《国际经济关系》Chapter7

Chapter7

MultinationalCorporationsintheThirdWorld

Thenatureofmultinationalcorporationsandforeigndirectinvestmentindevelopingcountrieshaschangedsignificantlyoverthethreepostwarperiods,ashavegovernmentpoliciesandpublicattitudestoMNCs.TheRoleofMNCsand

FDIintheSouth

TheimportanceofFDIintheSouthvariesfromcountrytocountry.Insomecountries,itisrelativelyinsignificant,whereasinothersitplaysakeyrole.ThepowerofmultinationalcorporationsgrowsoutoftheirstructuralpositionwithintherelativelysmallandunderdevelopedeconomiesofmanySoutherncountries.Inmanycases,thedevelopingcountriesoftenremaineddependentonthemultinationalsforprocessing,shipping,marketing,anddistributingtheirrawmaterials.AsecondandnewersectorofNortherncontrolismanufacturing.SinceWorldWarII,thedevelopingcountrieshavesoughttoexpandtheirindustrialsectorasaprimarymeansofdevelopmentandhaveofferedincentivesforinvestmentinmanufacturing.ForeignfirmsalsorepresentasignificantpercentageofthelargestandmostpowerfulfirmsinSoutherneconomies.BargainingforGreaterControlInprinciple,Southerngovernmentscouldassertthecontrolnecessarytoretaindecisionmakingathome.Theforeigninvestoroftencontrolsresourcesuchascapital,technology,andaccesstoforeignmarketsthatthedevelopingcountriesneedfordevelopment.Ontheonehand,officialswanttoregulatethemultinationalssoastomaximizenationalbenefitsandminimizenationalcosts.Butontheotherhand,officialsdonotwanttomakeregulationsorestrictivethatitwilldeterpotentialinvestors.Anotherfactorweakeningthebargainingpowerofthedevelopingcountriesistheabsenceofcompetitionforinvestmentopportunities.alternativesourcesofrawmaterialsandcheaplaborThereremainconstraintsonthecountry’sabilitytocarryoutregulatorypolicies.Anothergovernmentalproblemhasbeentheabilityofmultinationalstointerveneinthehoststate’sdomesticpoliticalprocesstoadvancetheircorporateinterests.SeveralcharacteristicsofMNCs,however,distinguishthemfromnationalcorporationsandmaketheirparticipationinhostpoliticsaproblemfortheSouthernstates.Politicalparticipationbymultinationalfirmscarriestheconnotationand,attimes,therealityofachallengetonationalsovereignty.MNCsbringmanyresourcestotheirpoliticalactivities.Theirfinancialresourcesandinternationalstructurecanbepowerfulpoliticaltools.Insum,becauseoftheirpowerfulposition,MNCscanaffecteconomicefficiencyandwelfareandinfluencepoliticsinSouthernhostcountries.ArgumentsabouttheEffectsofMNCs

onEconomicDevelopmentProponentarguethatforeigninvestmenthasapositiveeffectonSoutherneconomicdevelopment.fillsresourcegapsindevelopingcountriesandimprovesthequalityoffactorsofproduction.Oneofthemostimportantcontributionsiscapital.alsomayhelptoincreasethelevelofoveralldomesticinvestment.alsocontributecrucialforeignexchangeearningstothedevelopingworldthroughtheirtradeeffect.Asecondcrucialresourcegapfilledbythemultinational

