CEPR-碎片化世界中差异化一体化的政治经济学 The political economy of

Europe2050:

GeometriesofPeace,Power,andProsperity

September2026

Thepoliticaleconomyofdifferentiatedintegrationinafragmentingworld

JeffryFrieden

ColumbiaUniversity

StefanieWalter

UniversityofZurichandBruegel

Toensuretimelydissemination,the“Europe2050”papersarepublishedwithouteditingortypesetting.ThesecontributionswillsubsequentlyformthebasisofCEPRParisReport5,tobepublishedatalaterstageandeditedbyOlivierBlanchard,PascalLamy,EnricoLetta,andBeatriceWederdiMauro.

September2026

Thepoliticaleconomyofdifferentiatedintegration

inafragmentingworld

JeffryFrieden(ColumbiaUniversity)andStefanieWalter(UniversityofZurichandBruegel)

Wri$enfortheCenterforEconomicPolicyResearchinitiative“EuropeoftheFuture2050:

GeometriesofPeace,PowerandProsperity,”initiatedbyOlivierBlanchard,PascalLamy,EnricoLe$a,andBeatriceWederdiMauro.

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Introduction

TheEuropeanUnion(EU)wasbuiltinandforaninternationalordercharacterizedbyrules-basedmultilateralismandWesterndominancethatnowseemsarelicofthepast.Recentyearshaveseendramaticchangesintheinternationalarenathatsuggestatransitiontowardsapower-basedsysteminwhichEuropeplaysamuchlesscentralrole.ThesechangesconfronttheEUwithconsiderablechallenges.TheUnitedStateshasturnedawayfromitstraditionalleadershiprole,andfrommultilateralism,andnowtreatstheEUmorelikeanadversarythananally,includingwiththreatstoEUterritory.Europelacksastrongdigitalindustryofitsown,andrisksfallingbehindincuMing-edgetechnologiesandtheirapplications.Europe’scompetitivenessproblemsandChina’sexportdrivethreatenleadingEurope’sindustries,itslong-standinglabormarketinstitutions,anditssocialcontract.Onthestrategicfront,theAmericanretreatandtheRussianthreattoEuropeansecurityhavehighlightedEurope’sweakmilitaryposition.

Althoughtheultimatenatureoftheneworderisunclear,thereisliMledoubtthatfortheEUtoplayaleading,autonomous,roleintheworld,itwillneedtotransformitselfinimportantways.Europeremainsoneofworld’slargestandwealthiestintegratedmarketswithmanystrengths,suchasahighlyeducatedpopulation,strongregulatorypowerandresearchcapabilities,andgloballycompetitivefirms.Buttosuccessfullynavigatethenewinternationalorderandtocarveoutaroleasaninfluential,prosperousandsecureactorontheglobalstage,Europe,withtheEUinthelead,needstodevelopmoreeffective,andmoreunited,economic,foreign,anddefensepoliciestoconfrontthesechallenges.

Bringingaboutthenecessarychangespresentsbotheconomicandpoliticalchallenges.

Designingfunctioningandeffectiveinstitutionsandpoliciesisnoeasytask.Obtainingand

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sustainingthepoliticalsupportforthereformsnecessarytocreatesuchinstitutionsandimplementsuchpoliciesbothamongthememberstatesandwithinthemisevenharder:ThereisnoagreementamongtheEU’smemberstatesaboutwhereandhowtomoveforward.Inaddition,mostoftheEU’smemberstatesarethemselvesinternallydividedonthesequestions.

PopulistmovementsandpartiesofboththeRightandtheLeftareskepticalofthebroaderanddeepermeasuresofEuropeanintegrationitinvolves.ManyEuropeansarereluctanttoembraceathorough-goingchangeinthestructureoftheEU,withalltheuncertainties,trade-offsandpotentialcostsdeepreformstypicallyentail.Whilesomeintegrationstepscarrylargepotentialpayoffs,theyalsocarryrisksthatmayleadmanyEuropeanstocontestthevalueofintegrationitself.Movementinthatdirectionthusrisksprovokingabacklashfromatleastpartofthepublic.Atthesametime,ifEuropedoesnotmoveforwardwithreformsatatimeofmassivegeopoliticalandglobaleconomicchangeitfacesfundamentalrisks.

