimpliedGDPhitfallssharplywhenweexclude

inputsthataccountforatrivialshareofproduction.Second,reallocationof

scarceinputsfromlow-tohigh-value-addusesmateriallylowersthedrag.Third,evenmodestsubstitutabilityacrossinputslowersitfurther.Underreasonable

assumptionsforeachchannel,weestimatethedirectgrowthheadwindsfromnon-oilsupplydisruptionscouldlowerglobalGDPby0.4-0.5%,with

downstreamsupplyimpactsmoderatelyamplifyingtheseimpacts.

nDatasofarappearstoalignwiththesepredictions,asanecdotessuggestthat

demanddestructionhasskewedtowardlower-incomecountriesandlower-valueaddedindustries,andindustrialproductiondatahasyettoshowsignsofbindingsupplyconstraints.Moreover,supply-constrainedproductpriceshaveretracedsomewhatinrecentweeks.

Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegACcertificationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto

/research/hedge.html

.

GoldmanSachsGloba

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lo:/iwAnalyst

AssessingGlobalGrowthRisksfromMiddleEasternSupplyShortages

ThreemonthsintotheIranWaranddespiteongoingnegotiations,transitsthroughtheStraitofHormuzremaindepressed,withreportedvesselcountsdownover90%fromnormallevels.Our

baselinecommodity

andeconomicforecastsassumeanormalizationinGulfexportsbyend-June,butrisksappearincreasinglyskewedtowardsalonger

supplydisruption.

ExportsfromthePersianGulfaccountforsizeablesharesofglobaltradeinseveralkeyindustrialandagriculturalinputs—mostnotablyoil,butalsofertilizers,naturalgas,

refinedproducts,petrochemicals,steelandaluminum(Exhibit1).Whilewe

argued

shortlyafterthestartofthewarthatthesupplyshockwouldbemanageableandmostlylimitedtoenergy,theextendedsupplydisruptionhasraisedconcernsthataccumulatingshortagesandproductionbottleneckscouldbemoredisruptivetotheglobaleconomy.

Againstthisbackdrop,inthisGlobalEconomicsAnalystwemodelanindefinitelossof

MiddleEasterncommoditysuppliestoestimatetheGDPheadwindifsupplyconstraintsincreasinglybecomebinding.

Exhibit1:ExportsfromtheMiddleEastAccountforaLargeShareofGlobalTradeinCertainKeyIndustrialandAgriculturalInputs,AlthoughTheirShareofGlobalGDPisSmaller

Source:Exiobase,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Wecontinuetoexpectthatmostofthedemanddestructionrequiredtoclearmarketswillbedrivenbyprices,whichhaverisensharplyforhighlyexposedproducts(Exhibit2).Crudeoilpriceshaverisenbyupto50%,withevenlargerincreasesforrefinedproductslikegasoline,jetfuelanddiesel(Exhibit2,left).Atthesametime,basechemicalprices

rosemorethan60%

fromthestartoftheconfiicttoApril,thefastestrateeverrecorded.Spotpricesforhelium—abyproductofnaturalgasextractionandanindispensable

inputforcryogenicapplicationsincludingsemiconductorproduction—are

reported

tohavedoubledsincethestartoftheconfiict(thoughthemajorityoftheindustryworksoncontractpricingthatisupmuchless).Sulfurandsulfuricacid,keyinputsforcopperrefining,phosphatefertilizerandtitaniumdioxideproduction,areupover60%,whilemethanol—acriticalfeedstockforarangeofpetrochemicalsincludingformaldehyde

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lo:/iwAnalyst

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andaceticacid—isup40%(Exhibit2,right).

