信息不对称的市场演示文稿课件

第17章信息不对称的市场1本章要讨论的问题质量不确定性与柠檬市场市场信号道德风险委托代理问题2本章要讨论的问题一体化企业的管理激励问题劳动力市场的信息不对称:效率工资理论3引言我们将研究不完全信息对资源配置和价格机制所产生的影响。4质量不确定与柠檬市场在购买一辆二手车时，由于信息不完全，将增加购买的风险并降低消费者的效用；5二手车市场假定买卖双方都能鉴别高质量和低质量的车；将会出现两个市场；质量不确定与柠檬市场6柠檬问题PHPLQHQLSHSLDHDL5,00050,00050,000买卖双方能鉴别车的质量时，将出现高质量和低质量两个市场10,000DLDMDM75,00025,000由于信息不对称，消费者无法确定车的质量，他们将降低对二手车质量的期望。DemandforlowandhighqualityusedcarsshiftstoDM.DLMDLMTheincreaseinQLreducesexpectationsanddemandtoDLM.Theadjustmentprocesscontinuesuntildemand=DL.

7TheMarketforUsedCarsWithasymmetricinformation:Lowqualitygoodsdrivehighqualitygoodsoutofthemarket.Themarkethasfailedtoproducemutuallybeneficialtrade.Toomanylowandtoofewhighqualitycarsareonthemarket.Adverseselectionoccurs;theonlycarsonthemarketwillbelowqualitycars.QualityUncertainty

