麦肯锡 -速度难题：前沿人工智能如何暴露企业网络安全的薄弱环节 The speed problem How frontier AI exposes weakness in enterprise cybersecurity

September2026

McKinsey

&Company

Risk&Resilience

Thespeedproblem:HowfrontierAIexposes

weaknessinenterprisecybersecurity

Attackersnowmoveatmachinespeed,butorganizationsmakedecisionsatcommitteespeed.Toclosethegap,businessesneedadifferentoperatingmodelandcommittedexecutiveleadership.

ThisarticleisacollaborativeeffortbyBenjaminKlein,CharlieLewis,RichIsenberg,andVenkyAnant,withKevinCatalon,RaphaelEngler,andWolframSalmanian,representingviewsfromMcKinsey'sRisk&ResiliencePractice.

Therehasbeenanimportantshiftinenterprisecybersecurity,anditisnotthearrivalofmoresophisticatedmalware.Itisthecollapseoftime.

Fordecades,organizationsmanagedcyberriskontheassumptionthattheyhadtimetodetectvulnerabilities,assesstheirseverity,navigateapprovalprocesses,schedulepatchwindows,anddeployfixes.Thatassumptionisnowobsolete.Industrytrackingdatasuggestthattheaveragetimebetweenthedisclosureofavulnerabilityanditsactiveexploitationisjustamatterofhoursforthemostcriticalexposures,downfromroughlythreeweeksasrecentlyas2025.FrontierAImodelsthatcanautonomouslygenerateworkingexploitsatscaleandatnegligiblecosthave

closedthegap.1

AImodels,includingAnthropic’sMythos/Fable,OpenAI’sGPT-Cyber,andGoogle’sGemini,

representagenuinestepchange.Ratherthansimplyspeedingupattackworkflows,theyunlockdiscoveryandexploitation,makingthemaccessibletoafarlargergroupofpotentialattackers.McKinseyanalysissuggeststhatcriticalnovelvulnerabilitieswithoutavailablepatchesnow

accountformostactiveexposures.

Thequestionfororganizationsisnotwhetheravulnerabilitywillbeexploitedbeforeitcanbe

patched,buthowmanyvulnerabilitieswillbeexploited.FrontierAIisaconcernforchiefsecurityofficers(CSOs)andchiefinformationofficers(CIOs)becauseitenablesmoreeffectiveattacks

anddoessofasterthanenterprisedecision-making(Exhibit1).Fromthatperspective,it

presentsorganizationswithanoperating-modelprobleminsteadofatechnologyproblem.

Organizationallatency:Thehiddenchallenge

Whenaskedwhatispreventingthemfromrespondingfastertocriticalsystemvulnerabilities,

mostsecurityleadersseldomsayit’sthetechnologyitself.Manyorganizationsalreadyhave

robustdetectiontools,patchmanagementplatforms,andincidentresponseplaybooks.Rapid

responsescanbeachievedwithhighlystandardizedenvironments,zero-trustarchitectures,anddeployment-as-codecapabilities.Thegreaterchallengeliesinthedecision-makingprocesses,governance,andoperationalcoordinationneededtotranslatetechnicalcapabilitiesintoactionatspeed.Considerwhatoftenhappenswhenacriticalvulnerabilityisdiscovered:

—ITsecurityidentifiesthevulnerabilityandassessesitsseverityandthesystemsaffected.

Thiscantakeadayormore,dependingonthevisibilityofassetsacrosslegacysystems,cloudplatforms,software-as-a-service(SaaS)applications,andoperationaltechnologyenvironments,whicharerarelyfullyinventoried.

—ThesecurityteamescalatestheeventtoITleadership,whichmustassessthebutraitsinessimpactbeforeauthorizingpatching.ITleadershipthenmustspeakwithapplicationownerswhoaremanagingreleaseschedulesandchangefreezes.

1IndustrytrackingdatafromZsuggestsmeantimetoexploitationforcriticalvulnerabilitieshasfallenfromapproximately23daysin2025toanestimated20hoursin2026.Thesefiguresrepresenttrendestimatesforhigh-severity,activelyexploitedvulnerabilities.Individualcaseswillvary.