Exhibit2:CommodityPricesHaveSurgedInResponsetotheSupplyShock

Source:ICE,Platts,HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsFICCandEquities,TradingEconomics,CNBC,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Ourexpectationthatpriceincreaseswilldestroyenoughdemandtoavoidoutright

stockoutsappliesespeciallytooil.Whileoilinventoriesarebeingdrawndownrapidly,

underourbaselineforecastsOECDcommercialoilinventoriesremainabovepre-shale

averages,although

commercialproductsinventories

arelower.Againstthisbackdrop,

wecontinuetoseeour

standardrulesofthumb

—particularlythose

adjusted

fornaturalgaspriceincreases—asprovidingavalidguidetothehittoGDPfromhigherenergy

prices.Currentlyourgrowthestimatesandbaselinecommodityforecastsimplya1/2pphittoGDP,althoughthedragcouldrisedramaticallyifsupplyremainscurtailedformuchlonger(Exhibit3).

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Exhibit3:CrudeInventoriesRemainAboveHistoricalLevelsDespiteRapidDrawdowns;OurRulesofThumbCapturetheGrowthImpactofDemandDestructionviaHigherPrices

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

AQuantity-BasedApproachtotheGDPImpactsfromSupply

Reductions

Acomplementaryapproachtoassessingthegrowthdownsidefromsupplydisruptionsistolookatquantitylossesratherthanpriceincreases.Thisapproachisagnostictothepriceincreasesnecessarytolowercommoditydemandenoughtomatchsupply,whilepotentiallyprovidingusefulinsightsintowhereGDPhitscouldemergeduetosupply

shortageswhenmarketsarelessglobalandregionaldynamicsmattermore.

Toimplementthisquantity-basedapproach,weleveragetheExiobaseIOtables,whichmeasurethesupplylinkagesfor200productsin163industriesacross44countries.

ThesetablesallowustomeasurenotonlythedirectimpactsfromlossofMiddleEasterncommoditysupplies,butalsotheindirecte仟ectsondownstreamindustries.Inall

subsequentanalysisweusethesemappedlinkagestosimulateacompletelossofMiddleEasternsupplywithoutconsideringpotentialo仟setsfrominventorydrawdowns.

Tostart,Exhibit4showsthepotentialimpactofacompletelossofMiddleEasterncrudeoilsupplyundertheassumptionthateachdownstreamsectorreducesitsoutputin

proportiontoitsdirectandindirectMiddleEasternoilconsumption.Thisexercise

impliesthataround2%ofglobalGDPisdependentonMiddleEasternoilsupply—

refiectingarelianceonoilbothasasourceofenergyandpetrochemicalfeedstocks

(over95%

ofmanufacturedgoodscontainpetrochemicals)—withSouthKorea(-8%),India(-7%)andMainlandChina(-5%)especiallyexposedtooilsupplylosses.Asnotedabove,however,oilstockoutsarelesslikelygiventheglobalnatureofoilmarketswhereanoutsizedpriceincreasewouldlikelybesufficienttodestroydemand.

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Exhibit4:ACompleteLossofMiddleEasternCrudeOilSupplyWouldLikelyLowerGlobalGDPby2%

TheGhoshmodelassumesthateachdownstreamsectorreducesitsoutputinproportiontoitsdirectandindirectconsumptionoftheshockedinputs.

Source:Exiobase,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Forotherrefinedproductsandchemicals,supplyandstockoutconcernsaremore

pressing.Ourcommoditiesstrategists

see

thelargestshortagerisksforpetrochemicalfeedstocks(particularlynaphtha),dieselandjetfuel.Shortagerisksareparticularly

acutefor

diesel

,wheredemandishighlyprice-inelasticgivenitsimportanceinindustrialapplicationsandlimitedavailablesubstitutes.Acrosscountries,SouthAfrica,IndiaandTaiwanappearmostat-riskgivenlargereductionsinlocalproductsupplyandrelativelylowcrudestocks.Onthechemicalsside,someAsianpetrochemicalplantshavealreadydeclaredforcemajeure,andouranalysts

warn

thatsupplydisruptionscouldextend

throughto2027eveniftheStraitofHormuzopensimminently.

