麦肯锡 -竞技场时代的战略 Strategy in the age of arenas

September2026

McKinsey

&Company

Strategy&CorporateFinance

Strategyintheageof

arenas

Agroupoffast-growingindustriesisreshapingthecompetitivelandscape.

Theirriserequiresbusinessleaderstorethinkstrategyintwoimportantways.

byAntoineMontard,BruceDelteil,andKevinRussell

Gettingahandleoncompetitionusedtobearelativelystraightforwardmatterofassessing

industrypeersandtheirsupplychains.Buttheemergenceofanewindustryarchetypeoverthepasttwodecadeshasmadestrategymorecomplicated.Since2005,roughly85percentof

globalprofitgrowthhascomefromasmallsetofindustries,includingcloudcomputing,e-commerce,AI,robotics,andelectricvehicles.

Theseindustries,whichwecallarenas,haveuniquecharacteristics(seesidebar“Theevolutionofarenas”).Theygrowandevolvefasterthantraditionalindustries,drawinmorenewentrants,andcanconcentratevalueinthehandsoffewerplayersinaracetothetop.What’smore,

arenasdon’tusuallymapneatlytotraditionalindustryboundaries,withsomecuttingacross

severalsectorsandreshapingtheirvaluechains.Aninsurancecompanymaynowseeitscoreriskpoolsreshapedbyautonomous-vehicleplatformsthatreduceaccidentsandshift

liability—anarena-drivenchangeitdidnotseecoming.

Theevolutionofarenas

TheMcKinseyGlobalInstitute’s(MGI’s)2024report,Thenextbigarenasofcompetition,identified12arenasthatexhibitedexceptionalgrowthandcompetitivedynamismbetween2005and2020,

fromcloudservicesande-commercetobiopharmaceuticalsandindustrialelectronics.Learningfromtheearlymarkersoftechnologybreakthroughsinthosearenas,MGIalsohighlightedthese18

potentialfuturearenas,whichcoulddisplaysimilardynamicsoverthenext15years:

AIFOUNDATION

—Semiconductors

—AIsoftware&services—Cloudservices

DIGITIZATION

—E-commerce

—Digitaladvertisements—Streamingvideo

—Videogames

—CybersecurityELECTRIFICATION—Batteries

Strategyintheageofarenas2

Strategyintheageofarenas3

—Electricvehicles

—Nuclearfission

HARDTECH

—Robotics

—Futureairmobility

—Space

—Sharedautonomousvehicles

—Modularconstruction

NEWBIO-FRONTIERS

—Industrial&consumerbiotech

—Drugsforobesityandrelatedconditions

Amorerecentanalysissuggeststhatthesefuturearenasarealreadyrealizingtheirpotential.Since2022,theirmarketcapitalizationhasgrownat29percentperyear,aboutfourtimesfasterthanotherpartsoftheeconomy,andrevenueshaveexpandedmorethantentimesfaster(at11percentversus1

percentfornon-arenas),accountingforroughlyhalfofrecentglobalmarket-capgrowth.

Arenasaredefinedbyhighgrowthanddynamism,measuredasshiftsinmarketshareamongtopcompanies.Theseoutcomestypicallyresultfromtheinterplayofatechnologyorbusinessmodelbreakthrough,competitivedynamicsinwhichadvantagecompoundsrapidly,andalargeorgrowingaddressablemarket.Ascompaniesinvestmore,qualityimproves.Meanwhile,thesecompanieslearnfaster,lowertheiroperatingcosts,expandtheirecosystems,andstrengthen

theircustomerrelationships,allofwhichmaketheirleadershippositionsincreasinglydifficulttochallenge.

Becausearenasinfluenceadjacentsectorsandreshapecustomerexpectations,theyimpacttheentirebusinessenvironment.Eventhosewelloutsideanarenaareaffectedbyhowarenas

reshapecompetition,demand,andsupply(seesidebar“Howarenasreshapevalueacrosstheeconomy”).

Theriseofarenasrequiresbusinessleaderstorethinkstrategyintwoimportantways.First,theycannolongeranchorstrategysolelyintheirindustrystructurebecausecompetition

Strategyintheageofarenas4

Howarenasreshapetheeconomy

Arenasreshapevaluecreationthroughthreemainchannels.Theirmagnitudeandthetimingoftheireffectsdependonthearena’sstageofdevelopment:

—Competition:Arenasintroducenewcompetitorsandsubstituteofferingsthatoftenhavenovel

coststructuresorbusinessmodels.Evenwithoutcompetingdirectly,arenaleaderscanreset

customerexpectationsbychanginghowproductsareevaluated,purchased,andused.

