经济学国际经济学萨尔瓦多英文

IntroductionTariffs:historicallythemostimportantformoftraderestrictionothertradebarriers:importquotas,voluntaryexportrestraints,andantidumpingactionstheimportanceofnontarifftradebarrierswasgreatlyincreasedIntroductionSection2:examinestheeffectofanimportquotaandcomparesthemtothoseofanimporttariffSection3:othernontarifftradebarriers:voluntaryexportrestraintsandotherregulations,tradebarriersresultingfrominternationalcartel,dumping,andexportsubsidiesIntroductionSection4:argumentsforprotectionfromtheclearlyfallaciousonestothosethatseemstomakesomeeconomicsense.Section5:examinesstrategictradeandindustrialpoliciesSection7:theoutcomeoftheUruguayRound,thelaunchingoftheDohaRound,andtheoutstandingtradeproblemsoftoday(includingtheanti-globalizationmovement)ImportQuotas

themostimportantnontarifftradebarrieradirectquantitativerestrictionontheamountofacommodityallowedtobeimportedorexportedImportquotasvs.exportquotasEffectsofanImportQuota

Importquotas:protectadomesticindustry,protectdomesticagriculture,and/orforbalance-of-paymentsreasons.commoninWesternEuropeimmediatelyafterWorldWarIIusedbyallindustrialnationstoprotecttheiragricultureandbydevelopingnationstostimulateimportsubstitutionofmanufacturedproductsandforbalance-of-paymentsreasonsEffectsofanImportQuota

EffectsofanImportQuotafreetrade:worldpricePx=$1:consumes70X(AB),10X(AC)isproduceddomesticallyand60X(CB)isimportedAnimportquotaof30X(JH)raisedomesticpriceofXtoPx=$2:100%advaloremimporttariffReason:atPx=$2,animportquotaof30X(JH)P275vsP239EffectsofanImportQuotathegovernmentauctionedoffimportlicensestothehighestbidderinacompetitivemarkettherevenueeffect:$30($1oneachofthe30Xoftheimportquota,JHNM)theimportquotaof30Xineveryrespectto=“implicit”100%importtariffEffectsofanImportQuotaupwardshiftofDxtoD′ximportquotaof30X（J′H′）:increasethedomesticpriceofXtoPx=$2.5,domesticproductionrisingto25X(G′J′),anddomesticconsumptionrisingto55X(G′H′)100%importtariff:priceofXremainunchangedatPx=$2anddomesticproductionat20X(GJ),butdomesticconsumptionwouldriseto65X(GK)andimportsto45X(JK)PartialEquilibriumEffectsofanImportQuotaStartingfromthetradePx=$1,animportquotaof30X(JH)resultinPx=$2andconsumptionof50X(GH),ofwhich20X(GJ)isproduceddomesticallyIfthegovernmentauctionedoffimportlicensestothehighestbiggerinacompetitivemarket,therevenueeffect$30(JHNM),aswitha100%importtariffComparisonofanImportQuotatoanImportTariff

TheshiftofDxtoD′xpointstooneofseveralimportantdifferencesbetweenanimportquotaandanimporttariffWithagivenimportquota,anincreaseindemandwillresultinahigherdomesticpriceandgreaterdomesticproductionthanwithanequivalentimporttariff.ComparisonofanImportQuotatoanImportTariff

