外文翻译---对于一个企业的知识基础型理论

中文 3125 字 本科毕业论文外文翻译 外文题目： TOWARD A KNOWLEDGE-BASED THEORY OF THE FIRM 出 处： School of business, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, U.S.A 作 者 ROBERT M. GRANT TOWARD A KNOWLEDGE-BASED THEORY OF THE FIRM ROBERT M. GRANT School of business, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, U.S.A Given assumptions about the characteristics of knowledge and the knowledge requirements of production, the firm is conceptualized as an institution for integrating knowledge. The primary contribution of the paper is in exploring the coordination mechanisms through which firms integrate the specialist knowledge of their members. In contrast to earlier literature, knowledge is viewed as residing within the individual, and the primary role of the organization is knowledge application rather than knowledge creation. The resulting theory has implicatious for the basis of organizational capability, the principles of organization design (in particular, the analysis of hierarchy and the distribution of decision-ranking authority), and the determinnants of the horizontal and vertical boundaries of the firm. More generally, the knowledge-based approach sheds new light upon current organizational innovations and trends and has farreaching implications for management practice. Foudation The foundation for any theory of the firm is a set of initial premises which form the basis for the logical development of propositions concerning the structure, behavior, performance and indeed, the very existence of firms. Developing a knowledge-based theory of the firm raises the issue: What is knowledge? Since this question has intrigued some of the worlds greatest thinkers from Plato to Popper without the emergence of a clear consensus, this is not an arena in which I choose to compete. In terms of defining knowledge, all I offer beyond the simple tautology of that which is known is the recognition that there are many types of knowledge relevant to the firm. For the purposes of developing a theory of the firm, my primary task is to establish those characteristics of knowledge which have critical implications for management.The literature on the analysis and management of knowledge points to the following characteristics as pertinent to the utilization of knowledge within the firm to create value. Transferability The resource-based view of the firm recognizes the transferability of a firms resources and capabilities as a critical determinant of their capacity to confer sustainable competitive advantage(Barney, 1986). With regard to knowledge, the issue of transferability is important, not only between firms, but even more critically, within the firm. The management literature has clearly recognized the epistemological distinction between knowing how and knowing about which is captured by distinctions between subjective vs. objective knowledge, implicit or tacit vs. explicit knowledge, personal vs.prepositional knowledge,and procedural vs. declarative knowledge. My purpose here is not to make fine distinctions between different types of knowledge. I identify knowing how with tacit knowledge, and knowledge about facts and theories with explicit knowledge.The critical distinction between the two lies in transferability and the mechanisms for transfer across individuals, across space, and across time.Explicit knowledge is revealed by its communicanon. This ease of communication is its fundamental property. Indeed information has traditionally been viewed by economists as being a public good-once created it can be consumed by additional users at close to zero marginal cost.Tacit knowledge is revealed through its application. If tacit knowledge cannot be codified and can only be observed through its application and acquired through practice, its transfer between people is slow, costly, and uncertain (Kogut andZander, 1992). Capacity for aggregation The efficiency with which knowledge can be transferred depends, in part, upon knowledges potential for aggregation. Knowledge transfer involves both transmission and receipt. Knowledge receipt has been analyzed in terms of the absorptive capacity of the recipient (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). At both individual and organizational levels, knowledge absorption depends upon the recipients ability to add new knowledge to existing knowledge. This requires additivity between different elements of knowledge. Efficiency of knowledge aggregation is greatly enhanced when knowledge can be expressed in terms of common language. Statistics is a particularly useful language for aggregating (andtransferring) certain types of explicit knowledge-its efficiency in this role is greatly enhanced through advances in information technology. Thus, information on Ford Motor Companys cash balances, its foreign currency exposure, its inventories of spark plugs and crankshafts is readily transferred from multiple locations within the company and aggregated at a single location. Conversely information about the capabilities of Ford managers, or the quirks of individual machine tools, is idiosyncratic knowledge cannot which cannot be aggregated at a single location. Hayek(1945: 521) refers to this asknowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place, and Jensen and Meckling (1992) as specific knowledge. As these authors