—Demand:Asarenasexpand,theygeneratedemandshocksacrossvaluechains.GrowthinarenassuchasAI,cloud,orelectricvehiclescancreatesurgesindemandforcomponents,infrastructure,andenablingserviceswhilealsoshiftingcontrolovercustomeraccessanddistribution.

—Supply:Arenascanreshapesupplyconditionsbyconcentratingdemandoncriticalinputsor

technologies.Forexample,thegrowthofdatacentersisincreasingdemandforpower,coolingsystems,andadvancedsemiconductors,affectingthecostsandavailabilityoftheseinputsforothersectors.

increasinglycomesfromfast-movingarenasthatcanredefinewhereandhowvalueiscreated.Second,leadersneedtounderstandwhichindustriesbehavelikearenasandhowthese

dynamicsmaycreatebothopportunitiesandthreats.Intheageofarenas,advantageisshapedlessbyacompany’spositioninitscoreindustryandmorebyhoweffectivelyitallocatescapitalandresourcesacrossemergingarenas.

Tonavigatethislandscape,leadersneedawaytoassesstheirpositioninrelationtoarenasanddecidehowtorespond.Thismeansshiftingthefocusofstrategyfromdefendingexisting

positionswithinlegacyindustriestochoosinghowtocompetewithinoraroundarenasandallocatingstrategicinvestmentaccordingly.

Identifyingtherightstrategicresponse

Arenasdonotaffectallcompaniesinthesameway.Theirimpactdependsinpartontheir

proximitytoacompany’scorebusiness(Exhibit1).Insomecases,anarenadirectlyreshapestheeconomicsofthecore;forexample,electricvehicles(EVs)transformedthecoststructureand

profitsourcesoftraditionalautomakers.Inothers,anadjacentarenamaygraduallyshiftindustryprofitpoolsandwhocapturesthem,asstreamingplatformshavedoneinmediabytaking

controlofcustomerrelationships.Anarenaatthefringemayexertlittleinfluenceatfirstuntilitexpandsanddisruptsthecore,asobesitydrugscouldforsomefood,beverage,andconsumer-goodscompanies.

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Exhibit1

Companiesaretypicallyexposedtomultiplearenassimultaneously,eachpresentingadistinctstrategicchallenge.Businessleaders’taskbecomesmanagingaportfolioofapproaches:

transformingthebusinessinsomeareas,increasinginvestmentinothers,andmaintaining

flexibilitywhereuncertaintyremainshigh.Thisapproachrepresentsabreakfromtraditional

strategicplanning,wherethegoalwastomaximizeeachbusiness’schancetooutperformwithinitsindustry.Companiesareexposedtomultiplearenasatonce,andtheirrelationshipswith

thosearenasevolve.Therefore,leadersmustnavigateinterdependentchoicesacrossthem,allocatingcapitalandattentionastherelativeimportanceofdifferentarenasshifts.

Onewaytothinkaboutthesedecisionsistomapacompany’spositionrelativetoanarena

acrosstwodimensions:howdirectlythearenaaffectsthecompany’soperatingmodeland

competitiveposition(distancefromthearena)andwhetherthecompanyhasbuiltorcanbuildthecapabilitiesandassetsrequiredtoestablishacompetitiveadvantage(capabilitiestowin)(Exhibit2).

Thesetwodimensionshelpcompaniesdeterminethemostappropriateresponsetoanarena.

Therearefourbroadresponses:transformthecorebusiness,refocusonfewersegments,findanewwaytocompete,orexploreopportunitiesatthefringeofanarena.Theexperiencesoffourcompaniesoverthepast15yearsillustratetheseapproachesinpractice:Adoberespondedtoanewbusinessmodelinsoftware;TexasInstrumentsrefocusedassemiconductorsbecame

hyperspecialized;amediacompanybuiltadirect-to-consumerbusiness;andChinesecompaniesmovedearlytocapturetheemergingEVopportunity.