importtariff:demandincreaseleavesthedomesticpriceanddomesticproductionunchangedbuthigherconsumptionandimportsshiftinDxorSx:animportquota:changesinthedomesticpriceatariff:changesinthequantityofimportsanimportquotacompletelyreplacesthemarketmechanismthansimplyalteringitComparisonofanImportQuotatoanImportTariff2nddifference:quotainvolvesthedistributionofimportlicensesIfnotauctionoffthelicensesinacompetitivemarket,firmsthatreceivethemwillreapmonopolyprofitsgovernmentshoulddecidethebasisfordistributinglicenseschoicesmaybebasedonarbitraryofficialjudgmentsMayremainfrozenwhenchangesintherelativeefficiencyofactualandpotentialimportersComparisonofanImportQuotatoanImportTariffSinceimportlicensesresultinmonopolyprofits,potentialimportersarelikelytodevoteagreatdealofefforttolobbyingandevenbribinggovernmentofficialstoobtainthem(rent-seekingactivities)ImportquotasnotonlyreplacethemarketmechanismbutalsoresultinwasteoftheeconomyasawholeandcontaintheseedsofcorruptionComparisonofanImportQuotatoanImportTariffimportquota:importstothespecifiedlevelwithcertaintytradeeffectofanimporttariff:uncertaintheshapeorelasticityofDxorSxisoftennotknown,makingitdifficulttoestimatetheimporttariffrequiredtorestrictimportstoadesiredlevel.ForeignexportersmayabsorballorpartofthetariffbyincreasingtheirefficiencyofoperationorbyacceptinglowerprofitstheactualreductioninimportsmaybelessthananticipatedComparisonofanImportQuotatoanImportTariffimportquota:thequantityofimportsisclearlyspecifiedimportquota:less“visible,”domesticproducersstronglypreferimportquotatoimporttariffsimportquotas:morerestrictivethanimporttariffs,societyshouldgenerallyresisttheseefforts.UruguayRound:changeimportquotasandothernontariffbarriersintoequivalenttariffs(“tariffication”)OtherNontariffBarriersandtheNewProtectionism

voluntaryexportrestraintstechnical,administrative,andotherregulationsResultsof:internationalcartels,dumpingandexportsubsidiesthesenontarifftradebarriers(NTBS),orthenewprotectionism,havebecomemoreimportantthantariffsVoluntaryExportRestraintsVERs:importingcountryinducesanothernationtoreduceitsexportsofacommodity“voluntarily,”underthethreatofhigherall-roundtraderestrictionsnegotiatedsincethe1950sbytheUS,theEU,andotherindustrialnationstocurtailexportsoftextiles,steel,electronicproducts,automobiles,andotherproductsfromJapan,Korea,andothernationsmatureindustriesfacingsharpdeclinesinemploymentintheindustrialcountriesVoluntaryExportRestraintsSometimescalled“orderlymarketingarrangements”USandotherindustrialnationsmakeuseofthemtosaveatleasttheappearanceofcontinuedsupportfortheprincipleoffreetradeTheUruguayRound:phasingoutofallVERsbytheendof1999andprohibitionontheimpositionofnewVERsVoluntaryExportRestraintsWhenvoluntaryexportrestraintsaresuccessful,theyhavealltheeconomiceffectsof(analyzedinthesamewayas)equivalentimportquota,exceptthattheyareadministeredbytheexportingcountry,andsotherevenueeffectorrentsarecapturedbyforeignexportersVoluntaryExportRestraintsUSnegotiatedVERswithmajorsteelsuppliersin1982thatlimitedimportstoabout20%oftheU.S.steelmarketSavingabout20,000jobsRaisingsteelpriceby20%to30%.TheseVERSexpiredin1992butwereimmediatelyreplacedbyindustrydemandsforantidumpingdutiesagainstforeignsteelexportersResultinginbitterdisputesbetweentheUS,Japan,theEU,andothernationsVoluntaryExportRestraintsVERslesseffectivethanimportquota:exportingnationswerereluctanttocurbtheirexportsForeignexportersfilltheirquotawithhigher-qualityandhigher-pricedunitsoftheproductovertime:productupgradingevidentinJapanesevoluntaryrestraintonautomobileexporttoUSOnlymajorsuppliercountrieswereinvolved:othernationsreplacepartoftheexportsofthemajorsuppliersandtransshipmentsthroughthirdcountriesTechnical,Administrative,andOtherRegulationstechnical,administrative,andotherregulationssafetyregulationsforautomobileandelectricalequipment,healthregulationsforthehygienicproductionandpackagingofimportedfoodproducts,andlabelingrequirementsshowingoriginandcontents.manyservelegitimatepurposes,someareonlythinlyveileddisguisesforrestrictingimportsTechnical,Administrative,andOtherRegulationslawsrequiringgovernmentstobuyfromdomesticsuppliers(governmentprocurementpolicies)theBuyAmericanActof1933:U.S.governmentagenciesgaveapriceadvantageofupto12%(50%fordefensecontracts)todomesticsuppliersTechnical,Administrative,andOtherRegulationsTokyoRound:theUSandothernationsagreedtobringthesepracticesandregulationsintotheopenandgiveforeignsuppliersafairchanceControversiesremain,especiallybetweentheUnitedStatesandJapanTechnical,Administrative,andOtherRegulationsbordertaxes:rebatesforinternalindirecttaxesgiventoexportersandimposed(inadditiontotariff)onimportersmostgovernmentrevenuesareraisedthroughdirecttaxes(incometaxes)intheUSandindirecttaxes(thevalue-addedtax)inEuropeUSexportersreceivemuchlowerrebatesthanEuropeanexportersInternationalcommodityagreementandmultipleexchangeratesalsorestricttradeInternationalCartels