Inthiscontribution,welayoutsomeofthepoliticalchallengesconfrontingpolicymakersengagedininstitutionalandpolicyreform,discusstheimplicationsforthefeasibilityofsuchreforms,andsketchoutsomewaysinwhichthesepoliticalobstaclescouldbeaddressedWesuggestthatreformeffortsfocusonareaswherethepoliticalobstaclesarelowestandeconomicpayoffishighest,whileallowingmoreflexibilityanddifferentiationinareasthatarepoliticallyfraughtorwheretheintegrationpayoffislower.ThiswillallowEuropetoactdecisivelyandtocapitalizeonitsstrengths.

Thechallenge:Politics

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SignificantshiftsintheglobalordercreatestrongpressuresforEuropeinitscurrentform.Tostand“asanautonomousactorcapableofshapingoutcomes”(Blanchardetal2026),Europeneedsseriousreform.ThekeychallengeistomovetheUnionfromitscurrentpolitical-economicequilibriumtoanewonethatisbeMersuitedtothisemergingorder,whileensuringthatthistransitionstrengthensratherthanfragmentsandweakensit,bothpoliticallyandeconomically.TheUnitedStatesdemonstratesthatsuchmovementislikelytobedifficultandpotentiallyconflictual–ittook80yearsandacivilwarfortheUStotransitionfromaconfederationtowardafederation.Butthisexperiencealsoshowsthatsuchfundamentalreformsarepossible.

Toaddressthischallenge,EuropeanstateswillhavetobuildconsensusformeasuresthatrequirefullparticipationbyallcountriesintheEU,toencouragecooperationamongthosememberstateswillingtocooperateformeasuressuitablefor“coalitionsofthewilling,”

andtoleavetherestatthediscretionofnationalgovernments.Politically,thistaskconfrontsadifficultrealityontwofronts:differencesamongcountriesintheirpolicypreferences,anddifferenceswithincountriesovertheappropriatenationalstrategy.

Convergenceanddivergenceamongcountries.

NationalpositionsonfurtherEuropeanintegrationvaryconsiderablyacrosscountries.

Somesupportmuchdeeperintegration,whileothersarenotoriouslyskeptical.Drivenbothbymaterialconsiderationsaboutthenationalconsequencesoffurtherintegrationstepsanddomesticpoliticalconsiderations,suchaselectoralconcernsandspecialinterestpressures(Moravcsik1997;HoogheandMarks2009;Finkeetal.2012;Frieden2002),supportforintegrationiststepsalsotendtovaryconsiderablyacrossissueareas.Notallissuesand

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proposalsforreformarecontested;sometimes,aconsensusemerges.Atothertimes,clearlydefinedcampsemerge,whileatyetothertimes,nationalpositionsaremorevaried.Thesevaryingconstellationsareachallengeforreform,buttheyalsopresentsomeopportunities.

Toillustratethisdivergenceandconvergenceinnationalpositionsacrossdifferentpolicyissuesandreformproposals,wedrawondatacompiledbytheEMUChoicesproject(Wasserfallenetal.2019).1Thisprojectusedthetextualanalysisofmorethan5,000documents,alongwith27expertinterviews,tocharacterizemember-stategovernmentpositionson47contestedEMU-relatedreformproposalsdiscussedduringtheEurozonecrisis.Becausenationalpositionscanchangeovertime,thesedata–collectedintheaftermathoftheEurozonedebtcrisis–donotnecessarilyreflectcurrentthinkinginEuropeancapitals.

However,theyillustratethatatthesamepointintime,arangeofdifferentpreferenceconstellationscanco-existamongmemberstatesevenwithinabroadandcontestedissueareasuchasmacroeconomicgovernanceintheEurozone(seeFigure1).