Thespeedproblem:HowfrontierAIexposesweaknessinenterprisecybersecurity2

Thespeedproblem:HowfrontierAIexposesweaknessinenterprisecybersecurity3

Exhibit1

—Thepatchingofbothvendor/off-the-shelfandin-housesoftwaremustbetested.

Organizationsthatstillmanagesubstantialcustomorlegacycode—whichincludesmost

largeenterprises—frequentlyfaceweeksofvalidationworkbeforeafixcanbecertifiedforproductiondeployment.

—SchedulingthepatchwindowandunderstandingthereleasewindowrequiresITleaderstoalignwithpeopleinthebusiness.Iftheydothis,theyfacilitatebusinessasusual.

Manufacturingdoesnothavetostopproductionlinesforpatchesduringpeakperiods,

hospitalsdonothavetotakeclinicalsystemsofflineduringpatientcarehours,andfinancialinstitutionscanavoidchangesinpeaktransactionwindows.

—Deploymentrequiressign-offfromachangemanagementleader.Inmanyorganizations,thisrequiresachangeadvisoryboardthatmeetsweekly.

—Afterallthis,vendor-managedandthird-partysystemsmayoperateonentirelyindependent

Thespeedproblem:HowfrontierAIexposesweaknessinenterprisecybersecurity4

patchtimelinesthatnointernalteamcontrols.

Thisisnotdysfunctionbutratherhowlargeorganizationsaredesignedtooperate.The

processesexisttoprotectuptime,manageregulatorycompliance,preserveservicequality,andavoidtheoperationaldisruptionthatpoorlytestedpatchescancause.However,frontierAI

changesthegame.Vulnerabilitiesthatoncecouldremainexposedforweeksmustnowbe

addressedwithinhourstostopattackersfromcausingdamage.Organizationalarchitecturehasbecomeadirectsecurityliability.

Acommonchallengeisthatnobodyownsdecisionspeed.ITownsthepatchingprocess,the

businessownsdowntimedecisions,legalownsdisclosuretimelines,procurementownsvendorrelationships,operationsownsproductioncontinuity,andsecurityownsriskassessment.No

singlefunctionhastheauthority,visibility,andmandatetomovetheenterpriseatthepacethethreatrequires.Asaresult,acriticaldecisionthatshouldtakehoursendsuptakingmuch

longer.

Theoperatingmodelanswer:Redesigningdecisions

Theorganizationsthatnavigatethecyberlandscapemosteffectivelyshareacharacteristicunrelatedtotheirsecuritytoolstacks.Theyaredistinguishedbytheiroperatingmodels,andspecificallybyhowtheyhaveredesignedthestructureofcontinuousriskvisibility,the

governanceofAI-enableddefense,andthearchitectureoforganizationaldecision-makingundertimepressure.

Inmostcases,theseorganizationshaveachievedwhatwecallgovernedautonomy.

Thatis,acyberoperatingmodelinwhichAIhandlesthehigh-volume,time-sensitiveworkof

continuousmonitoringandroutineremediation,whilehumanjudgmentgovernsnovelthreats,strategicriskdecisions,andanythingmaterialtothebusiness.Achievinggovernedautonomyiscontingentonthreedesignimperatives,eachofwhichisorganizationalbeforeitistechnical.

Continuousriskvisibilityistablestakes

Thefirstdesignimperativeistomovetheorganizationfromperiodicscanningandscheduledremediationcyclestocontinuousoperationalawarenessanchoredonwhatmattersmost.Thisrequiresanexplicitdecisionaboutscopeandsequencing.

Thepracticalstartingpointisnottoaimforreal-timevisibilityacrosstheenterprise.That

ambitionconsistentlyfailsbecausethescopeistoolargeandthechangerequiredistoo

disruptive.Instead,leadingorganizationsbeginbydefiningaminimumviableorganization,whichistheirreduciblecoreofsystems,processes,andassetswhosedisruptionwouldbeexistential.Forabank,thatmightbepaymentprocessing,corebanking,andregulatoryreporting.Fora

manufacturer,itcouldbeproductionlinesandtheOperationaltechnology(OT)systemsthatgovernthem.Forahospital,itmaybeclinicalsystemsandlife-criticalinfrastructure.