WethereforerepeattheanalysisinExhibit4fornon-oilexportsfromtheMiddleEastinExhibit5.Indefinitelossofsupplyoftheseproductswouldrefiectan0.7%lossofglobalnon-oilimportsand1.3%hittoglobalGDP—ledbydeclinesinIndia(-3.6%),Turkiye

(-3.3%)andSouthKorea(-3.1%)—undertheassumptionthatdownstreamoutputisproportionallya仟ected.

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Exhibit5:DownstreamGDPExposuretoMiddleEastGoodsSupplyRangesfrom0.3%intheUStoOver3%inIndia,TurkiyeandSouthKorea

TheGhoshmodelassumesthateachdownstreamsectorreducesitsoutputinproportiontoitsdirectandindirectconsumptionoftheshockedinputs.

Source:Exiobase,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Whiletheselossesarenotable,akeylessonfromthesupplydisruptionsafterthe

pandemicisthatproductshortagescancreatecriticalchokepointsthatpropagate

throughsupplychains,therebyreducingoutputbyalargeramountthantheshareof

lostinputs.Thesedynamicshavebeenofparticularconcerntoinvestors,sinceamplifiedsupplyreductions(particularlydueto

limitedchemicalsupplies

)couldleadtomuch

sharperincreasesinpricesofdownstreamgoods,aswasthecaseforglobal

semiconductorshortagesin2021-2022.

Toshedlightontheseconcerns,werepeatouranalysisusingabottleneckmodelof

production(formally,aLeontiefproductionfunction)wherea10%lossofsupplyofanyinputleadstoa10%reductioninoutputinthereceivingsector,regardlessofwhetherotherinputsareavailable.Underthismoreextremeassumption,eachinputiscritical

andcannotbesubstituted,andproductionisconstrainedbytheinputmademost

scarceduetothelossofMiddleEastsupply.Underthisextremeassumption,thehittoglobalGDPwouldriseto27%.Moreover,ifweallowthesee仟ectstocascadealong

supplychains,thenalmostalloutputwouldeventuallybelost.ThisisbecauseifjustoneindustryreliesentirelyontheMiddleEastforsupplyofanyoneofitsinputs(nomatterhowsmallashareofproductionitaccountsfor),thatindustry,andallindustrieswhichdependonit,wouldceaseproductionunderaLeontiefproductionfunction.Givenhowinterconnectedglobalsupplychainsare,thesee仟ectsquicklypropagatethroughouttheglobaleconomy.

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Exhibit6:InanExtremeScenarioWhereGoodsfromtheMiddleEastAreCriticalfor

ProductionandNoOpportunitiesforSubstitutionExist,theGrowthImpactWouldBeSevere

Source:Exiobase,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

ManyMarginsofAdjustment

Whilethebottleneckmodelhighlightsthepossibilitythatbindingsupplyconstraints

couldbeveryproblematic,weexpecttheimpactsontheoveralleconomywillbemuchmorelimitedsincehouseholdsandbusinesseshavemanymarginsofadjustment.

Asarecentprecedent,whenRussiangassuppliestoEuropewerecompletelycuto仟,theresultingimpactonGDPwasfarlessseverethansomeforecastershadinitiallyfeared,

largelybecausefirmsandhouseholdsadaptedtheirbehaviourinresponsetotheshockmoree仟ectivelythanexpected.Ashighlightedby

Molletal(2023)’s

retrospectiveon

theGermangasshortages,themostpessimisticforecastersanticipateda12%hitto

GDPduetothelossofsupply,whileinrealityGermanyexperiencedonlyaslight

technicalrecession.Significantly,adjustmentsbyhouseholdsandfirmsmeantthatthe

hittoindustrialproductionwaslargelycontainedwithinthemostexposedsectors,withtheGermaneconomy

avoiding

thecascadinge仟ectshighlightedabovewhichcouldwipeoutentiresupplychains.Intheanalysisthatfollows,wethereforefocusprimarilyonthefirst-rounde仟ectsofsupplyshortages.

