公司董事会属性团队效能和财务绩效文献翻译

1、原文：CorporateBoardAttributes,TeamEffectivenessandFinancialPerformanceATeam-BasedModelofCorporateBoardEffectivenessTheexistingliteratureexaminingteamsandknowledge-basedworkgroupsdemonstratesacausallinkbetweenteampracticesorattributes,effectiveness,andoutcomes(CohenandBailey,1997;KirkmanandRosen,1999;M

2、arksetal.,2001).Extendingontheliteratureregardingteameffectiveness,somegovernancescholarshavestartedtofocusonmanagerialcompetenceandempowermentargumentstohelpexplainorganizationalperformancedifferences(Davisetal.,1997;Hendry,2002;Shen,2003).Intheirseminaltheoreticalwork,ForbesandMilliken(1999)integr

3、atedliteratureoncorporateboardsandteameffectivenessarguingthatboardeffectivenessisidentifiedbythesamecriteriaasmanypreviousmodelsofteameffectiveness.Further,theysuggestthatthevariousboarddemographicstypicallyusedinboardresearch,suchasinsider/outsiderratio,boardsize,andtenure,areexpectedtoinfluenceov

4、erallteameffectivenessindependently.Similarly,Sonnenfeld(2002)describeseffectiveboardsasbeingdistinguishedbyrobust,effectivesocialsystemsandcontendsthatboarddemographicsbetweenForbesMagazines(2001)most-admiredandleast-admiredcompaniesareactuallysimilar.Thissuggeststhatstructuralcharacteristicsinando

5、fthemselvesdonotdifferentiatebetweenhigh-performingandlow-performingboards.Sonnenfeld(2002,p.106)goesontostate,Weneedtoconsidernotonlyhowwestructuretheworkofaboardbutalsohowwemanagethesocialsystemaboardactuallyis.ThisisconsistentwiththeconclusionofPapadakisetal.(1998)thatdecision-specificandrelation

6、shipattributes,ratherthanboarddemographics,representthegreatestinfluenceonthestrategicdecision-makingprocess.Drawingfromboththecorporateboardandgroups/teamsresearch,wearguethatthesameconditionsenablingworkgroupstoachievetheirgoalsshouldberelatedtocorporateboardeffectiveness.Othershaveacknowledgedthi

7、srelationship,butinalessexplicitway(e.g.Dailyetal.,2003;FinkelsteinandHambrick,1996;FinkelsteinandMooney,2003;Huse,2005;Sonnenfeld,2004a).Soratherthandevelopanoriginalmodelofboardsasteams,weapplypreviousresearchontheattributesofhighperformingteamstoboardsofdirectors(Mohrmanetal.,1995).Hence,werecogn

8、izethattherelationshipsbetweengroupinputs,processesandoutcomesdependonfactorsthatarespecifictothetypeofgroupunderstudyandthespecificcriteriaofeffectivenessthatarebeingconsidered(ForbesandMilliken,1999;Mathieuetal.,2008).Weapplyamodelofgroupeffectivenessthatfitswithinalargerframeworkthathasdominatedg

9、roupsandteamsresearchfordecades(CohenandBailey,1997;Mathieuetal.,2008).Althoughithasbeenmodifiedandextendedovertheyears,thebasicinput-process-outputmodel(IPO)holdsthatcontextualfactorsandotherindividualandteamlevelantecedentsenableandconstrain(p.412)teammemberinteractionsanddefineteamprocesseswhichi

10、nturndrivetaskeffectiveness(Mathieuetal.,2008).Inthisstudy,wefocusonteaminputsusinganestablishedmodelderivedfromyearsofresearchonemployeeparticipationandinvolvement(Cotton,1993;Galbraith,1973;Lawler,1986;Vandenbergetal.,1999).Specifically,wedrawuponMohrmanetal.s(1995)modelofteameffectiveness,whichis

11、basedonfivekeyattributesofhighperforminggroups,andhasbeenpreviouslyappliedtocorporateboards(Congeretal.,2001).Thekeyattributeshighlightedinthismodelinclude:(1)knowledgethatiscloselyalignedwiththeorganizationsneedsandrequirements;(2)currentandcomprehensiveinformationdrawnfrommultiplesourcesandperspec

12、tives;(3)sufficientpowertoreachindependentdecisions,aswellastoevaluateandchallengetheCEO;(4)sufficientincentives,typicallyachievedthroughrewardssystemstoaligndirectorsandownersinterests;and(5)sufficientopportunityandtimefortheboardandcommitteestoprepareforandcompletetasks.Byapplyingthisestablishedmo