Exhibit2

Reinventthecore:Howasoftwarecompanyswitchedtosubscriptions

Whensoftwarecompaniesbegantoshiftfromperpetuallicensestosubscriptions,Adobefacedadefiningchoice.Adoptingthemodelimpliedlowershort-termrevenues,requiredadifferentoperatingmodel,andriskedcannibalizingitsmostprofitableproducts,butitalsoputAdobeatthecenterofwhatbecamethemainbusinessmodelforsoftwarecompanies.

Adobeactedquicklytomaketheswitch.1Itmoveditsflagshipproductstothecloudandrebuiltthebusinessaroundsubscriptions,acceptinginitialinvestorskepticismandanear-termdropinrevenue.2Overtime,theshiftstrengthenedcustomerengagement,increasedthosecustomers’lifetimevalue,andledtofasterinnovationcycles.

1FredericLardinois,“Adobegoesall-inwithsubscription-basedCreativeCloud,willstillsellCS6fornowbutwillstopdevelopingit,”TechCrunch,May6,2013.

2AdrianKingsley-Hughes,“Adobe’sCreativeCloudmovecausesoutcryandconfusion,”Forbes,May9,2013.

Strategyintheageofarenas6

Strategyintheageofarenas7

Thisistheessenceofreinventingthecore:actingwhilethebusinessisstillperformingwelltosecureapositioninanemergingmodelthatcouldotherwiseundermineperformance.This

responsesuitscompaniesthatfaceadirectchallengefromanarenabuthavetheassetsand

capabilities(includingbrand,customerrelationships,andtechnicalexpertise)tocompete

effectively.Thedifficulty,whichregularlychallengesincumbentsduringsignificantdisruptions,ishavingthewillingnesstocommitsufficientresourcestothetransformationamiduncertainty.

Inarenas,thewinningstrategicformulaisrarelyclearupfront.Multipletechnologiesand

businessmodelsoftencompete,andearlybetsmaynotpayoffimmediately—orever.But

waitingforclaritycanbackfirebecause,asothersacceleratetheirinvestments,theiradvantagecancompoundquickly.Companiesthattestnewbusinessmodels,scalethem,andcommitearlyarelikelytoshapetheoutcome,whilethosethatwaitriskbeinglockedout.

Inpractice,thelackofaclearhorizoncanmeanfacingtrickydecisions,includingthefollowing:

—continuingtoexperimentwithneweconomicmodelsevenwhentheyunderperformthecorebusinessintheshortterm

—reallocatingcapitaltowardtheseemergingmodelsattheexpenseofthecore,whichisstillthedominantcashgenerator

—shiftingassetsanddevelopingcapabilitiestosupportemergingwaysofcompeting

Reinventingthecoretypicallyrequiresmovingasubstantialshareofcapitalearly,whilethecorebusinesscanstillfundthetransition.InMcKinsey’sexperience,companiesthatsuccessfully

reinventtendtodirect50to70percentofstrategicinvestmenttowardbuildingandscalingemergingmodels,withtheremaindersupportingthecorebusinessandenablingflexibilitytopursuemoreemergingopportunities.

However,organizationsoftenfallintothetrapoftreatingthenewoperatingmodelasan

extensionoftheexistingbusiness.Thiscanfeellikealower-riskpath:Thenewmodelmayevenhelpdefendorstrengthenthecorebyprotectingcustomerrelationships,preservingrelevance,orextendingthelifeofthelegacycashgenerator.Butthisbeneficialoutcomeismostlikely

whenleaderscommittothenewmodelasasourceoffutureadvantage,notasanincremental

add-on.Intheageofarenas,partialcommitmentandgradualinvestmentsoftenslowlearning,

limittheabilitytobuildastrongposition,andbecomethehighest-riskchoices.Businessleadersneedtoacceptthatsomebetswillnotpayoff,thatpartsofthelegacybusinesswilldecline,andthatprotectingthecoremayrequirebuildingthemodelthateventuallyreshapesit.

Refocustowin:Howasemiconductorcompanyrepositioned

Whenanarenareshapesacompany’scorebusiness,leadersoftenfaceahardtruth:They

cannotwinineverycategoryinwhichtheypreviouslycompeted.Tryingtotakearenaleaders

head-onacrossthefullscopeofthemarketcanstretchcapabilities,dilutetheimpactof

investments,anderodereturns.Thebestoptionisoftentochoosewheretoplayandwherenot

Strategyintheageofarenas8

to.