Thespeedproblem:HowfrontierAIexposesweaknessinenterprisecybersecurity5

Byfirstconcentratingonnear-real-timevisibilityandcontinuousscanningonthecore,

organizationscancreateadefensibleperimeteraroundwhatmattersmost.Inparallel,theycanreducetheattacksurface,retiringunnecessaryexternal-facingassets,rationalizingopen-

sourcecodedependencies,removingstalecredentials,andtighteningnetworksegmentation.Atoneglobalfinancialinstitution,leadersfoundthatprioritizinglargelanguagemodelscanningonitsminimumviablebankproducedamaterialreductioninexposurearounditshighest-valueassetsfasterandatalowercostthanpreviousapproaches.

Critically,reducingtheattacksurfaceisnotjustatechnicalexercise.Itrequiresbusiness

decisionsaboutwhichassetstoretire,whichexternalinterfacestoclose,andwhichthird-partyintegrationstorestrict.ThosedecisionssimultaneouslyinvolveIT,operations,businessowners,andlegal.Thespeedoforganizationalalignmentdeterminesthespeedofsurfacereduction.

ThegovernanceofAI-enableddefensemustbefoundationalarchitecture

TheseconddesignimperativeistodeploydefensiveAIastheoperatingarchitecturefor

securityoperations.Threedistinctlayersdefinethatarchitecture,eachofwhichmustbe

designedasan“agentified”end-to-endworkflowratherthanassembledfromindependentvendorsolutions:

—Threathuntingandattack-pathdiscovery:AImodelscanruncontinuousattack-path

chaininganalysisacrosscomplex,heterogeneousenvironments—correlatingsignalsacrossIT,OT,cloud,andthird-partysystemstorevealexposuresandprioritizeremediation

backlogsbasedonrealexploitabilityandbusiness-valueexposure,ratherthangeneric

severityscores.Thismattersbecausecommonvulnerabilityscoringsystemsdonot

distinguishbetweenavulnerabilityinatestenvironmentandthesamevulnerabilityona

systemthatisthreestepsfrom“thecrownjewels.”AI-enabledprioritizationcanmakethatdistinctioncontinuouslyandatscale.

—Vulnerabilityremediationandthird-partyriskmanagement:Fororganizationsthatbuildandmaintainsignificantsoftware,meaningmostlargefinancialinstitutions,industrialcompanies,andtechnology-intensivemanufacturers,AI-assistedthreatmodeling,automatedpressure-testingduringthesoftwaredevelopmentlifecycle,andAI-generatedpatchsuggestionscandramaticallycompressthetimebetweenvulnerabilityidentificationandatestedfixbeing

available.Thisaddressesoneofthemoststubbornbottlenecks:thetimeittakesa

developmentteamtounderstand,reproduce,andfixavulnerabilityincodetheymaynothavetouchedinyears.

Open-sourcesoftwarecomponentscanbecomealiabilityduetoattackers’abilitytoeasily

identifyorintegratevulnerabilitiesandeventuallyusethemforexploitation(forinstance,inthecaseofdownstreamattacks).Organizationsshouldcreateinternaltransparencyintowhereandhowthesecomponentsaredeployedandthenengageinfrontier-AI-basedvulnerability

scanning,includingbeforedeployment,andAI-assistedpatchdevelopmentwhereapplicable.

Forcommercialsoftware,remediationservice-levelagreementsforthird-partysuppliersneedtobeupdatedtocoverchainedvulnerabilities.Finally,consequencemanagementmustbe

Thespeedproblem:HowfrontierAIexposesweaknessinenterprisecybersecurity6

strengthened.

—Incidentresponseandsecurityoperations:AIcanautomatetriage,acceleratecontainmentsequencing,andcoordinatecross-functionalresponsewithoutwaitingforahuman

decision-makertobeavailable.LeadingorganizationsarepreauthorizingAIagentsto

executespecific,boundedresponseactions,includingisolatingsystems,revoking

credentials,andapplyingcompensatingcontrols—allwithindefinedguardrails.Forlow-riskresponses,humanreviewfollowstheaction.Thisisnotautonomoussecurity;itisgovernedbyspeed.Businesscontinuityandcrisisprocessesmustberetestedagainstthatreality,

withaclear,pre-agreed-uponviewoftheminimumviableorganizationthatmustcontinuetorunwhileeverythingelseisquarantined.