13、delofgroupeffectivenesswehopetocontributetoourunderstandingofcorporateboardsinseveralways.Firstistoempiricallydemonstratethatboardeffectivenessisrelatedtothesameteaminputsthathavebeenshowntoimpactgroupperformanceinothercontexts.Secondistoprovideanintegrativeframeworkfortheexistingresearchonboardchar

14、acteristicsandtesttheirrelationshiptoactualboardtaskperformance.Whilemanyoftheseattributeshavebeenexaminedindependentlyfortheirrelationshipstofirmfinancialperformance,wetestthemtogetherfortheirrelationshipstoboardperformanceasratedbydirectorsthemselves.Inthefollowingparagraphs,wedrawonmultipletheore

15、ticalperspectivestodiscusseachofthesefiveteamattributesandpresenthypothesesabouttheirrelationshiptooverallboardeffectiveness.Knowledgeandboardeffectiveness.Boardresearchhaslongrecognizedtheimportanceofdirectorsabilities,judgment,experience,andknowledgetoeffectivegovernance(e.g.CopelandandTowl,1947).

16、Comingfromaresourcedependenceviewofcorporateboards,knowledgehasmostoftenbeenconceptualizedasthestockofinformationorbackgroundexpertisethatdirectorspossessinaggregate.Theseareasofexpertisecontributetooverallcognitiveresourcesandenhancethescopeandqualityoftheboardsdecisionsanditseffectiveness(Hillmana

17、ndDalziel,2003;ONealandThomas,1996).Giventhatdirectmeasurementofboardknowledgeisextremelydifficulttoobtain,variousstudieshaveusedanumberofdifferentproxiesasmeasuresofboardstrategicandoperationalknowledgeovertheyears.Theseincludeboardinterlocks(HaunschildandBeckman,1998),boardmemberfunctionalbackgrou

18、nd(CarpenterandWestphal,2001),andboardtenure(GoldenandZajac,2001;WestphalandZajac,1995).Whilethesevariousmeasuresofboardknowledgeareimportant,researchalsoindicatesthattheabilitytotranslateboardknowledgeintogoodstrategicdecisionsdependsonseveralmoderatingfactors.Thereshouldbesufficientdiversityamongb

19、oardmemberstopromotediscussionofawiderangeofoptions(Hillmanetal.,2002),thegroupnormsandprocesscontributetotheopenairingofopinions(Sonnenfeld,2002),andmostimportantly,thebenefitsofspecifictypesofknowledgearecontextspecific.Forexample,CarpenterandWestphal(2001)foundthatboardexperienceandexpertisewiths

20、pecificchallengesfacingacompany(suchasanunstablecompetitiveenvironmentoratakeoverbid)improvedmonitoringaswellasadviceandcounsel.This,inturn,improvesfirmperformanceinspecificcontexts.BoardEffectivenessandFirmPerformancePriorresearchoncorporategovernancehassuggestedmultiplewaysinwhichboardsmaycontribu

21、tetoorganizationaleffectiveness(e.g.Congeretal.,2001;ForbesandMilliken,1999).Fromaresourcedependenceperspective,effectiveboardsstrengthentieswiththeexternalenvironmentbygeneratingbusinesstiesandmaintainingapositivecorporateimage(BazermanandSchoorman,1983).Effectiveboardsarealsothoughttocontributetot

22、hedevelopmentofbetterorganizationalstrategies.Johnsonetal.(1996)arguethateffectiveboardsallowtopmanagerstotapthebreadthofknowledgepossessedbyoutsidedirectorstocomplementthedepthoffirm-specificknowledgeofexecutives.Usingacollaborativeapproach,boardsaregiventheabilitytoadvise,deliverfeedback,andenhanc

23、estrategyformulation(SundaramurthyandLewis,2003;Westphal,1999).Fromanagency/controlperspective,effectiveboardsprovideanecessarycheckontopmanagement(DaltonandKesner,1985),providingoversightandtyingexecutiverewardstoperformance(SundaramurthyandLewis,2003).Generallyspeaking,boardsareexpectedtoevaluatec

24、ompanyandCEOperformanceandtakeactionwhenneededtoprotectshareholderinterests(GoldenandZajac,2001).Thus,boardeffectivenessacrossabroadrangeofroles,includingcollaborationandcontrolmechanisms,shouldberelatedtocompanyperformance(CohenandBailey,1997;SundaramurthyandLewis,2003).Thereisanextensiveliterature

