2021年对技术非法使用的肯定回应

01ExecutiveSummary

02SummaryofRecommendations

05Introduction

06AddressSystemicRiskthroughExistingFederalMechanisms

08ImposeCostsonTech-EnabledHumanRightsAbuses

ioEstablishanAffirmativeAgendaforDigitalFreedom

14Conclusion

ChinesetelecommunicationsfirmHuawei'sattemptstobuildmuchoftheworldsnextgenerationwirelessnetworksgalvanizeddemocracies

topushback,citingnationalsecurityconcerns.Here,thecompanydisplaysafacialrecognitioncameraontheHuaweicampusinShenzhen,

Chinain2019.(KevinFrayer/GettyImages)

ExecutiveSummaryindealingwithauthoritarianregimesandalsoexamines

costimpositiononthosecomplicitintech-enabled

globalcontestbetweendemocraciesand

humanrightsabuses.

autocraciesisragingonthedigitalfront.

AYetastrategyaimedonlyatstaunchingtheilliberal

Technologystandstoalterthebalance

useoftechnologywillfailinthelongterm.Instead,the

betweenfree,opensocietiesandclosed,repressive

U.S.governmentandtechcompaniesalikemustrecruit

regimes.Nationstatesindirectcompetitionwith

democraticalliestopurveyanaffirmativeagendathat

theUnitedStatesseektoprojectglobalinfluence

promotesdigitalfreedomacrosstheglobe.Thisreport

byshapinganexistingdigitalordertotheirwill.

proposesanagendathatstressesprivacyleadershipby

Impulsestowardilliberaluseoftechnologyathome

theUnitedStatesanditstechnologycompanies.Itiden­

threatentocurtailindividualliberties,constrict

tifiesareasofcollaborationforU.S.alliesanddemocratic

opportunity,anderodeatrulyopensociety.

partners,likedigitaltrade,foreignlawenforcement

Democraciesdonotyethaveamodelforhowto

requestsfordata,andtechnicalstandards.Thisreport's

confrontthis.IntheUnitedStates,aroadmapfor

affirmativeagendaalsocontainsanimperativeforU.S.

asolutionmuststartwiththefundamental

techcompaniestobuildcommercialnormstoward

question:HowshouldU.S.technologycompanies,

digitalfreedomandincentivizetransparencywithin

withthehelpoftheU.S.government,respondtothe

theirownranks.

illiberaluseoftechnologybyauthoritarianactors

Fordigitalfreedomtoprevailoverauthoritarianusesof

abroad?Thisreportcontendswiththisquestionby

technology,democraciesmustpresentsomethingbetter.

identifyingconcreteactionsandthreat-mitigating

Together;theymustestablishanalternativemodelforthe

strategiesthatcontaintheinputofgovernment,the

useoftechnologyglobally.Theserecommenda-tions

techsectoi;civilsociety,andacademia.Itprovides

buildthatdemocraticcase,startingwiththeUnitedStates.

startingpointstoaddressthesystemicriskinherent

SummaryofRecommendations

ImposeCostsonTech-EnabledHuman

RightsAbuses

AddressSystemicRiskthroughExisting

Toimposecostsonactorscommittingtech-enabledhuman

FederalMechanisms

rightsabuses,theU.S.government(legislative,executive,

andfederalagenciesasspecified)should:

TohelpUS.privatecompaniesaddresssystemicriskwhen

operatingabroad,theILS.StateDepartment(DoS)should:jAuditthecurrentdecision-makingprocessusedto

informfederalactionsaimedatconfrontinghigh-tech

iIntegrateahostcountry'sdigitalpracticesintoitsannual

illiberalism.Specifically,theWhiteHouseshouldbring

CountryReportsonHumanRightsPractices,alsoknown

togethermultipleagencies,startingwiththeDoS,

asHumanRightsReports.