Theobjectiveinallthreelayersistoensurethathumanjudgmentisreservedfordecisionsthatgenuinelyrequireit,andthatroutine,time-sensitiveremediationactionsdonotwait.

Thearchitectureoforganizationaldecision-makingmustbeoptimizedfortimepressureThethirddesignimperative,andthemostunderestimated,isredesigningthedecision-makingarchitectureitself.Therealityisthatmostorganizationsstillmanagecybersecuritythrough

governancestructuresdesignedforadifferentera.Thereisacommonbeliefthattheriskofanunnecessaryorpoorlycontrolledchangeoutweighstheriskofaslowone.Changeadvisory

boards,securitysteeringcommittees,cross-functionalworkinggroups,andescalationchains

thatcrossseveralC-suitefunctionsallinstinctivelybuyintothatpremise.Butwhena

vulnerabilityisexposedtofast-paced,AI-enabledactiveexploitation,delaybecomesthebiggerrisk.

Leadingorganizationsareredesigningorganizationaldecision-makingprocessesarounda

cross-functionalresponsecell,whichisasmall,empoweredteamwithasingledecision-makerwhoholdsCSO-delegatedauthoritytooverridestandardchangemanagementprocessesfor

confirmedactivethreats.Thecellrunsadailytriagecycleandownsareal-timevulnerability

backlog.Ithaspreauthorizedplaybooksforresponsesthatitcanexecutewithoutescalation.

Andithasanexecutiveliaisonwhotranslatestechnicalprogressintoboard-levelvisibilityevery24hours.Therolesareclearlydefined,withdecisionauthorityexplicitlyassignedratherthan

diffused.

Thus,thekeydesignimperativeisthatdecisionauthorityisgenuinelycentralized.Onefinancialinstitutionrestructureditspatchmanagementgovernanceafteranincidentinwhichacritical

vulnerabilitysatunpatchedfor11daysbecausenoteamhadthetechnicalvisibilityandbusinessauthoritytooverrideaproductionchangefreeze.TherestructuredmodelgaveitsresponsecellleadexplicitCSO-delegatedauthoritytoact,withpostactionreportingreplacingpreaction

approvalforconfirmedactivethreats.Remediationtimelinesforcriticalvulnerabilitiesfellsignificantly.

Apharmaceuticalcompanytookasimilarapproachtooneofthemostintractablebottlenecks:R&Denvironmentupdatebacklogsthatroutinelydeprioritizesecuritypatchesbehindproduct

Thespeedproblem:HowfrontierAIexposesweaknessinenterprisecybersecurity7

developmentschedules.Thefixrequiredachangeprogramledbythebusiness(nottheIT

function),whichformallyestablishedremediation-firstsequencinginR&Denvironmentsand

gavethesecurityfunctionstandingauthoritytooverridedevelopmentschedulesduringactivethreats.Theorganizationalinterventionhelpedaddresstherootcauseinawaythattechnologyalonecouldnot.

Onecorollaryofthethreeimperativesisthatgovernanceredesignshouldextendtobroader

crisisoperatingmodels.Leadingorganizationsareinvestingincross-domainresponse

structuresthatcansimultaneouslycoordinateactionacrosscyber,physical,andoperational

dimensions.AEuropeanaerospaceanddefensecompany,forexample,builtasecurity

intelligencecenterthatintegrateditscyberoperationscenter,physicalsecurityoperations,andexternalthreatintelligenceintoaunified,real-timeview.Thecompanywantedtoenablea

coordinatedresponsetoattacksthatcombinedigitalandphysicalvectors.AEuropeaninsurerconsolidateditsresiliencecapabilitiesunderasingleheadofresilience.Itestablisheda

quarterlyresiliencecouncilattheboardlevel,recognizingthattheorganizationalsilosamongcybersecurity,businesscontinuity,andphysicalsecuritywerethemselvesvulnerable.

Governedautonomyinpractice

Governedautonomysitswithinanorganization’sbroaderresiliencearchitecture,whichoperatesacrosssixdimensions:financials,operations,technology,organization,reputation,andbusinessmodel.2

ACSOwhoownsonlythetechnologydimensionwithoutexplicitconnectionstoorganizationalandoperationalresiliencecannotimplementgovernedautonomysuccessfully.Themodel

requiresjointownershipacrosstheC-suite.Theimplementationjourneyshouldfollowa

consistentpattern,usuallywiththreephases,eachbuildingtheorganizationalmusclethatthenextrequires.