Evenifnon-oilsupplyfromtheMiddleEastwerepermanentlycurtailed,wewould

expecttheglobaleconomytorespondsimilarlytolimittheimpactsonactivity.Below,wehighlightthreekeymarginsofadjustmentthatcouldmitigatethee仟ectsofa

completelossofexportsfromthePersianGulf.

Mechanism1:Cuttingconsumptionof‘non-critical’inputs

Theassumptioninthebottleneckmodelthatallinputsarecriticalforproductionisverystrong,andforsomeinputs,supplylossesarelikelytohaveonlyatinye仟ectonoutput.Asanexample,theJapanesefoodmanufacturerCalbeehas

switchedto

black-and-whitepackaging

duetoshortagesofnaphtha,akeyingredientininkproduction.

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ToquantifyhowrapidlythehittoglobalGDPdiminishesafterallowingfornon-criticalinputs,inExhibit7wemaintainourbottleneckmodelbutrelaxthecriticalinput

assumptionforinputsthataccountforlessthanacertainpercentageofgrossoutput.Thisexercisedemonstratesthatalargeportionofthegrowthdragintheworst-casescenarioisdrivenbyindustrieswithtrivialexposuretoMiddleEastsupply.Raisingthebottleneckthresholdtojust0.01%ofgrossoutputwouldreducethegrowthhitfrom27%to10%,whileathresholdof1%wouldimplyonlya6%drag.Intheanalysisthatfollows,wecontinuetoimposea0.01%threshold,whichweseeasaconservative

assumption.Allowingfornon-criticalgoodsalsoeliminatesmanyofthecascading

supplychaine仟ects.Ifweaccountforallforwardlinkages,raisingthebottleneck

thresholdto1%reducesthegrowthhitbyaroundathird,andraisingitto5%lowersitbyover95%.

Exhibit7:TheGrowthImpactWouldBeMuchSmallerIfGoodsThatAccountforaTrivialShareofOverallInputsareNon-CriticalforProduction

Source:Exiobase,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Mechanism2:Supplyreallocation

Second,weexpecthigherpriceswillhelpreallocateresourcestowardstheirmostproductiveuses,therebydiminishingtheoverallGDPhit.

Forexample,heliumisacrucialinputforthesemiconductorindustrybutaround5-7%ofglobalsupplyis

used

forpartyballoons.Higherpriceswouldlikelyredirecthelium

supplyfrompartygoerstosemiconductormanufacturerswithlittlecosttooutput.Suchreallocationdynamicsarealreadyplayingout.InAsia,our

chemicalsanalysts

have

fiaggedthatproductioncutsduetopetrochemicalshortageshavemostlybeen

concentratedtolowvalue-addedsectorsliketextilesandpackaging.Similarly,EuropeissuccessfullyredirectingUSjetfuelfiowsawayfromAsianEMsby

bidding

upprices.

InExhibit8(left),wepresenttheresultsofasimplemodel(maintainingourbottleneckproductionfunction)wheresupplyisoptimallyreallocatedacrossindustriestominimizethehittoGDP.Weconsiderthreescenarios:noreallocation,within-countryreallocationandglobalreallocation.Inourmodel,reallocatingresourceswithincountriesdampensthegrowthhitfrom10%tojust0.4%,whilefrictionlessglobalreallocationreducesthehittolessthan0.1%.

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Exhibit8zoomsinonthelossofallphosphatefertilizersupplyfromtheMiddleEasttoChinatoillustratewhyreallocationsignificantlydampensoutputlosses.Inthis

illustration,weassumethatfertilizerscanbereallocatedwithinChinabutdonotallowforimportsubstitution.Wethenhighlightsectorsthatarereallocatedmoreorless

fertilizer(comparedtoascenariowithnoreallocation).Asshowninthechart,supplyisdivertedawayfromindustrieswherefertilizeraccountsforalargeshareofcostsbut

generateslowervalueadded(e.g.,vegetablesandnuts)towardindustrieswhere

fertilizeraccountsforatinyshareofcostsbuthighervalueadded(e.g.,plant-basedfibers).Whilethisexampledoesnotconsiderthewelfarecostsofareductioninfoodsupply(aswellasthelikelysignificantupwardpressureonfoodprices)thatmayalsofactorintosupplyallocationdecisions,ithighlightshowreallocationcanhelpaddresssupplyshortagesinsomeindustries.