internationalcartel:anorganizationofsuppliersofacommoditylocatedindifferentnations(oragroupofgovernments)thatagreestorestrictoutputandexportsofthecommoditywiththeaimofmaximizingorincreasingthetotalprofitsoforganizationDomesticcartelsareillegalintheUSandrestrictedinEuropepowerofinternationalcartelscannoteasilybecounteredbecausetheydonotfallunderthejurisdictionofanyonenationInternationalCartelsOPEC(OrganizationofPetroleumExportingCountries):byrestrictingproductionandexports,succeededinquadruplingthepriceofcrudeoilbetween1973and1974theInternationalAirTransportAssociation(acartelofmajorinternationalairlines):meetsannuallytosetinternationalairfaresandpolicesInternationalCartelsmanyvsafewinternationalsupplierssubstitutesavailablevsnosubstituteWhichinternationalcartelsmorelikelytosucceed?HowaboutOPEC?thefailureofinternationalcartels:inmineralsotherthanpetroleumandtin,andagriculturalproductsotherthansugar,coffee,andrubberInternationalCartelsincentiveforsomesuppliertoremainoutsidethecartelorto“cheat”byunrestrictedsalesatbelowthecartelpriceOPECduringthe1980s:highpetroleumpricesincreasedpetroleumexploration+productionbynonmembers(UK,Norway,andMexico)+conservationmeasures:lowerpetroleumpricesinthe1980sandmostofthe1990scartelsareinherentlyunstableandoftencollapseorfailIfsuccessful,acartelcouldbehaveexactlyasamonopolist(acentralizedcartel)inmaximizingitstotalprofitsDumpingDumping:exportofacommodityatbelowcostoratalowerpriceabroadthandomestically.persistent,predatory,andsporadicPersistentdumping(internationalpricediscrimination):continuoustendencyofadomesticmonopolisttomaximizetotalprofitsbysellingthecommodityatahigherpriceinthedomesticmarketthaninternationallyDumping