Weselectfourreformproposalsthatillustrateconvergenceanddivergenceinnationalpositions.Panelaillustratesthatthereareissueareaswherethereisaconsensus,orclosetoone,amongmemberstatesaboutthedesirabilityofaEuropeanapproach–inthiscaseevidentbytheneartotalsupportforalargerESMlendingcapacity.However,therearealsoissuesonwhichnationalpositionsstronglydiverge.Sometimes,suchaswiththeissueofEuropeandebtmutualization(panelb),therearecleardivisions,buttherearealsomemberstatesthatoccupyapossiblezoneofcompromise.Otherissues–illustratedherewithnationalpositionsonaproposaltosuspendmemberstatesvotingrightsintheCounciliftheybreachEUdeficit

1hMps://emuchoices.eu/

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rules(panelc)–arecharacterizedbyclearly-delineatedopposingcamps,inthiscasethefamiliarpaMernofmostlytraditionallyfrugalcreditorsofnorthernEuropesupportingatoughlinewithmemberstatesthatviolatefiscalrules(andopposingdebtmutualization,seepanelb),andthemoretraditionallydeficitanddebtorcountriesofperipheralEuropetakingtheoppositeposition.Andfinally,therearereformproposalsformoreEuropeanintegrationthataremetwithalmostuniversalrejection–suchastheproposalthattheEUCommissionshouldreviewnationalbudgetproposalsbeforenationalparliamentsvoteonthem.

Figure1:NationalnegotiationpositionsonselectedissuesduringtheEurozonecrisis

Figure1showsthatatanygiventimethepoliticalfeasibilityofdifferentreformproposalsvariesconsiderably.WhatmaMersfortheEU’soverallabilityforreformishowmanyreformproposalsfallintowhichcategory.Afterall,politicalobstacleshaveoftenallowedtheEUtomoveforwardonlyinincrementalwaysinrecentyears,“failingforward”

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ratherthanmakingboldreforms(Jonesetal.2015).Wereturntosomesuggestionsalongtheselinesbelow.

Convergenceanddivergencewithincountries.

Thedivisionsamongmemberstatescanbewide;divisionswithinthemcanbewiderstill.VirtuallyallEUmemberstateshavepowerfulpopulistmovementsandparties,whetheroftheRightoroftheLeft,thathavetypicallybeenskepticaloforhostiletomanyoftheintegrationistinitiativesofthepast.Asthesegroupingshavebecomepoliticallymorepowerfulinrecentyears,theissueofEuropeanintegrationhasbecomemorepoliticizedandcontentiousindomesticpolitics(HoogheandMarks2009;DeVriesandHobolt2020).WhilethisdevelopmenthasbeenamajorconstraintoneffortstosignificantlydeepenEuropeanintegration,however,vastmajoritiesofEuropeancitizensandpoliticalpartiescontinuetosupportEuropeanintegrationandviewtheEUpositively.Overall,domesticpoliticsinmemberstatesisthusdividedratherthanskepticalofEuropeanintegration.

WeusetheChapelHillExpertSurvey(CHES),whichreliesonexpertcharacterizationsofparty-specificpolicypositionsofupto279Europeanparties,toillustratethesedivisions.2Thesedatahavebeencollectedinsevenrounds,from1999until2024,foralmostallEUcountriesandhaveinvolvedbetween116and609expertstocodebetween143and279politicalpartiesperround.

PartypositionsonEuropeanintegrationvaryconsiderablyamongparties,asFigure2shows.ThisistruebothacrossallEUmemberstatesandwithinmanyEuropeancountries(of

2hMps://www.chesdata.eu/

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whichweshowaselection).Twofindingsstandoutfromthissimpledescriptivegraph:

Overall,mostparties–andgoverningpartiesinparticular–exhibitafavorablepositiontowardstheEU,althoughmanypartiesvoiceconsiderableskepticism.Second,thereisalsosubstantialvariationwithincountries:Insomecountries,suchasinGermany,themajorityofpartiesclustersonthepro-EUpole,insome,suchastheNetherlands,partypositionsaredistributedacrossthefullspectrum,andinyetothers,suchasinRomaniaandFrance,partiesarehighlypolarizedwhenitcomestoEUintegration.