istechnology.Thedesiretoobtainmoderntechnologyisperhapsthemostimportantattractionofforeigninvestmentforthedevelopingcountries.Third,foreigninvestmentimprovesthequalityoflaborintheSouth.Investmentprovidesneededmanagerialskillsthatimproveproduction,anditcreatesjobsandtrainsworkers.Finally,thatMNCshaveapositiveimpactonwelfare.Inthe1970s,anewbodyofcriticalanalysisofMNCsemerged.Thiscriticsarguedthat,atbest,thosepoliciesadoptedbecausetheyarebestforthemultinationalarenotnecessarilybestforthesubsidiaryorthehoststateandthat,atworst,themultinationalexploitsdevelopingcountriesandperpetuatesdependence.Somecriticsbelievethatforeigninvestmentindevelopingcountriesactuallyleadstoanoutflowofcapital.Furthermore,contendthecritics,profitsrepresentonlyasmallpartoftheeffectivereturntotheparent.Alargepartoftherealreturncomesfromthelicensingfeesandroyaltiespaidbythesubsidiarytotheparentfortheuseoftechnologycontrolledbytheparent.MNCscreateadistortedandundesirableformofgrowth.CriticsofMNCsarguethatfirmshaveusedtransferpricestounderpriceexportandoverpriceimports,therebyinvisiblyshiftingprofitsfromtheSouthtotheNorth.CriticsalsoarguethatMNCsdonotbenefitSouthernlabor.Finally,thetradebenefitsfromtheMNCs,arelimitedbyrestrictivebusinesspractices.EmpiricalstudiesexaminingtheeconomicimpactofMNCsonthedevelopingcountriesappeartoindicatethat,whileinflowsofFDIhaveagenerallypositiveeffectoneconomicgrowth,theextentoftheimpactdependsonothervariables.FDIflowshaveamorestronglypositiveeffectoneconomicgrowthincountriesthathavemadesignificantinvestmentineducationandworkertrainingthanincountriesthathavenot.AnotherimportantfindingisthatMNCsdonottrendtocreate“pollutionhavens”intheThirdWorldbutthattheydotendtousecapital-intensivetechnologiesandtoraisethewagesoflocalworkers.Finally,thereisempiricalevidencetosuggestthatgenuinetechnologytransferisquitelimited,exceptincaseswheretheMNChasbeenabletomaintainatleastmajoritycontroloveritssubsidiary.InterferencebyMNCsinNationalPoliticsWhilemostforeigninvestorsdonotbecomeactivelyinvolvedinhostcountrypolitics,someMNCshavetakenbothlegalandillegalactionswithinhoststatestofavorfriendlygovernmentsandopposeunfriendlygovernments,toobtainfavorabletreatmentforthecorporation,andtoblockeffortstorestrictcorporateactivity.Multinationalcorporationshavealsousedtheirpowerinthepoliticsofthehomestatetoobtainforeignpoliciesfavorabletocorporateinterests.Notonlyhavecorporationssoughttoshapehomegovernmentpolicy,buttheyhavealsoservedastoolsofthepolicy.Example:theinterventionoftheInternationalTelephone&TelegraphCompanyinChileintheearly1970s.InterdependenceRegulationofInflowofForeignInvestmentbyDevelopingCountriesInthe1950sand1960s,mostdevelopingcountrygovernmentsencouragedforeigninvestmentandplacedfewrestrictionsontheoperationofforeigninvestorsintheirstates.Inthe1970s,attitudesandpoliciestowardMNCsshifteddramatically.ThecriticismofMNCsdiscussedabovespreadfromLatinAmericanthroughouttheThirdWorld,andmanySoutherngovernmentsalteredtheiropen-doorpolicies.Ashiftinpublicattitudestowardforeigninvestmentwasanimportantfactorbehindthischange.AsecondfactorbehindthenewpoliciestowardMNCswasashiftinpowerfromthemultinationaltothehostgovernment.AthirdfactorcontributingtothepowershiftwastheincreasingcompetitionforinvestmentopportunitiesintheSouth.variousforcesofchangeledtonewSouthernattemptstoregulateMNCs.ThemostpublicizedSouthernpoliciestomanageMNCshavebeennationalizationsandexpropriationsofforeignsubsidiaries.Moreimportantthanwell-publicizednationalizationswerenewtaxlaws,regulations,andbureaucraticstructuresdesignedtostrengthengovernmentalcontrolandtoincreasethehostcountry’sshareoftheeconomicrewardsfromforeigninvestment.Restrictions:Governmentsoftenputstrictlimitsontheentryofnewinvestment.Somecountriessoughtwithvaryingdegreesofsuccesstoreducethelevelofexistingforeigninvestment.Throughthesesectoralandequityrestrictions,whichwerereinforcedbynewdomesticabilitiestoenforcetheserestrictions,govermentssoughttoencouragenewformsofforeignparticipation—jointventures,licensingagreements,managementcontracts,andturnkeyarrangements—toreplacetotalormajorityownership.Regulatebehavior:Anadditionalcontroltechniquereliesnotonrestrictionsbutonpositiveincentives.Anothertechniqueisthesupportofstate-ownedfirms.Inmanyindustrieswithhighbarrierstoentry,state-ownedenterpriseistheonlyviablenationalalternativetoforeigninvestment.Afinalmethodofcontrolwastheproducercartel.Variousexporterofrawmaterials—particularlyoil,copper,andbauxite—havetriedtomanageMNCsbycooperatingtoincreasepricesaswellasthenationalshareofprofitsandnationalownership.TheNewPragmatismReasons:

theresultofseveralconvergingforces.ThedeclineinFDIflowstodevelopingcountriesinLatinAmericaduringthedebtcrisisplayedanimportantrole.Restrictivepoliciesenactedinthe1960sand1970s.Depressedeconomicconditionsandlowratesofreturninmostdevelopingcountriesduringthe1980s.Asaresult,MNCsshiftedtheirinvestmenttowardthedevelopedcountriesandawayfromdevelopingcountries.

Between1982and1989,theshareofFDIflowingtodevelopingcountriesfellfromaround30percenttoaround14percent.Commercialbankloansreplacedbothdirectinvestmentandforeignaidasthemajorsourceofdevelopmentfinanceformanymiddle-incomedevelopingcountriesinthe1970s.Increasingly,FDIemergedasthemostdesirablesourceofneededforeigncapitalflows.Morereceptivepoliciestowardforeigninvestmentalsowerepartoftheprescriptionofdevelopedcountriesandmultilateralinstitutionsforresolvingthedebtcrisis.Asthesametime,developedcountriesgenerallytookamoreaggressiveroleontheissueofaccessforforeigninvestmenttothemarketsofdevelopingcountries.Inthe1980s,manydevelopingcountriesshiftedfrompromotingstate-ledinvestmenttoemphasizingtheadvantagesofprivateownership.Privatizationpoliciescomplementedthenewemphasisonexport-ledgrowth.moreliberalpoliciestowardFDI..reducingrestrictionsplacedontheentryandoperationsofMNCsandbystreamliningproceduresandofferingincentivestoforeigninvestors.Newinvestmentlawsandpoliciesadoptedinthe1980s

Itremovedavarietyofrestrictionsplacedonforeigninvestors.AnumberofotherdevelopingcountrieshavesetupEPZs,whichencourageinvestmentforproductionofgoodsforexportbymakingimportsandexportsfreefromtariffsorothertraderestraintsaswellasthroughsuchtechniquesasprovidinginfrastructurefacilitiesformanufacturingandofferingstreamlinedregulatoryandadministrativeprocedures.Internationaleffortstocontrolmultinationalsalsoshiftedfromhostilitytogreatercooperation.

OneimportantcontributingfactorwastheriseofFDIoutflowsfromtheNICs,especiallyinAsia.AgrowingnumberofSoutherncountries,primarilyinAfricaandSoutheastAsia,signedbilateralinvestmenttreaties(BITs)withdevelopedcountries.GlobalizationForeigndirectinvestmentinsouthgrewrapidlyintheeraofglobalization,althoughthatinvestmentwashighlyconcentratedinfewofthemoreadvanceddevelopingcountries.AsincomesandwagedroseintheAsianNICs,manylocallyownedfirmscontractedoutlabor-intensiveworktocountriesinAsiawithlowerwagelevels,includingChina.ThegeneralshiftinFDIflowstowardAsiaandChinareflectedinvestorperceptionthat,evenaftertheAsiancrisisofthelate1990s,theprospectsforgrowthinthatareaoftheworldwerebetterthanthoseinotherThird-Worldregions.Third-WorldMNCsBythe1990s,significantnumbersoflargeMNCswereheadquarteredindevelopingcountries.TheexperienceofThird-WorldcountriesinmanagingtheirownmultinationalscontributedtothegeneralmoodofacceptanceofMNCs.State-ownedcompaniestendedtobemanagedmuchlikeprivatefirms.MNCsintheThirdWorldandtheAntiglobalizationMovementUnionsintheindustrializedcountriesexpressedtheirconcernsaboutthemovementoflow-skilljobsfromindustrializedsocietiestodevelopingcountriesandabouttheunfairnessoflosingjobstocountriesthatdidnothaveord