Commerce,andTreasury,tosurveytheexistingfederal

iWorkwiththeCommerceDepartmenttoupdateitstoolkit—sanctions,bans,suspensions,anddivestment—

CountryCommercialGuidestoincorporateasetofkeyandconsideralternativemeasurestosloworprevent

indicatorsofauthoritariandigitalpracticesabroad.investmentintechnologiesandtechactorsthatenable

jUpdatetheCountryCommercialGuidestoincludethesehumanrightsabuses.

newindicators,aswellasfeedbackfromwillingpartnersjHarmonizethesemulti-prongedapproaches,adjudi­

incivilsocietyandthetechindustry,onanannualbasis.catedecisions,andtakeintoaccountallstakeholders

iHoldformalconsultationswithU.S.techcompaniesintheprocessviatheNationalSecurityCouncil(NSC),

everytwoyearsontheutilityofprovidinginforma­incoordinationwiththeNationalEconomicCouncil

tionontherisksassociatedwithaidingauthoritarian(NEC)andtheOfficeofScienceandTechnologyPolicy

3

governments.(OSTP).

iRegularlyupdateitsrisk-basedcomplianceframework

forsurveillanceteclinologyduediligence,incoordi­EstablishanAffirmativeAgendafor

nationwiththeDepartmentofCommerceandotherDigitalFreedom

relevantagencies.

Thisaffirmativeagendaconsistsofthreemainconcepts:

jTakestepstomakehumanrightsenduseduedili­leadinprivacy,findareasofmutualcooperationwith

gencecompliancelegallybinding,insteadofvoluntary.democraticpartnersandallies(e.g.,digitaltrade,foreign

ThisincludescoordinatingwiththeDepartmentoflawenforcementrequestsfordata,andtechnical

Commerce'sBureauofIndustryandSecurity(BIS)tostandards),andenlistandsupporttechcompanies,con­

1

expandexportcontrolsbasedonenduse.structionofcommercialnormstowarddigitalfreedom.

Toaddresssystemicrisk,US.universitiesshouldconsider

LEADINPRIVACY

thefollowingcoursesofaction:

jRethinkengagementwithauthoritariancountrieswritCongressshould:

large,basedonindicatorsofsystemicriskarisingfrom

jEstablishafederaldataprotectionframeworkwith

involvementwiththesecountriesandtheshifttoonline

appropriatestandardsandoversightforhowthe

learningduetotheCOVID-19pandemic.2

federalgovernmentandcommercialentitiescollect,

jComplywithU.S.governmenthumanrightsguidancestore,andshareU.S.userdata.4

basedonendusefromtheStateDepartmentandentity

jArticulateandpublishapublicjustificationforthis

listingsfromtheDepartmentofCommerce.

frameworkthatdescribesthefundamentalelementsof

jConductownduediligenceonindividuals,organiza­astrongprivacyregime.

tions,andendusesofacademicresearchbyinstitutingan

jMandatethattheFederalTradeCommission(FTC)

internalhumanrightsresearchreviewboard.

enforcesprivacylegislation.

jIntegratehumanrightsstandardsandtraininginto

businessandengineeringcurricula.CongressandtheWhiteHouseshouldalso:

jDevelopguidelinesforassessingnationalsecurityriskinjFundtheresearchanddevelopmentofprivacy-pre­

fundingsourcesandresearchcollaborations.servingtechnologysolutionsthroughtheNational

InstituteofStandardsandTechnology(NIST),the

NationalScienceFoundation(NSF)ZarestoredOpen

AfixtureonCapitolHillinWashington,D.C.,U.S.techCEOswillbecriticalinimplementinganyfederaldataprotectionframework.On

November17,2020,FacebookCEOMarkZuckerbergtestifiedbeforetheSenateJudiciaryCommitteeinahearingtitled"BreakingtheNews:

Censorship,Suppression,andthe2020Election."(BillClark/Pool/GettyImages)

TechnologyFund(OTF),andtheDoS,particularlyFOCUSONAREASOFMUTUALCOOPERATIONWITH

theBureauofDemocracy;HumanRights,andALLIESANDPARTNERS:DIGITALTRADE,FOREIGN

Labor(DRL).LAWENFORCEMENTREQUESTS,ANDTECHNICAL

STANDARDS5

jTheU.S.governmentalsoshouldfundtheresearch

anddevelopmentofprivacy-preservinganddemo­

craticmodelsofsurveillanceauthorities,utilizingTokeepdigitaltradeopen,theOfficeoftheUnitedStates

bilateralsolutions,suchastheClarifyingLawfulTradeRepresentative(USTR)should:

OverseasUseofData(CLOUD)Act,tobettercoor­jStrengthendigitaltradelanguageinfreetradeagree­

dinatewithpartners.mentstoenablethefreeflowofdataandregulatory

interoperabilitybetweenalliesthroughtheglobal

US.techcompaniesshould:expansionoftheAsia-PacificEconomicCooperation

iDevoteengineeringcapacitytodesigningprotocols(APEC)CrossBorderPrivacyRules(CBPR)System.

withbuilt-indataprivacyprotections.