Predatorydumping:temporarysaleofacommodityatbelowcostoratalowerpriceabroadinordertodriveforeignproducersoutofbusiness,afterwhichpricesareraisedtotakeadvantageofthenewlyacquiredmonopolypowerabroadSporadicdumping:occasionalsaleofacommodityatbelowcostoratalowerpriceabroadthandomesticallyinordertounloadanunforeseenandtemporarysurplusofthecommoditywithouthavingtoreducedomesticpricesDumpingMeasurestocounteractpredatorydumping:justifiedantidumpingdutiesorthethreattoimposesuchdutiesdifficulttodeterminethetypeofdumpingdomesticproducersdemandprotectionagainstdumpingtoincreaseprofitpersistentandsporadicdumping:thebenefittoconsumersfromlowpricesmayexceedthepossibleproductionlossesofdomesticproducersDumpingOverthepastthreedecades,JapanwasaccusedofdumpingsteelandtelevisionsetsintheUS,andEuropeannationsofdumpingcars,steel,andotherproducts.ManyindustrialnationsespeciallythosethatbelongtotheEU,haveatendencytopersistentlydumpagriculturalcommoditiesarisingfromtheirfarmsupportprogramsDumpingWhendumpingisproved,theviolatingnationorfirmusuallychoosestoraiseitspricesratherthanfaceantidumpingduties.In1980s,onlyeightcountrieshadantidumpinglaws;bytheendof2001,97countries(countingtheEUasasinglemember)hadthem(includingmanydevelopingcountries)DumpingIn1978trigger-pricemechanisminUS:foreignsteelproducerswhosoldsteelinUSatpricesbelowthelowest-costwassubjecttoaspeedyantidumpinginvestigationSince1992,whenVERsonsteelexportstotheUSexpired,U.S.steelproducershavefiledhundredsofantidumpingsuitsagainstforeignsteelproducersExportSubsidies

Exportsubsidies:directpaymentsorthegrantingoftaxreliefandsubsidizedloanstothenation’sexportersand/orlow-interestloanstoforeignbuyerssoastostimulatethenation’sexportsberegardedasaformofdumpingillegalbyinternationalagreementbutmanynationsprovidethemindisguisedandnot-so-disguisedformsExportSubsidiesAllmajorindustrialnationsgiveforeignbuyersofthenation’sexportslow-interestloanstofinancethepurchasethroughagenciesliketheU.S.Export-ImportBankLow-interestcreditsfinanceabout2%ofU.S.exportsExportSubsidiesMostserioustradecomplaintsthattheUShasagainstotherindustrialcountriestodayTheamountofsubsidycanbemeasuredbythedifferencebetweentheinterestthatwouldhavebeenpaidonacommercialloanandwhatisinfactpaidatthesubsidizedrateIn1996,theUSprovidedabout$1billioninsuchsubsidiesandJapan,France,andGermanytwotothreetimesthatamountExportSubsidiesveryhighsupportpricesprovidedbyEUtomaintainitsfarmers’incomeunderitscommonagriculturalpolicy(CAP)hugeagriculturalsurplusesandsubsidizedexports,takingexportmarketsawayfromothercountries,andthesharpesttradecontroversiesbetweentheUSandtheEUCountervailingduties(CVDs)areimposedonimportstooffsetexportsubsidiesbyforeigngovernmentsPartialEquilibriumEffectofanExportSubsidy

PartialEquilibriumEffectofanExportSubsidyfreetradeprice:Px=$3.50smallNation2:produces35X(A′C′),consumes20X(A′B′),andexports15X(B′C′)Withasubsidyof$0.50oneachXexported,Pxrisesto$4.00fordomesticproducersandconsumersAtPx=$4,Nation2produces40X(G′J′),consumes10X(G′H′),andexports30X(H′J′)PartialEquilibriumEffectofanExportSubsidyDomesticconsumerslose$7.50(areaa′+b′),domesticproducersgain$18.75(areaa′+b′+c′)governmentsubsidy:$15(b′+c′+d′)Protectioncost(deadweightloss):$3.75(thesumoftrianglesB′H′N′)=b′=$2.50andC′J′M′=d′=$1.25).ThePoliticalEconomyofProtectionism

analyzethevariousargumentsforprotectionclearlyfallaciouspropositionsargumentsthatcanstandup,withsomequalificationcloseeconomicscrutinyFallaciousandQuestionableArgumentsforProtection

fallacious:protectdomesticlaboragainstcheapforeignlaborevendomesticwagesarehigherthanwagesabroad,domesticlaborcanstillbeloweriftheproductivityoflaborissufficientlyhigherdomesticallythanabroadEvenifnotthecase,mutuallybeneficialtradecouldstillbebasedoncomparativeadvantage,theexpensive-labornationspecializingintheproductionofandexportingcapital-intensivecommoditiesFallaciousandQuestionableArgumentsforProtection