andtheMarketforLemons8ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformationMedicalInsuranceQuestionIsitpossibleforinsurancecompaniestoseparatehighandlowriskpolicyholders?Ifnot,onlyhighriskpeoplewillpurchaseinsurance.Adverseselectionwouldmakemedicalinsuranceunprofitable.TheMarketforInsurance9ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformationAutomobileInsuranceQuestionsWhatimpactdoesasymmetricinformationandadverseselectionhaveoninsuranceratesandthedeliveryofautomobileaccidentinsurance?Howcanthegovernmentreducetheimpactofadverseselectionintheinsuranceindustry?TheMarketforInsurance10ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformationTheMarketforCreditAsymmetricinformationcreatesthepotentialthatonlyhighriskborrowerswillseekloans.QuestionHowcancredithistorieshelpmakethismarketmoreefficientandreducethecostofcredit?11ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformationTheImportanceofReputationandStandardizationAsymmetricInformationandDailyMarketDecisionsRetailsalesAntiques,art,rarecoinsHomerepairsRestaurants12ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformationQuestionHowcantheseproducersprovidehigh-qualitygoodswhenasymmetricinformationwilldriveouthigh-qualitygoodsthroughadverseselection.AnswerReputation13ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformationQuestionWhydoyoulookforwardtoaBigMacwhentravelingeventhoughyouwouldneverconsiderbuyingoneathome.HolidayInnonceadvertised“NoSurprises”toaddresstheissueofadverseselection.14LemonsinMajorLeagueBaseballAsymmetricinformationandthemarketforfreeagentsIfalemonsmarketexists,freeagentsshouldbelessreliable(disabled)thanrenewedcontracts.15PlayerDisabilityAllPlayers 4.73 12.55 165.4Renewedplayers 4.76 9.68 103.4Freeagents 4.67 17.23 268.9DaysSpentonDisabledListperSeasonPrecontract Postcontract PercentageChange16FindingsDaysonthedisabledlistincreaseforbothfreeagentsandrenewedplayers.Freeagentshaveasignificantlyhigherdisabilityratethanrenewedplayers.Thisindicatesalemonsmarket.LemonsinMajorLeagueBaseball17QuestionIfyouareateamowner,whatstepswouldyoutaketoreducetheasymmetricinformationforfreeagents?LemonsinMajorLeagueBaseball18MarketSignalingTheprocessofsellersusingsignalstoconveyinformationtobuyersabouttheproduct’squalityhelpsbuyersandsellersdealwithasymmetricinformation.19MarketSignalingStrongSignalTobeeffective,asignalmustbeeasierforhighqualitysellerstogivethanlowqualitysellers.ExampleHighlyproductiveworkerssignalwitheducationalattainmentlevel.20MarketSignalingASimpleModelofJobMarketSignalingAssumeTwogroupsofworkersGroupI:Lowproductivity--AP&MP=1GroupII:Highproductivity--AP&MP=2TheworkersareequallydividedbetweenGroupIandGroupII--APforallworkers=1.521MarketSignalingASimpleModelofJobMarketSignalingAssumeCompetitiveProductMarketP=$10,000Employeesaverage10yearsofemploymentGroupIRevenue=$100,000(10,000/yr.x10)GroupIIRevenue=$200,000(20,000/yr.X10)22MarketSignalingWithCompleteInformationw=MRPGroupIwage=$10,000/yr.GroupIIwage=$20,000/yr.WithAsymmetricInformationw=averageproductivityGroupI&IIwage=$15,00023MarketSignalingSignalingWithEducationtoReduceAsymmetricInformationy=educationindex(yearsofhighereducation)C=costofattainingeducationallevelyGroupI--CI(y)=$40,000yGroupII--CII(y)=$20,000y24MarketSignalingSignalingWithEducationtoReduceAsymmetricInformationAssumeeducationdoesnotincreaseproductivityDecisionRule:y*signalsGIIandwage=$20,000Belowy*signalsGIandwage=$10,00025SignalingYearsofCollegeValueofCollegeEduc.0$100KValueofCollegeEduc.YearsofCollege1234560123456$200K$100K$200KGroupIGroupIICI(y)=$40,000yOptimalchoiceofyforGroupIHowmucheducationshouldapersonobtain?Theeducationdecisionisbasedonbenefits/costcomparison.B(y)B(y)y*y*B(y)=increaseinwageassociatedwitheachlevelofeducationCII(y)=$20,000yOptimalchoiceofyforGroupI26SignalingYearsofCollegeValueofCollegeEduc.0$100KValueofCollegeEduc.YearsofCollege1234560123456$200K$100K$200KCI(y)=$40,000yOptimalchoiceofyforGroupIB(y)B(y)y*y*Benefits=$100,000CostCI(y)=40,000y$100,000<$40,000y*y*>2.5ChoosenoeducationCII(y)=$20,000yOptimalchoiceofyforGroupIBenefits=$100,000CostCII(yO)=20,000y$100,000<$20,000y*y*<5Choosey*27SignalingCost/BenefitComparisonDecisionruleworksify*isbetween2.5and5Ify*=4GroupIwouldchoosenoschoolGroupIIwouldchoosey*Rulediscriminatescorrectly28SignalingEducationdoesincreaseproductivityandprovidesausefulsignalaboutindividualworkhabits.29WorkingintotheNightQuestionHowcanyousignaltoyouremployeryouaremoreproductive?30MarketSignalingGuaranteesandWarrantiesSignalingtoidentifyhighqualityanddependabilityEffectivedecisiontoolbecausethecostofwarrantiestolow-qualityproducersistoohigh31MoralHazardMoralhazardoccurswhentheinsuredpartywhoseactionsareunobservedcanaffecttheprobabilityormagnitudeofapaymentassociatedwithanevent.32MoralHazardDeterminingthePremiumforFireInsuranceWarehouseworth$100,000Probabilityofafire:.005witha$50firepreventionprogram.01withouttheprogram33MoralHazardDeterminingthePremiumforFireInsuranceWiththeprogramthepremiumis:.005x$100,000=$500Onceinsuredownerspurchasetheinsurance,theownersnolongerhaveanincentivetoruntheprogram,thereforetheprobabilityoflossis.01$500premiumwillleadtoalossbecausetheexpectedlossisnot$1,000(.01x$100,000)34TheEffectsofMoralHazardMilesperWeek0$0.5050100140CostperMile$1.00$1.50$2.00D=MBMC’Withmoralhazardinsurancecompaniescannotmeasuremileage.MCto$1.00andmilesdrivenincreasesto140miles/week--inefficientallocation.MCMCisthemarginalcostofdriving.WithnomoralhazardandassuminginsurancecompaniescanmeasuremilesdrivenMC=MBat$1.50and100miles/week--efficientallocation.35ReducingMoralHazard

