DownloadI股权结构现金流与资本投资

Law,CorporateGovernance,andCorporateScandalinChinaYiZhangPekingUniversityInternationalConferenceonCorporateGovernanceShanghaiMarch2005I.IntroductionIthasbeenovertenyearssincestockmarketsestablishedinChina.Chinastocksmarkethasbeenplayingarole.thereexistsomanylistedfirmscommittedfraudandscandalSince1992,about200listedfirmsamong1200havebeensubjecttosecurityenforcementactionbyChinaSecuritiesRegulationCommission(CSRC),ShenzhenStockExchange(SZSE)andShanghaiStockExchange(SSE).TheratiooffirmswithscandalisfarabovethelevelofothercountriesMotivationWhatcontributestofirm’sscandal?DoescorporategovernancematterinChina? Isthereasoundcorporategovernancemechanismcouldpreventscandal?Doeslegalandeconomicdevelopmentmatter? -Isthereadifferencebetweenfirmsinregionswithvariouslegaleffectiveness? -economicdevelopment?II.IssuesandHypothesis:

-Corporategovernance-legal-economic-finance1.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

ownershipOneofthemostessentialfeatureoftheownershipofChineselistedfirmsisthedominanceofthelargestshareholderTherehasnoeffectivemechanismtomonitorandrestrictthelargeshareholdersThelargeshareholdercanexpropriatetheminorityshareholdersforprivatebenefit1.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

ownershipJensen(1976)Stulz(1988)H1A:Astheownershipofthelargestshareholderincreasesfromzero,afirmismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalEntrenchmentoflargeshareholdersExpropriationbylargeshareholderLaPorta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shleifer(1999)LaPorta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shleifer(2002)Claessens,Djankov,Fan,andLang(2002)FanandWong(2002)H1B:Astheownershipofthelargestshareholderincreasesovercertainlevel,afirmismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.2

FirmControllerThereisfundamentaldifferencebetweenstateandnon-stateshareholdersThereishugedifferenceamongstateshareholdersininternalmonitoring,etc. -centralgovernment(bu/wei,中央部委）和-non-centralgovernment(非部委）LiandZhang（2005）LiandZhang（2004）LinandZhang（2004）1.2

FirmController-centralgovernment(bu/wei,中央部委）和-non-centralgovernment(非部委）centralgovernmentcontrolledlocalgovernmentcontrolledlocalStateEnterprises(SOE)controlledNon-statelegalpersoncontrolledNaturalpersonothers1.2

FirmControllerCentralgovernmentcontrolledfirmsareassociatedwithclearerownership,(alittle)moretransparency,moremonitoringmoresocialresponsibility， (maybe)betterprotectionofminorityshareholdersNon-centralSOEandnon-statelegalpersoncontrolledfirmsareassociatedwithlesstransparencyandlackofmonitoring uptolesssocialresponsibility lackofprotectionofminorityshareholdersH2:Firmscontrolledbycentral(/local)governmentarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal

1.