Fallacious:thescientifictariffthetariffratethatmakethepriceofimportsequaltodomesticpricesandallowdomesticproducerstomeetforeigncompetitioneliminateinternationalpricedifferencesandtradeinallcommoditiesFallaciousandQuestionableArgumentsforProtectionQuestionable:(1)toreducedomesticunemployment(2)tocureadeficitinthenation’sbalanceofpaymentsleadingtothesubstitutionofimportswithdomesticproductioncomeattheexpenseofothernationsFallaciousandQuestionableArgumentsforProtectioncausesgreaterunemploymentandworsenedbalanceofpaymentsabroadOthernationsarelikelytoretaliate,andallnationsloseintheendDomesticunemploymentanddeficitsinthenation’sbalanceofpaymentsshouldbecorrectedwithappropriatemonetary,fiscal,andtradepoliciesratherthanwithtraderestrictionsQualifiedArgumentsforProtection

Infant-industryargumentanationmayhaveapotentialcomparativeadvantageinacommodity,butbecauseoflackofknow-howandtheinitialsmalllevelofoutput,theindustrycannotcompetewithmoreestablishedforeignfirmsTheInfant-IndustryTemporarytradeprotectiontoprotectthedomesticindustryduringits“infancy”untilitcanmeetforeigncompetition,achieveeconomiesofscale,andreflectthenation’slong-runcomparativeadvantageprotectionisthenremovedthereturninthegrown-upindustrymustbesufficientlyhightooffsetthehigherpricepaidbydomesticconsumersInfant-industryArgumentrequiressomequalifications1st:morejustifiedfordevelopingnations(wherecapitalmarketsmaynotfunctionproperly)thanforindustrialnations2nd:difficulttoidentifytheindustriesforprotection;protection,oncegiven,difficulttoremove3rd:productionsubsidycandobetterInfant-industryArgumentpurelydomesticdistortionshouldbeovercomewithapurelydomesticpolicy(directproductionsubsidy)ratherthanwithatradepolicydirectproductionsubsidy:moredirectaid,easiertoremoveButsubsidyrequiresrevenues,ratherthangeneratingthemasanimporttariffdoesTheInfant-IndustryAbetterpolicywouldbetoprovideadirectsubsidytoindustrystimulatetheindustrywithouttheconsumptiondistortionandlosstodomesticconsumersOtherQualifiedArgumentsforProtectionprotectdomesticindustriesimportantfornationaldefense.directproductionsubsidiesaregenerallybetterthantariffSometariffscanberegardedas“bargainingtariffs”thataretobeusedtoinduceothernationstoagreetoamutualreductionintariffspoliticalscientistsmorequalifiedtojudgehoweffectivetheyareinachievingtheirintendedpurposeOtherQualifiedArgumentsforProtectionclosesttoatrulyvalideconomicargument:theoptimumtariff

ifanationislargeenoughtoaffectitstermsoftrade,thenationcanexploititsmarketpowerandimproveitstermsoftradeandwelfarewithanoptimumtariffothernationsarelikelytoretaliatesothatintheendallnationsloseWhoGetsProtected?

Producersvs.consumers?WhoGetsProtected?

increasingcommodityprice:tradeprotectionbenefitsproducersandharmsconsumers(thenationasawhole)Producers:few,strongincentivetolobbythegovernmentConsumers:eachlosesverylittle,notlikelytoeffectivelyorganizeWhoGetsProtected?