--WarrantiesofAnimalHealthScenarioLivestockbuyerswantdiseasefreeanimals.AsymmetricinformationexistsManystatesrequirewarrantiesBuyersandsellersnolongerhaveanincentivetoreducedisease(moralhazard).QuestionHowcanthismoralhazardbereduced?36CrisisintheSavingsandLoanIndustryQuestionHowmanypeopleknowthefinancialstrengthoftheirbank?Whynot?Depositinsurance,moralhazard,andfailuresintheS&Lindustry37CostoftheS&LBailout1,000+failedinstitutions$200billion(1990)Texasalone--$42billion(1990)Agencyexpenditures--$100million(1990)QuestionHowcanthismoralhazardbereduced?CrisisintheSavingsandLoanIndustry38ThePrincipal--AgentProblemAgencyRelationshipOneperson’swelfaredependsonwhatanotherpersondoesAgentPersonwhoactsPrincipal Personwhomtheactioneffects39ThePrincipal--AgentProblemCompanyownersareprincipals.Workersandmanagersareagents.Ownersdonothavecompleteknowledge.Employeesmaypursuetheirowngoalsandreduceprofits.40ThePrincipal--AgentProblemThePrincipal--AgentProbleminPrivateEnterprisesOnly16of100largestcorporationshaveindividualfamilyorfinancialinstitutionownershipexceeding10%.Mostlargefirmsarecontrolledbymanagement.Monitoringmanagementiscostly(asymmetricinformation).41ThePrincipal--AgentProblemThePrincipal--AgentProbleminPrivateEnterprisesManagersmaypursuetheirownobjectives.GrowthUtilityfromjob42ThePrincipal--AgentProblemThePrincipal--AgentProbleminPrivateEnterprisesLimitationstomanagers’abilitytodeviatefromobjectiveofownersStockholderscanoustmanagersTakeoverattemptsMarketformanagerswhomaximizeprofits43ThePrincipal--AgentProblemThePrincipal--AgentProbleminPublicEnterprisesObservationsManagers’goalsmaydeviatefromtheagenciesgoal(size)Oversightisdifficult(asymmetricinformation)Marketforcesarelacking44ThePrincipal--AgentProblemThePrincipal--AgentProbleminPublicEnterprisesLimitationstoManagementPowerManagerschooseapublicservicepositionManagerialjobmarketLegislativeandagencyoversight(GAO&OMB)Competitionamongagencies45TheManagersof

NonprofitHospitalsasAgentsArenonprofitorganizationsmoreorlessefficientthatfor-profitfirms?725hospitalsfrom14hospitalchainsReturnoninvestment(ROI)andaveragecost(AC)measured46For-Profit 11.6% 12.7%Nonprofit 8.8% 7.4%ReturnOnInvestment1977 1981TheManagersof

NonprofitHospitalsasAgents47Afteradjustingfordifferencesinservices:AC/patientdayinnonprofitsis8%greaterthanprofitsConclusionProfitincentiveimpactsperformanceCostandbenefitsofsubsidizingnonprofitsmustbeconsidered.TheManagersof

NonprofitHospitalsasAgents48IncentivesinthePrincipal-AgentFrameworkDesigningarewardsystemtoaligntheprincipalandagent’sgoals--anexampleWatchmanufacturerUseslaborandmachineryOwnersgoalistomaximizeprofitMachinerepairpersoncaninfluencereliabilityofmachinesandprofitsTheManagersof