Figure2:PositionsofnationalpoliticalpartiesinEuropeonEuropeanintegration

ThesedivisionshaveimplicationsforEuropeanpolitics,especiallyincountriesinwhichpoliticalpartiesarehighlypolarizedontheissueofEuropeanintegration.First,nationalgovernmentsaremoreconstrainedintheirabilitytocompromiseontheEuropeanlevelwhentheyfacepoliticalcompetitionfromEuroskepticpartiesathome.Second,whenpoliticalentrepreneursstandreadytoexploitissuessuchasEuropeanintegrationthatcan

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driveawedgeintotheelectorateofmoremainstreamandEurophileparties(DeVriesandHobolt2020;DeVriesetal.2021),reformproposalsthatseektoadvanceanddeepentheEUinamorefederaldirectiontendtobemorecontesteddomestically.Insuchcontexts,integrationistproposalshavethepotentialtofurtherinflamepopulistsentiments.Finally,domesticpartypolarizationmakesitlikelythatnationalelectionsmayresultinsignificantshiftsinmemberstates’stancestowardsEuropeanintegration.Nationalnegotiatingpositionsandsupportforintegrationistprojectsarethuslikelytobemuchmorevolatileinpolarizedcountries.

Figure3illustratesthispointforonespecificissue:EUauthorityovernationalbudgets.

Itcomparestheaveragepartypositionsofgovernmentandoppositionpartiesin2014and2019(theonlytwoyearsinwhichthesedatawerecollected)foraselectedsetofEUcountries,aswellastheEU27average.ItshowsthatthediscrepancybetweengovernmentandoppositiononEU-relatedissuescanbeverylarge(ItalyandGreecein2014areglaringexamples)andthatnationalnegotiatingpositionsontheseissuescanchangedramaticallywhengovernmentcompositionchanges,asthestrikingreversalsingovernmentpositionsinPolandandGreeceshow.WithpoliticalpartiesliketheAfDinGermanyandNationalRallyinFranceontherise,thissuggeststhatthetraditionallypro-integrationistpositioningofmajorEUmemberstatesmaybeatriskinthelongrun.

Figure3:Averagegovernmentandoppositionpositionsovertime

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Pathstounityanddiversity

ConfrontingtheexternalandinternalthreatstoEuropeanautonomyrequireswinningboththemindsandtheheartsofitscitizensandelites,inanenvironmentinwhichthereisliMleconsensusamongorwithinnationsastowhatistobedone.ReformsneedtobebothambitiousenoughtounlockEurope’spotential,andcalibratedenoughtobepoliticallyfeasibleandsustainable.ThepathtoamoreeffectiveUnionrequireschangesinpolicies,changesinpoliticalinstitutions,andchangesinaMitudes.Chartingthewayforwardinvolvesconsideringpossiblecoalitionsofnationsthatcantaketheleadwhennotallmemberstatesarewillingtoparticipate.Policiesmustbecraftedinwaysthatmustersupportforthereformsnecessary,allowthesecoalitionstoformandadvance,andaddressapotentialbacklashfromthosewhoopposethereforms.AndtheseeffortsneedtobeaccompaniedbynarrativesthatexplaintoEuropeanswhytheyarebeingaskedtomakepotentiallydifficultchangesthatarelikelytopayoffonlyinthelongerrun.

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ThedifferencesbothamongandwithincountriesonwhetherandhowtoproceedwithEuropeanintegrationpresentstheEuropeanintegrationprojectwithconsiderablepoliticalchallenges.Butaswehaveseen,notallpolicyareasintheEUareequallycontestedpolitically.