Tohelpensureforeign-generatedlawenforcementdata

jInvestin/"interoperableprivacy“toensurethefea­requestsandcomplianceareconsistentwithdemocratic

sibilityandenduranceofthisprivacyregimewithvaluesandtostrengthencollaborationwithlike-minded

thoseofdemocraticallies.partnersglobally,theDoSandDepartmentofJustice

jSimilarly,investinprivacycompliance,as(DOJ)should:

wellasprivacypreservation,tosolidifystrongjLeveragetheCLOUDActtoseekbilateralandevenmul­

privacypracticeshand-in-handwiththefederaltilateralagreementsonforeignlawenforcementdata

government.requeststoU.S.companieswithgovernmentsthathonor

baselineprinciplesofdigitalfreedom,opendigitaltrade,

privacy,humanrights,anddueprocess.

Topromotedigitalfreedomthroughinternationalstan­considerationssurroundingAIethicsandbiasin

dardsorganizationswithlike-mindedpartners,thecurriculumdesignwillallowfortheenhancement

SecretaryofCommerceshould:ofSTEMcurriculainalignmentwithinternational

standards.

jIssueaplanforfederalengagementindevelopingtech­

nicalstandardsforsurveillancetechnologies,akintoENLISTTECHCOMPANIESTOBUILDCOMMERCIAL

the2019NISTplantoadvanceartificialintelligenceNORMSTOWARDDIGITALFREEDOM

(AI)standardsandresearchpriorities.

Topromotedigitalfreedomthroughinternationalstan­Tobuildnormsthatpromotedigitalfreedomandincen­

dardsorganizationswithlike-mindedpartners,Congresstivizetransparency,US.techcompaniesshould:

andtheWhiteHouseshould:iDevelopguidanceforresponsiblereleaseofnovel

jExpandfederalsupportofstandardsdevelopingemergingtechnologiesthataresusceptibletoabuse

organizations(SDOs)toensurethatoutcomes(stan­(e.g.,leverageexamplessuchasOpenAl'sstaged

dardsandregulatoryrecommendations)relatedtoreleaseofGPT-2languagemodel)tobuildnorms

technologiespronetoabusebyauthoritarians,sucharoundresponsiblerelease.

asAl-relatedtech,aremoresupportiveofdigitaliContinuetoadvanceeffortstosafeguardusersecurity

6

freedom.andprivacy;includingthroughtechnologysuchas

Topromotedigitalfreedomthroughinternationalstan­encryptionandotherprivacy-preservingtechnologies.

dardsorganizationswithlike-mindedpartners,US.iConsiderpublicizingvoluntary,biannualpublic

universitiesshould:reportsonpoliciesandintentregardingdatacollec­

jLeverageU.S.involvementinthedevelopmentoftion,storage,andsharing.

InternationalOrganizationofStandardization/

InternationalElectrotechnicalCommission(ISO/IEC)

standards,suchas24368ZAIoverviewofethicaland

societalconcems'and24027"BiasinAIsystemsandAI

aideddecisionmaking/7Duly,implementtrainingon

theethicalandresponsibleuseanddevelopment

oftechnologyinscience,technology;engineering,and

mathematics(STEM)curricula,withanemphasison

algorithmdesign.Thisinclusionoftheappropriate

Beliedbyitsexterior,theU.S,DepartmentofCommerce'sNational

InstituteofStandardsandTechnology(NIST)buildinghouses

forward-leaningtechnicaleffortstodevelopthestandardsthatwill

determinetherulesoftheroadfortheglobaluseoftechnology.

(DanaRomanoff/GettyImages)

IntroductionTheilliberaluseofcertaintechnologiesandplatforms

tearsatthefabricofopensocietiestoo.U.S.entities,

echnologywassupposedtobethegreat/zdemoc-

Tratizer"ofourage.Theadventoftheinternetincludingindustryanduniversities,havecontributed

todigitalrepressionabroadbyexportingequipment,

andsocialmediapromisedtowrestcontrolof

software,expertise,andtrainingdata.8Athome,sur­

informationfromthehandsofafewanddistributeit

veillancecapitalismand//ad-tech,/imperiluserprivacy.

tomany.Itpromisedtomateriallyimprovequalityoflife

Unaccountablealgorithmsandunsecuredfacialrecog­

whileairingmarginalizedperspectives,elevatingnew

nitiondatabasesthreatenindividualliberties,evenin

viewsinameritocracyofideas,andevenpropagatinga

democraticsocieties.

moreopensociety.