Quotaraisesexpendituresonsugarbyabout$1.50perpersonperyearintheUS285millionpeopleintheUS,thequotageneratesmorethan$400millionAfewthousandsugarproducersWhoGetsProtected?empiricallyconfirmedindustrialcountries:protectiontolabor-intensiveindustriesemployingunskilled,low-wageworkerspressure-group(interest-group)theory:industriesthatarehighlyorganized(automobileindustry)receivemoretradeprotectionthanlessorganizedindustriesAnindustryismorelikelytobeorganizedifitiscomposedofonlyafewfirmsWhoGetsProtected?industriesproducingconsumerproductsvs.industriesproducingintermediateproducts?WhoGetsProtected?industriesthatproduceconsumerproductsareabletoobtainmoreprotectionindustriesproducingintermediateproductsusedasinputsbyotherindustriescanblockprotection(sincethatwouldincreasethepriceoftheirinputs)WhoGetsProtected?geographicallydecentralizedindustriesvs.industriesthatoperateinonlysomeregions?WhoGetsProtected?MoreprotectiontogeographicallydecentralizedindustrieswithalargenumberofworkersthantoindustriesthatoperateinonlysomeregionswithrelativelyfewworkersLargenumberofworkershasstrongvotingpowertoelectgovernmentofficialswhosupportprotectionfortheindustryDecentralizationensuresthatelectedofficialsfrommanyregionssupportthetradeprotectionWhoGetsProtected?maintainingthestatusquo:anindustrytobeprotectednowifitwasprotectedinthepastGovernmentsreluctanttoadopttradepoliciesthatresultinlargechanges,regardlessofthoseindustriesthatcompetewithproductsfromdevelopingcountriesbecausethesecountrieshavelesseconomicandpoliticalpowerthanindustrialcountriestosuccessfullyresisttraderestrictionsagainsttheirexportsWhoGetsProtected?Someoftheabovetheoriesareoverlappingandsomeareconflicting,andtheyhavebeenonlypartiallyconfirmedempiricallyThemosthighlyprotectedindustryintheUStodayisthetextilesandapparelindustryStrategicTradeandIndustrialPoliciesAnationcancreateacomparativeadvantageinsemiconductors,computers,andtelecommunicationscrucialtofuturegrowthinthenationThesehigh-technologyindustriesaresubjecttohighrisks,requirelarge-scaleproductiontoachieveeconomiesofscale,andgiverisetoextensiveexternaleconomieswhensuccessfulStrategicTradeandIndustrialPoliciesbyencouragingsuchindustries,thenationcanreapthelargeexternaleconomiesandenhanceitsfuturegrowthprospectssimilartotheinfant-industryargumentindevelopingnations,exceptthatitisadvancedforindustriesnationstoacquireacomparativeadvantageincrucialhigh-technologyindustriesagreatdealofthepostwarindustrialandtechnologicalsuccessofJapanwasduetoitsstrategicindustrialandtradepoliciesStrategicTradeandIndustrialPoliciestheseriousdifficultiesincarryingitout1st:extremelydifficulttopickwinnersanddeviseappropriatepoliciestosuccessfullynurturethem2nd:sincemostleadingnationsundertakestrategictradepoliciesatthesametime,theireffortsarelargelyneutralized,sothatthepotentialbenefittoeachmaybesmallStrategicTradeandIndustrialPolicies3rd,whenacountrydoesachievesubstantialsuccesswithstrategictradepolicy,thiscomesattheexpenseofothercountriesandsoothercountriesarelikelytoretaliateFacewithallthesepracticaldifficulties,evensupportersofstrategictradepolicygrudginglyacknowledgesthatfreetradeisstillthebestpolicyfreetrademaybesuboptimalintheory,butitisoptimalinpracticeStrategicTradeandIndustrialPolicieswithGameTheory

Two-FirmCompetitionandStrategicTradePolicy

Airbus

ProduceDon’tProduce

Produce

-10,-10100,0Boeing

Don’tproduce 0,100 0,0StrategicTradeandIndustrialPolicieswithGameTheoryThisanalysiswasfirstintroducedintointernationaltradebyJamesBranderandBarbaraSpencer(1985).Oneseriousshortcoming:itisusuallyverydifficulttoaccuratelyforecasttheoutcomeofgovernmentindustrialandtradepolicies.extremelydifficulttocorrectlycarryoutthistypeofanalysisTheUruguayRoundandOutstandingTradeProblems