TexasInstrumentsfacedthischallengeasthesemiconductorindustrymovedtoward

increasinglyadvanced,capital-intensivechipdesigns,particularlythoseusedinprocessorsformobilephones.Competingwiththeleaderswouldrequirelarge,sustainedinvestmentand

ecosystemrelationshipsthatwereconcentratedamongafewplayers.Ratherthantrytokeep

up,TexasInstrumentsexitedthatsegmentandrefocusedonanalogandembedded

semiconductors—marketswithlongerproductcycles,morestabledemand,andstronger

alignmentwithitsmanufacturingcapabilitiesandcustomerrelationships.Therepositioning

allowedthecompanytoconcentrateitsresourceswhereitcouldbuildastructuraladvantage.

Overtime,thisfocusdeliveredstrongermarginsandamoreresilientcompetitivepositionthanifTexasInstrumentshadcontinuedonamorediversifiedpath.

Inthearenacontext,refocusingtowinisthebeststrategicposturewhenacompanylacksthecapabilities,scale,orecosystempositiontocompeteonthetermssetbyarenaplayers.

Organizationsthatrefocusoftenallocate60to80percentoftheirstrategicinvestmentstowardstrengtheningorrepositioningthebusinesses,withtheremaindersupportingnecessary

transitions(suchasexitingnoncoresegments,restructuringoperations,andredeployingtalent)andmaintainingflexibility.Whenconfrontinginroadsfromarenas,lackoffocusisoftenmore

damagingthanlackofscale.

Buildthenextadvantage:Howaglobalmediacompanybuiltadirectcustomerbusiness

Someofthehardeststrategicdecisionsarisewhenthecorebusinessisstillperformingwell,butitscompetitiveadvantageisbeginningtoerode.Inthesesituations,companiesaretypicallynotfullycompetingwithinthearena,butthearena’sdynamicsarestartingtoreshapewherevalueiscreatedandcaptured.Therevenueandprofitpoolsoftenshiftfromonepartofthevaluechaintoanother—forexample,towardcustomerinterfacesasnewchannelsredefineaccessand

relationships;towardsystemsandservices,whenvaluemovesbeyondthecoreproduct;towardsuppliernetworkswhenscarcecapabilitiesbecomecriticalconstraints;andtowardnewuse

casesasarenasshiftcustomerpreferencestowarddifferentproducts,features,orwaysofconsumingtheoffering.Therisktoanincumbentisnotimmediatedisruptionbutagradualweakeningofitscompetitiveposition.

Aglobalmediacompanyfacedthischallengeasdigitaldistributionplatformsincreasingly

controlledcustomerrelationshipsandmarketaccess.Thecompany’scorebusinessesremainedhighlyprofitable,butvaluewasmovingtocompetitorswithdirectconnectionstoconsumers.Inresponse,thecompanyacceleratedinvestmentinownedcustomerchannels,shiftingkey

contentandcustomerexperiencestowardstheplatformsitcontrolled.Thecompanyacceptedtheshort-termtrade-offofreducedrevenuefromexistingcommercialpartnershipsand

distributionarrangementstosecureapositionwherevaluewasconcentrating.

Thecompanyactedfromapositionofstrengthtobuildanadvantageinanarenathatwasnot

yetcentraltoitscorebusinessbutwaslikelytoredefineit.Themainchallengeforincumbentsinthissituationisovercomingtheinertiabornofsuccess.Leadersoftencontinueoptimizingthe

Strategyintheageofarenas9

corebusinesswhilemakingsmall,fragmentedbetswithinthearena’ssphere.Butwhen

competitiveadvantagescompoundquickly,waitingtomakeamoveuntilit’snecessarycanputtheorganizationtoofarbehindtocatchupwithothersthatactmoredecisively.

Thestrategicchallengeistoidentifywhereadvantageismovingandcommitenough

resources—typically60to70percentofstrategiccapital—tobuildapositionintheadjacentarena.

Exploreatthefringe:HowChinagrewitsEVindustry

Industrialroboticswasoncelargelyconfinedtoautomotivemanufacturing.Overtime,however,ascostsdeclinedandcapabilitiesimproved,thetechnologybegantospreadtootherindustries,settingnewbenchmarksforefficiencyandqualityinmanufacturingandpressuring

manufacturersinsectorssuchaselectronicsandconsumergoodstoadoptautomationorriskfallingbehind.Thisisthenatureofarenasatthefringeofacompany’scorebusiness:Their

impactislimiteduntilit’ssuddenlyimportant.