Exhibit8:DivertingSupplytoHigherValue-AddedIndustriesCouldReducetheGlobalGDPHitfrom10%toLessthan1%

Source:Exiobase,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Inpractice,theamountofreallocationwilldependonindividualproducts.Some

productslikealuminumhavedeepglobalmarketsthatwillfacilitatereallocationacrosscountriesandindustries,whereasregionalsupplydynamicsandcontractstructureswilllimitnaturalgasreallocationinsomecountries.Nevertheless,theresultsabovehighlightthatsupplyreallocationcanbeverye仟ectiveindampeningtheoverallGDPhitfromlossofMiddleEastsupply.Moreover,supplyreallocationcanplayakeyroleindampening

thecascadinge仟ectsofsupplylosses.Amendingourmodeltoaccountforall

downstreamlinkagesstillyieldslessthana0.2%hittoglobalgrowthinaworldwhereglobalsupplycanbereallocatedfreely.

Mechanism3:Substitutionbetweenintermediateinputs

Third,firmsmaybeabletosubstitutebetweensomeintermediateinputs.

Forinstance,basicplasticssuchaspolyethylenecanbereplacedbypaper,glassor

aluminumpackaging.Environmentalconcernsandlegislationinrecentyearshave

alreadypromptedfirmstofindalternativestosingle-useplastic:somemoreinnovativesolutionsincludesupermarketsinAsiawrappingproducewithbananaleaves,and

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cosmeticsbrandsswitchingfromtraditionalliquidshampoostosolidversionspackagedincardboard

1

.Thelossofplastics(andupstreamfeedstockssuchasnaphtha)could

acceleratetherolloutofsuchmeasureswhileleavingGDPlittlechanged.

Admittedly,someproductsarelikelylesssubstitutableatthemicrolevel.Forexample,itisdifficultforindividualpetrochemicalplantstosubstituteawayfromtheirrespective

feedstocks.Likewise,therearefewsatisfactorysubstitutesforsulfuricacidincopperrefiningandoreleaching.Thatsaid,attheindustrylevel,theelasticityofsubstitutionwilllikelybehigherthanitisforanyindividualplant,sincefirmsemployvaried

productiontechnologies,enablingsupplyreallocationwithinindustrieswhichcanmoderategrowthimpacts.

Tomodelsubstitutability,inExhibit9,wecalibrateaconstantelasticityofsubstitution(CES)productionfunctiontomatchtheobservedinput-outputlinkages.Astheelasticityofsubstitutionincreasesfromzero(Leontief)to1(Cobb-Douglas),theglobalgrowthhitdeclinesfrom10%tojustlessthan5%,withmostofthisreductionresultingfrom

allowingforonlyamodestdegreeofsubstitutability.

Exhibit9:EvenaSmallDegreeofSubstitutabilityBetweenImportsWouldDampentheGDPHitSubstantially

Source:Exiobase,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

CombiningMarginsofAdjustment

Toassessthemagnitudeofthepotentialgrowthhitafteraccountingforthesemarginsofadjustment,wemakereasonableassumptionsonthebottleneckthreshold,easeofreallocationandsubstitutabilityofinputs,guidedbytheacademicliteratureandourownjudgement.

2

1SeetheonlinesupplementtoBachmannetal(2022)formoreexamplesoftheinnovativewaysthatfirmshaverespondedtohistoricalsupplyshocks.

