高盛-中国出口还能增长多少？-How Much More Can Chinas Exports Grow-20261007

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Ecohts:c/s/we.vaaruelist

7October2026|2:29PMHKT

ASIAECONOMICSANALYST

HowMuchMoreCanChina’sExportsGrow?

HuiShan

|

GoohoonKwon,CFA

|

China’sexportriseishistoricallyexceptional.From2000to2025,China’sshareof

globalnominalgoodsexportsincreasedfrom4%to15%,surpassingthepeaks

ofGermanyinthe1970sandJapaninthe1980s.Withimportvolumesunlikelyto

risesignificantlygiventhepursuitof“self-reliance”,China’stradesurplus

continuestoreachnewhighs,raisingthequestionofhowmuchfurtherChinese

exportscanexpand.

Unlike“ChinaShock1.0”in2001-07,whenexportgrowthcoincidedwithoverall

industrialprofitgrowth,thecurrentexportboomcoincideswithstagnatingor

fallingprofitability,asignofsupply-drivenexportstrength.Forexample,the

valueofChineseautoexportsnearlydoubledfrom2021to2025,whileprofit

marginsfellfrom6.4%to4.8%.Futuregrowththereforedependsincreasinglyon

foreignmarkets’abilitytoabsorbadditionalChinesesupply.

TheabsorptioncapacityofChina’stradingpartnersappearstobeshrinking

somewhat.EmergingmarketsnowtakealargershareofChineseexports,but

manyhavedevelopedlargebilateraldeficitswithChina.Thenumberofcountries

runningdeficitsabove3%ofGDPwithChinarosefrom24in2005to82in2025,

andtheircombinedshareofChineseexportsincreasedfrom24%to44%.The

majorityofthesecountries—67outof82—arelow-incomeEMeconomies.

Oneo仟settingfactoristhatChina’stradingpartnersmaybuylessfrom

elsewherewhenbuyingmorefromChina.Weestimatethatover2021-25,on

averageeach1pp-of-GDPincreaseinthedeficitwithChinawasassociatedwith

a0.7ppdeclineinthedeficitwithallothercountries,slightlymorethanthe

0.6ppestimatedfor“ChinaShock1.0”in2001-07.Thisshifttowarddeficitswith

Chinaandsurpluseswithnon-ChinaismostpronouncedamongASEAN

countries,likelyrefiectingregionalsupplychainreconfigurationoverthepast

decade.

WeconductathoughtexperimentwhereweassumeChina’sshareinother

countries’non-mineralimportsreachesthepreviousrecordhighbyanycountry

during2000-24.Chinasupplied17.6%ofglobalex-Chinanon-mineralimportsin

Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegAC

certificationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto

/research/hedge.html.

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2024.Underdi仟erentassumptions,weestimatethatthissharecouldriseto

19.2-27.6%.Witheach1ppgaininChina’sshareaddingabout5.5%toChinese

exports,thisbenchmarkingexerciseimpliesthatrobustrealexportgrowthcan

continueoverthenextfewyears.Therunwayisthereforeclearfornow—but

eventuallywilldependonstrongereconomicgrowthinimportingeconomies.

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HowMuchMoreCanChina’sExportsGrow?

TheriseinChineseexportsandthetradesurplusoverthepastfewdecadeshasbeen

extraordinary.From2000to2025,China’sshareofglobalgoodsexportsrosefromless

than4%tonearly15%—aboveGermany’speakof13%inthelate1970sandJapan’s

peakof10%inthe1980s,andsurpassedonlybytheUSbefore1970duringthe

post-WWIIperiod(leftpanelofExhibit1).EvenasChineseexportshavecontinuedto

riseinrecentyears,importshavestalledamidweakdomesticdemandandthepursuitof

self-reliance.From2021to2025,ChinaCustoms’officialdatashowthatexportvolume

increasedbyaround25%,whereasimportvolumewaslargelyunchanged.Thispatternis

highlyunusual:intheearly1960s,whenUSexportsaccountedfor19%oftheglobal

total,theUStradesurpluswasonly0.3%ofglobalGDP,farbelowChina’s1%in2025

(rightpanelofExhibit1).