NonprofitHospitalsasAgents49ThePrincipal--AgentProblemIncentivesinthePrincipal-AgentFrameworkDesigningarewardsystemtoaligntheprincipalandagent’sgoals--anexampleRevenuealsodepends,inpart,onthequalityofpartsandthereliabilityoflabor.Highmonitoringcostmakesitdifficulttoassesstherepair-person’swork50TheRevenuefromMakingWatchesLoweffort(a=0) $10,000 $20,000Higheffort(a=1) $20,000 $40,000PoorLuck GoodLuck51ThePrincipal--AgentProblemIncentivesinthePrincipal-AgentFrameworkDesigningarewardsystemtoaligntheprincipalandagent’sgoals--anexampleRepairpersoncanworkwitheitherhighorloweffortRevenuesdependoneffortrelativetotheotherevents(poororgoodluck)Ownerscannotdetermineahighorloweffortwhenrevenue=$20,00052ThePrincipal--AgentProblemIncentivesinthePrincipal-AgentFrameworkDesigningarewardsystemtoaligntheprincipalandagent’sgoals--anexampleRepairperson’sgoalistomaximizewagenetofcostCost=0forloweffortCost=$10,000forhigheffortw(R)=repairpersonwagebasedonlyonoutput53ThePrincipal--AgentProblemIncentivesinthePrincipal-AgentFrameworkChoosingaWagew=0;a=0;R=$15,000R=$10,000or$20,000,w=0R=$40,000;w=$24,000R=$30,000;Profit=$18,000Netwage=$2,00054ThePrincipal--AgentProblemIncentivesinthePrincipal-AgentFrameworkChoosingaWagew=R-$18,000Netwage=$2,000Higheffort55ThePrincipal--AgentProblemConclusionIncentivestructurethatrewardstheoutcomeofhighlevelsofeffortcaninduceagentstoaimforthegoalssetbytheprincipals.56ThePrincipal--AgentProblemAsymmetricInformationandIncentiveDesignintheIntegratedFirmInintegratedfirms,divisionmanagershavebetter(asymmetric)informationaboutproductionthancentralmanagement57ThePrincipal--AgentProblemAsymmetricInformationandIncentiveDesignintheIntegratedFirmTwoIssuesHowcancentralmanagementillicitaccurateinformationHowcancentralmanagementachieveefficientdivisionalproduction58ThePrincipal--AgentProblemPossibleIncentivePlansBonusbasedonoutputorprofitWillthisplanprovideanincentiveforaccurateinformation?59ThePrincipal--AgentProblemPossibleIncentivePlansBonusbasedonhowclosethemanagersgettotheirforecastsofoutputandprofitsQf=estimateoffeasibleproductionlevelB=bonusindollarsQ=actualoutputB=10,000-.5(Qf-Q)IncentivetounderestimateQf60ThePrincipal--AgentProblemPossibleIncentivePlansBonusstilltiedtoaccuracyofforecastIfQ>Qf

;B=.3Qf+.2(Q-Qf)IfQ<Qf;B=.3Qf-.5(Qf-Q)61IncentiveDesigninanIntegratedFirmOutput(unitsperyear)2,0004,0006,00010,000010,00020,00030,00040,000Bonus($peryear)8,000IfQf=30,000,bonusis$6,000,themaximumamountpossible.Qf=30,000Qf=10,000IfQf=10,000,bonusis$5,000Qf=20,000IfQf=20,000,bonusis$4,00062AsymmetricInformationinLaborMarkets:EfficiencyWageTheoryInacompetitivelabormarket,allwhowishtoworkwillfindjobsforawageequaltotheirmarginalproduct.However,mostcountries’economiesexperienceunemployment.63Theefficiencywagetheorycanexplainthepresenceofunemploymentandwagediscrimination.Indevelopingcountries,productivitydependsonthewageratefornutritionalreasons.AsymmetricInformationinLaborMarkets:EfficiencyWageTheory64Theshirkingmodelcanbebetterusedtoe