2Wemaintainourconservative0.01%bottleneckthresholdassumption.Weassumethatproductswhicharehighlyspecialized/regulatedandproductswithshortshelf-lives/complexlogisticsorothergeographic

constraintscan’tbereallocatedintheshort-run(thiscoversmostfooditems,waste/recyclingindustriesandsomesectorslikeprocessingofnuclearfuel).Naturalgas—whichisdeliveredbypipelineorbytankerto

specializedreceivingterminals—canonlybereallocatedwithincountries.Lowvaluequarryingproductslikestonearealsoonlyreallocatedwithincountriesgiventheirlowvalue-to-weightandhightransportationcosts.

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Undertheseassumptions,weestimatethatacompletelossofnon-oilgoodssupply

fromtheMiddleEastwoulddirectlylowerglobalGDPby0.4-0.5%(incrementaltothehitfromhigheroilandgaspricesshowninExhibit3),withthelargesthitsinTurkiye

(2.2%)andIndia(1.1%).DMssuchastheUSandNorwaywouldfacemuchsmaller

growthhits(0.1%orless),refiectingtheirhigher-valueaddedproductionandlower

dependenceonMiddleEasternsupply.Whilefullyaccountingforalldownstream

linkageswouldleadtoamoderatelylargerGDPhit—simulationssuggestuptothree

timesaslarge—theseimpactsremainmuchsmallerthantheextremescenarioshowninExhibit6whereallgoodsarecritical,notsubstitutable,andnoreallocationoccurs.

Whilethereisadmittedlysignificantuncertaintyhowactiveeachofthesemarginsof

adjustmentwillbeinpracticeandweremainconcernedthatnon-energysupply

reductionscouldposeincrementalchallengestogrowthin2026H2(particularly

inAsia

,consistentwiththepredictionsinExhibit10)ourresultshighlightthatadjustmentstoproductionandpre-existingsupplychainscanmeaningfullydampeneconomiclosses.

Exhibit10:UnderReasonableAssumptions,WeEstimatethataCompleteandPersistentLossofNon-OilGoodsSupplyfromtheMiddleEastWouldDirectlyLowerGlobalGDPby0.4-0.5%

Source:Exiobase,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Ourresultsalsohaveimplicationsforpotentialpriceincreases.Whilepricesofdirectlya仟ectedcommoditieswilllikelyleadtosignificantupwardinfiationpressures,if

adjustmentskeepdownstreamgoodsproductionmostlyintact,extremelylargeprice

increasesmaybemostlyavoided.Forexample,combiningtheimpliedreductionin

Exhibit10with

ourtypicalgoodssupply

elasticity(-0.8)impliesonly0.4ppupward

pressureoncoreinfiationfromchemicalandrefinedproductshortages,incrementaltotheimpactfromhigherenergyprices(whichweexpectwillraiseglobalheadline

infiationby1.0ppandcoreinfiationby0.3pp).Whilelatentchokepointsleadingto

outsizedpriceincreasescouldstillemerge,theseresultssupportourlong-standingviewthatenergypriceswillremainthemaindriverofinfiation.

Weassumeallotherinputscanbereallocatedglobally.Lastly,weassumeanelasticityofsubstitutionbetweenintermediateinputsof0.1,consistentwithAtalay(2017),whousesthechangesinmilitaryspendingas

exogenousdemandshifterstoestimatethiselasticityintheUS.

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WhattoWatch

Astheconfiictevolves,wewillbecloselywatchingbusinesssurveysasanearlysignalofsupplychainstress.Manufacturingsuppliers’deliverytimeshavelengthenedacross

countriesoverthelastthreemonths—Euroareadeliverytimessawthelargestincreasesince2022inApril—withcommentaryattributingthistotheconfiictintheMiddleEast.TheNewYorkFed’s

GlobalSupplyChainPressureIndex

—whichincorporatessignals

fromthemanufacturingPMIs,aswellasadditionalinformationonfreightcosts—alsosurgedinApriltoitshighestlevelsincethepandemic.InitialPMInumbersforMaypointtoongoingdelaysinsupplychains,withmodestreliefinAustraliaandJapanfollowinglargeupticksinApril(Exhibit11).

Exhibit11:BusinessSurveysPointtoEmergingSupplyChainStress

Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Thatsaidandconsistentwit