Thenaturalquestionis:“HowmuchmorecanChina’sexportsgrow?”Thisisespecially

relevantbecauseChineseimportsareunlikelytorisemuchfromhere,giventhestrategic

shiftawayfromfossilfuelsandtowardtechnologicalself-sufficiency(crudeoil,natural

gas,andsemiconductorsaccountedfor30%ofChineseimportsin2025).Inthisnote,

weexaminetheprofitabilityofChineseexportsandtradingpartners’

balance-of-paymentsconstraintstoassessthesustainabilityofChina’sexportgrowth.

Ouranalysissuggeststhat,atleastoverthenextfewyears,thereisstillroomforChinese

exportstomaintaintheirstrongmomentum.Overthelongerterm,however,stronger

economicgrowthinimportingeconomieswillberequiredforcontinuedChineseexport

gains.

Exhibit1:China’sexportstrengthandtradesurplusareexceptionalbyhistoricalstandards

PercentPercentPercentPercent

30301.51.5

NominalshareinglobalexportsTradebalanceasshareofworldGDP

China1

2525.01.0

US

Germany0.50.5

20Japan20

0.00.0

1515

-0.5-0.5

1010

-1.0China-1.0

US

55

-1.5Germany-1.5

Japan

00-2.0-2.0

48525660646872768084889296000408121620246064687276808488929600040812162024

Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

SustainabilityThroughtheProfitabilityLens

Onewaytoassessexportsustainabilityistoaskwhetherrisingexportscoincidewith

risingprofits.Ifso,theexportboomislikelydemand-drivenandmorepersistent.During

“ChinaShock1.0”in2001-07,thiswasindeedthecase:Exhibit2showsthatChina’s

industrialprofitsasashareoftotalindustrialassetsrosealongsidetheexportshareof

manufacturingvalue-addedintheearly2000s.Inrecentyears,however,this

relationshiphasreversed:theexportshareofmanufacturingvalue-addedhasclimbed

again,whileindustrialprofitsasashareofassetshavedeclined.Inotherwords,unlike

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“ChinaShock1.0,”“ChinaShock2.0”since2021appearstobesupply-driven,featuring

risingexportvolumesbutfallingoverallprofitability.

Exhibit2:Theexportshareofmanufacturingvalue-addedandindustrialprofitswere

positivelycorrelatedintheearly2000sbuthavebecomenegativelycorrelatedinrecent

years

PercentPercent

6012

Industrialprofitsvs.exportsharesofmanufacturingvalue-addedinChina

10

56

8

52

6

48

4

44

2

Exportshareinmanufacturingvalue-added(GSestimates)

Industrialprofitsaspercentoftotalassets(rhs)

400

200020052010201520202025

Shadedareasindicatethe“ChinaShock1.0”periodof2001-07andthe“ChinaShock2.0”periodsince2021.Thelatest

input-outputtablepublishedbytheChinaNationalBureauofStatistics(NBS)wasfrom2023andwecannotestimateexport

shareofmanufacturingvalue-addedfor2024and2025.

Source:NBS,HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

WhilethelackofadetailedChineseinput-outputtableforrecentyearsmakesitdifficult

toassessthelatesttrendsintheexportshareofmanufacturingvalue-added,ourstudy

ofexportgrowthandchangesinprofitmarginsacrossindustriesfrom2023to2025

suggeststhatprofitmarginshavenotimprovedalongwithrisingexportsinrecentyears,

incontrasttothepatternduringtheearlyperiodofexport-drivengrowth.1Exhibit3

showsthathigh-techsectors(reddots),whichhavereceivedsignificantgovernment

support,experiencedrapidexportgrowthwithoutnoticeableincreasesinprofit

margins.Infact,theautoindustry’sprofitmarginfellfrom6.4%in2021to4.8%in2025

despiteanalmost100%increaseinexportvalueovertheperiod,illustratingChina’s

enormousproductioncapacity.ThesustainabilityofChineseexportgrowththerefore

dependsontradingpartners’abilitytoabsorbmoreChineseproducts.Weturnto

China’stradingpartnersnext.