CorporateGovernance1.3BoardFamaandJensen(1983)theorizethattheboardofdirectorsisthehighestinternalcontrolmechanismresponsibleformonitoringtheactionsoftopmanagement.-thecompositionofindividualswhoserveontheboardofdirectorsisanimportantfactorincreatingaboardthatisaneffectivemonitorofmanagementactionsFama’s(1980)andFamaandJensen’s(1983)theorywouldpredictthathigherpercentagesofindependentdirectorsincreasetheboard’seffectivenessasamonitorofmanagement.Jensen(1993)arguesthatboardsofdirectorareineffectivemonitorswhentheboardistoolarge,whentheboard’sequityownershipissmall,andwhentheCEOisalsotheChairmanoftheBpositionoftheboardofdirectorsdeterminesitseffectivenessDeFondandJiambalvo(1991)Beasley(1996)Dechow,SloanandSweeney(1996),etc.BoardcompositionanddisclosureChenandJaggi（2000）TheboardsizeH3A:FirmwithalargerboardsizeismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalTheboard-managementrelationshipTheCEO/ChairmanH3B:FirmwithaseparateCEOandChairmanislesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalIndependentdirectorsIndependentdirectors,comparedwithinsidedirectors,arelesslikelytocolludewithmanagementH3C:Firmswithlowerproportion(seats)ofindependentdirectorontheboardofdirectorsaremorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalDirectorholdingsH3D:Firmswithahigherratio(number)ofdirectorsholdfirmstockarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalChairmanHoldingH3E:FirmswithhigherChairmanstockholdingarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalDirectorCompensationH3F:Firmwithhigherratio(number)ofdirectorpaidarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.4SupervisoryCommittee(BoardofSupervisors-监事会)SupervisoryCommitteesizeH4A:FirmswithalargerSupervisoryCommitteesizeismore(less?)likelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.4SupervisoryCommittee(BoardofSupervisors-监事会)SupervisoryCommitteememberholdingsH4B:Firmswithahigherratio(number)ofsupervisorsholdfirmstockislesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalSupervisoryCommitteememberCompensationH4C:Firmwithhigherratio(number)ofSupervisoryCommitteememberpaidisless(ormore?)likelytobeassociatedwithscandal4．Institutioninvestors机构投资者能能够降低公司司内部的代理理成本，减少少公司管理层层的不良行为为JarrellandPoulsen(1987)Brickley,Lease,andSmith(1988)机构投资者更更倾向于反对对减少股东财财富的行为机构投资者相相比其他类型型的投资者而而言更需要透透明度和信息息的披露Healyetal.(1999)Bushee和Noe(2000)机构投资者更更偏好购买那那些持续披露露信息的公司司的股票长期持有公司司股票的机构构投资者，很很可能出于自自身的利益而而合谋进行不不法行为机构投资者可可以从中得到到的益处财务性的收益益，如低于市市价的转让价价格，阻止封封闭式基金的的赎回以及承承销、财务顾顾问方面的合合同（Barclay,Holderness,和Pontiff(1993)）非财务性的收收益，如影响响公司在政治治、经济或社社会方面的政政策就我国的实际际情况而言，，基金、证券券等机构重仓仓持有上市公公司的股票，，利用内部信信息进行炒作作、牟取暴利利已不是秘密密因此，在我国国机构投资者者的持股比例例同公司违规规行为是正相相关还是负相相关或不相关关需要实证检检验。H4：InstitutionholdingsarerelatedtothelikelihoodforfirmtocommitscandalFinancialdistressFirmsconfrontingwithfinancialdistressaremorelikelytocommitfinancialstatementfraudNeedcontrolforfinancials3.EconomicdevelopmentFirmsinmoreeconomydevelopedregionarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal4.LawWrittenlawLLSV(1998)Allen,Qian,Qian(JFE,forthcoming)EffectivenessoflawismoreimportantthanthewrittenlawinatransitioneconomyBerkowitzetal(2003)Alford(2000)LuandYao(2004)China’’sprovincessignificantlydiffersintermsoflegaldevelopment.Whetherlaweffectivenessintheregionaffectsfirm’sdecisiontocommitfraud?MaybelawdoesnotmattersincelawisnoteffectiveoverallinChina?