Likewise,thepayofffromintegrationvariesacrossissueareas.Onekeytaskisthustoidentifyissuesonwhichintegrationislikelytoberelativelyfeasible,andareasinwhichthepoliticalcostsofintegrationoutweighthebenefitssostronglythatitisbesttokeepthemonthenationallevel(Table1).Thereremainmanyissueareasthatare,andshouldremain,thedomainofnationalpolicy.Insomecases,thisisbecausethereisliMlereasonfordealingwiththematasupranationallevel–suchaslinguisticorculturalmaMers.Inothercases,whiletheremightbesomeargumentforharmonization,thestrengthanddiversityofnationalcommitmentsdemandsseparation–suchassocialpolicies.

Unfortunately,politicalagreementonjointlymovingforwardisnotnecessarilystrongestwhereeconomicanalysisimpliesthelargestpayofffromintegration.UnanimouspoliticalagreementamongmemberstatesoftenlacksontopicsonwhichanalysissuggeststheneedforUnion-wideinclusion,andviceversa.ThatthenraisesthepoliticalchallengestheUnionfacesthatwediscussedabove.

Table1:PayoffsfromandobstaclestoEuropeanintegration

Aggregatepayofffromintegration

Low

high

Political

obstacles

low

Small-scaleintegration

Examples

“Low-hangingfruit”

Examples:

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Small-scaleharmonizationoftechnicalissues

Limitedjointdefense

procurementandcapabilities;integrationoftheenergygrid/markets

high

Nationalpolicypriority

Examples:

Harmonizationofnationalwelfareorpensionmodels,housingpolicy,educationpolicy

Importantbuthighlycontested

Examples:

Jointdefensedecision-making,capital-marketsunion;commonborrowing/debtmutualization;commonforeignpolicy;significantinstitutionalEUreform

MakingEuropefitfor2050thusrequireswaysofaddressingthepoliticalobstaclesitfaces.Asecond–andharder–taskisthereforetoidentifyandfocusonthosepolicyareaswheretheaggregatepayofffromintegrationishigh,andtofindwaystoreducepoliticalobstacleswithoutgivinguptoomuchofthepotentialgains.Thisisnotanewtask:unanimoussupportforfar-reachingreformhasalwaysbeendifficulttoreachintheEU,especiallyasmembershiphasgrown.Asaresult,theEUhassuccessfullyexperimentedwithdifferentiatedintegration(Leuffenetal.2013):Memberandnon-memberstatesparticipateinEUpoliciesselectively,reflectingheterogeneityofintegrationpreferences,interdependence,andstatecapacities.Althoughdifferentiatedintegrationalwaysconfrontsmemberstateswithatrade-offbetweenthecapacitytoactandinclusiveness,asCatherinedeVries(2026)pointsoutinhercontribution,thishasenabledtheEUtoengageinintegrationprocessesinareassuchasmonetarypolicy(mostnotablyEMU),migrationandasylum(SchengenandDublin),ordefenseandsecuritycooperation(e.g.PESCOorSAFE).

Copingwithpreferencedivergenceamongmemberstates

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Differentiatedintegrationisonewaytoaddresspoliticalobstacles,becauseitreducesthenumberofstateswhoseagreementisnecessarytomoveforward.Cooperationamongmemberstatesvariesintheextenttowhichitfavors,orrequires,all-inclusiveparticipationofall,ornearlyall,memberstates.Insomeareas,unanimityisabsolutelyrequired;inothers,itmaynotbenecessary,sothatjointpolicymaymoveforwardwiththeinvolvementofseveralmemberstates.Andtherearemanypoliciesthatcanandshouldbelefttogovernmentstopursueatthenationallevel.Thechallengeistothinkbothabouttheissuesinwhichjointactionisnecessaryandthoseinwhichdifferentiatedintegrationispossible,ontheonehand,andhowthepoliticalrealitiesthatmayconstrainthesechoicescanbeaddressed.