25、oncorporateboardsthathasexaminedanumberofboardactionstodeterminewhetherboardsarebehavingeffectivelyfromashareholderperspective,includingstudiesofCEOcompensation,theadoptionofpoisonpills,adoptionofgreenmailandotheranti-takeoverprovisions(e.g.ConyonandPeck,1998;Frankforteretal.,2000).However,weknowofn

26、opreviousstudieswhichhavebeenabletodirectlymeasureboardeffectivenessfrominsidetheboardroominawaythatmightbeusedtodirectlyexaminethetheoreticalblackboxbetweenboardpracticesorattributesandperformance.Giventhenumberofpreviousstudiesthathavetiedmanyoftheaforementionedboardattributestocompanyperformance,

27、weexpectthatboardeffectivenesswillactuallyactasamediatoroftheboardattributesperformancerelationshipsthathavebeenextensivelystudiedbygovernancescholars.Moreover,wesuggestthatexaminingtheseattributestogether,basedontheoryderivedfromresearchoneffectiveteams,hastheadvantageofpotentiallyintegratingthisva

28、stsetofstudiesintoamorecoherentstoryofhowthepracticesworktogethertosupportbettercorporategovernance.Forexample,Robertsetal.(2005)arguethataprerequisiteforeffectiveboardsisfordirectorstobecomeengagedincarryingouttheir various responsibilitiesto the company. This requiressignificanttimecommitmenttolea

29、rnandkeepupwiththevariousintricaciesofthecompanysoperationsandtimeisaseriousconstraintformostdirectors(CarterandLorsch,2004;LorschandMacIver,1989).Shen(2005)supportsthisargumentbutsuggeststhatwithoutappropriateincentivesinplacethelikelihoodofdirectorswillinglyputtinginthetimetoadheretotheirdutiesisl

30、ow.Thismediatingroleofboardeffectivenessisimpliedinpreviousboardsresearchalthoughnotempiricallytested.Forinstance,GoldenandZajac(2001)showthatboarddemographyandprocessessignificantlyaffectstrategicchange.Thisessentiallyimpliesthatboardattributesimpactboardeffectiveness,leadingtohigher-qualitystrateg

31、icdecisionsandhigherlevelsoforganizationalperformance.Similarly,ForbesandMillikens(1999)comprehensivetheoreticalmodelshowshowboardtaskperformance(i.e.boardeffectiveness)actsasamediator,orinterveningconstruct,betweenboardprocessesandfirmperformance.Further,theyarguethatboardcharacteristicsareantecede

32、ntstotaskperformance.Followingtheseargumentsandthemanypreviousstudiesoncorporategovernancedemonstratingtheimportanceofboardsofdirectorstothesuccessfuloperationofthecorporation(BaysingerandButler,1985),weproposetwomorehypotheses:Hypothesis1:Corporationswithmoreeffectiveboardswilldemonstratehigherleve

33、lsoffinancialperformance.Hypothesis2(a-e):Boardeffectivenessmediatestherelationshipbetweenboardattributes-(a)knowledge,(b)information,(c)power,(d)incentives,(e)opportunity/timeandthefinancialperformanceofthecompany.Takentogether,thesevenhypothesesdiscussedabovetestthecomprehensivemodelthatboardswith

34、sufficientknowledge,information,power,incentives,andopportunity/timearemorelikelytobeeffective,andmoreeffectiveboardswillbeassociatedwithsuperiorcorporateperformance.Figure1visuallydemonstratestheoverallmodel.SampleandDataCollectionTominimizetheeffectsofmethodvariance,eachstageofthehypothesizedmodel

35、wasoperationalizedusingvarioustypesofsurveyand/orarchivaldata.ThedataforsomeoftheboardattributesandtheeffectivenessmeasureweredrawnfromanannualwrittensurveyofthedirectorsofallFortune1000companiesconductedbyKorn/FerryInternational,aninternationalexecutivesearchfirm,inconjunctionwiththeCenterforEffect

36、iveOrganizationsattheUniversityofSouthernCalifornia.Dataweretakenfromthesurveyof1996boardsinwhich1151chiefexecutives,insidedirectors,andoutsidedirectorsresponded.SurveydatawerethenmatchedwitharchivaldataonboardstakenfromproxystatementsfiledwiththeSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC),theInstitutional