Whenarenasaredeveloping,unevenlyevolving,orstillsearchingforviablebusinessmodels,

theydon’tseemtorequireurgentaction.ConsiderthecaseofEVsinChina,whichwereonce

treatedasperipheralbuthavesincebecomecentraltocompetitionintheautomotiveindustry.Tellingly,manyChineseEVcompaniesbeganinotherindustries(forexample,BYD,which

startedinbatteries).Yetastechnologiesmatureandadoptionaccelerates,arenascanshiftfromperipheraltocentraltoacompany’sbusinessinarelativelyshortperiod.Thechallengeis

stayingpreparedwithoutovercommitting.

Exploringatthefringemeansbuildingoptionsforandinsightsaboutarenasthatarenotyetinfluencingbusinessbutcoulddoso.Earlysignalsoftenappearintheformofemerging

customerneeds,newtechnicalcapabilities,orsmallpocketsofdemand.Forexample,dronedeliverieswereinitiallylimitedtonicheusecasessuchasmedicalsuppliesbeforeexpandingintobroadercommercialapplications.Thesesignscanbeeasytodismisswhenthecore

businessremainsstrong,butignoringthemcanleavetheorganizationunpreparedwhenthepaceofchangeaccelerates.

Topreparefortherapidaccelerationofanarena,leaderscansetexplicittrigger

points—includingspecifiedadoptionratesforanewtechnology,costthresholdsforthe

technology,regulatorychanges,orexpansionoftheecosystem—thatwouldjustifygreater

investment.Thisapproachenablesbusinessleaderstomovequicklywithoutrequiringthemtocommitprematurely.Investmenttimingmattersasmuchasfocus.Capitalallocationwhen

exploringanarenaatthefringeismorelimitedthanintheothercaseswe’veexplored—typicallyintherangeof5to10percent—thoughit’simportanttopreservetheflexibilitytoscalerapidlyifconditionschange.Theobjectiveistobereadytoplayastrongroleifandwhenthearena

movesclosertothecore.

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Leadershipintheageofarenas

Arenasarechangingwhereandhowcompaniescompeteandexposingweaknessesinhow

someleadershipteamsapproachstrategy.Winnersarenotalwaysthosewhogetitrightfrom

thestart,butthosewhocombineconvictionwithadaptability.Manyorganizationsstrugglewiththis.Asaresult,theyeitherhesitatetoolongorcommitandthendoubledownwhentheyshouldpivot.Butit’snolongerviabletodevelopstrategiesasifindustriesarestable,capitalinvestmentcanbestaged,andalldecisionsarereversible.Delaycancompounddisadvantages.

Leadershipintheageofarenasrequiresanewkindofdiscipline.Itmeansmakingdifficult

choicesaboutwheretocompete,concentratingcapitalandattentionbehindthosechoices,andusingthecorebusinesstofundthenextsourceofadvantage—evenwhenthatunderminesthecorebusiness.Inthiscontext,strategyisaboutmanagingatrajectorythroughasequenceof

deliberate,oftenirreversiblechoicesaboutwheretobuildadvantage,committingresourcesbeforetheoutcomeisclear.

ThreeprinciplescanguidehowCEOsapproachleadershipintheeraofthe18futurearenas:

—Aportfolioofhardbetsbeatsafive-yearplan.Theconceptofstrategyasathree-tofive-

yearplanisincreasinglyoutdated.Arenasevolvetooquickly,andcompetitivepositionsshifttoofast.Whatmattersisthedirectionoftravelandthequalityoftheforesightthatguidesit.Mostcompaniesarealreadyexposedtomultiplearenas.Somearenasarealreadyreshapingtheircorebusiness,othersareadjacenttoitandinfluencingitscompetitiveenvironment,

andothersareemergingandmaybecomemoreimportantovertime.

Thequestioniswheretocommit.Tryingtoparticipateeverywherecanleadtowinning

nowhere.Successcomesfromconcentratingcapitalandattentiononafewpositionsthatcanendureanddeprioritizingorexitingotherareas.

—Strategyhingesonresourceallocation;everythingelseiscommentary.Intheageofarenas,competitiveadvantageisbuiltthroughinvestmentcycles:morecapitalenablesfaster

learning,stronger