Butdemocraciesapproachtheseproblemsdiffer-ently.

Realitybesiegedthatvision.Authoritarianshavetaken

Theruleoflawandexistingnormshelp,albeit

advantageofthesetoolstobolsterinternalstability,

imperfectly,tocurtailabuseoftechnologybydemocratic

supplementtheirdatareserves,enrichtheircoffers,

governmentsandprivatecompanies.Incontrastto

andriseinglobalinfluence.Manycountriescontinueto

authoritarianregimes,democraciesopenlydebatethe

drawinspirationfromChina'sexampleofdigitalsur­

meritsofdifferentapproaches.Theytapadiversesetof

veillanceandinternalcontrol,whichcombines“cyber

stakeholderstoadjudicateoutcomes,oftenslowlyand

sovereignty"withambiguous,widely-scopedlawsto

fromthegroundup.9TheUnitedStatesmustleverage

booststatecontrol.Compoundingthisarechallenges

thesefeaturesofitsprocesstoformulateaclearalterna­

fortechcompaniesandU.S.consumersalike,suchas

tivetotheauthoritarianuseoftechnology.

evolvingdatalocalizationlawsandhostnationdemands

Thisreportaimstobuildontheintrinsicadvantagesof

fordatafromprivateU.S.companies.Otherchallengesof

thedemocraticprocess—transparency,inclusivity,and

high-techilliberalisminclude:theexpansionandexport

deliberation-tocreateaframeworkforhowtheU.S.

ofdata-guzzlingplatformssubjecttoauthoritarian

federalgovernment,techcompanies,anduniversities

governments,theproliferationofintrusivesurveillance

shouldrespondtotheilliberaluseoftechnologyabroad.10

technology,tech-enabledhumanrightsabuses,infor­

Privatesectorleaders,policymakers,academics,andcivil

mationcontrol,andineffectivedatasecurityandprivacy

societyexpertsarecriticaltothesuccessofthiseffort

measuresonglobaldigitalplatforms.

Likewise,theU.S.companiesthatdevelopandmaintain

digitalplatformsacrosstheglobe

mustalsodefendopensocietiesand

individualfreedom.Invariably;these

companiesarecentraltothesurvival

andfutureofindividuallibertyin

the21stcentury.Thisreportdesig­

natestherolesandresponsibilitiesof

theseplayers,discusseswaysto

fosterandenactspecificprinciples,

andrecommendsconcreteactions

tobuildana任irmativeagendathat

promotesdigitalfreedomtogether

withdemocraticpartners.

From2010onward,dissidentsreliedonsocialmediatoorganizeprotestsduringtheArab

Spring.Technologypromisedtobeagreat"democratizer,"inmorewaysthanone.Reality

turnedouttobemorecomplicated.Thisimagedepictsprotestorsdemonstratingagainst

then-PresidentofEgyptHosniMubarakinTahirSquareinCairo.Egypt,in2011.(Chris

Hondros/GettyImages)

AddressSystemicRiskthrough

ExistingFederalMechanisms

hecurrentU.S.approachtodigitalauthoritarianism

oftenamountstoad-hocfixesthatdonotaccount

Tfortheholisticthreatatmosphere,despiterecent

surgesinactivityfrom2019to2020bytheWhiteHouse,

StateDepartment,TreasuryDepartment,andCommerce

Department.11Inthesamevein,existingU.S.lawsand

regulationsdonotofferanenduringroadmaptohelp

U.S.techcompaniescounterrepressivedigitalpractices

abroad.Solutionsrequireidentifyingandmitigatingthe

systemicriskthatarisesfromdealingwithauthoritarian

governments.12Systemicriskconsistsofthethreatsthat

areintrinsictosystemsofgovernancedistinctfrom,or

opposedto,freeandopensocieties.Characteristicsthat

distinguishauthoritarianregimesfromopensocietiesTheHongKonggovernment'sdeepeningrelationshipwiththe

andthatarerelevanttothedigitalenvironmentinclude,ChineseCommunistPartyandincreasingauthoritarianism,

demonstratedbytheapprovalofarestrictivenationalsecurity/aw

butarenotlimitedto:moreintrusivedatapracticesnotin2020,iscementinganatmosphereofilliberalgovernance.Here,

subjecttolegalrecourse;anilliberallegalandgovernanceaprotestorisarrestedatananti-governmentdemonstrationin