have shown, and as we shall explore later in the paper,the ability to transfer and aggregate knowledge is a key determinant of the optimal location of decision-making authority within the firm. Appropriability Appropriability refers to the ability of the owner of a resource to receive a return equal to the value created by that resource (Teece, 1987; Levin et n1., 1987). Knowledge, is a resource which is subject to uniquely complex problems of appropriability. Tacit knowledge is not directly appropriable because it cannot be directly transferred: it can be appropriated only through its application to productive activity. Explicit knowledge suffers from two key problems of appropriability: first,as a public or nonrivalroos good, any one who acquires it can resell without losing it (Arcow,1984); second, the mere act of marketing knowledge makes it available to potential buyers(Arcow, 1971: 152). Thus, except for patents and copyrights where knowledge owners are protected by legally established property rights, knowledge is generally inappropriable by means of market transactions. Lack of clear property rights results in ambiguity over the ownership of knowledge.While most explicit knowledge and all tacit knowledge is stored within individuals, much of this knowledge is created within the firm and is firm specific. This creates difficulties over the allocation of the returns to knowledge and achieving optimal investment in new knowledge(Rosen, 1991). Specialization in knowledge acquisition Fundamental to Simons principle of bounded rationality is recognition that the human brain has limited capacity to acquire, store and process knowledge. The result is that efficiency in know- ledge production (by which I mean the creation of new knowledge, the acquisition of existing knowledge, and storage of knowledge) requires that individuals specialize in particular areas of knowledge. This implies that experts are (almost) invariably specialists, while jacks-of-all-trades are masters-of-none.The knowledge requirements of production Production involves the transformation of inputs into outputs. Fundamental to a knowledge-based theory of the fine is the assumption that the critical input in production and primary source of value is knowledge. Indeed, if we were to resurrect a single-factor theory of value in the tradition of the classical economists labor theory of value or the French Physiocrats land-based theory of value, then the only defensible approach would be a knowledge-based theory of value,on the grounds that all human productivity is knowledge dependent, and machines are simply embodiments of knowledge. The exitence of the firms The above precepts establish a rationale for the existence of firms. Following Demsetz (1991:171一 175), the existence of the firm represents a response to a fundamental asymmetry in the economics of knowledge: knowledge acquisition requires greater specialization than is needed for its utilization. Hence, production requires the coordinated efforts of individual specialists who possess many different types of knowledge. Yet markets are unable to undertake this coordinating role because of their failure in the face of (a)the immobility of tacit knowledge and (b) the risk of expropriation of explicit knowledge by the potential buyer. Hence, firms exist as institutions for producing goods and services because they can create conditions under which multiple individuals can integrate their specialist knowledge. These conditions include propinquity and low-powered incentives designed to foster condition between individual specialists which avoid the problems of opportunism associated with the high-powered incentives directly related to knowledge transactions. A possible solution to the inability of markets to contract over transfers of tacit knowledge is to contract over units of workers time. But ever if units of labor time are suitable proxies for the supply of tacit knowledge, so long as production requires the complex integration of multiple types of knowledge within a system of team production then Rosen(1991)shows that markets must establish an incredibly complex wage structure which sets a separate wage rate for every workers interaction with every other worker. Note that this view of the role of the firm as a knowledge-integrating institution is somewhat different from that emphasized in the literature Most research into organizational learning (Levitt and March, 1988; Huber, 1991)and the knowledge-based view of the firm (Spender, 1989;Nonaka, 1991, 1994) focuses upon the acquisition and creation of organizional knowledge. Thus, spender(1989: 185) defines the organization as, in essence, a body of knowledge about the organizations circumstances, resources, causal mechanisms, objectives, attitudes, policies, and so forth. My approach is distinguished by two assumptions: first, that knowledge creation is an individual activity; second, that the primary role of firms is in the application of existing knowledge to the production of goods and services.this dispensing with the concept of organizational knowledge in favor of emphasizing the role of the individual in creating and storing knowledge is consistent with Simons observation that:All learning takes place inside individual human heads; an organization learns in only two ways:(a) by the learning