1BecausetheNBSsectorclassificationforindustrialprofitsisdi仟erentfromtheHScodeclassificationfor

exportgrowth,wemapthetwoandonlyshowsectorswherewecanbridgethetwoclassifications.

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Exhibit3:High-techsectorshaveseenstrongexportgrowth

recently,butnotrisingprofitmargins

Exportgrowthvs.changeinprofitmarginbyindustryfrom2023to2025

1.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5

-1.0Auto

-1.5

-2.0

-2.5

Reddotsindicatehigh-techsectors

-3.0

-20-10010203040

Exportgrowthfrom2023to2025(percent)

Source:CEIC,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

PressuresAreIncreasing…

Onthesurface,ChinaShock1.0andChinaShock2.0looksimilarintermsofshifting

exportdestinations.Inboth2001-07and2021-25,emergingmarkets—including

low-incomeandotherEMcountries—accountedforrisingsharesofChineseexports.2By

contrast,developedmarkets—includingtheUSandotherDMcountries—accountedfor

fallingshares(Exhibit4).Ourpreviousresearchhasdocumentedthegrowing

importanceofEMcountriestoChineseexports(seehereandhere,forexample).

Exhibit4:Inboth2001-07and2021-25,theEMshareof

Chineseexportsincreased

PercentagepointsPercentagepoints

66

ChangesinsharesofChina'sexportsbydestination

44

increasedshareof

Chineseexports

22

00

-2-2

-4-4

2001-07

-6-6

2021-25

-8-8

USOtherDMLow-incomecountriesOtherEM

Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Beneaththesurface,however,bilateraltradebalancesbetweenEMcountries—

especiallylow-incomecountries—andChinahavedeterioratednotablyoverthepast

twodecades.Forexample,in2005,only24countrieshadtradedeficitswithChina

exceeding3%oftheirGDP,andthesecountriesreceived24%oftotalChineseexports.

In2025,however,thenumberofcountrieswithbilateraltradedeficitsabove3%ofGDP

roseto82,andcollectivelytheyaccountedfor44%oftotalChineseexports(Exhibit5).

Amongthe82countries,67arelow-incomecountries.Thesetendtobesmall

2“OtherEM”include27countrieswithrelativelylargefinancialmarketsorlargepopulation/highGDPlevels.

“Low-incomecountries”include128economieswithper-capitaincomesoflessthanUS$4000perannum.

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economies,manyofwhichareinAfrica,theCaribbeanandOceania.The67countries

combinedaccountedfor12%ofChineseexportsin2025,comparedwith28%forthe11

otherEMeconomieswhosetradedeficitswithChinaexceeded3%ofGDP(thebiggest

fourofwhichareVietnam,Malaysia,Thailand,andMexico).

Becausetradingpartners’tradedeficitscannotriseindefinitely,thesharpincreaseinthe

numberofcountriesalreadyfacinglargeandstill-risingdeficitswithChinapointsto

balance-of-paymentsconstraintsforsomeofChina’stradingpartners.

Exhibit5:AnincreasingnumberofChina’stradingpartnersfacebilateraltradedeficitsexceeding3%ofGDP

NumberofcountriesNumberofcountriesPercentofChina'sexportsPercentofChina'sexports

1001005050

CountrieswheretradedeficitwithChina>3%ofGDPCountrieswheretradedeficitwithChina>3%ofGDP

Low-incomecountriesLow-incomecountries

EMexlow-incomecountries

808040EMexlow-incomecountries40

DMDM

60603030

40402020

20201010

0000

1091111171225

X:\Research\hk\c0hinaon\0uiSan\0ResearchP3rojets\Tradearowuchmore\analy0s1is20609010709111315171921E2x3517/202611:49AM

Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

…ButThereIsStillRoomtoImportMorefromChinaOvertheNextFew

Years

Oneo仟settingfactoristradingpartners’substitutionawayfromimportsfromother

countriesandtowardimportsfromChina,limitingtheimpactontheiroveralltrade

deficitsevenastheirbilateraldeficitswithChinarise.Togaugetheextentofthis

substitution,weestimateapanelregressionmodelusingannualdataformorethan170

countries.Exhibit6presentstheresultsseparatelyfor2001-07and2021-25,from

whichwedrawtwoconclusions.

First,thereismeaningfulsubstitutionbetweenimportsfromChinaandthosefrom

elsewhere.Second,thise仟ecthasstrengthenedslightlyinrecentyears.Weestimatethat

each1pp-of-GDPincreaseinthedeficitwithChinawasassociatedwitha0.7ppdecline

inthedeficitwithnon-Chinain2021-25,comparedwith0.6ppin2001-07.Thispattern

suggeststhattheoverallpressureontradingpartnersfromhigherimportsfromChina

maybesmallerthanbilateraltradedeficitsaloneimply.Thatsaid,ourestimatesstill

pointtoweakerbalance-of-paymentspositions,astheo仟setislessthanone-for-one.

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Exhibit6:China’stradingpartnersshiftedawayfrom

importsfromnon-Chinasourceswhentheyincrease

importsfromChina

%ofGDP%ofGDP

-1.0-1.0

Sensitivityofnon-Chinatradebalancetoa1pptriseintradedeficitwithChina

Low-incomecountries(commodityexporters)

Low-incomecountries(non-commodity-exporters)

-0.8EMexlow-incomecountries-0.8

DM

-0.6higher-0.6

substitution

from

non-China

-0.4toChina-0.4

-0.2-0.2

0.00.0

2001-20072021-2025

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

InmanyEMeconomies,balance-of-paymentpressuresmanifestthemselvesthroughFX

depreciation.InExhibit7,weassessthesustainabilityofbilateraltradedeficitswith

Chinafromafinancingperspective,focusingontradedeficitsasashareofFXreserves

ratherthanasapercentageofGDP.WeseparatetheanalysisintoASEANandEMex

ASEANbecauseofthedistinctpatternsinthetwogroups.

ASEANcountries’tradedeficitsasashareofFXreserveshavedivergedsharply.While

deficitswithChinahaveincreasedsignificantlyinrecentyears,tradebalanceswith

non-Chinahaveimprovedmeaningfully.Thisclearo仟settingpatternlikelyrefiectsthe

reconfigurationofregionalsupplychainsoverthepastdecade.

FortheremainingEMcountries,tradedeficitswithChinahaveedgedupinrecentyears,

whiledeficitswithnon-Chinahaveincreasednotably,suggestingweakeroverall

balance-of-paymentsconditionsandscopetoshiftimportsfromnon-ChinatoChina.

WithinthisbroaderEMexASEANgroup,thereremainssignificantheterogeneity:for

somelow-incomecountries,bothdeficitswithChinaanddeficitswithnon-China

approach50%ofFXreserves,underscoringsignificantbalance-of-payments

vulnerability,althoughtheircombinedsharesofglobalGDPandChineseexportsremain

small.

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Exhibit7:ASEANcountries’wideningdeficitswithChinaarefullyoffsetbyrisingsurpluseswithnon-China,whileEMex

ASEANcountriesshowwiderdeficitswithbothChinaandnon-China

%ofinternationalreserves%ofinternationalreserves%ofinternationalreserves%ofinternationalreserves

40404040

TradedeficitofASEANTradedeficitofEMex-ASEAN

30higherWithChina30higher

30WithChina30

deficitWithnon-Chinadeficit

Withnon-China

20202020

10101010

0000

-10-10-10-10

-20-20-20-20

-30-30-30-30

-40-40-40-40

00020406081012141618202224260002040608101214161820222426

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