37、BrokersEstimateSystem(IBES),andtheInvestorResponsibilityResearchCenter(IRRC),whichpublishesdetailedlistingsofcorporategovernanceprovisionsforindividualfirms.TheIRRCdataarederivedfromseveralsources,includingcorporatebylawsandcharters,proxystatements,annualreports,and10-Kand10-QdocumentsfiledwiththeSE

38、C.Finally,companyperformancedataweretakenfromtheCOMPUSTATdatabaseforyears1995-98.Inordertomatchthesurveydatawitharchivalinformation,companynameswererecordedforasmanyrespondentsaspossibleusingtwodifferentmethods.Directorswereaskedtogivethenameofthecompanyfortheboardthattheydescribedinthesurvey,butthi

39、squestionwasstrictlyoptional.Second,companynamesweretakenfromthereturnaddressontheenvelopesinwhichthedirectorreturnedthesurvey.Duetospecificinstructionsonthesurvey,thismethodwasonlyusedwhentherespondentself-identifiedasaninsidedirectorofafirm.2Thisprocessoriginallyidentified420boardmembersfrom335dif

40、ferentpublicly-tradedcompanies.Incaseswherethereweremultiplerespondentsfromthesamecompany,onewaschosenatrandomtorepresentthatparticularboard.Therewere71companiesforwhichthereweretwoormorerespondents.Fifty-sevenofthesehadonlytworespondents,withamaximumoffivedirectorsrespondingfromasingleboard.Anevalu

41、ationoftheinter-raterreliabilitybetweenrespondentsfromthesamecompanywasmadewiththe71boardsthatcouldbeidentifiedashavingmultiplerespondents.Pairedsamplet-testsindicatedthatonegroupof71responsescouldnotbedistinguishedfromasecondgroup.Overall,directorsfromthesamecompanyagreed64-84percentofthetime,depen

42、dingontheparticularquestion.Therewere39companiesforwhichcompletedatawereavailableforall11itemsusedtomeasureboardeffectivenessfromtwodirectors.Evenwithasmallsampleofrepeatresponseswewereabletofindsignificantassociationbetweentherespondents.Source:G.TygePayne,GeorgeS,BensonandDavidL.Finegold,2009.“Cor

43、porateBoardAttributes,TeamEffectivenessandFinancialPerformance”.JournalofManagementStudies,pp.11译文：公司董事会属性、团队效能和财务绩效基于团队的董事会效率模型现有研究团队和基于知识的工作小组的文献表明，团队之间的行为或属性，效能与结果之间存在因果关系（Cohen和Bailey,1997;Kirkman和Rosen,1999;Marks等,2001）。在团队效能研究的拓展方面，一些管理学者已经开始关注管理能力和赋能，以解释组织绩效的差异（Davisetal.,1997;Hendry,2002;She

44、n,2003）。ForbesandMilliken（1999）整合了企业董事会和团队效能方面的研究，认为董事会的有效性确定标准与以前许多的团队效能标准相同。此外，他们建议董事会人口通常在董事会研究中使用，例如内幕或是董事会人口的比例，董事会规模，以及任期，预计都将影响整体团队效能的独立。同样，Sonnenfeld（2002）介绍指出，杰出有效的董事会能作为稳健，有效的社会制度，并认为福布斯杂志（2001）最欣赏和最不尊敬的公司董事会人口实际上是相似的。这就表明，其本身的结构特点并没有区分高绩效和低绩效的董事会。Sonnenfeld（2002,P106）指出：“我们需要考虑的不仅是我们如何组织了

45、一个董事会的工作，实际上也要知道如何管理我们的一个董事会制度。”这是与Papadakis等人的结论是一致的。Papadakis等（1998）提出了这个决定的具体属性和关系，而不是董事会人口，表明这在战略决策过程的影响最大。借鉴于对公司董事会和团队的研究，我们认为，在相同的条件下，为了使工作组实现他们的目标应该与公司董事会的有效性相联系。其他人也承认这种关系，但用的是一个不太明显的方式（例如Daily等,2003;Finkelstein和Hambrick,1996;Finkelstein和Mooney,2003;Huse,2005;Sonnenfeld,2004）。因此，不是作为一个团队开发董事

46、会的原始模型，我们采用的是对以往高层董事会的属性的研究（Mohrman，1995）。因此，针对所研究型组和有效性正在考虑的具体标准，我们认识到，投入、过程和结果的关系受多种因素的影响。等, 2008 ) 。(Forbes和Milliken,1999;Mathieu我们采用团队效能的模型，即适合在一个较大的框架内，占据主导地位的团队几十年来的研究模型（Cohen和Bailey,1997;Mathieu等,2008）。虽然经过这么多年，它已被修改，但该模型的基本内容（IPO）认为，环境因素以及其他个人和队伍等级前提是启用和约束（第412页），以及团队成员的互动过程，并反过来确定团队这激励任务的成效