September2020inHocgKong.(AnfhonyKwac/GeHyImages)

atmosphere(e.g.,China's2017NationalIntelligenceLaw

andHongKong's2020nationalsecuritylaw);astate-led

economicsystem;alackofanindependentjudicialTheabsenceofaframeworktoassessthisriskisparticu­

system;lackoftheruleoflaw;theabsenceofrepresenta­larlydetrimentalforU.S.techcompanies.Techcompanies

tive,democraticgovernance;andlackoffree,independentareonthefrontlinesofthisbattleground,oftenimpro­

mediainstitutions.visingandtestingpoliciesandpracticesastheyoperatein

Thesesystemicrisksareindependentfromspecificundemocraticnations.AU.S.government-builtframework

companiesortechnologyusecaseswithinthesesocieties.toassesssystemicriskwouldenablecommercialentities

Rather,theserisksareintrinsictothesystemofgover­tomaintaintheirglobalfootprintandresponsibilitiesto

nanceandarisefromdealingwithactorsbeholdentoorusersoutsideoftheUnitedStates.Top-downguidanceand

exportingwhattheEuropeanCommissionreferstoasresourceswouldhelpflagandavoidcomplicityinauthori­

^alternativemodelsofgovernance/renderingthemintarianabuses.Thisframeworkwouldalsohelpprovidean

“systemic"competitionwithdemocraticactors.13Evenofficialrationaleforprivatecompaniestodeclinemalign

ifaparticularcompanyisnot(atpresent)engagedinactors'requestsforcooperationabroad.Inturn,techcom­

paniescanidentifylessonslearnedfromoperatingabroad

SolutionsrequireidentifyingandinformtheU.S.governmentoftheirbestpracticesto

andmitigatingthesystemichelpthemaddressthenextchallengetogether.

Finally,theU.S.governmentcanaidU.S.universities

riskthatarisesfrominrespondingtopotentialdigitalrepressionbymalign,

dealingwithauthoritarianforeignactors.Theseinstitutionsfacechallengessimilar

governments.totechcompaniesinmanagingresearchandfunding

partnershipswithnationalsecurityimplications.They

abusivepractices,acompanyoperatingwithinanationarealsodealingwithanewdigitalbattlefrontdueto

sIubjecttothisformofgovernanceisatriskofthegovern­anoverwhelmingshifttovirtuallearningduringthe

ment'scoercivepower.Moreover;acompanycouldfindCOVID-19pandemic,theirabilitytoproliferatenorms

themselveswithoutrecoursetoanindependentjudiciarythrougheducation,andtheprodigiousinternationaltalent

tosuethegovernmentorafreepresstoshinealightonandintellectualpropertyconsiderationswithintheirwalls.

governmentabuses.TheU.S.governmentmustassessandArisk-basedframeworkforhandlingthesechai-lenges

identifyindicatorsthatcapturethesethreatstohelpwouldprovideacademiawitharobustvehiclefor

informtheduediligencepracticesandriskassessmentsofidentifyingandassessingdigitalthreatsemanatingfrom

U.S.techcompaniesforthedigitalenvironment.authoritarianregimes.

TohelpILS.privatecompaniesaddresssystemicrisk,»Theseconsultationscouldfurtherservetosolicit

theStateDepartment(DoS)should:ideasfromtechcompaniesonwhatinformationor

jIntegrateahostcountry'sdigitalpracticesintowhatnewindicatorswouldhelprefineandorient

itsannualCountryReportsonHumanRightstheiroperatingpracticestowarddigitalfreedom.

Practices,alsoknownasHumanRightsReports.»Inreturn,techcompaniescancommunicatewhat

Theguidesshoulddefinewhat"abuse“oftech­theyaredoingrightandsharetheirbestpractices

nologyconstitutestohelpcompaniescreatetheirwiththeDoStohelpthemanticipatethenext

ownrulesetstorespondtotheilliberaluseofchallengestogether.ThiswouldalsohelptheDoS

theirtechnologyabroad.KeyindicatorsforabuseupdatetheirCountryCommercialGuidesand

include,butarenotlimitedto:issue-basedduediligencereportswithanynew

»Aggregationofinstitutionaldatawithestab­riskindicatorsdirectlyfromthepractitioners

lishedintentofpoliticalorsocialcontrol(e.g.,themselves.

developmentofa"/nationalarchitecture”foriRegularlyupdateits