四、实证研究方法法（i）变量SCANDAL，公司是是否被监管机机构认定为违违规并公开批批评,谴责或或处罚控制变量DEBT：公公司的资产负负债率ROA：公司司的资产收益益率LIQUIDITY：公公司的流动比比率2．实证回归模模型Matchingscandalfirmswithnon-scandalfirmsLogisticregressionExaminefirm’spropensitytocommitscandalSCANDAL=f(ββ0+β1GOVERN+β2INSTITUTE+β3BOARD+β4FSIZE+ββ5DEBT+β6ROA+β7LIQUIDITY+（OtherControls）)（（1）五、样本与数据（一）数据Inordertoidentifyfirmsthatcommitscandal,werefertotheChinaSecuritiesJournal,ShanghaiSecuritiesJournalandtheGuotaianDatasetforfinancialscandals.ThetotalnumberoffirmssubjecttoenforcementactionsbytheCEC,SSE,andSZSEbetween1993and2003is178.Weeliminate12firmswhosegovernanceinformationinandbeforethefraudperiodarenotavailable,2firmslistedonB-StockMarketofChina,and4firmsthatcannotbematchedbyindustrycode,andthenthesamplesizeisreducedto160虚构利润虚列资产虚假陈述重大遗漏擅自改变资金金用途大股东占用资资产违规担保五、样本与数据Eachofthescandalfirmismatchedwithano-scandalfirm,creatingachoice-basedsampleof160scandaland160no-scandalfirms.Thecontrolfirmisobtainedbythefollowingfour-stepprocess:(i)StockExchange(ii)Industry.3-digitindustrialcode.Ifthere’snofirmmatchingthethreedigits,thenselectthatofthesameprimarytwodigits(iii)FirmSize.53of160committedscandalinaperiodlasting2ormoreaccountingyears,andwedefinethefraudperiodofthesefirmsasthefirstdateoftheirfinancialstatementfraudWhenfirmscommittedscandalandwasdenounced/criticized/punishedmorethanonce,weonlyrecordthefirsttimeSampledescriptionlogistic回归分析GovernanceandfinancialsAddmarketizationindexProxyforeconomicsdevelopmentProxyforlegaldevelopmentProxyforfinancialdevelopmentCorporateGovernanceOwnershipLARGEST回归系数为负负,在5%水平上显著,LARGESTSQ的回归系数为为正，在10%水平上显著第一大股东持持股比例从零零开始增大,公司越不不会commitscandal;当第一大股东东持股比例达达到一定水平平,持股比例例越高,公司司越可能commitscandal;LOCAL和LEGALP的回归系数为为正，LOCAL在5%水平上显显著，LEGALP在0.1%水平上显显著非国有法法人和地地方政府府控制的的公司更更有可能能违规董事会BOARDSIZE,INDEPENDENT均不显著著董事会规规模和独独立董事事席位（（比例））CHAIRCEO不显显著CEO是是否兼任任董事持股董事事人数（（比例））和付报报酬董事事人数（（比例））均不显显著CHAIRHOLDING为为负，在在10％％水平上上显著董事长持持股比例例越高，，公司越越不会commitscandal监事会监事会规规模不显显著持股监事事人数（（比例））不显著著付报酬监监事比例例显著为为正(10%水水平)取得报酬酬的监事事比例越越高，公公司越可可能commitscandal机构投资资者机构投资资者持股股比例不不显著分拆上市市或整体体上市分拆上市市或整体体上市没没有显著著影响Controls流动比率率的回归归系数显显著为负负流动比率率越高的的公司，，financialdistress的可能能较小,违规可可能较小小DEBT的回归系系数为正正，但统统计上不不显著ROA的回归系系数显著著为负资产收益益率较高高的公司司违规可可能较小小RegiondevelopmentNortheast显显著为正正,公司发生生丑闻的的可能性性较高midyangtz显显著为正正,公司发生生丑闻的的可能性性较高Economicdevelopmentlgdppc，该省人人均GDP对数数值为负负，并在在统计上上显著经济越发发达，公公司发生生丑闻的的可能性性越小LegaldevelopmentMeasureoflegaleffectiveness检察院(procuratorialsystem)ProcuratorialCases_per_capita:立立案经经济案件件ProcuratorialCases_gdpLoss_to_GDP:TheratioofsavedlossbyprocuratorialsuitstolocalGDPCadre_In_procurate:Thismeasuresthecorruptnessofofficials.Thenumberofcadresatcountylevelorabove(县处级级以上)involvedinprocuratatedividedbythepopulationLegaldevelopment法院(courtsystem)Case_Close_RateRCMP:Thenumberofcommercialcasesreceivedbythecourtpermillionofpopulation律师协会会(lawyerassociation)Lawyer_per_capita