47、（Mathieu等，2008）。在这项研究中，我们注重建立团队投入使用的模型，从而从多年的员工参与和研究中，推导参与制度（Cotton,1993;Galbraith,1973;Lawler,1986;Vandenberg等,1999）。具体来说，我们借鉴Mohrman（1995）团队效率，这是基于五个关键属性的高层组，并已应用到公司董事会此前的模型（Conger等，2001）。在这个模型中，突出的关键属性包括：（1）知识是需要密切与组织的要求保持一致；（2）现行的观点和全面的信息，从多个来源绘制；（3）有足够的权力，达到独立决定，以及评估和挑战的CEO；（4）有足够的激励，通常是通过奖励系统达

48、到对董事及业主的利益；（5）充分的机会，为董事会和委员会的时间来准备和完成任务。通过应用这一团队的成效，我们希望在既定模式的几个方面作出贡献以及我们对公司董事会的理解。首先，经验表明，董事会效率是关系到同一个团队，已被证实在其他公司投入表现方面产生影响。其次，董事会特征提供了一个综合框架，研究和测试他们现有的实际董事的工作绩效的关系。虽然他们这些公司的业绩关系属性有很多已经过独立审查，但我们一起测试他们性能的关系，是作为董事会对董事本身评级。在下面的段落中，我们借鉴多种角度理论来讨论这五个小组的属性，并询问其董事会整体效益的关系。知识和董事会的有效性。长期以来，董事会研究一直承认董事的能力、判

49、断、经验、有效治理和知识的重要性。（如Copeland和Towl，1947年）。公司董事会从资源依赖的观点看，董事合共持有的知识作为最经常被概念化的信息或背景知识存量。这些领域的专业知识有助于整体认知资源，提高规模和董事会的决定和其成效（Hillman和Dalziel,2003;ONeal和Thomas,1996）的质量。鉴于董事会所知，获得直接测量是非常困难的，各种研究已经使用了多年不同的代理，作为董事会战略措施和操作知识。这些措施包括董事联结（Haunschild和Beckman，1998），董事会成员的功能背景（Carpenter和Westphal，2001），和董事会使用权（Golde

50、n和Zajac,2001;Westphal和Zajac,1995）。这些不同董事会的知识是重要的措施。研究还表明，董事会知识转化为良好的战略决策依靠知悉若干干扰因素而定。董事会成员之间应该有足够的多样性，能促进多种选择的讨论（Hillman等，2002年），团队规范和流程有助于意见公开宣布（Sonnenfeld，2002），最重要的好处时具体的知识类型上下文相关。例如，Carpenter和Westphal（2001）发现，董事会成员的经验，面临公司（如竞争环境不稳定或收购）的具体挑战的专业知识以及改进监测作为指导和建议，这反过来又提高了企业在特定情况下的性能。董事会效率与公司绩效在此之前对公司

51、治理的研究已经表明多种方法，董事会可能有助于组织效能（如Conger等,2001;Forbes和Milliken,1999）。从资源依赖的角度看，产生有效的董事会需要加强业务联系并保持良好的企业形象（Bazerman和Schoorman，1983）以及与外部环境的关系。有效的董事会效益也被认为有助于提高组织的战略。约翰逊等人（1996）认为，有效的董事会允许高层管理人员挖掘外部董事所具备的补充企业特有的知识深度和广度管理人员。用合作的方式，董事会给出能力和指导，并提供反馈，从而增强战略制定（Sundaramurthy和Lewis,2003;Westphal,1999）。从机构/控制的角度，提供了一个有效的董事会高层管理人员（Dalton和Kesner,1985），提供监督和必要的检查搭售行政奖励与业绩（Sundaramurthy和Lewis,2003）。一般而言，董事会预计公司和经营者业绩评价和在必要时采取行动，以保障股东利益（Golden和Zajac，2001）。因此，在董事会的角色，包括协作和控制机制，广泛的成效，应与公司业绩相联系。（Cohena和Bailey,1997;Sundaramurthy和Lewis，2003）。有一个广泛的文献在企业董事会已审查了董事会的一些行动，以确定是否有效地从股东行为的角度来看，包括总裁的薪酬，讹诈和其他反收购条款的规定（例如，Co