InDec.1993,theUruguayRoundofmultilateraltradenegotiationswascompleted,butmanytradeproblemsremainfirstreviewtheprovisionsoftheUruguayRoundandthenoutstandingtradeproblemsfacingtheworldtodayTheUruguayRound

Dec.1993,theUruguayRound,the8thandmostambitiousround:123countriesparticipated,completedaftersevenyearsofnegotiations.startedinSep.1986andscheduledtobecompletedbyDec.1990signedbytheUSandmostothercountriesonApril15,1994,andtookeffectonJuly1,1995.Aimestablishrulesforcheckingthenewprotectionismandreverseitstrendbringservices,agriculture,andforeigninvestmentsintothenegotiationsnegotiateinternationalrulesfortheprotectionofintellectualpropertyrightscompliancewithGATTrulingsTheUruguayRound1.Tariffs.Tariffsonindustrialproductsreducedfromanaverageof4.7%to3%andtheshareofgoodswithzerotariffsincreasefrom20-22%to40-45%;tariffswereremovedaltogetheronpharmaceuticals,constructionequipment,medicalequipment,paperproducts,andsteelTheUruguayRound2.Quotas.replacequotasonagriculturalimportsandimportsoftextilesandapparel(undertheMulti-fiberAgreement)withlessrestrictivetariffsbytheendof1999foragriculturalandbytheendof2004fortextilesandappareltariffsonagriculturalproductsaretobereducedby24%indevelopingnationsandby36%inindustrialnations,andtariffsontextilesaretobecutby25%.TheUruguayRound3.Antidumping.tougherandquickeractiontoresolvedisputesresultingfromtheuseofantidumpinglaws,butdoesnotbantheiruse.4.Subsidies.Thevolumeofsubsidizedagriculturalexportsistobereducedby21%overa6-yearperiod;governmentsubsidiesforindustrialresearcharelimitedto50%ofappliedcosts

TheUruguayRound5.Safeguards.Nationsmaytemporarilyraisetariffsorotherrestrictionsagainstanimportsurgethatseverelyharmsadomesticindustry,butitbarscountriesfromadministeringhealthandsafetystandardsunlessbasedonscientificevidenceandnotsimplytorestricttradeAnationcanonlykeepoutbeefimportsfromcattleraisedwithgrowthhormonesbyshowingthatthebeefsoproducedisunsafeforhumanconsumptionTheUruguayRound6.Intellectualproperty:providesfor20-yearprotectionofpatents,trademarks,andcopyrights,butitallowsa10-yearphase-inperiodforpatentprotectioninpharmaceuticalsfordevelopingcountriesTheUruguayRound7.Services.TheUnitedStatesfailedtosecureaccesstothemarketsofJapan,Korea,andmanydevelopingnationsforitsbanksandsecurityfirms,anddidnotsucceedinhavingFranceandtheEuropeanUnionliftrestrictionsontheshowingofAmericanfilmsandTVprogramsinEuropeTheUruguayRound8.Otherindustryprovisions:USandEuropeagreedtocontinuetalkingaboutfurtherlimitinggovernmentsubsidiestocivilaircraftmakers,openingupthedistancetelephonemarket,andlimitingEuropeansubsidiestosteelmakers;USalsoindicatedthatitintendedtocontinuenegotiatingthefurtheropeningoftheJapanesecomputerchipmarket.TheUruguayRound9.Trade-relatedinvestmentmeasures:phasesouttherequirementthatforeigninvestorsbuysupplieslocallyorexportasmuchastheyimportTheUruguayRound10.WorldTradeOrganization.replacementoftheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(GATT)withauthoritynoto