Ausefulwaytothinkaboutwhichissuesfallintowhichcategoryistoimaginewhetherthepublic(orclub)goodinquestioncanbeprovidedwithouttheparticipationofeverymemberstateor,putdifferently,whetheritsprovisionwouldbeunderminedbythenon-participationofamemberstate.Thecommonexternaltariffforgoodsisanexampleofapolicythatrequirestheparticipationofallmemberstates(assumingtheyareallpartoftheSinglemarket):itonlyholdsifallmemberstatesapplyit.Lookingahead,itmaybethattheCapitalMarketsUnion(andtheSavingsandInvestmentUnionmorebroadly)withcommonregulatorystandardsrequiresfullinclusion:ifsomememberstateshavenotablymorelaxregulationthanothers,thereisapotentialforevasion,arbitrage,andeventualfinancialcrisis.

Thereareotherareaswhereuniversalparticipationisdesirable,butnotstrictlynecessary.Here,newformsofintegrationcanbelaunchedwithasubsetofcountries.ThisallowsforcooperationbyaselectgroupofEUmemberswhileothersholdbacktoseetheresults.Candidatesforeithervoluntaryparticipationoraclubmightberesearchanddevelopment,highereducation,andcertainindustrialpolicies.Althoughthecooperation

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gainsinsuchmorelimitedschemesaretypicallylowerthaninissueareaswithuniversalparticipation,suchareashaveseveralpoliticaladvantages:notonlyaretheyeasiertolaunch,theycanalsodemonstratetoskepticalmemberstatesthatcooperationgainsarereal.Inaddition,overtimetheycancreatenewrealitiesonthegroundthatmakeparticipationmoreaMractiveforcountriesthatinitiallyoptedtoremainoutside.

Thecreationofacooperativeclubofonegroupofmemberstateswithacommonpolicycan,ifsuccessful,thereforegiveothermemberstatesincentivestojoinlater.TherearemanyareasinwhichscalemaMers,andforwhichtheadvantagesofcooperationbecomeclearonlyastheyaredemonstratedinpractice.TheSchengenArea,too,startedwithalimitedcooperationcluboffivecountries,butexpandedgraduallyasitwasshowntobeworkable.

TodayitexcludestwoEUmembersforparticularisticreasons(CyprusandIreland)andincludesfournon-EUmembers(Iceland,Liechtenstein,Norway,andSwimerland).Thevisibletravel,transport,andsecuritybenefitsandincreasingcostsofexclusionmadeSchengenmembershipaMractive,eventuallymakingitpartoftheEUacquisandnearuniversalmembershipofEUcountries.Thissuggeststhatasacoalitionofthewillingdemonstratesitsvalue,itcanexpand.

Startingsmallmayevenbethebestwayforwardwhereaprospectivereformultimatelyrequiresuniversalparticipation.Whenpoliticalobstaclesarehigh,politicalrealitiesmaydictategradualismasthebestwaytoachievethislevelofparticipation.Inaddition,therearemanypoliciesthatcanbesustainedwithoutuniversalparticipation,andcooperationclubsmaybethebestwaytodealwithpolicyareasinwhichunanimityisneithernecessarynorfeasible.Herethepublic(orclub)goodcanbedeliveredtomembersonly.The

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Eurozoneisanobviousexample:itprovidesmonetaryandexchange-ratestabilityonlytoEMUclubmembers.