Beforeexamininghowthemodelworks,itisworthaskingwhereyourorganizationcurrentlysits.Mostenterprisesweworkwithareinoneofthreepositions:

—Strongsecuritytoolingisinplace,butthereisdiffusedecisionauthority,andnooneisempoweredtoactatspeed(themostcommonstateofaffairs).

—Thereiscentralizationofsomedecision-making,butwithaconnectiontoAI-enabledoperations.

—TheorganizationisbeginningtodeployAIagentsintoanenvironmentwherethegovernancearchitecturetomanagethemdoesnotyetexist.

Eachpositionhasadifferenthighest-priorityaction,whichmay,forexample,betechnology

deploymentororganizationalchange.Thethree-phasemodeldescribesthepathfromthefirst

2FritzNauck,LucaPancaldi,ThomasPoppensieker,andOliviaWhite,“Theresilienceimperative:Succeedinginuncertaintimes,”McKinsey,May17,2021.

Thespeedproblem:HowfrontierAIexposesweaknessinenterprisecybersecurity8

positiontothethird,andtheorganizationaldecisionsthatdeterminewhetheranorganizationmakesamove(Exhibit2).

Exhibit2

Inimplementinggovernedautonomy,threeoverarchingphasesapply:

—First,theoperatingmodeldoesnotjustenableAIdeployment;itgovernsAIusageacrosstheorganization.Accuracythresholds,trustcalibrationprocesses,automaticrevocationofautonomousauthorityforsystematicerrors,andpostactionreportingrequirementscan

ensurethat,asautomationexpands,humanaccountabilityexpandswithit.Thisiswhat

Thespeedproblem:HowfrontierAIexposesweaknessinenterprisecybersecurity9

autonomyinpracticemeans:ItisnotaconstraintonAI’spotential;thearchitecturemakesAIsafetouse.Forexample,apatching(orchestration)agentwithfar-reachingaccessand

autonomytodeploy,soitcanmatchthespeedofthreats,shouldalsobetreatedasacriticalassetthatrequiressafeguardstopreventcompromiseorbehavioraldrift.

—Second,theoperatingmodelisdesignedtobuildorganizationalcapabilitybeforeextendingAIauthority.Phaseone,orthehumansurge,isaboutcentralizinghumandecision-making

andestablishingAIgovernancediscipline.OrganizationsthatskipphaseoneandattempttodeployAIagentsintoanenvironmentwheredecisionauthorityremainsdiffuseconsistentlyproduceAIsystemsthatgeneraterecommendationsnobodyactson.

—Third,andmostimportant,theoperatingmodelrequiresCEOandboardsponsorship.Our

experienceacrossimplementationsshowsthatorganizationsthattreatgovernedautonomyasasecurityprogramstallatphaseone.Thebottlenecksarebusinessdecisionsregarding

productiondowntime,changemanagementauthority,developmentprioritization,andvendorobligations,whichthesecurityfunctioncannotresolveunilaterally.Organizationsthattreat

governedauthorityasanenterpriseresilienceprogram,withexplicitexecutivesponsorshipandboard-levelgovernance,aremorelikelytoprogressthroughallthreephases.

Governedautonomycanhelpleadersdeterminewhodecideswhat,withwhatauthority,onwhattimeline,governedbywhatrules,andaccountabletowhom.Itistheoperatingarchitecture

insidewhichthetechnologyperforms.Withoutit,thebesttoolsinthemarketsitbehindthesamecommitteeapprovalchainsthatwereaproblemtobeginwith.

Operatingmodeldisciplineundercompressedtimelines

Theoperatingmodeldisciplinedescribedhereaddressesthemosturgentdimensionofthe

challenge.Butasecondwaveofcomplexityisalreadyforming.DeployingagenticAIsystemsatscaleintroducesanewclassoffoundationalrequirements,includingdataaccessboundaries,

identitycontrols,andbehavioralguardrailsthatmustbedefinedandenforcedbefore

autonomousagentscanbetrustedtoact.Gettingthosefoundationsrightisagovernancedecisionwithboard-levelconsequences.

ThesameprincipleappliestotheemergingeconomicsofAI-drivensecurity.Putanotherway,t