of its members, or (b) by ingesting new members who have knowledge the organization didnt previously have (Simon,1991: 125). More importantly, however, is the desire to understand the organizational processes through which firms access and utilize the knowledge possessed by their members. The flange inherent in the concept of organizational knowledge is that, by viewing the organization as thentity which creates, stores and deploys knowledge, the organizational processes through whicl individuals engage in these activities may be obscured. Thus, March views organizations a storing knowledge in their procedures, norms rules, and forms. They accumulate such knowledge over time learning from their members(March, 1991: 73). This learning process involve encoding inferences from history into routine that guide behavior. The generic term routine,includes the forms, rules, procedures, conventions strategies, and technologies around which organizations are constructed and through which the;operate (Levitt and March, 1988: 320). Takinl the organization as the unit of analysis not only runs the risk of reification, but, by defining rules procedures, conventions, and nouns as knowledge fails to direct attention to the mechanisms through which this organizational knowledge is createc through the interactions of individuals, and offers little guidance as to how managers can influence these processes. My emphasis is on the firm as an institution for knowledge application. This is not to deny the importance of organizational constext in knowledge creation. If production creation requires the integration of each persons knowledge with that of others, even if knowledge acquisition is individualistic, the firm provides necessary incentives and direction. If knowledge is specific to a particular team production process,then knowledge creation cannot be separated from knowledge application-both occur within a commen organizational context. Thus, if the members of Manchester United soccer team have cumplementary skills, then they need to be tied together by long-term relationships in order to achieve the investment in team-based skills required to maximize team performance. Market contracts are unlikely to achieve the stability of long-term relationships and are likely to give rise to all the problems of opportunism that transactions cost economics predicts are a consequence of small numbers and transaction-specific investments. This rationale for the existence of the firm may be criticized as being a special case of the Coase/Williamson transaction cost theory of the firm. Firms exist because they are able to avoid the costs associated with market transactions; the knowledge-based view simply focuses upon the costs associated with a specific type of transaction-those involving knowledge. Certainly, the above analysis draws upon some familiar concepts of market failure. However, the key distinction is emphasis upon the firm as an organization for managing team production rather than an institution for managing transactions. In common with the arguments of Ghoshal and Moran(1996), the central advantage of firms in the production process is not simply an avoidance of the transactions costs associated with market exchange, but their unique advantages for governing certain types of economic activities from a logic that is very different from that of a market(Ghoshal and Moran, 1996: 13). Integrating the knowledge of many different individuals in the process of producing goods and services is such a logic. To develop this argument further, these processes for integrating knowledge need to be specified more clearly. 译 文： 对于一个企业的知识基础型理论 ROBERT M. GRANT 美国华盛顿 乔治镇大学 根据知识的特点和产品生产的知识要求，企业被定义为一 个整合知识的机构。本论文的主要贡献在于通过企业成员中专家的知识 来探究协调机制。和早期文献资料相反，现在人们认为知识存在于个人内部。而组织最主要的角色是知识的应用，不是知识的创造。随之产生的理论对组织能力基础、组织设计理论（尤其是对等级制度和决策等级分布的分析）以及企业横向、纵向边界的决定因素都有指示作用。总的来说，知识基础型理论为现今的组织创新和走向指明了道路 ，而且对管理实践有深远意义。 基础 任何公司理论的基础都是由一套初始假设构成的。这些假设对公司的结构、行为、表现以及存在等论点的逻辑发展奠定了基础。若要阐述企业知识基础型理论，我们势必会碰到一个问题：什么是知识？这个问题激发了世界上最伟大的思想家（从柏拉图到波普尔）的兴趣，但始终没有统一的意见。我不想再这个领域竞争。说到知识的定义，除了“众所周知”的简单真理外，人们承认很多类型的知识都和企业有关。笔者也会在本论文中提及。为了企业理论的发展，笔者的主要任务是发现那些对管理有决定性作用的知识特征。许多对知识的分 析和管理指出，以下特征非常恰当的证明在企业内部对知识的利用能够创造价值。 可转移性 持资源基础型观点的人认为，企业资源和能力的可转移性就是企业实现可持续竞争优势的决定因素 (Barney, 1986)。关于知识，不仅仅在企业之间，更关键在于企业内部，可转移性这点是非常重要的。知道“怎样”和知道“关于”的区别在于“主观和客观的知识，含蓄和明了的知识，个人的和前置的知识，以及程序上和陈述上的知识”，管理学者已经清楚的认识到了以上几点在认识论中的差别。笔者在此的目的不是想完美地区分知识的各种形式。通过利用含蓄知识 ，笔者能够鉴别“怎样”，利用明了知识了解事实和理论。两者最关键的区别在于可转移性以及通过个人，空间，时间的转移机制。明了的知识是通过通信而显露的。这些交流的过程是最基础的属性。事实上经济学家一直都认为信息是一种公共利好的资源，更多的使用者可以接近 0边际成本的水平来消费信息。隐性知识是在应用中体现出来。如果人们不能把隐性知识精确归类，只能在应用中发现，在实践中获得，那么它在人们的转移中是缓慢的，高成本的，不确定的 (Kogut andZander, 1992)。 集成能力 知识转移的效率部分是靠知识集成的内在潜 力。知识转移包括转送和接受。人们通过“接受者的吸收能力”来分析知识接受 (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990)。从个人和组织的层面上来说，知识的吸收能力取决于接受者在有知识基础上增加新知识的能力。这要求不同知识之间元素的可叠加性。当知识能以普通语言表达出来后，知识扩张的效率就会大大提高。对于扩张（和传播）特定类型的明了知识时，数据就成了一门特别有用的语言。随着信息技术的进步，其角色的有效性大大提高。因此，福特汽车公司的员工已随时准备将公司的现金平衡信息，外币曝露信息以及火花塞和曲轴的存货从公司 的多个位置转移并集聚到一个地方。但是，福特管理者的能力或单个机器部件的高效率是一种特殊的知识，无法集中到一个位置。 Hayek(1945: 521)认为这是“特定时间和地点的下知识”， Jensen 和 Meckling (1992)认为其是“特殊知识”。正如以上学者所述，转移和集成知识的能力对形成企业内部最佳决策制度来说至关重要。 适应性 适应性是指资源所有者接受与资源价值同等水平知识的能力 (Teece, 1987; Levin et n1., 1987)。知识是一种资源，其取决于各种独特、复杂问题的适应性。因为人们不能直接转移隐性知识，所以它并不是放之四海而皆准的。只有当人们把它应用到生产活动中，它才能实现其合理性。清晰知识面临两大关于适用性的问题：第一，作为一种公共或者说不排他的资源，任何一个人得到它的人都可以重复出售它，但是不会失去它的使用权 (Arcow,1984)。第