Twohotlydebatedissuesdemonstratethesedynamics.ThefirstisthedebateaboutthecreationofanEUsafeassetthatmemberstatesstandbehindcollectively.Thisisacrucialsteptoward,asOlivierBlanchardandAngelUbide(2025)haveputit,“creatingaEuropeanfinancialecosystemthatcancompetewiththatoftheUnitedStates.AndanecessaryconditionforsuchasystemtofunctionistohaveatitsbaseadeepandliquidEurobondmarket.”Thegoal,aimedatestablishingtheeuroasatrulyleadinginternationalcurrency,istocreateanamplesupplyofeuro-denominatedsafeassets,backedjointlybyEUgovernments.Theirproposal,andvirtuallyanyotheralongsimilarlines,wouldseemtorequiretheinvolvementofall,orvirtuallyall,memberstates.Nonetheless,itmightbemoreprudenttobeginwithasubsetofmemberstates,toprovideproofofconcept,inthehopethatthiswouldleadtotheaccessionofothers.Afterall,totheextentthattheschemeleadstoareductioninthecostofgovernmentborrowing,itsaMractivenesstonon-membergovernmentswillincrease.Otherfinancial“clubs”thatincludeonlysomeEUmembersmaybefeasible,especiallyifplansforatrulyintegratedall-EUfinancialsystemprovedifficulttoachieveinthefirstinstance.

Anotherrealmisdefense.Whilesomecommondefensepoliciesmaybenefitfromuniversalinclusion,othersmaybeamenabletoclubformation.AlthoughthereisgeneralagreementontheneedforamorecohesiveEuropeandefenseposture,andforgreatercoordinationindefenseprocurement,thereisnouniversalwillingnesstoparticipateinacommondefenseforce.Austria,Ireland,andMaltaareneutral;they,alongwithCyprus,arenotNATOmembers;andsomeotherEUmemberstateshaveindicatedthattheyarenotenthusiasticaboutsuchproposals.Despitealackofunanimityonthisdimension,itis

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probablyfeasiblefora“coalitionofthewilling”tomoveforwardonitsown.AstrongcandidateforsuchaclubcouldbedefenseoftheEasternborder.Thiscertainlyrequiresthefullparticipationofeachfrontlinestateandofthecountriesthatwillprovidetheprincipalfirepowerforthisdefense.Butwhileitwouldseemthatthatthefrontlinestates,plusFrance,Germany,andItaly,areneededtomoveinthisdirection,thelackofparticipationfrom,say,Ireland,Spain,orCyprus,wouldnotbeanotableobstacle.

Thiskindofvariablegeometryhasrisks:theclubscangetpermanently“stuck”inaprovisionalconstruct.Whenthislimitspayoffsfromintegration,theycanalsowitheraway.

ButanupwardspiralofaccretiontoasuccessfulcoalitionismuchofthestoryofthecourseofEuropeanintegration.Thetaskistofindwaysthatcreateconditionsinwhichapositivespiralismorelikelytoemerge.Thisrequirestacklingsomeofthedomesticpoliticschallengesfacingtheunions,inwaysthatmakeitmorelikelyfornationalgovernmentstojoininandcontinuetosupportjointEuropeaninitiatives.

Inthiscontext,itiscrucialtonotethatneitherthedistributionofreformproposalsnornationalpositionsarefixed:Nationalnegotiationpositions–andinsomecasesnationalpreferences–change.Asstructuralconditions,distributionalconsequencesandgeopoliticalcircumstancesevolve,EUmemberstatescananddochangetheirpositionsandperceptionsofdesirablepoliciesovertime,andthiscanopenwaystoovercomedisagreementsandpoliticalobstaclestomeaningfulEuropeanintegration.TheissueofjointEuropeandebt,whichfacedmajorheadwindsduringtheEurozonecrisis(seepanelb),isagoodexampleofhownationalpositionsandthepoliticalfeasibilityofreformproposalscanevolveovertime:

SeveralofthecountriesstaunchlyopposedtoEurobondsinthemid-2010shaverevisedtheirpositionssincethen.Forexample,Germanysofteneditsoppositiontojointborrowingduring

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thepandemic,andEstoniaandLithuaniahavebecomesupportiveofjointEUborrowingfordefense-relatedpurposesinthefaceofgrowingsecurityrisksrelatedtoRussia.

Alongsimilarlines,reformproposalshavebeenmodifiedinwaysthathavemadethemmoreacceptabletoalargergroupofcountries.Anexampleisissuingjointdebtonlyunderexceptionalcircumstances,usingamixofgrantsandloans,andtightlydelineatingthetype